Interacting Minds: A Framework for Combining Process- and Accuracy-Oriented Social Cognitive Research

A number of problems posed by cognitive-mediational theories of emotion offer major challenges for theory and research. I address five problems that seem particularly important and vexing, and I offer some possible solutions. My purpose is to stimulate additional thought and interdisciplinary discussion. The problems include unconscious appraising; confusions about the bares of emotional variations across cultures; irrationality in our emotional life; research demands imposed by the transactional nature of emotion; and the potential for tautology when we treat appraisal as a cause of emotions. Although these problems are widely recognized, they have not been thoroughly dealt with, and they call for renewed efforts to seek solutions in the design of our research.     

Emotions,Me, Myself and I

We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they are about an object and evaluate it – this means that the relation between emotions and the self may take different shapes. My discussion focuses on three different claims about this relation. According to the first claim, all emotions are about the subject who undergoes them. The second claim appeals to a more moderate form of reflexivity and affirms that emotions always feature a representation of other psychological states of the subject. The third understands the relation between emotions and the self in evaluative terms: emotions are said to evaluate relationally, one of the terms of this relation being the subject who undergoes it. I argue that all three claims apply, at best, only to a limited subset of emotions and that they must sometimes give way to claims that do not presuppose any intentional connection between emotions and the self.     

Psychological and Religious Perspectives on Emotion

This article is devoted to examining theoretical issues on the interface of the psychology of religion and the psychology of emotion, something which recently has been surprisingly neglected. The broad range of psychological components involved in emotion, and the importance of emotional processes in religion, make it a particularly relevant area of general psychology as far as religion is concerned. The first issue to be examined is the centrality of emotion (or feeling ) in religion and the extent to which religion can be conceptualized as a kind of emotional state—an idea that can be found in different forms in Schleiermacher and James. Though both psychology and emotion are now seen as less private than previously supposed, the analogy remains potentially fruitful. The second issue arises from the notable tendency in the psychology of emotion to see emotion as functional, even rational, rather than disruptive. The view of Averill is endorsed that emotions can be psychologically creative when used appropriately. This leads to a review of attitudes toward emotional aspects of religion and religious attitudes to everyday emotions, where a positive but discriminating approach to emotions seems appropriate.     

The elements of emotion

I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion (IRT). In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three pieces of content: representations of (1) the emoter’s body, (2) something in the world, and (3) a relevance relation between the objects of these first two pieces of content. I describe four general advantages I think the IRT offers. Finally, in Section 3, I elucidate and defend my account by contrasting it with another, similar proposal: Barlassina and Newen’s Impure Somatic Theory. In so doing, I explain two additional advantages of my view: first, it supports a unified explanation of all types of emotional response; and second, it offers the best framework for explaining how the representational contents of an emotion are integrated.     

Gaze and emotional expression: The effects of message positivity-negativity and emotional intensity

The effects of emotional positivity-negativity and emotional intensity on actor's gaze were examined by simulating emotional situations to a camera. Female subjects were first asked to act out a neutral message as if they were speaking to a person to obtain a baseline for direct gaze. Subjects were then asked to perform a positive or a negative message to the camera. Half the subjects attempted to express the message with strong emotion; half expressed it with weak, ambivalent emotion. As expected, it was found that more direct gaze was maintained when expressing strong emotion. Whether the message was positive or negative did not affect gaze direction. The results were discussed in relation to the dimensions of nonverbal communication.     

Recalcitrant Fears of Death

According to what I will refer to as judgmentalist approaches to the fear of death (JFD), the fear of death conforms to the structure implied by judgmentalist theories of emotion. JFD holds that fears of death are constituted in part by evaluative judgments or beliefs about one’s own death. Although many philosophers endorse JFD (explicitly or implicitly), there is good reason to believe that it may be problematic. For, there is a troubling (and, for the purposes of this discussion, rather interesting) objection to judgmentalist theories of emotion; if judgmentalism is false, then so too is JFD. In brief, the worry with judgmentalist theories is this: it is sometimes the case that one has an emotion, but holds a belief (or beliefs) that is in tension with the emotion. For example, I sometimes fear flying despite the fact that I believe flying is not dangerous. Emotions of this sort are often referred to as recalcitrant emotions, and they are widely thought to pose a serious challenge to judgmentalist theories. In this paper, I consider an objection to JFD based on the existence of recalcitrant bouts of the fear of death. I include in this discussion an Epicurean-inspired solution to the problem of emotional recalcitrance. Although I argue this solution may be ultimately unsuccessful, I believe it is still worth considering. For, in most discussions of the problem of emotional recalcitrance, philosophers abandon judgmentalism in favour of some other theory of emotion. The Epicurean-inspired solution I discuss in this paper, however, may allow one to retain one’s commitment to judgmentalism.     

