A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing our Minds

Philosophical Studies -     

进化还是倒退:儿童过度模仿的文化共性与差异

过度模仿指模仿与完成目标无关的动作。本文通过比较不同文化下儿童过度模仿行为的共性和差异,探究了儿童过度模仿可能的产生机制。不同文化下的儿童均存在过度模仿行为,说明它很可能是人类累积文明发展的重要产物;而不同文化下儿童过度模仿的倾向又存在差异,生存环境、教导式学习和对社会规范的强调等因素均可能产生影响。未来研究可考虑进一步探究不同文化因素的具体作用,并比较不同文化下个体过度模仿行为的发展进程,帮助我们更好地理解过度模仿在人类文明发展中的意义。     

进化还是倒退:儿童过度模仿的文化共性与差异

过度模仿指模仿与完成目标无关的动作。本文通过比较不同文化下儿童过度模仿行为的共性和差异,探究了儿童过度模仿可能的产生机制。不同文化下的儿童均存在过度模仿行为,说明它很可能是人类累积文明发展的重要产物;而不同文化下儿童过度模仿的倾向又存在差异,生存环境、教导式学习和对社会规范的强调等因素均可能产生影响。未来研究可考虑进一步探究不同文化因素的具体作用,并比较不同文化下个体过度模仿行为的发展进程,帮助我们更好地理解过度模仿在人类文明发展中的意义。     

Connecting Data to Action: How the Santa Cruz County Community Assessment Project Contributes to Better Outcomes for Youth

Community indicator projects have the potential to deliver new knowledge about the quality of life in local communities and drive actions to improve them (Phillips 2003; Holden Social Indicators Research 92:429–448, 2009; Memon and Johnstone 2008). However, the connection between the information produced by community indicator projects and the actions taken to improve conditions in communities remains under-researched (Holden Social Indicators Research 92:429–448, 2009; Hezri and Dovers Ecological Economics 60:86–99, 2006). This is because community indicator projects have mainly been conceptualized as producing information for action rather than as part of an action process (Memon and Johnstone 2008). This paper provides a case study of a community indicator project with an explicit plan to move beyond the data and into action. A review of one of the oldest community indicator projects in the United States, the Santa Cruz County Community Assessment Project (CAP) demonstrates how an action oriented community improvement cycle has contributed to measurable improvements for children and youth in one California County. The paper identifies key elements that were important for turning CAP data into local actions and concludes with lessons for community indicator practitioners and questions for future research.     

Limits to Infants' Knowledge of Objects: The Case of MagicalAppearance

Young infants have an impressive knowledge of material objects. They appreciate that distinct objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, are internally cohesive units that maintain their boundaries, and exist continuously in space and time. We report a surprising limit to this body of understanding: Although 8-month-olds responded to the "magical" disappearance of an object as an unexpected event, they did not so respond to a magical appearance. These results suggest that infants' understanding of objects differs from adult cognition in important respects. We discuss four possible ways in which this finding can be reconciled with evidence that infants appreciate the spatiotemporal continuity of objects.     

Self-Control: A Function of Knowing When and How to Exercise Restraint

ABSTRACT— To successfully pursue a goal in the face of temptation, an individual must first identify that she faces a self-control conflict. Only then will the individual exercise self-control to promote goal pursuit over indulging in temptation. We propose a new model that distinguishes between the problems of conflict identification and those of conflict resolution. We then review research on the factors that influence conflict identification and those that determine conflict resolution.     

Tell Me a Story: How Children's Developing Domain Knowledge Affects Their Story Construction

Young children distinguish between the physical and biological domains of knowledge. The current study examines how this distinction is expressed in a story construction task. Three- and 4-year-olds were shown pairs of pictures, one that depicted a normal event and one that depicted an event that violated either physical or biological causal structure. Children were asked to choose which picture to include in a story. Three-year-olds generally showed no systematic patterns of responses when constructing their stories. Four-year-olds, in contrast, made more normal than violation choices overall, and their stories were relatively consistent with regard to the fictional world's internal coherence. When 4-year-olds did include violation events in their stories, those violations tended to be of physical rather than biological causality. These data suggest that a general understanding of impossible events is underpinned by causal domain knowledge.     

Knowledge and its Objects: Revisiting the Bounds of Sense

The Kantian project of investigating the necessary structure of experience presupposes answers to three questions: what is the purpose of such an investigation, what is the source of necessary features of experience, and by what means is it possible to establish the necessary structure of experience? This paper is a critical examination of Strawson's answers to these questions in The Bounds of Sense and his later work. The realism that is implicit in The Bounds of Sense is much more explicit in Strawson's later work but relies on problematic assumptions about the relationship between epistemology and metaphysics.     

