3～5岁幼儿在主题-规则冲突条件下的类比推理

本研究采用经典类比任务,考察了3～5岁幼儿在主题-规则冲突条件下类比推理发展的水平与特点.结果表明:(1)在无主题联想条件下,幼儿的单维类比推理在3～4岁迅速发展,4～5岁发展较为平缓,而双维类比推理在3～5岁仍处于较低水平.(2)在主题—规则冲突条件下,幼儿在单维类比推理中表现出一定的主题联想优势反应;幼儿在双维类比推理中表现出较强的主题联想优势反应,年龄特点为:3岁幼儿有较强的主题联想优势反应,4岁幼儿的主题联想优势反应明显下降,而5岁幼儿又表现出较强的主题联想优势反应.     

正结合演算

从结构推理的观点来看,结合演算是一种很弱的逻辑,因为它仅容纳一种结构规则,即“结合规则”。正结合演算作为一种“正命题逻辑”,是结合演算的基础。本文构建了正结合演算结构推理系统BL和对应的公理系统B,阐述了结合演算拒斥“交换规则”、“收缩规则”和“弱化规则”的理论意义和应用价值,证明了系统BL和系统B的等价性。     

Hyperlexia as a variant of developmental language disorder

Memory and associative reasoning skills of 10 hyperlexic children are examined. The results suggest superior visual and isolated auditory memory skills along with impaired associative language ability. The results are discussed in relation to various theories of hyperlexia.     

A dissociation between causal judgment and outcome recall

It has been suggested that causal learning in humans is similar to Pavlovian conditioning in animals. According to this view, judgments of cause reflect the degree to which an association exists between the cause and the effect. Inferential accounts, by contrast, suggest that causal judgments are reasoning based rather than associative in nature. We used a direct measure of associative strength, identification of the outcome with which a cause was paired (cued recall), to see whether associative strength translated directly into causal ratings. Causal compounds AB+ and CD+ were intermixed with A+ and C- training. Cued-recall performance was better for cue B than for cue D; thus, associative strength was inherited by cue B from the strongly associated cue A (augmentation). However, the reverse was observed on the causal judgment measure: Cue B was judged to be less causal than D (cue competition). These results support an inferential over an associative account of causal judgments.     

图形推理任务中儿童策略获得的发展机制

运用微观发生学设计对30名6岁儿童在矩阵填充任务中策略获得的发展机制进行了研究。结果发现：(1)从策略获得点前的错误类型分析,这个阶段主要是元认知机制起决定作用,图形推理的策略获得是一个渐进过程;(2)从反应时的变化趋势分析,元认知机制仍起决定作用,而在策略获得后期,联结机制代替元认知机制起决定性作用;(3)从自我解释中提到的维度分析,也表明元认知机制起着决定性作用,但联结机制在某些题目维度上已经逐渐“竞争”超过了元认知机制。     

Semantic representation of Kinship systems

Four representational systems are examined with respect to their adequacy for representing reasoning processes within kinship systems; the systems are associative, semantic feature, logical predicate, and an “algebraic” one based on set mappings. The associative and semantic feature systems are shown to be inadequate, and the logical predicate system is shown to be somewhat clumsy and unintuitive. The algebraic is proposed as the correct representation of kinship terms. It is suggested that certain other conceptual domains can also be best represented by an algebraic system.     

How many processes underlie category-based induction? Effects of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture somekey phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.     

Reasoning rats: forward blocking in Pavlovian animal conditioning is sensitive to constraints of causal inference

Forward blocking is one of the best-documented phenomena in Pavlovian animal conditioning. According to contemporary associative learning theories, forward blocking arises directly from the hardwired basic learning rules that govern the acquisition or expression of associations. Contrary to this view, here the authors demonstrate that blocking in rats is flexible and sensitive to constraints of causal inference, such as violation of additivity and ceiling considerations. This suggests that complex cognitive processes akin to causal inferential reasoning are involved in a well-established Pavlovian animal conditioning phenomenon commonly attributed to the operation of basic associative processes.     

Failures of explaining away and screening off in described versus experienced causal learning scenarios

Causal Bayes nets capture many aspects of causal thinking that set them apart from purely associative reasoning. However, some central properties of this normative theory routinely violated. In tasks requiring an understanding of explaining away and screening off, subjects often deviate from these principles and manifest the operation of an associative bias that we refer to as the rich-get-richer principle. This research focuses on these two failures comparing tasks in which causal scenarios are merely described (via verbal statements of the causal relations) versus experienced (via samples of data that manifest the intervariable correlations implied by the causal relations). Our key finding is that we obtained stronger deviations from normative predictions in the described conditions that highlight the instructed causal model compared to those that presented data. This counterintuitive finding indicate that a theory of causal reasoning and learning needs to integrate normative principles with biases people hold about causal relations.     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.     

