The involvement of working memory in children's exact and approximate mental addition

The involvement of working memory (WM) was examined in two types of mental calculation tasks: exact and approximate. Specifically, children attending Grades 3 and 4 of primary school were involved in three experiments that examined the role of verbal and visuospatial WM in solving addition problems presented in vertical or horizontal format. For Experiment 1, the children were required to solve addition problems with carrying. For Experiment 2, they were required to solve addition problems without carrying. Then, for Experiment 3, the children needed to solve approximate problems with and without carrying. Results confirmed that different WM components are involved in solving mental addition problems. In Experiment 1, horizontally presented addition problems were more impaired than vertically presented ones, according to a verbal WM load; conversely, vertically presented addition problems were more affected by a visuospatial WM load, especially when the children were required to perform approximate calculations. In Experiment 2, this pattern emerged in neither exact nor approximate calculations. Finally, in Experiment 3, the specific involvement of WM components was observed only in problems with carrying. Overall, these results reveal that both approximate calculation and carrying procedures demand particularly high WM resources that vary according to the task's constraints.     

External source monitoring in a real‐life event: developmental changes in ability to identify source persons

The present study investigated young children's and adults' external source‐monitoring abilities with respect to facial identification accuracy for complex live events. Five‐ to 6‐ year‐olds and adults watched a magic show in which three different female magicians (i.e. source persons) performed three different kinds of magic tricks each. After approximately 1 month, the participants were asked to recognize what kinds of magic tricks had been performed, to make face identifications as to which magician had performed those magic tricks and to recognize those magicians' attributes. Results showed that both young children and adults had more difficulty with identifying source persons than recognizing them in a real‐life event in which a number of persons appeared. Especially for young children, low credibility was shown not only for the source memories but also for the recognition memories of the source person attributes. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How fantasy benefits young children's understanding of pretense

Sobel and Lillard (2001) demonstrated that 4-year-olds' understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented.     

Melting Lizards and Crying Mailboxes: Children's Preferential Recall of Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts

Previous research with adults suggests that a catalog of minimally counterintuitive concepts, which underlies supernatural or religious concepts, may constitute a cognitive optimum and is therefore cognitively encoded and culturally transmitted more successfully than either entirely intuitive concepts or maximally counterintuitive concepts. This study examines whether children's concept recall similarly is sensitive to the degree of conceptual counterintuitiveness (operationalized as a concept's number of ontological domain violations) for items presented in the context of a fictional narrative. Seven‐ to nine‐year‐old children who listened to a story including both intuitive and counterintuitive concepts recalled the counterintuitive concepts containing one (Experiment 1) or two (Experiment 2), but not three (Experiment 3), violations of intuitive ontological expectations significantly more and in greater detail than the intuitive concepts, both immediately after hearing the story and 1 week later. We conclude that one or two violations of expectation may be a cognitive optimum for children: They are more inferentially rich and therefore more memorable, whereas three or more violations diminish memorability for target concepts. These results suggest that the cognitive bias for minimally counterintuitive ideas is present and active early in human development, near the start of formal religious instruction. This finding supports a growing literature suggesting that diverse, early‐emerging, evolved psychological biases predispose humans to hold and perform religious beliefs and practices whose primary form and content is not derived from arbitrary custom or the social environment alone.     

Buying and Selling Prices of Investments: Configural Weight Model of Interactions Predicts Violations of Joint Independence

Judges evaluated buying and selling prices of hypothetical investments, based on the previous price of each investment and estimates of the investment's future value given by advisors of varied expertise. Effect of a source's estimate varied in proportion to the source's expertise, and it varied inversely with the number and expertise of other sources. There was also a configural effect in which the effect of a source's estimate was affected by the rank order of that source's estimate, in relation to other estimates of the same investment. These interactions were fit with a configural weight averaging model in which buyers and sellers place different weights on estimates of different ranks. This model implies that one can design a new experiment in which there will be different violations of joint independence in different viewpoints. Experiment 2 confirmed patterns of violations of joint independence predicted from the model fit in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 also showed that preference reversals between viewpoints can be predicted by the model of Experiment 1. Configural weighting provides a better account of buying and selling prices than either of two models of loss aversion or the theory of anchoring and insufficient adjustment.     

The Influence of Boundaries on Young Children's Searching and Gathering

Two experiments were conducted to examine how boundaries influence the organization of the gathering and searching of 3- and 4-year-olds. In Experiment 1, children retrieved miniature carrots that were in plain view from a dollhouse that was divided in half by a visual, a functional, or a visual-functional boundary. There was also a control condition in which no boundary was present. Children exhibited more organized gathering in the visual and visual-functional boundary conditions than in the functional boundary and no-boundary conditions. This suggests that visual rather than functional properties of boundaries influenced the organization of young children's gathering behavior. In Experiment 2, we increased task difficulty by requiring children to search for carrots that were out of sight. Unlike in Experiment 1, children produced more organized searching in the visual, visual-functional, and the functional boundary conditions than in the no-boundary condition. Our discussion focuses on the role of the physical environment in organizing behavior.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Do you believe in magic? Infants’ social looking during violations of expectations