Emotion and Full Understanding

Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same object. If an emotional awareness does not have a unique character, then it is unlikely that emotions provide an understanding that is different from unemotional states of awareness: they are perhaps little more than “hot-blooded” instances of the same understanding. If, on the other hand, an emotional state involves a perceptual awareness that is unique to the emotion, then emotions are cognitively significant, providing an understanding of the object of the emotion that is absent in a similar but unemotional episode of awareness. I argue the latter and substantiate the claim that emotions are essential to moral virtue because they can be essential to a full understanding of the situations that they involve. In such cases, emotions are not merely a symptom of the possession of an adequate understanding, but are rather necessary for having an adequate understanding.     

The assessment of emotional clarity via response times to emotion items: shedding light on the response process and its relation to emotion regulation strategies

Researchers have begun to use response times (RTs) to emotion items as an indirect measure of emotional clarity. Our first aim was to scrutinise the properties of this RT measure in more detail than previously. To be able to provide recommendations as to whether (and how) emotional intensity – as a possible confound – should be controlled for, we investigated the specific form of the relation between emotional intensity and RTs to emotion items. In particular, we assumed an inverted U-shaped relation at the item level. Moreover, we analysed the RT measure’s convergent validity with respect to individuals’ confidence in their emotion ratings. As a second aim, we compared the predictive validity of emotional clarity measures (RT measure, self-report) with respect to daily emotion regulation. The results of three experience sampling studies showed that the association between emotional intensity and RT followed an inverted U shape. RT was in part related to confidence. Emotional clarity measures were unrelated to reappraisal. There was some evidence that lower emotional clarity was related to a greater use of suppression. The findings highlight that emotional intensity and squared emotional intensity should be controlled for when using the RT measure of emotional clarity in future research.     

Emotion,Evaluation, Desire,Behavior and Goals: a <Emphasis Type="Italic">Eudaimonistic</Emphasis> View

In this essay I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their corresponding evaluations, desires, behavior and goals. Such conceptual relation is of the utmost importance in order to account for the unity or oneness of emotion, for if the different aspects of emotion are linked conceptually, then to have one such aspect would imply having all the others. After I discuss how emotions are related to their corresponding evaluations, desires and behavior, I show how each aspect of emotion is related to the others. Next, I argue that indeed there is such conceptual or quasi-conceptual relation between emotions, evaluations and conative or desiderative states (i.e. desires or wishes). However, while intentional behavior in terms of actions is conceptually related to some emotions, other times the emotion-specific desires are either non-forward-looking, and thus do not give rise to intentional actions, or they may be overridden, and the resultant behavioral manifestations are not conceptually related to emotion. Next, I argue that emotions are eudaimonistic, in the sense that they are essentially concerned with important goals, concerns and attachments that comprise our conception of the good life and well-being. Finally, I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their respective goals, and argue that while emotions logically presuppose such goals, the reverse is not the case.     

THE LEGACY OF GORDON KAUFMAN: THEOLOGICAL METHOD AND ITS PRAGMATIC NORMS

I argue that the most significant contribution and legacy of Gordon Kaufman's work rests in his theological method. I limit my discussion to his methodological starting point, his concept of human nature, as he develops it in his book, In Face of Mystery. I show the relevance of this starting point for cultural and theological criticism by arguing two points: first, that this starting point embraces religious and cultural pluralism at its center, providing a framework for intercultural and interreligious discussion and cooperation, and second, that Kaufman's interpretation of religion that emerges out of this starting point embodies pragmatic criteria for evaluating and reconstructing alternative cultural and religious worldviews, so that they may function more adequately within the changing contexts of life.     