The need for central resources in answering questions in different domains: Folk psychology,biology, and economics

This study examined whether, when lay people reason about everyday domains, they do so in a slow, serial, deliberate process or using an automatic, effortless, associative process, and whether there are differences in this respect between content domains. The cognitive resources used by lay persons in reasoning about everyday domains were investigated using a dual task methodology. Fifty-eight adult participants answered computer-administered questions on folk biology (ToB), folk economics (ToE), and folk psychology, where the latter included questions requiring participants to infer an emotion from a verbally presented situation (ToP) and false-belief tasks (ToM). Each domain was tested with questionnaires at two levels of difficulty. Half the participants concurrently performed the 2-back task. Cognitive load reduced accuracy on the main task for ToM tasks (especially for second-order false-belief items) but not for the other domains. Performing the main tasks reduces accuracy and increases latencies on the secondary task for all domains. These findings suggest that the appropriate generalisation does not relate to content domains (such as folk psychology vs. folk biology), but rather to the nature of the task under consideration. For ToE, ToB, and ToP, the relevant inference questions appear to be processed mainly by the associative systems in LTM, and the process is not affected by a concurrent secondary task. For ToM, the response generation processing occurs in the analytic subsystem, and is therefore affected by cognitive load. Further, the more difficult set of questions impaired the secondary task more than the simpler set, in every domain and in terms of both accuracy and latency. This suggests that the processing involved in the associative system consumes domain-general resources too.     

Higher-order structure and relational reasoning: contrasting analogical and thematic relations

A popular explanation of younger children's success in analogy tasks is that lower-level associative reasoning strategies are used. Younger children are said to have a primarily associative understanding of analogy, with the ability to coordinate sets of relations largely emerging later in development (Goldman, Pellegrino, Parseghian, & Sallis, 1982; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). One way of testing the associative claim is to pit young children's emergent analogical abilities against thematic (associative) relations, which are known to play an important role in the knowledge structures of young children. The present experiments presented 4-, 5- and 9-year-old children with a:b::c:d analogies in a picture choice format, offering a choice between Analogy and Thematic responses. Only the Analogy responses were correct in terms of the higher-order structure of the analogies. The results showed that the Analogy responses were consistently preferred to the Thematic responses by children of all ages. It is concluded that analogy is an important building block for learning from an early age.     

Conditional reasoning with causal premises: Evidence for a retrieval model

This study examined the hypothesis that a key process in conditional reasoning with concrete premises involves on-line retrieval of information about potential alternate antecedents. Participants were asked to solve reasoning problems with causal conditional premises (If cause P then effect Q). These premises were inserted into short contexts. The availability of potential alternatives was varied from one context to another by adding statements that explicitly invalidated one or more of these alternatives (i.e., other causes that lead to the effect (Q). The invalidated alternatives differed in the degree of their semantic association to the consequent term (Q). The results show that the effect of invalidating one or more potential alternatives on the two uncertain logical forms, AC and DA, was largely determined by their relative associative strength. These results strongly support a model for conditional reasoning with causal premises that supposes that a key element in responding to the uncertain logical forms is on-line retrieval of at least one potential alternative antecedent.     

When logic fails: Implicit transitive inference in humans

Transitive inference (TI) in animals (e.g., choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C) has been interpreted by some as reflecting a declarative logical inference process. We invert this anthropomorphic interpretation by providing evidence that humans can exhibit TI-like behavior on the basis of simpler associative mechanisms that underlie many theories of animal learning. In this study, human participants were trained on a five-pair TI problem (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, E+F-) and, unlike in previous human TI studies, were prevented from becoming explicitly aware of the logical hierarchy, so they could not employ logical reasoning. They were then tested with three problems: B versus D, B versus E, and C versus E. Participants only reliably chose B over E, whereas the other test conditions yielded chance performance. This result is inconsistent with the use of logical reasoning and is instead consistent with an account developed to explain earlier TI studies with rats that found the same pattern of results. In this account, choice performance is based on differential associative strengths across the stimulus items that develop over training, despite equal overt reinforcement.     

