The Blicket Within: Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes

Four experiments examined children's inferences about the relation between objects' internal parts and their causal properties. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds recognized that objects with different internal parts had different causal properties, and those causal properties transferred if the internal part moved to another object. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds made inferences from an object's internal parts to its causal properties without being given verbal labels for objects or being shown that insides and causal properties covaried. Experiment 3 found that 4-year-olds chose an object with the same internal part over one with the same external property when asked which object had the same causal property as the target (which had both the internal part and external property). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 4-year-olds made similar inferences from causal properties to internal parts, but 3-year-olds relied more on objects' external perceptual appearance. These results suggest that by the age of 4, children have developed an understanding of a relation between an artifact's internal parts and its causal properties.     

How should we question young children's understanding of aspectuality?

In two experiments, we investigated whether 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children's ability to demonstrate their understanding of aspectuality was influenced by how the test question was phrased. In Experiment 1, 60 children chose whether to look or feel to gain information about a hidden object (identifiable by sight or touch). Test questions referred either to the perceptual aspect of the hidden object (e.g., whether it was red or blue), the modality dimension (e.g., what colour it was), or the object's identity (e.g., which one it was). Children who heard the identity question performed worse than those who heard the aspect or dimension question. Further investigation in Experiment 2 (N= 23) established that children's difficulty with the identity question was not due to a problem recalling the objects. We discuss how the results of these methodological investigations impact on researchers’ assessment of the development of aspectuality understanding.     

Association between objects and body parts mediated by function

Recent accounts of conceptual knowledge suggest that the specific gestures/actions that should be performed in order to use an object for its intended function are an integral part of its mental representation. If this is true, then the information regarding which body part needs activating to interact with the object should also be part of such representation. Starting from the assumption that not only artefacts (i.e., tools), but also natural objects (i.e., fruits and vegetables) have a function, the present study investigates the existence of a link between a specific object and the effector involved in its use. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) paradigm was adopted to test for an association between natural objects and mouth, and between artefacts and hand (Experiment 1) or foot (Experiment 2). Results showed selective links between objects and effectors, based on which body part is needed to carry out the object's function.     

Word Learning and Attention Allocation Based on Word Class and Category Knowledge

Attention allocation in word learning may vary developmentally based on the novelty of the object. It has been suggested that children differentially learn verbs based on the novelty of the agent, but adults do not because they automatically infer the object's category and thus treat it like a familiar object. The current research examined whether adults and children differentially learn words or attend to objects without access to category knowledge in a relatively difficult (Experiment 1, adult n = 54, child n = 66) and a relatively easy task (Experiment 2, adult n = 88, child n = 62). Results show that category knowledge affects noun and verb extension for children but not adults and that adults similarly attended to objects when learning a verb regardless of category knowledge. These findings highlight the importance of investigating how word class, attention allocation, and categorical inference interact across development. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preschoolers’ behavioural reenactment of “failed attempts”: The roles of intention-reading,emulation and mimicry

To clarify the nature of the social cognitive skills involved in preschoolers’ reenactment of actions on objects, we studied 31- and 41-month-old children's reenactment of intended acts (“failed attempts”) in Meltzoff's (Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Reenactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31, 838–850) behavioural reenactment paradigm. Measuring children's first action, performance of target acts was similar in a novel Emulation Learning condition to that seen in the Failed Attempt condition. In the Emulation Learning condition, children did not see the adult's manipulation and their response was likely to have been based on the end state specifying the object's key affordances. Both 31- and 41-month-old children also copied the control acts they had observed in the Adult Manipulation condition. However, 41-month-old but not 31-month-old children reproduced the failed attempt actions in the Failed Attempt condition. This pattern of findings suggests that, whilst 2- to 3-year-olds mimic adults’ actions when these actions do not trigger alternative object affordances, only in the third year of life will children mimic adults’ actions when these actions simultaneously trigger such affordances. Reenactment of actions on objects involves a number of social cognitive processes and exceptional care in the design of experiments is required to determine the roles played by intention-reading, emulation, and mimicry.     