Young infants tend to look longer at physical events that have unexpected outcomes than those that have expected outcomes, suggesting that they have knowledge of physical principles such as numerosity and occlusion (Baillargeon & Graber, 1987; Wynn, 1992). Although infants are typically tested in the presence of a caregiver, the social component of violations of expectations has received little attention. The present study investigated social looking during presumably expected and unexpected cognitive/perceptual events. Two experiments replicated the results of well-known physical knowledge experiments on addition/subtraction and occlusion in 6- (Experiments 1 and 2) and 9-month-old infants (Experiment 1), in that infants at both ages looked longer at unexpected than at expected events. Furthermore, infants at both ages initiated more looks at their caregivers' faces during unexpected than expected events. These findings are interpreted as suggesting that infants as young as 6 months of age actively seek to embed their experiences of unexpected physical/cognitive events in a social context.     

UNDERSTANDING COMPLEMENT CLAUSES BY EDUCABLE MENTALLY RETARDED AND NONRETARDED CHILDREN AND YOUNG ADULTS*

Two experiments are reported on understanding complement clauses embedded into four Greek matrix verbs, Ask (ask information), Promise, Request and Tell (give information), equivalent to English in syntactic and semantic constraints. Experiment 1 was conducted with educably mentally retarded (EMR) and nonretarded (NR) children matched on verbal mental age (MA), and the second with fifth and sixth graders and young high school adults. The results suggest that: (1) EMR and NR children are similar in performance, despite other differences, according to Guttman coefficients of reproducibility and scalability, (2) verbal MA and Digit Span cannot best predict EMR and young NR children's linguistic behavior, (3) the minimal distance principle (MDP) advocated by Chomsky (1969, 1972, 1982) fails to account for performance by either population sample on constructions conforming to the same syntactic and semantic constraints as in English, (4) the semantic role principle (SRP) approach (Lederberg and Maratsos 1981; Maratsos 1974) falls short of making consistent predictions of performance by EMR and NR children on constructions requiring the same semantic role allocation, (5) evidence from Experiment 2, despite differences, supports the results of Experiment 1, (6) the results on understanding complement clauses of the type tested are discussed within the framework of the SRP approach in general, but the emphasis is placed on interaction of semantic and pragmatic presuppositions.     

The role of testimony in young children's solution of a gravity-driven invisible displacement task

Previous research has shown that young children make a perseverative, gravity-oriented, error when asked to predict the final location of a ball dropped down an S-shaped opaque tube (Hood, 1995). We asked if providing children with verbal information concerning the role that the tubes play, in determining the ball's trajectory would improve their performance. Experiment 1 showed that performance of 3.5-year-olds improved after hearing testimony about the movement of the ball. Experiment 2 showed that the specific content of the testimony – rather than any accompanying non-verbal cues – helped children improve. These findings suggest that other people's testimony can be a valuable source of information when young children learn about the physical world. Indeed, under some circumstances children seem to benefit more from verbal than visual information. An educational implication is that it may sometimes be ineffective to focus on the impact of first-hand experience while marginalizing the role of verbal information.     

Retrieval of Episodic Information From Memory: Comparisons Among 3- and 4-Year-Olds, 7- and 8-Year-Olds,and Adults

Young children's and adults' recall of episodic information was explored in 4 experiments. The task required participants to recall a target noun presented as the last item of a 4-noun string of related (either categorically or thematically) or unrelated words. Providing all 3 preceding nouns or a subset of them cued recall. Experiment 1 found that 7- and 8-year-old children's recall was better with pictures as opposed to text, and children showed performance equal to adults with thematically related pictorial stimuli. Using pictorial stimuli, Experiment 2 showed that the number of cues present at retrieval affected 7- and 8-year-olds' recall. Experiments 3 and 4 tested recall of episodic information in 3- and 4-year-olds using pictorial stimuli. The results suggested that young children also have access to episodic information in memory and the number of cues present at retrieval influenced recall. The findings are discussed in the context of children's memory for events.     

Generalizing Kant's Distinction between Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Trust in Different Situations

Based on previous research that violations of perfect duties cause stronger correspondent inferences than violations of imperfect ones, the authors performed four experiments to generalize this effect to trust. In Experiment 1, abstract violations of perfect duties resulted in less trust than violations of imperfect ones for specific trust scenarios. In Experiments 2 and 3, the authors experimented with different levels of abstractness of the duty violations and obtained similar effects. Experiment 4 was concerned with generalizing further—from duty violations in one situation to trust in a different situation. Although mostly consistent with the findings from Experiments 1–3, the data also demonstrated partial generalization for violations of both perfect and imperfect duties.     