Comparing associative, statistical, and inferential reasoning accounts of human contingency learning

For more than two decades, researchers have contrasted the relative merits of associative and statistical theories as accounts of human contingency learning. This debate, still far from resolution, has led to further refinement of models within each family of theories. More recently, a third theoretical view has joined the debate: the inferential reasoning account. The explanations of these three accounts differ critically in many aspects, such as level of analysis and their emphasis on different steps within the information-processing sequence. Also, each account has important advantages (as well as critical flaws) and emphasizes experimental evidence that poses problems to the others. Some hybrid models of human contingency learning have attempted to reconcile certain features of these accounts, thereby benefiting from some of the unique advantages of different families of accounts. A comparison of these families of accounts will help us appreciate the challenges that research on human contingency learning will face over the coming years.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

Tests of inferential reasoning by exclusion in Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana)

We examined inferential reasoning by exclusion in the Clark’s nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana) using two-way object-choice procedures. While other social scatter-hoarding corvids appear capable of engaging in inferential reasoning, it remains unclear if the relatively less social nutcracker is able to do so. In an initial experiment, food was hidden in one of two opaque containers. All of the birds immediately selected the baited container when shown only the empty container during testing. We subsequently examined the nutcrackers in two follow-up experiments using a task that may have been less likely to be solved by associative processes. The birds were trained that two distinctive objects were always found hidden in opaque containers that were always positioned at the same two locations. During testing, one of the two objects was found in a transparent “trash bin” and was unavailable. The birds were required to infer that if one of the objects was in the “trash,” then the other object should still be available in its hidden location. Five out of six birds were unable to make this inference, suggesting that associative mechanisms likely accounted for our earlier results. However, one bird consistently chose the object that was not seen in the “trash,” demonstrating that nutcrackers may have the ability to use inferential reasoning by exclusion to solve inference tasks. The role of scatter hoarding and social organization is discussed as factors in the ability of corvid birds to reason.     

Outcome maximality and additivity training also influence cue competition in causal learning when learning involves many cues and events

Recent evidence shows that outcome maximality (e.g., De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002) and additivity training (e.g., Lovibond, Been, Mitchell, Bouton, & Frohard, 2003) have an influence on cue competition in human causal learning. This evidence supports the idea that cue competition is based on controlled reasoning processes rather than on automatic associative processes. Until now, however, all the evidence for controlled reasoning processes comes from studies with rather simple designs that involved only few cues and events. We conducted two experiments with a complex design involving 24 different cues. The results showed that outcome maximality and additivity training had an influence on cue competition but that this influence was more pronounced for forward cue competition than for retrospective cue competition.     

Associative responding versus analogical reasoning by children

Following upon work which showed that college and high school students' analogy solutions were predictable from ratings of the relatedness of the words comprising the analogy choices, this study extended those results to children's analogy solutions. Achenbach's Children's Associative Responding Test was used as the criterion to determine (1) whether analogy solutions by children were as related to word relatedness ratings as analogy solutions were in previous subject samples, (2) whether individual differences in using associative responding versus analogical reasoning processes could enhance the predictability estimates, and (3) whether associative priming can affect analogy solutions. Two correlational studies were done, one on an American and another on a Nigerian sample. A third study was an experimental manipulation of choices on analogy items on an American sample. The results suggest that the answer to questions (1) and (3) is yes, but the answer to question (2) is no.     

Inferential reasoning by exclusion in great apes, lesser apes, and spider monkeys

Using the cups task, in which subjects are presented with limited visual or auditory information that can be used to deduce the location of a hidden reward, Call (2004) found prima facie evidence of inferential reasoning by exclusion in several great ape species. One bonobo (Pan paniscus) and two gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) appeared to make such inferences in both the visual and auditory domains. However, common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were successful only in the visual domain, and Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) in neither. The present research built on this paradigm, and Experiment 1 yielded prima facie evidence of inference by exclusion in both domains for two common chimpanzees, and in the visual domain for two Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii). Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that two specific associative learning explanations could not readily account for these results. Because an important focus of the program of research was to assess the cognitive capacities of lesser apes (family Hylobatidae), we modified Call's original procedures to better suit their attentional and dispositional characteristics. In Experiment 1, testing was also attempted with three gibbon genera (Symphalangus, Nomascus, Hylobates), but none of the subjects completed the standard task. Further testing of three siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus) and a spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi) using a faster method yielded prima facie evidence of inferential reasoning by exclusion in the visual domain among the siamangs (Experiment 4).