Verbal and nonverbal behaviour as a basis for credibility attribution: The impact of task involvement and cognitive capacity

Three experiments were able to demonstrate the usefulness of dual-process models for the understanding of the process of credibility attribution. According to the assumptions of dual-process models, only high task involvement and high cognitive capacity leads to intensive processing of verbal and nonverbal information when making credibility judgments. Under low task involvement and/or low cognitive capacity, people predominantly use nonverbal information for their credibility attribution. In Experiment 1, participants under low or high task involvement saw a film in which the nonverbal behaviour (fidgety vs. calm) and the verbal information (low versus high credibility) of a source were manipulated. As predicted, when task involvement was low, only the nonverbal behaviour influenced participants’ credibility attribution. Participants with high task involvement also used the verbal information. In Experiment 2 and 3, the cognitive capacity of the participants was manipulated. Participants with high cognitive capacity, in contrast to those of low cognitive capacity, used the verbal information for their credibility attribution.     

Need for Cognition and Affective Orientation as Predictors of Sales Performance: An Investigation of Main and Interaction Effects

Two constructs—need for cognition (NFC) and affective orientation (AO)—might be helpful in explaining and ultimately predicting two measures of sales performance: a self-rated behavioral measure and an objective sales measure. Specifically, we hypothesize (1) a positive relationship between NFC and sales performance; (2) a positive relationship between AO and sales performance; and (3) a positive interaction effect between NFC and AO on sales performance. The results of this study revealed both NFC and AO correlated with self-rated behavioral performance but only NFC correlated with both performance measures; suggesting that need for cognition may be the more influential of the two for sales organizations concerned with selling behaviors as well as sales outcomes. The hypothesized interaction effect was not supported.     

Need for Cognition and false recall

Two experiments investigated whether Need for Cognition (NFC) affected false recall in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In the first experiment, participants were presented with DRM lists and given one attempt to recall the items. In the second experiment, participants were presented with DRM lists under full or divided attention and were given three consecutive recall tests. In Experiment 2, high-NFC individuals exhibited increased false recall across successive recall attempts in both the full and divided attention conditions whereas low-NFC individuals did not. Furthermore, high-NFC individuals in the full attention condition exhibited increased levels of true recall across successive tests. These results show that the individual differences in the ways in which individuals process information can affect true and false recall in the DRM task.     

Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.     

The Effects of Need for Cognition and Need for Affect on Partisan Evaluations

The voting behavior literature has advanced two prominent theoretical models of partisanship: the social psychological and rational models. Implicit to both stylized models is the assumption that all partisans process information similarly. Yet, growing research in psychology suggests that individuals possess different motivations when evaluating information. We propose that the applicability of the stylized models of partisanship is conditioned on individuals' need for cognition (NFC) and need for affect (NFA), with the social psychological model being most applicable to individuals who have a high NFA and the rational model most applicable to those with a high NFC. To test this proposition, we fielded a survey in which respondents who identified with the two major political parties in the United States (Democrat or Republican) were randomly assigned factual information that depicted either their party or their opposing party in a negative light. Respondents were then asked to assess the actions of that party and subsequently evaluate both political parties. We find evidence that is generally consistent with the proposition that the stylized models of partisanship are conditionally dependent on the extent to which individuals possess a need to engage in effortful thinking or a need to seek out emotions.     

On being happy and gullible: Mood effects on skepticism and the detection of deception

Are we more likely to believe or disbelieve another person depending on our mood state? Based on past research on interpersonal communication and recent work on affect and social cognition, we predicted and found that negative mood increased and positive mood decreased people’s skepticism and their ability to detect deception, consistent with the more externally focused, accommodative processing style promoted by negative affect. After a mood induction using positive, neutral or negative films, participants viewed deceptive or truthful interviews with individuals who denied committing a theft. Judgments of the targets’ guilt and their truthfulness were collected. As predicted, negative mood increased judges’ skepticism towards the targets, and improved their accuracy in detecting deceptive communications, while judges in a positive mood were more trusting and gullible. The relevance of these findings for everyday judgments of trust and the detection of deception are considered, and their implications for recent affect-cognition theories are discussed.     

认知需要与战略决策过程之间的关系

认知需要指人们在信息加工过程中是否愿意投入周密的心考以及能否从深入的思考中获得享受．它反映的是人的认知动机。由于企业管理者在决策过程中涉及诸多处理信息和思考问题的环节,认知需要必然在这一过程中起作用。本研究运用情境案例法探讨了在不确定环境下决策者的认知需要与其在战略决策过程中分析环境和判断战略导向的关系。通过相关分析发现高认知需要者在决策过程中更倾向于关注环境、对环境做出积极判断、强调从长远和全面的角度去分析企业战略。     

Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures

We propose that individual differences in the motivation to avoid emotions are related to political conservatism. We argue that because conservatism is concerned with managing uncertainty and emphasizes ego-control, conservative ideologies match with the motivational concerns of those individuals who find emotions to be uncertainty-enhancing and dysfunctional. In a group of 267 participants, positive associations were found between emotion avoidance and right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and support for conservative policies. Negative associations were found between emotion approach and conservatism measures.     

