What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality

The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self‐determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self‐determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

An objection to gareth evans' account of self-identity

In chapter seven ‘Self Identification’ of his challenging book The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans attempts to give an account of how it is that one is able to think about oneself self‐consciously. On Evans’ view, when one attempts to think of oneself self‐consciously that person is having what he calls an ‘I’ thought. Since these ‘I’ thoughts are a case of reference, more specifically self‐reference, Evans thinks that these thoughts can be explained by employing the same theoretical framework that he uses to explain other kinds of reference. Evans thinks all thoughts are essentially structured, and this means that they must fall under his ‘generality constraint’. Since ‘I’ thoughts are also ‘thoughts’ they are essentially structured as well, and they too must be subject to the generality constraint. The radical implication of this is that Evans thinks that if ‘I’ thoughts are subject to the generality constraint, then he can show that self‐reference must be reference to a thing which we can locate on a spatio‐temporal map. In this article I hope to accomplish three things. First, I will spell out in detail the argument Evans uses to arrive at his claim that self‐reference must be reference to something located on a spatio‐temporal map. Second, I will raise an objection, which states that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is not a consequence of the generality constraint. Finally I will argue that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is in fact in tension with the generality constraint, rather than being an implication of it.     

Self‐esteem and emotional health in adolescents – gender and age as potential moderators

Moksnes, U. K. & Espnes, G. A. (2012). Self‐esteem and emotional health in adolescents – gender and age as a potential moderators. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 483–489. The present paper investigates possible gender and age differences on emotional states (depression and anxiety) and self‐esteem as well as the association between self‐esteem and emotional states. The cross‐sectional sectional sample consists of 1,209 adolescents 13–18 years from public elementary and secondary schools in mid‐Norway. The results showed that girls reported higher scores on state anxiety and state depression, whereas boys consistently scored higher on self‐esteem in all age groups. Self‐esteem was strongly and inversely associated with both state depression and state anxiety. An interaction effect of gender by self‐esteem was found on state depression, where the association was stronger for girls than for boys. The associations found give support for the positive role of self‐esteem in relation to adolescents’ emotional health and well‐being.     

Cares,Identification, and Agency Reductionism

Reductionists about agency maintain that an agent's causing something is reducible to states and events involving the agent causing something. Some worry that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self‐determination. One reductionist answer to this worry, which I call ‘identification reductionism,’ contends that self‐governing agents are identified with certain attitudes, and so these attitudes causing a decision count as the agent's self‐determining the decision. I argue that a prominent species of identification reductionism developed by Harry Frankfurt, Agnieszka Jaworska, Jeffrey Seidman, and David Shoemaker – according to which an agent is identified with his (deepest) cares – is inadequate.     

Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics

In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems presented by the passions. Such agents are able to stick to the results of self‐legislation over time and thereby achieve a form of temporally extended freedom.     

Identification with community‐based HIV agencies as a correlate of turnover intentions and general self‐efficacy

Research (e.g. French, Power, & Mitchell, 2000 ; Harris, 2006 ; Harris & Alderson, 2006 , 2007 ; Roy & Cain, 2001 ) has highlighted important benefits for people living with HIV/AIDS to become connected with HIV community‐based (CB) agencies (e.g. reduction of isolation, educational opportunities, empowerment). However, CB HIV organizations sometimes experience challenges in recruiting and retaining people living with HIV/AIDS. In a sample of 68 respondents associated with a Canadian HIV/AIDS CB agency, facets of agency identification were examined as correlates of (a) turnover intentions with the agency and (b) aspects of psychological adjustment (hope and general self‐efficacy). Results indicated one dimension of social identification, in‐group affect, as a significant correlate of turnover intentions (such that members with more positive agency‐derived feelings were more likely to say they would stay at the agency), and another emotionally‐relevant aspect of identification, in‐group ties, as a significant correlate of general self‐efficacy. Hope was unrelated to social identification. Several implications for HIV CB agencies are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Propositional Attitudes and Embodied Skills in the Philosophy of Action

Propositionalism in the philosophy of action is the popular view that intentional actions are bodily movements caused and rationalized by certain ‘internal’ propositional attitude states that constitute the agent's perspective. I attack propositionalism's background claim that the genuinely mental/cognitive dimension of human action resides solely in some range of ‘internal’ agency‐conferring representational states that causally trigger, and thus are always conceptually disentangle‐able from, bodily activity itself. My opposing claim, following Ryle, Wittgenstein, and others, is that mentality and intentionality can be constitutively implicated in bodily actions themselves, as exercises of a distinctive form of embodied practical understanding. I attempt to show this by attending to the fine‐grained contours of various skillful actions.     

Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions

Most philosophers of emotion endorse a compound account of the emotions: emotions are wholes made of parts; or, as I prefer to put it, emotions are mental states that supervene on other (mental) states. The goal of this paper is to ascertain how the intentionality of these subvening members relates to the intentionality of the emotions. Towards this end, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the problems with the account Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson offer of the intentionality of the emotions; I argue their account is fundamentally misguided by virtue of being motivated by a misunderstanding of the nature of propositional attitudes. Second, I argue against Peter Goldie's claim that an affective component of an emotion contributes to its intentionality. Third, I offer my own compound account of emotions. I argue (1) emotions are mental states that supervene on other mental states, (2) the mental states that constitute the subvenience base of emotion can have nonconceptual and/or conceptual representational content, and (3) an emotion's intentionality supervenes on (but is often not identical to) the intentionality of only one of its subvening members, specifically, the evaluative representation.     

Peace,Self‐Determination and Reckoning with the Past: A Reply to Butt,Lippert‐Rasmussen,Pasternak, Wellman and Stemplowska

In this article, I offer responses to five commentaries on my recently published book, Cosmopolitan Peace. Those articles address my conception of individual and collective agency, my account of self‐determination (and its implication for the problem of annexation during and after the war), and my accounts of, respectively, reparations and remembrance after war. I revise or provide further defences of those accounts in the light of my commentators’ probing remarks.     

Self‐confidence,anxiety, and post‐purchase dissonance: a panel study

This study proposes an integrated conceptual model of the antecedents of post‐purchase dissonance. Data were gathered via a two‐stage panel study among consumers who made purchase of technology items. Study results demonstrate that consumer chronic characteristics (i.e., trait anxiety and generalized self‐confidence) not only directly influence post‐purchase dissonance positively and negatively but also are mediated by consumers' temporary feelings (i.e., state anxiety and specific self‐confidence) toward a purchase situation, and then indirectly influence post‐purchase dissonance positively and negatively. Trait anxiety positively influences state anxiety and that generalized self‐confidence and specific self‐confidence negatively influence state anxiety. Furthermore, trait anxiety appears to negatively influence specific self‐confidence, and generalized self‐confidence appears to negatively influence trait anxiety and positively influence specific self‐confidence.     

Object‐Dependent Thought Without Illusion

When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he or she can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his or her cognitive situation? I answer negatively. Moreover, I argue that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object – singular thought – is object‐dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object‐dependent have assumed this view to be committed to postulation of illusions of object‐dependent thought in cases like that mentioned. The core ingredient in my illusion‐free version of the view is a special form of disjunctivism. Alleged cases of illusion are not considered parasitic on ‘the good case’ where the object thought about is perceived.     

Children's judgments about their own self‐knowledge: The role of disclosure to other

Previous research has suggested that children of 5/6 years fail to understand that they are the authority on their own self‐knowledge. That is, when asked questions like, ‘Who knows best when you are feeling tired?’, they tend to cite their mother rather than themselves. Here we report a study that, rather than asking about generalities (‘Who knows best what you are thinking?’), presented 5‐, 7‐ 9‐ and 11‐year‐children with hypothetical vignettes about specific circumstances in which they were described as either disclosing or not disclosing a specified state to their mother. Children were subsequently asked to judge who would best know the state. Over all age groups children were significantly more likely to identify themselves as authorities on their own self‐knowledge when states had not been disclosed to mother than when they had. However, in the case of disclosed states, young children (though not older ones) asserted that, ‘mum knows best’. These findings are interpreted as suggesting not that young children entirely fail to understand first person authority, but instead that they make the relatively sophisticated assumption that mothers' interpretive competence is greater than their own.     

The Duty to Support Nationalistic Policies

We demonstrate that citizens perceive a duty to support policies that benefit their nation, even when they themselves judge that the consequences of the policies will be worse on the whole, taking outsiders into account. In terms of actions, subjects think they would do their perceived duty rather than violate it for the sake of better consequences. The discrepancy between duty and judged consequences does not seem to result from self‐interest alone. When asked for reasons, many subjects felt an obligation to help their fellow citizens before others, and they also thought that they owed something to their nation, in return for what it did for them. The obligation to help fellow citizens was the strongest predictor of perceived duty. In an experiment with Israeli and Palestinian students, group membership affected both perceived overall consequences and duty, but the effect of group on perceived consequences did not account for the effect on perceived duty. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.