Development of children's mental representations: effects of age, sex, and school experience

In the present study mental representations in drawings by 158 young children, ages 2 1/2 to 6 yr. old were analysed. The aim was to investigate whether the accuracy of mental representations increased with age and how this development progressed. Also tested were whether the inferred mental representations differed for boys and girls and whether preschool experience affected the drawings. As expected, mental representation increased in complexity with age as measured by Goodenough's score, and girls' mental representations (drawings) were significantly more elaborate than boys. Moreover, attending school early seemed to affect mental representations of the 3-yr.-olds but not the 4-yr.-olds. Results are discussed in terms of internal and external factors in mental representation in drawing a man.     

Kinesthetic aspects of mental representations in the identification of left and right hands

Kinesthetic aspects of mental representations of one’s own hands were investigated. Line drawings showed a human hand in one of five versions, in which finger position and wrist rotation varied; each version occurred as a left and as a right hand, and could appear in any one of eight directions in the picture plane. The subject was required to make quick judgments of whether a left or a right hand was represented, under three conditions of head tilt (left, upright, right). Reaction time varied systematically, reflecting the time required to move one’s own hand into congruence with the stimulus. Head tilt influenced the subjective reference frame of mental rotation when the degree of head tilt was 60 deg.     

Is subjective shortening in human memory unique to time representations?

Three experiments compared forgetting of the duration of a bar-like visual stimulus with forgetting of its length. The main aim of the experiments was to investigate whether subjective shortening (a decrease in the subjective magnitude of a stimulus as its retention interval increased) was observable in length judgements as well as in time judgements, where subjective shortening has been often observed previously. On all trials of the three experiments, humans received two briefly presented coloured bars, separated by adelay ranging from 1 to 10 s, and the bars could differ in length, duration of presentation, or both. In Experiment 1 two groups of subjects made either length or duration judgements, and subjective shortening-type forgetting functions were observed only for duration. Experiments 2 and 3 used the same general procedure, but the stimuli judged could differ both in length and duration within a trial, and different subject groups (Experiment 2) or the same subjects in two conditions (Experiment 3) made either length or duration judgements of stimuli, which were on average physically identical. Subjective shortening was only found with duration, and never with length, supporting the view that subjective shortening may be unique to time judgements.     

Mental representations of social status

How do people think about social status? We investigated the nature of social status and number representations using a semantic distance latency test. In Study 1, 21 college students compared words connoting different social status as well as numbers, which served as a control task. Participants were faster at comparing occupations and numbers that were semantically farther apart relative to those more closely related. In Study 2, we examined the semantic distance effect for a social status category, for which participants have as much knowledge of, as with numbers. We asked 15 US Navy Midshipmen to compare the social status associated with different ranks in the Navy as well as compare number magnitudes. Participants were fastest when comparing ranks far in status relative to ranks close in status. These findings reveal that humans have mental representations of social status that share properties with that of number.     

Stimulus structures and mental representations in expert comprehension of computer programs

Comprehension of computer programs involves detecting or inferring different kinds of relations between program parts. Different kinds of programming knowledge facilitate detection and representation of the different textual relations. The present research investigates the role of programming knowledge in program comprehension and the nature of mental representations of programs; specifically, whether procedural (control flow) or functional (goal hierarchy) relations dominate programmers' mental representations of programs. In the first study, 80 professional programmers were tested on comprehension and recognition of short computer program texts. The results suggest that procedural rather than functional units form the basis of expert programmers' mental representations, supporting work in other areas of text comprehension showing the importance of text structure knowledge in understanding. In a second study 40 professional programmers studied and modified programs of moderate length. Results support conclusions from the first study that programs are first understood in terms of their procedural episodes. However, results also suggest that a programmer's task goals may influence the relations that dominate mental representations later in comprehension.     

Maternal representations: A clinical and subjective phenomenological view

The relationship — as represented — is proving to be of growing value in our thinking about clinical problems such as “intergenerational transfer.” It is also an extremely positive influence in our thinking about how the interpersonal world is remembered, abstracted, and lived. Yet, the nature of a “represented relationship” remains unclear. This paper is an attempt to clarify some of the problems and areas for needed study regarding this concept. The mother's representation of her infant and of the people in her own life who have played “maternal roles” will be taken as the model. First, we will explore the richness and complexity of these representations and conclude that, for clinical purposes, different models are used to simplify this richness and render it therapeutically useful. Three models will be discussed. The first is the disfortion model which measures the distance between the mother's subjective experience of her interaction or relationship with another and some objective, observable “reality.” The model of overdeter-mining themes is a second model, largely the inspiration of psychoanalysis but inclusive of Bowlby's theory of attachment. Here psychobiological and/or psychodynamic themes organize the clinical material. Finally, a coherence model is discussed. Here the motive is goodness of the narrative construction rather than the historical “truth.” A second issue discussed is the capacity to represent dyads vs. triads and actual vs. second-hand narrated relationships. These issues are crucial for notions not only about the nature of such representations but also their limitations in understanding family interactions and relationships, i.e., where many members are concerned. A third issue concerns the nature of the subjective experience for a mother when a representation of her infant or herself in relation to the infant is “activated.” There exists here an unknown typology of experience. Finally, we will discuss what all of the above have to contribute to our further understanding of the nature of represented relationships.     

