Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?

Examples cited by Feldman, Lehrer and others of true beliefs that are justified, but not by false lemmas, turn out under scrutiny to involve false lemmas after all. In each case there is an EG inference whose conclusion is unwarranted unless its base instance is false. A shift to non-deductive justification does not avert the difficulty. The relation of this result to non-inferential Gettier cases is suggested.     

Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?

Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don't know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it's impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it's impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it's impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren't standard epistemological fare—at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious—but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it's possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I shall argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.     

Nature and Nurture: A False Dichotomy?

Nancy Tuana holds that the nature/nurture dichotomy does not accurately represent the world and hence that a whole series of assumptions about human nature is mistaken. She rejects both biological determinism and alternative interactionist views. I argue that although her arguments and political concerns do rule out any kind of simple biological determinism, they do not show that the alternative interactionist view is untenable: in fact, she uses the distinction in her attempt to demolish it. 1 argue that the assumption that “nature” implies fixity is the source of difficulties here, not the dichotomy itself.     

False Though Partly True – An Experiment in Logic

We explore in an experimental spirit the prospects for extending classical propositional logic with a new operator P intended to be interpreted when prefixed to a formula as saying that formula in question is at least partly true. The paradigm case of something which is, in the sense envisaged, false though still partly true is a conjunction one of whose conjuncts is false while the other is true. Ideally, we should like such a logic to extend classical logic – or any fragment thereof under consideration – conservatively, to be closed under uniform substitution (of arbitrary formulas for sentence letters or propositional variables), and to allow the substitutivity of provably equivalent formulas salva provabilitate. To varying degrees, we experience some difficulties only with this last (congruentiality) desideratum in the two four-valued logics we end up giving our most extended consideration to.     

False working memories? Semantic distortion in a mere 4 seconds

False memories are well-established, episodic memory phenomena: Semantically related associates are confidently and erroneously remembered as studied items. We report four experiments yielding similar effects in a working memory paradigm. Four semantically related words were retained over a brief interval. Whether or not the interval was filled with a math verification task, semantically related lures were mistakenly recognized as members of the memory set and took longer to reject than did unrelated negative probes. In a short-term recall task, semantic intrusions exceeded other errors (e.g., phonemic). Our results demonstrate false memory effects for a subspan list when a mere 4 sec was given between study and test. Such rapid semantic errors presumably result from associative processing, may be related to familiarity-based proactive interference in working memory, and are consistent with recent models that integrate short- and long-term memory processes.     

False recognition of associates: How robust is the effect?

False recognition of nonpresented words that were strong associates of 12 words in a study list was examined. Six lists were read to subjects; each list contained the 12 strongest associates to a critical nonpresented word. False-alarm rates to the 6 critical nonpresented words were obtained under several different conditions. The manipulations included varying the level of processing done to the study lists, varying the recognition-test procedure, repeating each of the study lists three times, and mixing the words from the six study lists together. A reliable false-recognition effect for critical nonpresented words was obtained in all conditions. However, the effect was not impervious to all of the manipulations. Significantly lower false recognition was obtained when learning was incidental as well as when the words on the six lists were mixed together. Neither level of processing nor repetition significantly influenced false recognition. This last result is inconsistent with Hintzman’s (1988) MINERVA 2 global memory model, but agrees with predictions from Shiffrin, Ratcliff, and Clark’s (1990) SAM model.     

Do Cognitive Interview Instructions Contribute to False Beliefs and Memories?

To examine whether exposing people to false events using instructions taken from the cognitive interview creates false beliefs and false memories, we conducted an experiment where participants took part in two sessions. First, they rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events and their memories of those events; they also rated how plausible they thought the events were. Second, 2 weeks later, participants were exposed to two of three false target events: one high, one moderate, and one low plausibility. For the first event, participants were instructed to either report everything or mentally reinstate the event context. For the second event, participants received both instructions. The third event was the control event about which participants received no instructions. Finally, participants rated their confidence and memories the second time. The results showed that the cognitive interview instructions had little to no effect on the development of false beliefs and false memories. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why perversion?: False love and the perverse pact1