Developing organization of mental verbs: Evidence for the development of a constructivist theory of mind in middle childhood

Two experiments examined the development of a theory of mind in middle childhood by examining changes in the organization of mental verbs of knowing. In both experiments, children and adults rated the similarity of pairs of mental verbs in terms of the way they felt they used their mind in each one. Experiment 1 used thirty-six 8- and thirty-four 10-year-olds, and 27 adults. In Experiment 2, 9- and 11-year-old children were classified according to their cognitive monitoring ability (Markman, 1981). Fifteen cognitive monitoring and 15 nonmonitoring children were used, and 33 adults also participated. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses of each group's ratings indicated that participants distinguished mental verbs according to the certainty aspects and information processing aspects of mental activity. Older children and comprehension monitors placed greater emphasis on the certainty aspects of mental activity than younger children and comprehension nonmonitors. It is concluded that important aspects of a constructivist theory of mind develop during middle childhood.     

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others’ irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.     

Mere social knowledge impacts children's consumption and categorization of foods

How does social information affect the perception of taste early in life? Does mere knowledge of other people's food preferences impact children's own experience when eating? In Experiment 1, 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children consumed more of a food described as popular with other children than a food that was described as unpopular with other children, even though the two foods were identical. In Experiment 2, children ate more of a food described as popular with children than a food described as popular with adults. Experiment 3 tested whether different perceptual experiences of otherwise identical foods contributed to the mechanisms underlying children's consumption. After sampling both endpoints of a sweet‐to‐sour range (applesauce with 0 mL or 5mL of lemon juice added), children were asked to taste and categorize applesauce samples with varying amounts of lemon juice added. When classifying ambiguous samples that were near the midpoint of the range (2 mL and 3 mL), children were more likely to categorize popular foods as sweet as compared to unpopular foods. Together, these findings provide evidence that social information plays a powerful role in guiding children's consumption and perception of foods. Broader links to the sociality of food selection are discussed.     

Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator's group affiliation

To become cooperative members of their cultural groups, developing children must follow their group's social norms. But young children are not just blind norm followers, they are also active norm enforcers, for example, protesting and correcting when someone plays a conventional game the "wrong" way. In two studies, we asked whether young children enforce social norms on all people equally, or only on ingroup members who presumably know and respect the norm. We looked at both moral norms involving harm and conventional game norms involving rule violations. Three-year-old children actively protested violation of moral norms equally for ingroup and outgroup individuals, but they enforced conventional game norms for ingroup members only. Despite their ingroup favoritism, young children nevertheless hold ingroup members to standards whose violation they tolerate from outsiders.     

Knowing How to Project Objects: Probing the Generality of Children's Action Knowledge

Previous work on the development of intuitive knowledge about trajectories has shown a dissociation between young children's aimed throwing actions, in which they are highly sensitive to the physical laws of motion, and their explicit judgments, in which they exhibit misconceptions. This research investigated the generality of children's action knowledge by having the participants project a ball with a sling. Instead of adjusting sling stretch, and hence sling force, correctly as a function of both the release height and the target distance, 5- and 6-year-olds (Experiment 1, N = 32) and, without flight feedback, even most 7- to 10-year-olds (Experiment 2, N = 96) considered distance only and ignored the height dimension. Similarly, children's judgments of the required sling stretch tended to follow a distance-only rule, especially with children younger than 9 years of age. These results show that young children's action knowledge exhibited in throwing does not generalize to arbitrary means of force production. They further suggest that there is no developmental trend toward such generalization in the age range examined.     

Teenage Childbearing,Reproductive Justice,and Infant Mental Health

Reproductive justice advocates emphasize the rights of women to choose to have children, to decide the conditions under which they give birth, and to parent their children with support, safety, and dignity. This article examines what a reproductive justice perspective contributes to infant mental health work with teenage mothers and their families. It explores the historical framing of teenage pregnancy in which young mothers are the cause of a variety of social problems and in which the primary policy and practice approach is pregnancy prevention. The article offers alternative framings of teenage childbearing, based on reproductive justice principles, which focus on social conditions surrounding teenage parenthood and the meaning of motherhood in the lives of young women. These alternative frames shift the practice agenda to eradicating unjust social conditions and providing supports for young women in their roles as parents. The article then describes ways in which two infant mental health programs have incorporated reproductive justice principles into their work with young families: Chicago's community doula model and Florida's Young Parents Project for court-involved teenage parents. Finally, the article extracts a set of principles deriving from a reproductive justice perspective that are relevant to infant mental health work with young families.     

Trick or treat: Children's understanding of surprise

This study examines the hypothesis that an understanding of false belief would lead to a radical change in young children's understanding of surprise. In Experiment 1, children aged 3 to 8 years were asked to assess the knowledge state of another person and to then choose an object that would surprise that person. The results showed that whereas the 3-year-olds' choice of surprising object varied with the object, the 5-year-olds' choice of object varied with their assessment of the other's knowledge state. Hence, understanding surprise depends on an understanding of false belief. In Experiment 2, the number of questions was reduced and children were required to match a schematized facial expression to the object judged to be surprising. Again, older children, unlike their younger counterparts, pointed out that surprised faces are made when another's expectations are violated. Once children begin to ascribe belief states to others they begin to understand that surprise depends upon the unexpected. The results help resolve the differences in the findings of Wellman and Banerjee (1991) and Hadwin and Perner (1991) on children's understanding of surprise. In natural judgements, young children employ a principle of desirability; older children employ principles of belief violation.