Expanding transformative experience

We develop a broader, more fine‐grained taxonomy of forms of transformative experience, inspired by the work of L. A. Paul. Our vulnerability to such experiences arises, we argue, due to the vulnerability, dependence, and affliction intrinsic to the human condition. We use this trio to distinguish a variety of positively, negatively, and ambivalently valenced forms of epistemically and/or personally transformative experiences. Moreover, we argue that many transformative experiences can arise gradually and cumulatively, unfolding over the course of longer periods of time.     

Next steps in the abortion debate: It is time to consider some overlooked and new data

As the abortion debate moves into its next stage since The Supreme Court struck down the Roe v. Wade decision, little has changed, except for the dire circumstances in which many pregnant women find themselves. Both sides in the debate continue talking past each other in nasty ways, using the same tired, old arguments. We need more and fresh data really to advance the discussion. This article provides fresh historical, neurobiological, and theological data for the debate. From history we learn that the debate on abortion has not always been about feminism versus conservatives (though the Pro-Life side has been associated with white nationalism) and that Protestants have not always been divided on the issue. Theologically the author directs us to his previous research indicating that disagreements today among the denominations on the issue have not been theologically related. This has important implications for rendering the debate more civil, since it is not about faith and Biblical fidelity. From Neurobiology, we receive fresh insights about when in the course of a pregnancy the fetus/embryo actually begins to function with a human-like brain, when it is truly a homo sapiens. In addition to offering reflections on the implications of these insights for the abortion debate, we are reminded that the inputs of history and science are most appropriate inputs for Lutherans committed to using the Two-Kingdom Ethic in social ethics and politics.     

The problems of transformative experience

Philosophical Studies - Laurie Paul has recently argued that transformative experiences pose a problem for decision theory. According to Paul, agents facing transformative experiences do not...     

Analogical Reasoning in Ethics

In this article I am concerned with analogical reasoning in ethics. There is no doubt that the use of analogy can be a powerful tool in our ethical reasoning. The importance of this mode of reasoning is therefore commonly accepted, but there is considerable debate concerning how its structure should be understood and how it should be assessed, both logically and epistemically. In this paper, I first explain the basic structure of arguments from analogy in ethics. I then discuss the diversity of analogical arguments that can be found in ethics. I analyse their structure, assess them from a logical viewpoint, and show how they can be epistemically challenged and defended. The result of this investigation is that, contrary to a commonly held view, analogical reasoning can be a logically valid type of ethical reasoning that can provide reasons for action that are not worse than the reasons provided by any other kind of practical reasoning.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

Epistemic supererogation and its implications

Supererogatory acts, those which are praiseworthy but not obligatory, have become a significant topic in contemporary moral philosophy, primarily because morally supererogatory acts have proven difficult to reconcile with other important aspects of normative ethics. However, despite the similarities between ethics and epistemology, epistemic supererogation has received very little attention. In this paper, I aim to further the discussion of supererogation by arguing for the existence of epistemically supererogatory acts and considering the potential implications of their existence. First, I offer a brief account of moral supererogation and how morally supererogatory acts generate a strong intuition that a similar phenomenon should exist in epistemology. Afterward, I argue for the existence of epistemically supererogatory acts by examining five cases where an epistemic activity appears to be epistemically supererogatory. Epistemic supererogation appears to provide the best explanation for our considered judgments about the individuals’ behavior in these different cases. Finally, I consider how epistemic supererogation might impact the contemporary study of epistemology, particularly with regard to how we appraise certain epistemic duties.     

Reengineering Biomedical Translational Research with Engineering Ethics

It is widely accepted that translational research practitioners need to acquire special skills and knowledge that will enable them to anticipate, analyze, and manage a range of ethical issues. While there is a small but growing literature that addresses the ethics of translational research, there is a dearth of scholarship regarding how this might apply to engineers. In this paper we examine engineers as key translators and argue that they are well positioned to ask transformative ethical questions. Asking engineers to both broaden and deepen their consideration of ethics in their work, however, requires a shift in the way ethics is often portrayed and perceived in science and engineering communities. Rather than interpreting ethics as a roadblock to the success of translational research, we suggest that engineers should be encouraged to ask questions about the socio-ethical dimensions of their work. This requires expanding the conceptual framework of engineering beyond its traditional focus on “how” and “what” questions to also include “why” and “who” questions to facilitate the gathering of normative, socially-situated information. Empowering engineers to ask “why” and “who” questions should spur the development of technologies and practices that contribute to improving health outcomes.     

Fairness in Knowing: Science Communication and Epistemic Justice

Science communication, as a field and as a practice, is fundamentally about knowledge distribution; it is about the access to, and the sharing of knowledge. All distribution (science communication included) brings with it issues of ethics and justice. Indeed, whether science communicators acknowledge it or not, they get to decide both which knowledge is shared (by choosing which topic is communicated), and who gets access to this knowledge (by choosing which audience it is presented to). As a result, the decisions of science communicators have important implications for epistemic justice: how knowledge is distributed fairly and equitably. This paper presents an overview of issues related to epistemic justice for science communication, and argues that there are two quite distinct ways in which science communicators can be just (or unjust) in the way they distribute knowledge. Both of these paths will be considered before concluding that, at least on one of these accounts, science communication as a field and as a practice is fundamentally epistemically unjust. Possible ways to redress this injustice are suggested.     