Competing roles for the subfactors of need for closure in committing the fundamental attribution error

Webster’s (1993) finding that the need for closure (NFC) trait predicts the fundamental attribution error (FAE) is well-cited but has mixed support. After detailing failed replications and contradictory findings, this article reports an attempt to verify the positive NFC–FAE relation using the questioner–contestant paradigm. Rarely investigated but potentially vital to the field, this research also considered the two orthogonal subfactors of NFC, decisiveness and need for structure (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997). Results showed that need for structure predicted, overall NFC partially predicted, but decisiveness attenuated the FAE. Thus, Webster’s finding was both replicated and reversed by different aspects of NFC. Decisiveness adds to a short list of trait moderators of the FAE. Implications are discussed for how to measure NFC.     

从认知逻辑视角看西方伦理学的发展

本文希望从认知伦理学的视角出发探讨伦理学的发展,以及人类对道德问题认知的过程与人类一般认知的逻辑之间的一致性。人类认知的逻辑是由概念到判断再到推论的过程,伦理学史由德性伦理学到规范伦理学再到话语伦理学、元伦理学和新德性伦理学的过程,实际上就是人类在道德认知上从概念伦理学到判断伦理学再到推论伦理学最后回归到概念伦理学的过程。     

Detecting true and false opinions: The Devil's Advocate approach as a lie detection aid

We examined the efficacy of a new approach to detect truths and lies in expressing opinions: the Devil's Advocate approach. Interviewees are first asked an opinion eliciting question that asks participants to argue in favour of their personal view. This is followed by a Devil's Advocate question that asks participants to argue against their personal view. People normally think more about reasons that support rather than oppose their opinion. Therefore we expected truth tellers to provide more information and shorter latency times in their responses to the opinion eliciting question than to the Devil's Advocate question. Liars are expected to reveal the opposite pattern as the Devil's Advocate question is more compatible with their beliefs than is the opinion eliciting question. In Experiment 1, we interviewed seventeen truth tellers and liars via the Devil's Advocate approach and measured the difference in number of words and latency times to the two questions. Our hypotheses were supported. In Experiment 2, 25 observers were shown these interviews, and made qualitative judgements about the statements. Truth tellers' opinion eliciting answers were seen as more immediate and plausible and revealed more emotional involvement than their Devil's Advocate answers. No clear differences emerged in liars' answers to the two types of question. We conclude that the Devil's Advocate approach is a promising lie detection approach that deserves attention in future research.     

Religiosity, Religious Doubt, and the Need for Cognition: Their Interactive Relationship with Life Satisfaction

Previous research has found a consistent, negative relationship between holding religious doubts and mental well-being, and a small positive relationship between religiosity and mental well-being. To assess the interrelationship between religious doubt, religiosity, and need for cognition on life satisfaction, a survey was administered to an almost exclusively Christian sample of 192 Americans drawn from undergraduates and alumni of a small mid-western college, undergraduates from a small south-eastern college, and several churches from the metro-Detroit area. Zero-order correlations revealed relationships between religiosity and life satisfaction, as well as religious doubt and life satisfaction. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that the three-way interaction of religiosity, religious doubt, and the need for cognition was predictive of life satisfaction. Significant two-way interactions also emerged for both gender and religiosity, and gender and religious doubt as predictors of life satisfaction. Based upon these findings, counseling applications are discussed, and the importance of probing for interactions in research on religious influences on well-being is espoused. Portions of this research were presented at the 2004 Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Honolulu, HI.     

Individual differences in need for cognition and decision-making competence among leaders

When making decisions, people sometimes deviate from normative standards. While such deviations may appear to be alarmingly common, examining individual differences may reveal a more nuanced picture. Specifically, the personality factor of need for cognition (i.e., the extent to which people engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) may moderate decision makers’ susceptibility to bias, as could personality factors associated with being a leader. As part of a large-scale assessment of high-level leaders, participants completed a battery of decision-making competence and personality scales. Leaders who scored higher on need for cognition performed better on two of four components of a decision-making competence measure: framing and honoring sunk costs. In addition, the leader sample performed better than published controls. Thus, both individual differences in need for cognition and leadership experience moderate susceptibility to decision biases. Implications for broader theories of individual differences and bias are discussed.     