Quantifying the role of context in visual object recognition

An object's context may serve as a source of information for recognition when the object's image is degraded. The current study aimed to quantify this source of information. Stimuli were photographs of objects divided into quantized blocks. Participants decreased block size (increasing resolution) until identification. Critical resolution was compared across three conditions: (1) when the picture of the target object was shown in isolation, (2) in the object's contextual setting where that context was unfamiliar to the participant, and (3) where that context was familiar to the participant. A second experiment assessed the role of object familiarity without context. Results showed a profound effect of context: Participants identified objects in familiar contexts with minimal resolution. Unfamiliar contexts required higher-resolution images, but much less so than those without context. Experiment 2 found a much smaller effect of familiarity without context, suggesting that recognition in familiar contexts is primarily based on object-location memory.     

Two- and three-year-olds infer and reason about design intentions in order to categorize broken objects

In naming artifacts, do young children infer and reason about the intended functions of the objects? Participants between the ages of 2 and 4 years were shown two kinds of objects derived from familiar categories. One kind was damaged so as to undermine its usual function. The other kind was also dysfunctional, but made so by adding features that appeared to be intentional. Evidence that 2‐, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds were more likely to apprehend the broken objects than the intentionally dysfunctional objects as members of the familiar lexical categories favors the conclusion that, in naming, children may spontaneously infer and reason about design intentions from an early age. This is the first evidence that 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds not only take design intentions into account in object categorization, but that they do so even without explicit mention of the objects’ accidental or intentional histories. The results cast doubt on a proposal that young children's lexical categorization is based on automatic, non‐deliberative processes.     

Developmental changes in visual object recognition between 18 and 24 months of age

Two experiments examined developmental changes in children's visual recognition of common objects during the period of 18 to 24 months. Experiment 1 examined children's ability to recognize common category instances that presented three different kinds of information: (1) richly detailed and prototypical instances that presented both local and global shape information, color, textural and featural information, (2) the same rich and prototypical shapes but no color, texture or surface featural information, or (3) that presented only abstract and global representations of object shape in terms of geometric volumes. Significant developmental differences were observed only for the abstract shape representations in terms of geometric volumes, the kind of shape representation that has been hypothesized to underlie mature object recognition. Further, these differences were strongly linked in individual children to the number of object names in their productive vocabulary. Experiment 2 replicated these results and showed further that the less advanced children's object recognition was based on the piecemeal use of individual features and parts, rather than overall shape. The results provide further evidence for significant and rapid developmental changes in object recognition during the same period children first learn object names. The implications of the results for theories of visual object recognition, the relation of object recognition to category learning, and underlying developmental processes are discussed.     

Constraints on spatial extrapolation in the mental representation of scenes: View-boundaries vs. object-boundaries

Viewers remember seeing information from outside the boundaries of a scene (boundary extension; BE). To determine if view-boundaries have a special status in scene perception, we sought to determine if object-boundaries would yield the same effect. In Experiment 1 eight “bird's-eye view” photographs containing single object clusters (a smaller object on top of a larger one) were presented. After the presentation, participants reconstructed four scenes by selecting among five different-sized cutouts of each object. BE occurred between the view-boundaries and the object cluster, but not between the smaller object and the larger object's boundaries. There was no consistent effect of the larger object's boundaries. Experiment 2 replicated these results using a drawing task. BE does not occur whenever a border surrounds an object, it occurs when the border signifies the edge of the view. We propose the BE reflects anticipatory representation of scene structure that supports scene comprehension and view integration.     