Face imagery is based on featural representations

The effect of imagery on featural and configural face processing was investigated using blurred and scrambled faces. By means of blurring, featural information is reduced; by scrambling a face into its constituent parts configural information is lost. Twenty-four participants learned ten faces together with the sound of a name. In following matching-to-sample tasks participants had to decide whether an auditory presented name belonged to a visually presented scrambled or blurred face in two experimental conditions. In the imagery condition, the name was presented prior to the visual stimulus and participants were required to imagine the corresponding face as clearly and vividly as possible. In the perception condition name and test face were presented simultaneously, thus no facilitation via mental imagery was possible. Analyses of the hit values showed that in the imagery condition scrambled faces were recognized significantly better than blurred faces whereas there was no such effect for the perception condition. The results suggest that mental imagery activates featural representations more than configural representations.     

Conjunctive bias in memory representations of logical connectivesa

The paper presents the conjunctive bias in memory-a novel phenomenon that helps to clarify representations of logical connectives. The conjunctive bias is a tendency toward more accurate recall and recognition of conjunctive forms than of forms based on other logical connectives and a tendency to recall and recognize other logical forms as if they were conjunctions. Three experiments, in which participants' memory representations associated with different logical connectives were examined, were conducted to test the conjunctive bias hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants learned picture-proposition pairs involving either conjunctions or disjunctions and then had to recall each proposition when cued with its picture. In Experiments 2 and 3, recognition memory for conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals was examined with an old/new recognition procedure. The findings of these experiments provide evidence for the conjunctive bias. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that corjunctive bias is not simply a pragmatically caused preference for conjunctions. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for current theories of deductive reasoning.     

Cross-group recognition bias generalizes to diverse non-face representations of digital identity

We investigated the potential for cross-group recognition bias, the reliable tendency for perceivers to better recognize people who share their ethnic or social groups than people who do not share their ethnic or social groups, with diverse non-face representations of digital identity. We compared German participants' memory for people they believed to be German or French when those people were identified using non-face pictorial representations of identity (Studies 1 and 2) and verbal written representations of identity (Study 3) taken from the World Wide Web. Participants better recognized ingroup targets than outgroup targets regardless of type of identity representation. These results generalize cross-group recognition bias to an important new domain as well as to a new class of stimuli and suggest that process explanations of cross-group recognition bias that are domain specific to faces do not provide a comprehensive account of the bias.     

A standard conceptual framework for the study of subjective time

Research on the mental representation of time (‘subjective time’) has provided broad insights into the nature of time perception and temporal processing. As the field comprises different scientific disciplines, such as psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience, studies differ with regard to the basic terms and concepts used. For this reason, research on subjective time lacks a coherent conceptual system. We argue that research in the field of subjective time should aim at establishing such a system, i.e., a more standardized terminology, in order to strengthen its theoretical basis and to support an efficient communication of results. Based on key empirical findings and concepts that are commonly (but inconsistently) used in the literature, we argue for a conceptual framework for the study of subjective time that differentiates between three types of mental representations of time: basic temporal processing, time perception in terms of passage, and time perception in terms of duration.     

Switching between environmental representations in memory

In everyday life we accomplish tasks that require the storage and access of mental representations of different environments that we are not currently perceiving. Past research has suggested that environments are encoded by a series of independent representations that are organized in memory. Three experiments tested this idea further by asking whether multiple representations of environments can be accessed simultaneously. Using a cued task-set switching paradigm, subjects judged spatial relationships between target locations in two familiar environments. Response times were longer when successive trials probed different environments, an effect not due to switching between semantic categories or semantic priming, suggesting that representations of environments are accessed sequentially. Implications for various hypotheses concerning the properties of environmental representations are discussed.     

The non-abstractness of mental representations

An argument is made that formal abstract mental representations are lacking because they fail to accommodate the contribution of the medium. The importance of the medium is singled out and several respects in which it resists formal characterization noted. Specifically, it is pointed out that the medium can always be relevant, that the aspects by which it is made so are not in principle demarcated or constrained, and that they cannot be restricted a priori at the time of encoding. The examination of several ways by which specifications of medium could be incorporated into mental representations suggests that to obtain a full account of the medium one has to abandon some basic characteristics of mental representations. Conversely, maintaining the concept of mental representation in its standard sense leaves the medium, and with it some fundamental properties of human cognition, outside of one's scientific account. This conclusion serves as the basis for more general comments regarding the study of mind.     