In this paper, the author works with the awareness that perversion is a socially, historically and theologically loaded term, at the same time as it may be the latest frontier in psychoanalysis, both clinically, and in relation to contemporary art and culture which emphasize the perverse. Positioning itself against tendencies to deny the existence of a category of perversion or, inversely, to abuse it for the power that accrues from the act of diagnosing, she also points to other liabilities in the history of the treatment of this term, such as the narrowing down of perversion to the exclusively sexual domain, or, alternatively, the overextension of it to polymorphously erotic practices that enhance sexual excitement. The paradoxes of perversion and the difficulties of distinguishing the perverse from the non‐perverse are addressed. The case is also made that, in order to understand perversion, one must unlink it from the narrow notion of sexual practice and see what is involved on a deeper level an approach initiated when psychoanalysis turned to perversion as a defense against psychotic anxieties, and began considering the necessary place of perversion in the transference countertransference. Two features common to both sexual and non‐sexual perverse relations are the seductive and bribing aspects of perversion, and its means‐ends reversal. Perversion is a haven for the disguising of hatred and suspicion as excitement and (false) love. Displaced child and beating father, entitled child and seductive mother, are both prototypes of psychoanalytic refiection on parents who excite, deceive and corrupt their children and establish perverse pacts with them. The notion of the perverse pact is foregrounded in Alice's analysis, where first the resurrection and then the dismantling of such a pact were effected through various analytic means.     

Teacher Nominations of Preschool Children at Risk for Mental Health Problems: how False Is a False Positive Nomination and What Make Teachers Concerned?

Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment - Identification attempts in populations with a low prevalence of problems usually result in a considerable number of false positives. Thus, the...     

False reports from patients with frontotemporal dementia: delusions or confabulations?

Patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) can make false statements consistent with delusions or confabulations. It is unclear whether bvFTD is primarily associated with either delusions or with confabulations and whether they can be explained by the pathophysiology of this disease. In order to clarify this, we retrospectively surveyed the records of 48 patients with bvFTD for the presence of any false reports and identified four patients. Their false reports included continued interaction with a favorite but dead relation, fictitious marriages with movie stars, and two who claimed that their partner was having an affair. When confronted with the falsity of their statements, the patients conveyed a lack of certainty regarding their external or internal source but persisted in the constancy of their reports. On functional neuroimaging, the patients had predominant frontal involvement. This report found that patients with bvFTD can have both fantastic, wish fulfilling confabulations and typical content-specific delusions. We propose that both phenomena result from known disturbances of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in bvFTD, including deficits in source monitoring and in activating an automatic "doubt tag" for false reports.     

False or recovered memories?: Legal and ethical implications for therapists

The allegation that therapists encourage false memories of abuse in their clients presents a challenge to practitioners in the UK and USA. The development of the debate over false or recovered memories is briefly placed in its social and historical context. Some of the ethical and legal implications of this area of work for therapists are identified, using the concept of the Drama Triangle. Therapists may become involved in ethical dilemmas, and even in legal proceedings, by unwittingly being perceived by third parties as having taken on the roles of 'rescuer', persecutor' or 'victim'. Responses by therapists to this potential development could include adopting defensive forms of practice, promoting self-regulation, and establishing a more active presence in this wider debate.     

False action memories in older adults: Relationship with executive functions?

Merely observing another person performing an action can make young people later misremember having performed this action themselves (the observation-inflation effect). We examined this type of memory error in healthy older adults. Overall, both young and older adult groups showed robust observation inflation. Although the number of people committing observation-inflation errors did not differ between age groups, those older adults who were prone to this illusion showed a greater observation-inflation effect compared to the corresponding young. At the same time, observation also had beneficial effects on subsequent action memory, especially in older adults. Surprisingly, executive functioning was not correlated with the degree to which older adults made observation-inflation errors, but it was related to the degree to which older adults benefited from observation. We consider accounts of observation inflation based on source monitoring, familiarity misattribution, and motor simulation.     

False‐self sensitivity to countertransference: Anatomy of a single session

This paper describes how a patient's sensitivity to the counter‐transference sparked a transference regression that generated insight about her core conflict: False‐Self compliance at the expense of her needs for love, emotional support, and nurturance.

My patient's regression was important, first, because it produced symptoms that dramatically illustrated to her how much self‐denial she was willing to exercise to feel needed by others. Previously, such insight had not been effective because of the extraordinary secondary gains of her behavior. This time was more successful because of the ego‐dystonic symptoms that developed, with intense shame and embarrassment. Second, the regression resulted in a transference dream that provided her with new insights into the anxiety she was warding off through False‐Self compliance to the narcissistic requirements of her parents.     