Effects of hedonic valence and physiological arousal on emotion: A comparison of two theoretical perspectives

Two theoretical perspectives concerned with how one emotional state may influence a subsequent one were examined. Zillmann's (1979) excitation transfer theory suggests that undetected residual arousal from a first state will transfer and intensify a subsequent state—regardless of the first state's hedonic valence. Baron's (1977) incompatible response model, on the other hand, suggests that the hedonic valence of an earlier state will affect the experience of a second state and that this effect will be strongest when the two states are temporally close. The results of this investigation support the incompatible response model but not the excitation transfer model. Unrecognized residual arousal from a prior state failed to affect subjects' second emotional state, although the hedonic valence of the prior state did affect the final emotional state when the second state was induced immediately after the first. All emotional states, although they may be equally arousing, do not affect subsequent emotion in an identical manner. When two emotional states are induced in quick succession, the hedonic valence of the prior state plays an important role in determining the intensity of the subsequent emotional state.     

Religiosity enhances emotion and deontological choice in moral dilemmas

While early psychological theories debated the relation between religiosity and moral decision making, more recent work approached this relation on empirical grounds using multidimensional measures of religiosity and moral dilemmas. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in religious thoughts and feelings, social desirability and mood on emotions and decisions in moral dilemmas that pit social welfare against harming another person. In order to increase emotional salience, moral dilemmas were framed as personal choices. Results indicated that the tendency to seek religious guidance in everyday life, and social desirability positively predicted deontological choices (i.e., refusing to harm one person in order to save several people). In addition, individual differences in religious feelings positively predicted negative emotion presence in these moral dilemmas. These results highlight the motivational and emotional dimensions of religiosity that influence moral choice and emotional experience in moral dilemmas.     

宗教体验的神经生理基础

宗教体验是人在宗教活动中的心态或体悟及伴随的情感体验,它是一个过程。其神经生理基础的研究表明,宗教体验过程中大脑的某些特定脑波或区域被激活。这些研究表明宗教体验与认知和情绪有关,在一定程度上与早期有关宗教体验实质的结论吻合,但这并不表明大脑中存在“上帝脑区”。该文简要介绍了宗教体验的概念、冥想以及基督教宗教体验神经生理基础的研究以及跨宗教传统的相关比较研究,并对该领域内的一些问题做出了说明     

When can we choose to forget? An ERP study into item-method directed forgetting of emotional words

Emotionally arousing information is treated in a specialised manner across a number of different processing stages, and memory for affective events is often found to be heightened by virtue of this. However, in some cases, emotional experiences might be the very ones that we would like to forget. Here, two item-method directed forgetting studies are presented which investigate people's ability to intentionally forget affective words when stimuli and memory instructions are presented simultaneously. In the first experiment an interaction between task instruction and emotional content was evident in a diminished directed forgetting effect for emotional words, suggesting that they may be relatively resistant to deliberate forgetting. The interaction between instruction and emotion appeared both in free recall of words and in a yes-no recognition task. In the second study, an ERP procedure was utilised to investigate whether emotion modulates the effects of instruction during the initial encoding of stimuli. Recognition data again showed a clear interaction between instruction and emotion, with a reduced directed forgetting effect for emotional words. The ERP data demonstrated evidence for individual effects of both emotion and instruction during encoding; however, despite this, no evidence for an interaction between these factors was evident in the ERP data. As such, we conclude that even when study items are presented simultaneously with their associated memory instructions, neither does emotion prevent differential processing of directed forgetting instruction, nor does memory instruction prevent differential processing of emotion during early encoding. Implications are discussed in relation to the directed forgetting literature and more broadly with respect to circumstances under which emotion and cognitive processing work in parallel or in competition with each other.     