Ability and Knowing How in the Situation Calculus

Most agents can acquire information about their environments as they operate. A good plan for such an agent is one that not only achieves the goal, but is also executable, i.e., ensures that the agent has enough information at every step to know what to do next. In this paper, we present a formal account of what it means for an agent to know how to execute a plan and to be able to achieve a goal. Such a theory is a prerequisite for producing specifications of planners for agents that can acquire information at run time. It is also essential to account for cooperation among agents. Our account is more general than previous proposals, correctly handles programs containing loops, and incorporates a solution to the frame problem. It can also be used to prove programs containing sensing actions correct.     

Knowledge,Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism

Book Information Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism. Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism Colin Cheyne, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, xvi + 236, £55 (cloth) By Colin Cheyne. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. xvi + 236. £55,     

Children's Representation and Imitation of Events: How Goal Organization Influences 3‐Year‐Old Children's Memory for Action Sequences

Children's imitation of adults plays a prominent role in human cognitive development. However, few studies have investigated how children represent the complex structure of observed actions which underlies their imitation. We integrate theories of action segmentation, memory, and imitation to investigate whether children's event representation is organized according to veridical serial order or a higher level goal structure. Children were randomly assigned to learn novel event sequences either through interactive hands‐on experience (Study 1) or via storybook (Study 2). Results demonstrate that children's representation of observed actions is organized according to higher level goals, even at the cost of representing the veridical temporal ordering of the sequence. We argue that prioritizing goal structure enhances event memory, and that this mental organization is a key mechanism of social‐cognitive development in real‐world, dynamic environments. It supports cultural learning and imitation in ecologically valid settings when social agents are multitasking and not demonstrating one isolated goal at a time.     

Learning From Gesture and Action: An Investigation of Memory for Where Objects Went and How They Got There

Speakers often use gesture to demonstrate how to perform actions—for example, they might show how to open the top of a jar by making a twisting motion above the jar. Yet it is unclear whether listeners learn as much from seeing such gestures as they learn from seeing actions that physically change the position of objects (i.e., actually opening the jar). Here, we examined participants' implicit and explicit understanding about a series of movements that demonstrated how to move a set of objects. The movements were either shown with actions that physically relocated each object or with gestures that represented the relocation without touching the objects. Further, the end location that was indicated for each object covaried with whether the object was grasped with one or two hands. We found that memory for the end location of each object was better after seeing the physical relocation of the objects, that is, after seeing action, than after seeing gesture, regardless of whether speech was absent (Experiment 1) or present (Experiment 2). However, gesture and action built similar implicit understanding of how a particular handgrasp corresponded with a particular end location. Although gestures miss the benefit of showing the end state of objects that have been acted upon, the data show that gestures are as good as action in building knowledge of how to perform an action.     

Knowing How to Talk About What Cannot Be Said: Objectivity and Epistemic Locatedness

I take it that A. W. Moore is right when he said that ‘Wittgenstein was right: some things cannot be put into words. Moreover, some things that cannot be put into words are of the utmost philosophical importance’. There is, however, a constant threat of self-stultification whenever an attempt is made to put the ineffable into words. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes in Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion: reason, love, and epistemic locatedness, certain recent approaches to ineffability—including Moore’s approach—attempt to find a ‘third way’ of engaging with it, which displaces the traditional dichotomy between the effable and the ineffable, that is, between what can be said and what cannot be said. In this way, they seek to overcome the threat of self-stultification mentioned above. Still, one important challenge to this kind of approach, which Moore addresses, is, as he puts it, ‘to show how it is possible’ to talk about the ineffable ‘without belying its very ineffability’. His solution to the problem of the ineffable takes the notion of ‘knowing how’ to play a central role, and is formulated in accordance with his commitments to truth and objectivity. A further important challenge to the kind of approach to the ineffable Moore proposes concerns the issue of objectivity. In Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion, Anderson draws attention to our epistemic locatedness, which brings in questions concerning, for example, gender and culture. Pursuing this view, the challenge is to show ineffable insight without ignoring our epistemic locatedness and, in particular, the role of gender in the conceptualisation and imagery through which we seek to come to terms with the ineffable. My paper deals with these challenges. By engaging with Moore’s and Anderson’s discussions of the ineffable, I examine how it is possible to talk philosophically about the ineffable, without breaking a commitment to enlarged or objective thinking, and without ignoring the epistemic locatedness of thinking.     

Corporeal Objects and the Interdependence of Perception and Action

This paper is about how action and perception are related in self–awareness. The main positive claim is that bodily awareness may consist in perceptual experiences that are sufficient to provide corporeal objects with introspective self–awareness. The short–term goal is to examine the grounds and motivations for strong versions of the claim that the self–awareness of corporeal objects is dependent on the exercise of their agency. As examples of 'patient perceivers' show, we should not underestimate the resources that perceptual experience alone offers to corporeal selves.