Roles of function, reminding, and variability in categorization by 3-month-old infants

The roles of function, reminding, and exemplar variability in categorization of a physically dissimilar object were studied with 3-month-old infants trained to move a crib mobile by kicking. Performance on a transfer test with a motionless novel object provided evidence of categorization. In Experiments 1 and 2, infants, like adults, initially categorized novel objects on the basis of physical appearance, but only if trained with multiple exemplars, after delays of 1 and 7 days. In Experiment 3, prior knowledge of an object's functional properties overrode physical dissimilarity as the basis for categorization and enabled reminding of the classification response 2 weeks later. In Experiment 4, postevent contingency information overrode physical and functional properties as the basis for categorization. These findings indicate that expectations and goals influence infants' category decisions and raise the possibility that infants of 3 months respond by analogy.     

Two-Year-Olds' Appreciation of the Shared Nature of Novel Object Labels

Two-year-olds' appreciation of the shared nature of object labels versus object preferences was examined in 2 studies. A total of 128 24- to 27-month-olds played a finding game with an experimenter during which they were taught a piece of information about a target object in a nonostensive learning context. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a cue signaling the referent of a novel label. In Experiment 2, children were presented with a cue signaling the experimenter's preference for a particular object. Results indicate children appreciate that knowledge of an object's label is shared between 2 different individuals, but object preferences are not.     

Contrasting Memory for Temporal-Source and Memory for Content in Children's Discrimination of Repeated Events

The current studies examined the separate roles that memory of temporal-source and memory of content play in children's discrimination of occurrences of a repeated event. The studies were also designed to determine the impact of age and retention interval on each of these components. In Experiment One, 4- to 5- versus 6- to 8-year-old children experienced six occurrences of a repeated event; each occurrence had the same underlying structure; however, a different version or instantiation of each item was included in each occurrence of the event. At either 1 or 6 week delay, the children were asked to recall which instantiation of the item was included in the final occurrence. In Experiment Two, children were required to recall as many instantiations as they could, prior to making a decision about which instantiation was included in the final occurrence. The results indicated that: (a) children's capacity to correctly identify the final instantiation declined over time and increased with age; (b) children's capacity to provide an instantiation that was temporally close to the final occurrence declined over time and increased with age; and (c) children's ability to remember the source of an instantiation decreased over time irrespective of any loss of memory for content. The results were discussed in relation to current theories of memory and children's eyewitness memory. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Valence and the development of immediate and long-term false memory illusions

Across five experiments we examined the role of valence in children's and adults’ true and false memories. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm and either neutral or negative-emotional lists, both adults’ (Experiment 1) and children's (Experiment 2) true recall and recognition was better for neutral than negative items, and although false recall was also higher for neutral items, false recognition was higher for negative items. The last three experiments examined adults’ (Experiment 3) and children's (Experiments 4 and 5) 1-week long-term recognition of neutral and negative-emotional information. The results replicated the immediate recall and recognition findings from the first two experiments. More important, these experiments showed that although true recognition decreased over the 1-week interval, false recognition of neutral items remained unchanged whereas false recognition of negative-emotional items increased. These findings are discussed in terms of theories of emotion and memory as well as their forensic implications.     

The use of stories as autistic objects

This paper reviews Frances Tustin's concept of the 'autistic object' and its development over the course of her writings. Clinical material from work with a 4-year-old boy is brought to suggest that the concept can usefully be extended to include such cultural artefacts as stories as well as the physical objects emphasized by Tustin. It is also emphasized that the awareness of reality which autistic objects are used to defend against refers both to internal as well as external reality. The paper argues that it is the function to which the object is put that is critical in determining whether or not it should be viewed as an autistic object.     

Implicit understanding of belief

Implicit understanding of false belief was investigated by monitoring where children look in anticipation of a protagonist reappearing, when the protagonist mistakenly thinks that his desired object is in a different place from the place where it really is. This implicit measure of understanding was contrasted with children's explicit answers to the experimenter's question about where the protagonist would look for the object. Children from 2 years 5 months to 2 years 10 months erroneously looked at the object's real location, which they gave for their answer. From 2 years 11 months to 4 years 5 months, about 90% of the children looked at the empty location where the protagonist thought the object was.In sharp contrast, only about 45% of the children in this age span gave that location as their explicit answer to the experimenter's question. These results are explained in terms of a distinction between representing a fact and making a judgment about that fact.     