The orientation of young and older adults' mental representations of their home town with familiar and new landmarks

Familiarity with an environment produces refined mental representations in adults of all ages, but it is not clear whether these representations tend to have a north-up orientation and whether familiarity facilitates the learning of new spatial information, especially in ageing. Thirty-two young and 32 older adults studied a map of their home town that included familiar and new fictitious landmarks, then performed pointing tasks, some aligned with the cardinal points south–north (SN), and others counter-aligned, north–south (NS). A measure of visuo-spatial working memory (VSWM) and a questionnaire on pleasure in exploring were also administered. The results showed that performance was better when pointing SN than NS (alignment effect), whereas pointing performance for familiar landmarks was similar for SN and NS alignments (no alignment effect). No interaction involving age was found. VSWM emerged as a significant predictor of pointing performance. Spatial mental representations of familiar environments are elaborate and flexible as regards familiar landmarks, in both young and older adults; and a familiar layout does not seem to enhance older adults' spatial memory as regards new landmarks.     

Magnitude comparisons distort mental representations of magnitude

Many cognitive processes rely on representations of magnitude, yet these representations are often malleable (H. Helson, 1964; J. Huttenlocher, L. V. Hedges, & J. L. Vevea, 2000; A. Parducci, 1965). It is likely that factors that affect these representations in turn affect the psychological processes that rely on them. The authors conducted 4 experiments to investigate whether language-expressible magnitude comparisons distort mental representations of compared magnitudes. Participants compared magnitudes and estimated those magnitudes in a variety of tasks. Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated systematic comparison-induced distortions. Experiment 4 demonstrated that comparison-induced distortions might account for the asymmetric dominance effect discussed in the decision-making literature. Potential effects of comparison-induced distortions on other psychological processes (e.g., density effects, order effects, body-size estimation, pain estimation, and consumer decision making) are discussed.     

Uncovering mental representations with Markov chain Monte Carlo

A key challenge for cognitive psychology is the investigation of mental representations, such as object categories, subjective probabilities, choice utilities, and memory traces. In many cases, these representations can be expressed as a non-negative function defined over a set of objects. We present a behavioral method for estimating these functions. Our approach uses people as components of a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, a sophisticated sampling method originally developed in statistical physics. Experiments 1 and 2 verified the MCMC method by training participants on various category structures and then recovering those structures. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the MCMC method can be used estimate the structures of the real-world animal shape categories of giraffes, horses, dogs, and cats. Experiment 4 combined the MCMC method with multidimensional scaling to demonstrate how different accounts of the structure of categories, such as prototype and exemplar models, can be tested, producing samples from the categories of apples, oranges, and grapes.     

Children's understanding of the knowledge prerequisites of drawing and pretending

Many young children will claim that someone is pretending to be something even when the person does not know what that something is. To examine whether children's failure to take knowledge prerequisites into account is part of a more fundamental problem in recognizing how mental representations constrain external ones, the authors asked children whether an artist who did not know what something was, yet whose drawing bore resemblance to it, was drawing it. The same questions were asked regarding pretending. Children performed similarly on pretending and drawing questions, and performance on both questions improved when the protagonists' point of view was emphasized. Performance for drawing improved somewhat when alternative goals were stated. Further, cross-sectional data indicated that understanding how knowledge relates to producing external representations increases gradually from age 4 to age 8, suggesting that experiential factors may be crucial to this understanding.     

Visual mental representations supporting object drawing: How naming a novel object with a novel count noun impacts on young children's object drawing

Object drawing can be supported by a number of cognitive resources, each making available visual information about the object being drawn. These resources include perceptual input, short-term visual memory, and long-term visual memory. Each of these resources has the potential to make available distinct forms of visual representation, including viewpoint-specific and viewpoint-independent representations, object-specific and category representations, and separate representations of object colour. We review neuropsychological and developmental evidence supporting these claims, including evidence that the same drawing can reflect the influence of multiple forms of visual representation. Seven experiments are then reported, investigating object drawing by 4- to 6-year-old children, to confirm the support for drawing provided by different forms of visual representation. Young children are selected for investigation because their drawing is relatively unconstrained by culturally determined norms which, in our culture, dictate that objects should be drawn just as they appear from the vantage point of the drawer. To distinguish the support provided by object and category representations, the experiments exploit the privileged links between count nouns as object labels, and representations of object categories. In addition, pre-established representations, visual or otherwise, are precluded from influencing drawing by asking the children to draw novel objects, and by creating novel count nouns with which to label the objects. The results reveal how viewpoint-specific perceptual representations, object-specific representations of shape and of colour, and category representations of shape can each impact on object drawing, and in some circumstances on the same drawing. It appears that simple drawing tasks have the potential to reveal some of the distinct types of representation able to support visual cognition.