Skepticism,Contextualism, and Discrimination*

The skeptic says that “knowledge” is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that ‘knowledge” is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about “knowledge”? And what implications do these hypotheses about “knowledge” have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about “knowledge”, but that both hypotheses about “knowledge” have deeply anti‐skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.     

Repentance Rituals and Restorative Justice

For most of this century, debate over how criminal justice should be transacted has alternated between an emphasis on retribution versus rehabilitation. Restoration has emerged in the 1990s as a credible third alternative. The most influential definition of restorative justice is by Tony Marshall in the context of a Delphi process conducted by Paul McCold: 'Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future'. Restorative justice means restoring victims, restoring offenders and restoring communities. Among the losses victims, offenders or communities might want restored are property loss, injury, a sense of security, dignity, a sense of empowerment, voice, harmony based on a feeling that justice has been done, and social support.     

Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense

Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects don't have such doubts, so epistemically circular beliefs are rarely called upon to play this role. Second, following Thomas Reid, Bergmann argues that we have noninferential, though epistemically circular, knowledge that our faculties are reliable. I argue, however, that Bergmann's view is undermined by doubts a subject should have and that there is no plausible explanation for how we can have noninferential knowledge that our faculties are reliable.     

Asymmetrical Relations, Identity and Abortion

ABSTRACT In this article I freely use the thought of Charles Hartshorne to defend the ethical permissibility of abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. In the later stages of pregnancy the fetus has an ethical status similar to that of a sentient yet non-rational animal, a status which should generate in us considerable ethical respect. The distinctiveness of this Hartshornian approach lies in the effort to bring metaphysics to bear on a controversial issue in applied ethics. In particular, the metaphysical issue of temporal relations is crucial to consider in the effort to ascertain the ethical status of the fetus. Two symmetrical (immoderate) theories of temporal relations are criticised, one of which provides the basis for opposition to abortion, a theory wherein one is internally related both to one's past and to one's future. An asymmetrical (moderate) theory of temporal relations is defended, a theory wherein one is internally related to one's past yet externally related to the future. This latter theory would permit abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.     

Social Biases and Solutions for Procedural Objectivity

An empirically sensitive formulation of the norms of transformative criticism must recognize that even public and shared standards of evaluation can be implemented in ways that unintentionally perpetuate and reproduce forms of social bias that are epistemically detrimental. Helen Longino's theory can explain and redress such social bias by treating peer evaluations as hypotheses based on data and by requiring a kind of perspectival diversity that bears, not on the content of the community's knowledge claims, but on the beliefs and norms of the culture of the knowledge community itself. To illustrate how socializing cognition can bias evaluations, we focus on peer‐review practices, with some discussion of peer‐review practices in philosophy. Data include responses to surveys by editors from general philosophy journals, as well as analyses of reviews and editorial decisions for the 2007 Cognitive Science Society Conference.     

Transformative Learning: A Case for Using Grounded Theory as an Assessment Analytic

Transformative Learning Theory and pedagogies leverage disruptive experiences as catalysts for learning and teaching. By facilitating processes of critical analysis and reflection that challenge assumptions, transformative learning reframes what counts as knowledge and the sources and processes for gaining and producing it. Students develop a broader range of perspectives on and entry points for learning and behavior change engaging cognition, embodiment, aesthetics, emotions, and ethics (see Mezirow 1991 and Figures 1 and 2). The open‐inquiry, multi‐modal nature of transformative learning defies most traditional assessment strategies. This article demonstrates that grounded theory offers the rigorous qualitative analysis needed to document and track transformative learning outcomes in practice. By applying a grounded theory approach to data from over eighty student portfolios across several iterations of a Religion and Ecology course at Emory University, this article demonstrates a successful and replicable assessment of transformative learning pedagogies.     

Meehl's contribution to clinical versus statistical prediction

Paul E. Meehl's work on the clinical versus statistical prediction controversy is reviewed. His contributions included the following: putting the controversy center stage in applied psychology; clarifying concepts underpinning the debate (especially his crucial distinction between ways of gathering data and ways of combining them) as well as establishing that the controversy was real and not concocted, analyzing clinical inference from both theoretical and probabilistic points of view, and reviewing studies that compared the accuracy of these 2 methods of data combination. Meehl's (1954/1996) conclusion that statistical prediction consistently outperforms clinical judgment has stood up extremely well for half a century. His conceptual analyses have not been significantly improved since he published them in the 1950s and 1960s. His work in this area contains several citation classics, which are part of the working knowledge of all competent applied psychologists today.     

Found Voices:

This article explores the cultural consequences of disability on women. The author interviewed four women with disabilities and two mothers and shares some of her own experiences with disability. The relationship between disability rights and feminism and ethnic identity and the impact of disability on the sense of self and personal goals are considered, as is the transformative power of speaking to the larger culture about how disability experiences inform human perceptions and social practices.     

Amenable to reason: Aristotle's rhetoric and the moral psychology of practical ethics.

An Aristotelian conception of practical ethics can be derived from the account of practical reasoning that Aristotle articulates in is Rhetoric and this has important implications for the way we understand the nature and limits of practical ethics. an important feature of this conception of practical ethics is its responsiveness to the complex ways in which agents form and maintain moral commitments, and this has important implications for the debate concerning methods of ethics in applied ethics. In particular, this feature enables us to understand casuistry, narrative, and principlism as mutually supportive modes of moral inquiry, rather than divergent and mutually exclusive methods of ethics. As a result, an Aristotelian conception of practical ethics clears the conceptual common ground upon which practical ethicists can forge a stable and realistic self-understanding.