False consensus in situational judgment tests: What would others do?

We introduce an alternative response instruction to reduce the fakability of situational judgment tests. This novel instruction is based on the false consensus effect, a robust social psychological bias whereby people infer that the majority of other people’s thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors are aligned with their own. In four studies, including both field and laboratory data (total N = 882), we demonstrate that participants show a false consensus bias when asked what others would do in situational judgment tests. Furthermore, the situational judgment test based on the false consensus effect turned out to relatively difficult to be fake, and produced scores that were meaningfully correlated with conceptually related traits, as well as both self-reported and behavioral outcomes.     

False memory and importance: Can we prioritize encoding without consequence?

Given the large amount of information that we encounter, we often must prioritize what information we attempt to remember. Although critical for everyday functioning, relatively little research has focused on how people prioritize the encoding of information. Recent research has shown that people can and do selectively remember information assigned with higher, relative to lower, importance. However, the mechanisms underlying this prioritization process and the consequences of these processes are still not well understood. In the present study, we sought to better understand these prioritization processes and whether implementing these processes comes at the cost of memory accuracy, by increasing false memories. We used a modified form of the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which participants studied DRM lists, with each list paired with low, medium, or high point values. In Experiment 1, encoding higher values led to more false memories than did encoding lower values, possibly because prioritizing information enhanced relational processing among high-value words. In Experiment 2, disrupting relational processing selectively reduced false memories for high-value words. Finally, in Experiment 3, facilitating relational processing selectively increased false memories for low-value words. These findings suggest that while prioritizing information can enhance true memory, this process concomitantly increases false memories. Furthermore, the mechanism underlying these prioritization processes depends on the ability to successfully engage in relational processing. Thus, how we prioritize the encoding of incoming information can come at a cost in terms of accurate memory.     

Do children "DRM" like adults? False memory production in children

The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm was used to investigate developmental trends in accurate and false memory production. In Experiment 1, DRM lists adjusted to be more consistent with children's vocabulary were used with 2nd graders, 8th graders, and college students. Accurate and false recall and recognition increased with age, but semantic information appeared to be available to all age groups. Experiment 2 created a set of child-generated lists based on the free associations by a group of 3rd graders to critical items. The child-generated associates were different from those generated by adults; long and short versions of the child-generated lists were therefore presented to 2nd, 5th, and 8th graders and college students in Experiment 3. Second graders exhibited few false memories, whereas 5th graders were similar to adults in low-demand conditions and more similar to younger children in high-demand conditions. Findings are discussed in terms of developmental changes in automatic and effortful processing and the use of semantic networks.     

Gating Out Misinformation: Can Young Children Follow Instructions to Ignore False Information?

The current study investigated the effects of misinformation on children's memory reports after practice with the logic-of-opposition instruction at time of test. Four- and 6-year-old children participated in a play event in Session 1. During a two-week delay, parents presented their children with either misinformation or correct information about the play event. Prior to a memory interview in Session 2, some misled children were given a developmentally appropriate logic-of-opposition instruction to not report information provided by their parents. Results indicated that children were misled by the incorrect information, but that the logic-of-opposition instruction aided in the children's retrieval of the original memory, particularly for the 6-year-olds. Implications of the results for memory malleability and social demand effects in children are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intending or Pretending? Automatic Evaluations of Goal Cues Discriminate True and False Intentions

This research presents a novel approach to discriminating between true and deceptive statements about intended future behavior. Arguing that true intentions are goal‐directed, we predict that people who genuinely intend to pursue a reported goal will implicitly evaluate goal‐relevant cues positively, whereas people who do not intend to pursue the goal will not. Participants in an experiment were instructed to tell the truth about a planned future behavior (true intention) or to falsely report that same behavior to mask their actual mock‐criminal intention (false intention). As predicted, an evaluative priming task showed that participants with true intention exhibited implicit positive evaluations of cues relevant to the reported goal, whereas participants with false intention did not. Subsequent analyses showed that implicit positivity significantly discriminated between true and false intentions. The findings are discussed in terms of theoretical contributions and implications for the development of future detection tools. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.