Children's Understanding of the Causal Origins of Disability

This study explores children's understanding of the causal origins of disabilities. Using a forced-choice explanation task, children's understanding of social-psychological, physical, and biological causal explanations of disabilities was considered. We presented 79 children (26 4- to 5-year-olds, 26 6- to 7-year-olds, and 27 10- to 11-year-olds) with 4 vignettes describing a child with a particular disability (physical disability, blindness, learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder). Participants rated their agreement with a variety of causal explanations of disability. Results showed significant age, disability, and causal explanation differences in children's causal understandings of disability. Children of all ages showed a preference for physical and biological causes of disability and rejected social-psychological causal explanations. These findings highlight the usefulness of employing a forced-choice methodology to examine young children's concepts of the causal origins of disabilities.     

Children's memory for a personally experienced event: Implications for testimony

This study was prompted by an interest in children's abilities to testify in legal settings. Based on the fundamental premise that children cannot provide accurate testimony about events that cannot be remembered, this investigation focused on 3- and 6-year-olds' memory of a salient, personally experienced event. The event selected was that of a visit to the doctor for a physical examination. Children at both ages remembered most of the features of the check-up at an immediate memory test, although the older children performed somewhat better than younger children. In addition, the performance of the 3-year-olds decreased over delay intervals of 1 and 3 weeks, whereas that of the 6-year-olds remained constant over this period. Moreover, at all assessment points the older children provided more information in response to open-ended general questions than did the younger children. Both groups of children were quite good at giving accurate responses to misleading questions, although the 3-year-olds performed below the level of 6-year-olds. The need for further controlled studies of children's memory capabilities is discussed.     

Children and the War on Iraq: Developmental Differences in Fear Responses to Television News Coverage

The purpose of this study was to examine age-related differences in children's responses to news coverage of the War on Iraq. To this end, a random sample of 161 parents of 5- to 17-year-olds in Ingham County, Michigan was surveyed about their child's fear responses to the war and patterns of exposure. Using developmental theory and research, age-related hypotheses were advanced. The results show that 13- to 17-year-olds reportedly watched more news coverage of the war and experienced greater fear/concern than did 5- to 8-year-olds. Also consistent with predictions, younger children were reportedly more scared by concrete, visual dangers depicted in the news whereas older children were reportedly more scared by abstract, verbally communicated threats. Despite multiple controls, news viewing of the War on Iraq was a significant and positive predictor of children's heightened safety concerns but not behavioral manifestations of upset.     

What Is a Conventional Object Function? The Effects of Intentionality and Consistency of Use

By preschool age, children have a sophisticated assumption about the conventional nature of various kinds of information. The present studies investigated the role of two cues in 2- and 3-year-olds' determination of what is conventional, namely the intentionality and intra-individual consistency in the use of objects. Overall, in Study 1, both 2- and 3-year-olds were more likely to say that the expected use and purpose of an object was a function intentionally and consistently demonstrated. In Study 2, 3-year-olds but not 2-year-olds generalized their expectation about the conventionality of an intentionally demonstrated function to another agent's learning of the function. These findings shed light on how children's assumption of what is conventional gets refined via children's intuitive interpretive dispositions regarding human actions.     

Children's,adolescents’, and adults’ judgments and reasoning about different methods of teaching values

This study investigated children's, adolescents’, and young adults’ judgments and reasoning about teaching two values (racial equality and patriotism) using methods that varied in provision for children's rational autonomy, active involvement, and choice. Ninety-six participants (7–8-, 10–11-, and 13–14-year-olds, and college students) evaluated four methods of teaching values in schools (Inculcation, Direct Teaching, Behavioral, and Discussion) for agents of two ages (3rd and 8th grade students), and in two contexts (student- vs. teacher-implemented methods). Older participants were more likely than younger participants (7–8-year-olds) to distinguish value education methods that stimulated children's rational thought processes and active involvement, and to coordinate factors such as the age of agents and the context of implementation in their judgments and reasoning.     

Perspective taking and cognitive flexibility in the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task

In a study with 79 3-year-olds, we confirm earlier findings that separating the sorting dimensions improve children's performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. We also demonstrate that the central reason for this facilitation is that the two sorting dimensions are not integral features of a single object. Spatial separation of the sorting dimensions has no additional significant influence. This finding highlights the important role of objects with respect to children's attentional flexibility. Implications for current theories on the DCCS task and for the development of perspective taking and cognitive flexibility are discussed.     

