Government Surveillance and Why Defining Privacy Matters in a Post‐Snowden World

There is a long‐running debate as to whether privacy is a matter of control or access. This has become more important following revelations made by Edward Snowden in 2013 regarding the collection of vast swathes of data from the Internet by signals intelligence agencies such as NSA and GCHQ. The nature of this collection is such that if the control account is correct then there has been a significant invasion of people's privacy. If, though, the access account is correct then there has not been an invasion of privacy on the scale suggested by the control account. I argue that the control account of privacy is mistaken. However, the consequences of this are not that the seizing control of personal information is unproblematic. I argue that the control account, while mistaken, seems plausible for two reasons. The first is that a loss of control over my information entails harm to the rights and interests that privacy protects. The second is that a loss of control over my information increases the risk that my information will be accessed and that my privacy will be violated. Seizing control of another's information is therefore harmful, even though it may not entail a violation of privacy. Indeed, seizing control of another's information may be more harmful than actually violating their privacy.     

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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On Not Taking Objective Risk Assessments at Face Value

Progress in gene sequencing could make rapid whole genome sequencing of individuals affordable to millions of persons and useful for many purposes in a future era of genomic medicine. Using the idea of $1000 genome as a focus, this article reviews the main technical, ethical, and legal issues that must be resolved to make mass genotyping of individuals cost-effective and ethically acceptable. It presents the case for individual ownership of a person's genome and its information, and shows the implications of that position for rights to informed consent and privacy over sequencing, testing, and disclosing genomic information about identifiable individuals. Legal recognition of a person's right to control his or her genome and the information that it contains is essential for further progress in applying genomic discoveries to human lives.     

The Right to Privacy,Control Over Self-Presentation,and Subsequent Harm

Andrei Marmor has recently offered a narrow interpretation of the right to privacy as a right to having a reasonable amount of control over one's self-presentation. He claims that the interest people have in preventing others from abusing their personal information to do harm is not directly protected by the right to privacy. This article rejects that claim and defends a view according to which concerns about abuse play a central role in fleshing out the appropriate scope of a general right to privacy.     

"I-I" AND "I-ME": TRANSPOSING BUBER's INTERPERSONAL ATTITUDES TO THE INTRAPERSONAL PLANE

Hermans' polyphonic model of the self proposes that dialogical relationships can be established between multiple I-positions1 (e.g., Hermans, 2001a). There have been few attempts, however, to explicitly characterize the forms that these intrapersonal relationships may take. Drawing on Buber's (1958) distinction between the "I-Thou" and "I-It" attitude, it is proposed that intrapersonal relationships can take one of two forms: an "I-I" form, in which one I-position encounters and confirms another I-position in its uniqueness and wholeness; and an "I-Me" form, in which one I-position experiences another I-position in a detached and objectifying way. This article argues that this I-Me form of intrapersonal relating is associated with psychological distress, and that this is so for a number of reasons: Most notably, because an individual who objectifies and subjugates certain I-position cannot reconnect with more central I-positions when dominance reversal (Hermans, 2001a) takes place. On this basis, it is suggested that a key role of the therapeutic process is to help clients become more able to experience moments of I-I intrapersonal encounter, and it is argued that this requires the therapist to confirm the client both as a whole and in terms of each of his or her different voices.     

Gratifications in change of privacy? The response of four consumers' generational cohorts toward facial recognition technology in retail settings

New technologies enable retailers to collect large amounts of information about consumers, which might lead to ethical issues and risks of individuals' privacy loss. However, consumers might choose to disclose information to retailers when they perceive that the information would generate more benefits for themselves rather than for the retailer. Since little research has been done to explain the role of age in disclosing personal information to third parties, the present study investigates the difference in the perception of one's own control when it comes to the usage of privacy-threatening technology depending on respondents' age. Drawing upon uses and gratification theory, the present study explores the response of consumers from four generational cohorts towards the facial recognition technology in retailing. Results reveal that the locus of control over information collected by the technology is neither related to the age of consumers nor to their knowledge of a specific technology used to collect their personal data. Instead, consumers' expected gratifications (in terms of economic and utilitarian) vary across different age groups. Implications for practitioners are discussed.     