A Mutually Facilitative Relationship Between Learning Names and Learning Concepts in Preschool Children: The Case of Artifacts

Two studies investigated the relationship between learning names and learning concepts in preschool children. More specifically, we focused on the relationship between learning the names and learning the intended functions of artifacts, given that the intended function of an artifact is generally thought to constitute core conceptual information about an artifact's category. We asked whether learning the intended function of a novel artifact facilitates retention of its name and whether learning the name of a novel artifact prompts the search for information about its intended function. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-old children better retained the names of novel artifacts when the intended functions of these artifacts were revealed. The comparison condition involved providing perceptually relevant and conceptually irrelevant information about the objects. In Experiment 2, 4-year-old children who were provided with the names of novel artifacts were more likely to seek out information about the objects' functions than children provided with conceptually irrelevant information about the artifacts. Together, the studies demonstrate the intimate and mutually facilitative relationship between names and concepts in young children.     

Children's Comprehension of Critical and Complimentary Forms of Verbal Irony

The existing research on children's comprehension of verbal irony has focused exclusively on children's understanding of ironic criticisms. Two experiments examined 5- and 6-year-old children's ability to detect the nonliteral nature and intended meaning of both ironic criticism and ironic praise as depicted in short, videotaped stories. Considered together, the results from these experiments permit several conclusions: First, the data confirm earlier research suggesting that children's detection of nonliteral utterances and their interpretation of the speaker's pragmatic intent are separable components of early irony comprehension. Second, children's ability to detect ironic statements is asymmetrical across critical and complimentary forms of irony. Finally, although children more readily detect ironic criticisms, explicit echoic cues play an important role in facilitating uniquely their detection of ironic compliments. We discuss these results in the context of social pragmatic theories of early communicative development (e.g., Bruner, 1983; Tomasello, 1992, 1995) and with reference to a recent allusional-pretense model of irony comprehension proposed for mature speakers (Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995).     

The role of visual attention in action priming

It has been demonstrated that the task-irrelevant left–right orientation of an object is capable of facilitating left–right-hand responses when the object is orientated towards the responding hand. We investigated the role of attention in this orientation effect. Experiment 1 showed that object orientation facilitates responses of the hand that is compatible with the object's orientation, despite the entire object being irrelevant. However, when a task-relevant fixation point was displayed over the prime object in Experiment 2, the effect was not observed. Together Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the orientation information of viewed objects primes the action selection processes even when the object is irrelevant, but only when attention is not allocated to a competing stimulus during the prime presentation. Experiment 3 suggested that the elimination of the effect in Experiment 2 could not be attributed to the elimination of an attentional shift to the graspable part of the prime. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that object orientation can evoke an abstract response code, influencing the selection of finger responses.     

Transport and use of common objects: Influence of weight on action planning

Internal knowledge and visual cues about object's weight play an important role in grasping and lifting objects. It has been shown that both visual cues and internal knowledge might influence movement kinematics and force production depending on action goal (use vs. transport). However, there is little evidence about weight's influence on action planning as reflected by initiation time. In the present study we investigated this issue. In Experiment 1, participants had to grasp light and heavy objects (without moving them) to either use or transport them. In Experiment 2 we asked another group of participants to actually use or transport the same objects. We observed that initiation times were faster for heavy objects than for light objects in both the transport and use tasks, but only in Experiment 2. Thus, weight influenced the planning of use and transport actions, only when the end-goal of the action was really achieved. These data are incompatible with the hypothesis that only use actions are supported by stored object's representations. They rather suggest that in some circumstances, depending of the end-goal of the action and the physical constraints the planning of both use and transport actions are based on stored object representation.