It takes one to know one: Relationship between lie detection and psychopathy

We investigated primary and secondary psychopathy and the ability to detect high-stakes, real-life emotional lies in an on-line experiment (N = 150). Using signal detection analysis, we found that lie detection ability was overall above chance level, there was a tendency towards responding liberally to the test stimuli, and women were more accurate than men. Further, sex moderated the relationship between psychopathy and lie detection ability; in men, primary psychopathy had a significant positive correlation with the ability to detect lies, whereas in women there was a significant negative correlation with deception detection. The results are discussed with reference to evolutionary theory and sex differences in processing socio-emotional information.     

Relationships Between Need for Cognition,Knowledge, and Verbal Ability

The authors investigated the relationships between need for cognition. knowledge, and verbal ability. Participants completed scales that measured their need for cognition, verbal ability, and knowledge about people and events that occurred during the Vietnam War era. Correlational analyses showed that the participants' need for cognition scores were modestly but positively correlated with verbal ability and knowledge and that verbal ability and knowledge were also positively correlated. The correlation between need for cognition and knowledge was small but significant when verbal ability was controlled. The conclusion drawn from these results is that need for cognition contributes to the acquisition of knowledge beyond the contribution of verbal ability.     

Need for Cognition and Cognitive Performance From a Cross-Cultural Perspective: Examples of Academic Success and Solving Anagrams

The cross-cultural validity of the Need for Cognition Scale and its relationship with cognitive performance were investigated in two studies. In the first study, the relationships between the scale and university entrance scores, course grades, study skills, and social desirability were examined. Using the short form of the Turkish version of the Need for Cognition Scale (S. Gülgöz & C. J. Sadowski, 1995) no correlation with academic performance was found but there was significant correlation with a study skills scale and a social desirability scale created for this study. When regression analysis was used to predict grade point average, the Need for Cognition Scale was a significant predictor. In the second study, participants low or high in need for cognition solved multiple-solution anagrams. The instructions preceding the task set the participants' expectations regarding task difficulty. An interaction between expectation and need for cognition indicated that participants with low need for cognition performed worse when they expected difficult problems. Results of the two studies showed that need for cognition has cross-cultural validity and that its effect on cognitive performance was mediated by other variables.     

On luck and chance: Need for control as a mediator of the attribution of events to luck

Chance and luck are regarded as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. Whereas chance is deemed utterly uncontrollable, luck elicits, at the very least, an illusion of control. Hence, need for control might be a decisive factor in determining whether an event is attributed to chance or to luck. More specifically, the greater is a person's need for control, the stronger would be that person's tendency to attribute events to luck. This proposition, along with its implications concerning effects of luck attributions on decision making, were tested in three experiments. The results showed that situational circumstances and personality dispositions that heighten individuals' need for control strengthen their tendency to attribute events and outcomes to luck. The results showed, further, that such attributions can affect the process of decision making.     

Shaping reality vs. hiding from reality: Reconsidering the effects of trait need for closure on information search

For tentative and final decisions on real and artificial issues, three studies revealed a positive relation between trait need for closure and selective approach to supportive (vs. unsupportive) information. Specifically, individuals with high (vs. low) trait need for closure selected more decision-supportive information and less decision-challenging information for viewing. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that the effect of trait need for closure functioned independently of authoritarianism and dogmatism, and Study 3 showed that the effect of trait need for closure on selective approach to decision-supportive information was mediated by a current concern to get closure on the experimental issue. These findings provide a new understanding of how trait need for closure shapes post-decisional information search and decision making.     

The association between implicit theories of personality and the attributional process

The influence of implicit theories of personality (entity vs. incremental theorists; see Dweck, Chiu and Hong, 1995) on the stages of the Sequential Operations Model of attribution (Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988) was investigated. Two hundred eighty Norwegian participants were given a Norwegian translation of the implicit personality theories measure. Participants then read two essays, one advocating the pro-life position and the other advocating the pro-choice position on the abortion issue. The essay positions were ostensibly assigned rather than freely chosen by the author. After each essay, participants were asked to rate the essay position and the true attitude of the author. Entity and incremental theorists showed no differences in their ratings of the essay position; however, entity theorists made significantly stronger correspondent inferences about the author's attitude than did incremental theorists. These results support the contention that entity theorists engage in less attributional correction than incremental theorists.     

Individual differences in need for cognition and decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task

Differences in decision making between individuals differing in Need for Cognition (NFC) are examined using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Previous work using normative one time decisions suggests that individual low in NFC process gains and losses differently than those high in NFC and are more susceptible to decision biases. The IGT is a popular laboratory task that involves making risky decisions from experience involving both gains and losses. In the first experiment, low NFC participants performed significantly worse than the high NFC participants. A second experiment designed to examine the nature of these differences provides evidence that low NFC participants place more importance on gains as opposed to losses when performing the IGT. Results are discussed in light of previous work suggesting that low NFC participants place more importance on losses in mixed outcome decisions.