Privacy and the Computer: Why We Need Privacy in the Information Society

For more than thirty years an extensive and significant philosophical debate about the notion of privacy has been going on. Therefore it seems puzzling that most current authors on information technology and privacy assume that all individuals intuitively know why privacy is important. This assumption allows privacy to be seen as a liberal "nice to have" value: something that can easily be discarded in the face of other really important matters like national security, the doing of justice and the effective administration of the state and the corporation. In this paper I want to argue that there is something fundamental in the notion of privacy and that due to the profoundness of the notion it merits extraordinary measures of protection and overt support. I will also argue that the notion of transparency (as advocated by Wasserstrom) is a useless concept without privacy and that accountability and transparency can only be meaningful if encapsulated in the context of privacy. From philosophical and legal literature I will discuss and argue the value of privacy as the essential context and foundation of human autonomy in social relationships. In the conclusion of the paper I will discuss implications of this notion of privacy for the information society in general, and for the discipline of information systems in particular.     

The role of information about "convention," "design," and "goal" in representing artificial kinds

In this chapter, we have considered the nature and development of our capacities for the representation of artificial kinds. We have presented a range of evidence collected using varying methods and from our own laboratories and those of others that speaks to the question of the kinds of information that might be central to knowledge of artifacts and their functions in human semantic memory. One key argument here has been that despite the fact that information about shared convention has been argued to play an important role in understanding of the "proper" uses of artifacts, just as it does in the case of the use of linguistic symbols within language communities, there are important differences between the two cases, and indeed across development, decisions about categories and functions dissociate. We have argued here that the nonarbitrary relationship between the material kind and mechanical structure of artifacts and the functions that can be supported undercuts the force of information about convention as important to determining proper artifact function. Shared convention appears less important for determining this facet of our semantic memory for artifacts than it does in supporting the proper relationship between linguistic symbols and the categories of artifact to which they refer.     

When the Woman Presents Herself as "the Patient"

The thesis of this paper is that women are delegated by their families, by sociocultural norms and stereotypes, and by the psychotherapeutic community to perform in the role of patient. In many cases women are diagnosed, labeled and treated for supposed intrapsychic difficulties without adequate consideration of the relationships of the woman's social system to the dysfunction. This acceptance of the notion of intrapsychic causation in the woman, while ignoring the larger family system, grows out of a cultural world view which stresses individual self-determination is economically rewarding for the therapeutic community (two-thirds of the client population is female), it does a disservice to the woman and her family. A societal myth is perpetuated of the women as the "problem-bearer" and the one who is "sicker" or "crazier" than others in her family. The woman's symptoms need to be viewed as having interpersonal reality; symptoms are tactics of communication not mythological internalized driving forces with special attraction to the female psyche. An attempt will be made to outline how therapists may unwittingly collude in perpetuating the myth of individual dysfunction in the woman. Ideas are presented for viewing the woman's request for service as an attempt to solve a systemic problem and how therapists, by recognizing the function of the symptom in the woman's social system, can help the woman better define and solve the problem.     

The emergence of "family integrity" in later life

In contrast to the rich and abundant literature on the early stages of the family life cycle, there are relatively few theoretical accounts of family developmental processes in the second half of life. In an effort to address this imbalance, we introduce the concept of "family integrity" to refer to the ultimate, positive outcome of an older adult's developmental striving toward meaning, connection, and continuity within his or her multigenerational family. Subjectively, for the older adult, family integrity may be experienced as a deep and abiding sense of peace and/or satisfaction with his or her multigenerational family relationships, past, present, and future. It is the result of a growing concern for relational closure that typically begins to emerge in mid-life and gains ascendance in later-life. Objectively, at the level of observable relational processes, it is manifest in three interrelated competencies of the family as a system: (a) the transformation of relationships over time in a manner that is dynamic and responsive to the changing life cycle needs of individual family members, (b) the resolution or acceptance of past losses or family conflicts, with the dead as well as the living, and (c) the shared creation of meaning by passing on individual and family legacies within and across generations. As a construct, family integrity involves processes at multiple levels of social organization. At the individual level, it refers to an older adult's inner experience of satisfaction or "completeness" in the context of his or her family relationships. At the family level, it refers to observable relational competencies and transactions that contribute directly to an elder's sense of meaning, purpose, and connection with others. Simultaneously, at the level of culture and society, there are values and rituals that influence whether individuals experience meaning and purpose within the multigenerational family.     