Children's Level of Participation in a False-Belief Task,Age, and Theory of Mind

The hide-and-seek deception task of M. Chandler, A. S. Fritz, and S. Hala (1989) was modified to provide a more precise estimate of the age at which children acquire and manifest a theory of mind. Two characters (good, bad) and two levels of involvement (pretend play, sociodramatic play) were incorporated into the research design, so that children's representational understanding of deception could be studied. Two-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (N = 90) participated in the study. The results indicated that 4-year-olds used significantly more deceptive strategies than 2- and 3-year-olds in pretend play and in sociodramatic play. There was no difference between 2- and 3-year-olds in the use of deceptive strategies; they used significantly fewer strategies in the bad roles than in the good roles. No significant differences were found in the 3 age groups' performances in the good-character tasks. The reality-masking hypothesis (P. Mitchell, 1994) accounts for the differences in performances on that task; thus, children younger than 4 years old do seem to have a theory of mind.     

Keeping the reader's mind in mind: Development of perspective-taking in children's dictations

This study investigated when children can take the perspective of their reader if the information-processing demands of writing are removed by means of dictation to a scribe. Participants (N = 96) aged 5, 6 and 7 years dictated letters to an addressee who possessed requisite content knowledge, and then revised the letter or dictated a new letter to an addressee who lacked this knowledge (counterbalanced). Results showed that 19% of 5-year-olds, 41% of 6-year-olds, and 72% of 7-year-olds considered their reader's missing knowledge. Children's awareness of their reader's knowledge was neither related to performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks, nor to measures of executive function. Significantly greater perspective-taking was demonstrated in children's new letters than revised letters. However, although revision is considered a late-developing skill, half of even the 5-year-olds were able to make revisions (albeit few revisions demonstrated actual perspective-taking). Findings have significant implications for the emergent-literacy curriculum.     

Knowing How to Project Objects: Probing the Generality of Children's Action Knowledge

Previous work on the development of intuitive knowledge about trajectories has shown a dissociation between young children's aimed throwing actions, in which they are highly sensitive to the physical laws of motion, and their explicit judgments, in which they exhibit misconceptions. This research investigated the generality of children's action knowledge by having the participants project a ball with a sling. Instead of adjusting sling stretch, and hence sling force, correctly as a function of both the release height and the target distance, 5- and 6-year-olds (Experiment 1, N = 32) and, without flight feedback, even most 7- to 10-year-olds (Experiment 2, N = 96) considered distance only and ignored the height dimension. Similarly, children's judgments of the required sling stretch tended to follow a distance-only rule, especially with children younger than 9 years of age. These results show that young children's action knowledge exhibited in throwing does not generalize to arbitrary means of force production. They further suggest that there is no developmental trend toward such generalization in the age range examined.     

The Blicket Within: Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes

Four experiments examined children's inferences about the relation between objects' internal parts and their causal properties. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds recognized that objects with different internal parts had different causal properties, and those causal properties transferred if the internal part moved to another object. In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds made inferences from an object's internal parts to its causal properties without being given verbal labels for objects or being shown that insides and causal properties covaried. Experiment 3 found that 4-year-olds chose an object with the same internal part over one with the same external property when asked which object had the same causal property as the target (which had both the internal part and external property). Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that 4-year-olds made similar inferences from causal properties to internal parts, but 3-year-olds relied more on objects' external perceptual appearance. These results suggest that by the age of 4, children have developed an understanding of a relation between an artifact's internal parts and its causal properties.     

My future self: Young children's ability to anticipate and explain future states

Two experiments examine preschool-aged children's ability to anticipate physiological states of the self. One hundred and eight 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were presented with stories and pictorial scenes designed to evoke thought about future states such as thirst, cold, and hunger. They were asked to imagine themselves in these scenarios and to choose one item from a set of three that they would need. Only one of the items could be used to address the future state. In both experiments, developmental differences were obtained for correct item choices and types of verbal explanations. In Experiment 2, the performance of the 3- and 4-year-olds was negatively affected by introducing items that were semantically associated with the scenarios but did not address the future state, whereas the 5-year-olds’ performance was not. Results are discussed with respect to children's understanding of the future, theory of mind, and inhibitory control skills.     

Young children's understanding of diversity in pretense

Four studies probed preschoolers' understanding of diversity in the domain of pretense. In Study 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown video skits in which two characters pretended different things with the same object. To assess preschoolers understanding that the mind is involved in pretense, thought bubbles were superimposed over the actors' heads. Results of this study indicated that both 3- and 4-year-olds appreciate the potential for diversity in pretense, and understand pretense to be a mental activity. Results of Study 2 replicate Study 1, and argue against alternative explanations for participants' good performance in that study. Studies 3 and 4 compared the unique contributions made by dialogs and thought bubbles and revealed that 3-year-olds relied more on actors' mental contents than on their actions or dialogs when reasoning about pretense. Results of the studies are discussed in terms of children's developing understanding of the subjective and mental aspects of pretense, and the implications of this understanding for the development of their understanding of mind more generally.     