A state space analysis of emotion and flexibility in parent-child interactions

Negative emotion has been shown to reduce flexibility in cognition and behavior. We examined interpersonal flexibility during negative emotional episodes within parent-child interactions. Fifty-five mothers and early-adolescent daughters were observed during a positive discussion, a negative (conflict) discussion, and another positive discussion. Codes of moment-to-moment changes in emotion expression were used to create state space grids from which measures of emotional valence and flexibility were derived. As expected, mean flexibility was lowest during the conflict discussion when negative emotion peaked, suggesting that interpersonal flexibility decreases with increasing negative emotion. Sub-groups identified as low or high in stress were also compared. Dyads with girls reporting more stressful events showed lower flexibility during the first positive discussion. However, dyads expressing more negative emotion during the conflict discussion were also more flexible, suggesting that flexible dyadic styles permit more negative emotion. These individual difference findings are discussed in terms of the suppression versus expression of negative emotions.     

Feelings in Moral Conflict and the Hazards of Emotional Intelligence

From some perspectives, it seems obvious that emotions and feelings must be both reasonable and morally significant: from others, it may seem as obvious that they cannot be. This paper seeks to advance discussion of ethical implications of the currently contested issue of the relationship of reason to feeling and emotion via reflection upon various examples of affectively charged moral dilemma. This discussion also proceeds by way of critical consideration of recent empirical enquiry into these issues in the literature of so-called emotional intelligence. In this regard, despite ambiguities in their accounts of the relationship of reason to emotion, advocates of emotional intelligence generally incline to therapeutic conceptions of emotional health which are not inconsistent with currently fashionable cognitivist accounts of feeling and emotion. All the same, it is arguable that therapeutic or other strategies which overplay the possibility of cognitive or other resolution of emotional conflict are prey to certain difficulties. First, they underemphasise those passive but identity-constitutive aspects of affect which are not obviously rationally accountable. Secondly, they insufficiently recognise the extent to which emotional conflicts can be significantly implicated in moral diversity. In view of either or both of these points, they may fail to appreciate the moral inappropriateness of attempts to resolve certain forms of emotional conflict or tension.     

情绪调节目标的分类与优化

摘要：情绪调节目标决定人们是否调节情绪以及怎样调节情绪。基于情绪调节服务功能的类型差异,可分离出以下类型的调节目标：增加积极体验可满足享乐性需要,社会事务需使用情绪的工具效用,复杂体验的融合可优化自我成长,而情绪体验的文化精致可促进自我与世界的融合。这些目标既可能相互一致,也存在多种冲突,对幸福体验产生综合影响。拓展积极情绪最大化的暂时性适应角色,理解内隐层面的心理因素和文化价值正当性对调节目标的制约,是未来研究的方向。     

Spontaneous emotional coordination of first-born dizygotic twins and singletons with their mothers in early infancy

We compare matching of facial expressions of emotion, completion of the positive valence of emotional expression, attunement of emotional intensity, and non-matching of emotion, in engagements with their mothers of firstborn dizygotic twins and of singletons. Nine twins and nine singletons were video-recorded at home in spontaneous face-to-face interactions from the second to the sixth month after birth. Microanalysis of infant and maternal facial expressions of emotion revealed qualitative and quantitative differences that indicate that engagements with twins had more frequent and more accurate emotional matching and attunements compared to those with singletons. Singletons displayed more emotional completion and non-matching reactions. Expressions of matching for pleasure and interest followed different developmental patterns in the two kinds of dyads. These results are discussed in relation to the theory of innate affective intersubjectivity. Differences may shed light on the relationship between sharing early life with a twin, and development of self-other awareness.     

‘The tables have turned’: Sport,emotion & the passive counter-politics of youth citizenship

This article considers the intersections between sport, emotion, and youth citizenship. I explore the emotional dynamics of citizenship of young people, in relation to sport, and within the context of liberal immigration polity in Singapore. In this qualitative study, I conducted video-elicitation written interviews (VEWI) with twenty-two Singaporean youths to understand the multiple ways in which young people negotiate and conceive of their citizenship through emotion, specifically in relation to an emotionally charged sport space. With the 2010 Moscow World Table Tennis Team Championships as the focus of this study, this article explores young people's ‘emotional subjectivities’ of citizenship to make sense of their strategies in articulating resistance through a form of passive counter-politics to top-down power relations of citizenship governance in Singapore. An emergent spatiality of emotional citizenship in relation to spaces of modern sport is identified, contributing to debates in geography and beyond.