Relationships,Environment, and the Brain: How Emerging Research is Changing What We Know about the Impact of Families on Human Development

Recent research is providing family therapists with new information about the complex interaction between an individual's biological makeup and his/her social and physical environment. Family and social relationships, particularly during sensitive periods early in life, can affect a child's biological foundation. Additionally, stress during the early years can have a lasting effect on an individual's physical and mental health and contribute to the onset of severe mental illness. Community programs have been developed to intervene early with families who have an at‐risk child to prevent or minimize the onset of mental illness including providing partnerships with at‐risk mothers of infants to shape attachment relationships. Programs are also developing individual and family interventions to prevent the onset of psychosis. Practicing family therapists can incorporate emerging neuroscience and early intervention research and leverage the growing base of community programs to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of mental health outcomes for clients. Additionally, family therapy education programs should broaden student training to incorporate the growing body of information about how family relationships affect individual mental health development.     

Contributions of contingencies in modern societies to "privacy" in the behavioral relations of cognition and emotion

The aim of this paper is to examine specific features of modern individualistic societies that contribute to "emotions" and "cognitions" becoming a matter of privacy. Although some behavior analysts identify emotions and cognitions as "private events," we argue with Skinner (1945) that cognitions and emotions are relations among events and that their origin is in public events in the contingencies of reinforcement maintained by other people. Guided by Elias (1939/1996), we suggest that the shift from feudal economies to market economies involved the increasing individualization of society's members. This individualizing process includes the socially maintained contingencies that bring some verbal responses under control of private stimulation and reduce the magnitude of some verbal responses to a covert level. Behavioral relations in which either stimuli or responses (or both) cannot be observed by others set the stage for a concept of "privacy." Changes in societal contingencies that gave rise to individualization and the attribution of privacy to cognitions and emotions are suggested to include the following: (a) increasing frequency of individual consequences that have no apparent or direct relevance to the group; (b) increasing numbers of concurrent contingencies and choice requirements; (c) conflicts between immediate and delayed consequences for the individual; and (d) conflicts between consequences for the individual and for the group.     

Is there a duty to remain in ignorance?

Questions about information inform many debates in bioethics. One of the reasons for this is that at least some level of information is taken by many to be a prerequisite of valid consent. For others, autonomy in the widest sense presupposes information, because one cannot be in control of one’s life without at least some insight into what it could turn out to contain. Yet not everyone shares this view, and there is a debate about whether or not there is a right to remain in ignorance of one’s medical, and especially genetic, information. It is notable, though, that this debate leaves unexamined the assumption that, if a person wants information, he is entitled to it. This paper examines the assumption, specifically in relation to genetics, where learning facts about oneself may reveal facts about other people, particularly one’s close relatives. This may be taken as a violation of their privacy, and since privacy is something that we normally think should be respected, it is worth asking whether one ought to abjure the opportunity to obtain genetic information for the sake of privacy. In effect, there may be an argument to be made not just for a right to remain in ignorance, but for a duty to do so.     

Perceived information ownership and control: Negotiating communication preferences in potential adoption reunions

In this study, the tension adoptees feel between learning information about their past and protecting themselves from negative or unwanted information about their birth/adoption was explored. Specifically, communication privacy management theory was used to explore adoptee preferences for information during a potential reunion with their birth mother/family. Findings suggest adoptees' preferences for information ownership and control correspond to the following privacy rules: (a) permeably boundary privacy rules, (b) privacy rule calibrations of boundary access, (c) protection privacy rules, and (d) privacy rules restricting boundary access. In addition, adoptees often expressed that they would like their birth mothers to serve as information guardians, revealing desired information and concealing unwanted disclosures. By assuming this guardian role, birth mothers and adoptees might have less stressful reunions, especially if both parties have similar expectations for information preferences.     

Privacy and the encryption debate

Conclusion Robert Heinlein, author of Stranger in a Strange Land as well as countless other science fiction stories, once claimed that "The sole thing achieved by any privacy law is to make the bugs smaller." Heinlein may be correct, but that travesties will happen does not sanction them—and maybe we will invent bugs to root out and foil other bugs. I have argued for individual privacy rights or rights to control sensitive personal information. The explosion of digital technology has made possible severe violations of individual privacy by corporations, news agencies, and the government. If I am correct about all of this, one commonly used "public interest" argument given for limiting privacy rights has been undermined. It is also far from true to claim that the prevalence of strong encryption technology will lead to disaster. While I do not adhere to the view that "rights hold, though the heavens may fall," in this article I have maintained that the security arguments of law enforcement do not come close to meeting the threshold for violating privacy rights. The heavens are far from falling. He is the author of, "Employee Monitoring and Computer Technology" (forthcoming in Business Ethics Quarterly), "Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information Control," American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (October 1998) and is the editor of Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal, and International Dilemmas (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), in which he contributes "Introduction to Intellectual Property" and "Toward A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property."     