Right and Righteous: Children's Incipient Understanding and Evaluation of True and False Statements

Two studies examined young children's early understanding and evaluation of truth telling and lying and the role that factuality plays in their judgments. Study 1 (one hundred four 2- to 5-year-olds) found that even the youngest children reliably accepted true statements and rejected false statements and that older children's ability to label true and false (T/F) statements as “truth” and “lie” emerged in tandem with their positive evaluation of true statements and “truth” and their negative evaluation of false statements and “lie.” The findings suggest that children's early preference for factuality develops into a conception of “truth” and “lie” that is linked both to factuality and moral evaluation. Study 2 (one hundred twenty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds) revealed that whereas young children exhibited good understanding of the association of T/F statements with “truth,” “lie,” “mistake,” “right,” and “wrong,” they showed little awareness of assumptions about speaker knowledge underlying “lie” and “mistake.” The results further support the primacy of factuality in children's early understanding and evaluation of truth and lies.     

Seeing Things Unseen: Fantasy Beliefs and False Reports

Whereas past research has demonstrated that children's beliefs about the real world can influence their memory for events, the role of fantasy beliefs in children's recall remains largely unexplored. We examine this topic in 5- and 6-year-olds by focusing on how belief in a familiar fantasy figure, namely the Tooth Fairy, is related to children's memory for their most recent primary tooth loss. Although children who fully believed in the reality of the Tooth Fairy provided more voluminous and complex accounts than those with less strong beliefs, they also provided the most fictitious reports, frequently characterized by claims of hearing or seeing the Tooth Fairy. Belief in the Tooth Fairy did not affect the accuracy of children's reports of the mundane elements of their tooth loss, and many fantastic claims were linked to real events. Exposure to seemingly tangible evidence of the Tooth Fairy's existence was associated with the provision of fantastic claims.     

“They Danced Around in My Head and I Learned Them”: Children's Developing Conceptions of Learning

Two studies examined how 3–6-year-olds understand the process of learning. In study 1 examined how children spontaneously talk about learning via a CHILDES language analysis. Talk about the learning process increased between the ages of 3–5. Talk specifically about learning in terms of desire decreased during this period. This suggests the possibility that desire is important to children's initial understanding of learning, and children develop an understanding that various mental states including desire, attention, and intention, play a role in the learning process. In Study 2, we presented 4- and 6-year-olds with a set of stories designed to test their understanding of the role of these mental states. In both their judgments about whether someone learns and their justifications of their responses, younger children relied more on the character's desires whereas older children were more likely to integrate desire, attention, and intention together. These data suggest that children's understanding of the process of learning is developing during the early elementary school years.     

Preschoolers trust novel members of accurate speakers' groups and judge them favourably

By age 3, children track a speaker's record of past accuracy and use it as a cue to current reliability. Two experiments (N?=?95 children) explored whether preschoolers' judgements about, and trust in, the accuracy of a previously reliable informant extend to other members of the informant's group. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year-olds consistently judged an animated character who was associated with a previously accurate speaker more likely to be correct than a character associated with a previously inaccurate speaker, despite possessing no information about these characters' individual records of reliability. They continued to show this preference one week later. Experiment 2 presented 4- and 5-year-olds with a related task using videos of human actors. Both showed preferences for members of previously accurate speakers' groups on a common measure of epistemic trust. This result suggests that by at least age 4, children's trust in speaker testimony spreads to members of a previously accurate speaker's group.     

Preschoolers Use Questions as a Tool to Acquire Knowledge From Different Sources

How do children use questions as tools to acquire new knowledge? The current experiment examined preschool children's ability to direct questions to appropriate sources to acquire knowledge. Fifty preschoolers engaged in a task that entailed asking questions to discover which special key would open a box that contained a prize. Children solved simple and complex problems by questioning two puppet experts who knew about separate features of each key. Results indicate dramatic developmental differences in the efficiency and efficacy of children's questions. Although even 3-year-olds asked questions, their questions were largely ineffective and directed toward inappropriate sources. Four-year-olds directed questions toward the appropriate sources but asked approximately equal numbers of effective and ineffective questions. Only 5-year-olds both asked the appropriate sources and formulated effective questions. Implications for the development of problem-solving abilities are discussed.     

The Recognition of Adults' and Children's Facial Expressions of Emotions

The purpose of this study was to compare the recognition performance of children who identified facial expressions of emotions using adults' and children's stimuli. The subjects were 60 children equally distributed in six subgroups as a function of sex and three age levels: 5, 7, and 9 years. They had to identify the emotion that was expressed in 48 stimuli (24 adults' and 24 children's expressions) illustrating six emotions: happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness. The task of the children consisted of selecting the facial stimulus that best matched a short story that clearly described an emotional situation. The results indicated that recognition performances were significantly affected by the age of the subjects: 5-year-olds were less accurate than 7- and 9-year-olds who did not differ among themselves. There were also differences in recognition levels between emotions. No effects related to the sex of the subjects and to the age of the facial stimuli were observed.