New Procedures for Analyzing Relational Communication

The purpose of this paper is to present a system for describing and indexing patterns of communication at the relational level, primarily in dyadic systems. Relational communication refers to the control aspects of message exchanges that define an interactor's relationships with others. The reciprocal definition of each individual's role at a given moment in the interaction is reflected in the relative control each individual has and/or is given by the other individual. The control-defining aspects of communication, rather than other information such communication may convey, is the focus of the coding system to be described. Further, the analysis deals with sequences of messages rather than individual messages, and attempts to index the control dimensions of those messages according to their similarity or difference. While previous interaction analysis techniques have been predominantly monadic in nature, i.e., single-message coding schemes, the present approach is based on a systems level of analysis. ¹ 1 See Rogers ( 9 ) for a detailed review and critique of existing interaction coding schemes.
     

Therapeutic moments are the key: foster children give clues to their past experience of infant trauma and neglect

Foster parents often despair over the lack of information about the past experience of the children in their care, particularly with children who have experienced infant trauma and neglect. In the context of family therapy these unknowns pose both a challenge and an opportunity. The author proposes that foster children gives clues to their past experiences in therapeutic moments, which the therapist may recognize as a result of her own inner conversation. In conjunction with a sound theoretical knowledge of infant trauma and neglect, these moments have the capacity to open a dialogue in the relationships between therapist, child and foster family. This dialogical process offers an opportunity for the child's past experience of infant trauma and neglect to be expressed in silence, and the foster parent's present experience to be heard in stillness, opening for them a way to go on beyond the family therapy sessions.     

Is it okay to tell? Children's judgements about information disclosure

The present research investigates how young children evaluate and reason about the disclosure of private information. Using story vignettes, children aged 4–5 and 7–8 years were asked to evaluate an individual who passed on information from a peer revealing that he or she had broken a rule (e.g., stolen a cookie; rule type) or lacked a skill (e.g., could not ride a bicycle; competence type). These negative valence stories were compared with positive valence stories in which the peer had followed a rule or possessed a skill. Younger children approved the sharing of positive, but not negative, information, irrespective of type (rule vs. competence). Older children disapproved the disclosure of someone's incompetence, whereas they approved the disclosure of a rule violation. Children justified their evaluations by reference to social rules in the rule‐type vignettes and to an individual's feelings in the competence‐type vignettes. The findings suggest that young children are concerned about the disclosure of negative information about other people, but with age they become increasingly concerned about protecting the social order even at the cost of individual privacy.     

心理治疗循证实践中“证据”的四个基本问题

循证实践正在成为西方心理治疗发展的主流方向。但如何理解循证实践的"证据"仍是见仁见智。部分社会大众甚至心理学专家仅将"循证"当作一种"修辞"或"时尚",顾名思义地界定"证据",或按主观信仰随意地选择与应用"证据"。文章以"证据"为研究焦点,试图建构系统理解"证据"的全面图景,探讨了心理治疗循证实践中关于"证据"的4个基本问题:(1)从历史考察与理论分析的视角出发,探讨了"心理治疗为什么需要证据";(2)从证据的类型范围、生产者及存在形式三个视角,描述了"心理治疗存在哪些证据";(3)从证据的科学程度、研究设计的严谨程度及解决实践问题的契合程度出发,阐述了"哪些证据才是好的证据";(4)从6个步骤推广证据及创新研究设计两个方面展开,分析了"在现实世界中如何推广与应用证据"。     

Cultural knowledge,category label,and social connections: Components of cultural identity in the global,multicultural context

Cultural identity refers to the psychological connection between an individual's self and a culture. In this paper, we identify three components that make up an individual's cultural identity – cultural knowledge, category label, and social connections. The cultural knowledge component connects an individual with a culture through the individual's direct endorsement of what are widely known to be the culture's central characteristics. The category label component connects an individual with a culture through the individual's depersonalized membership in a cultural collective. The social connections component connects an individual with a culture through networks of specific social relationships. The three components are conceptually distinct, and yet may have interconnections in influencing the development of cultural identity. We examine the implications of the three components on cultural identification processes in the context of multiculturalism and global cultural contact.