Eye Gaze Provides a Window on Children's Understanding of Verbal Irony

We investigated how children solve the interpretive problem of verbal irony. Children 5 to 8 years of age and a group of adults were presented with ironic and literal remarks in the context of short puppet shows. The speaker puppet's personality was manipulated as a cue to intent; that is, speakers were described as funny or serious. We measured all participants' interpretations of the remarks and also children's eye gaze and response latencies as they made their interpretations. As expected, children were less accurate than adults in their judgments of speaker intent. Although children took longer to judge speaker intent for ironic remarks than literal remarks, eye gaze data showed no evidence that children had a literal-first bias in their processing of ironic language. Instead, children's eye gaze behavior suggested that they considered an ironic interpretation even in the earliest moments of processing. We argue that these results are most consistent with a parallel constraint satisfaction framework for irony comprehension.     

Children's interpretive understanding,moral judgments,and emotion attributions: Relations to social behaviour

The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5‐year‐old, 123 7‐year‐old, and 130 9‐year‐old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were measured using two moral rule transgressions. Social behaviour was assessed using teachers' ratings of aggressive and prosocial behaviour. Aggressive behaviour was positively related to interpretive understanding and negatively related to moral reasoning. Prosocial behaviour was positively associated with attribution of fear. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were related, depending on age. Interpretive understanding was unrelated to moral judgments and emotion attributions. The findings are discussed in regard to the role of interpretive understanding and moral and affective knowledge in understanding children's social behaviour.     

The Development of Children's Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction

Recent research has shown parallels between the development of young children's understanding of false belief and their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. First, both develop between 3 and 4–5 years of age and develop concurrently in individual children. Second, the younger children's difficulties with both concepts seem genuine and deep-seated. Finally, these difficulties are general, in the sense of being evident in a variety of types of beliefs and appearances. Most researchers in this area believe that these developments are mediated by an emerging representational conception of the mind.     

Theory of mind and emotion understanding predict moral development in early childhood

The current study utilized longitudinal data to investigate how theory of mind (ToM) and emotion understanding (EU) concurrently and prospectively predicted young children's moral reasoning and decision making. One hundred twenty‐eight children were assessed on measures of ToM and EU at 3.5 and 5.5 years of age. At 5.5 years, children were also assessed on the quality of moral reasoning and decision making they used to negotiate prosocial moral dilemmas, in which the needs of a story protagonist conflict with the needs of another story character. More sophisticated EU predicted greater use of physical‐ and material‐needs reasoning, and a more advanced ToM predicted greater use of psychological‐needs reasoning. Most intriguing, ToM and EU jointly predicted greater use of higher‐level acceptance‐authority reasoning, which is likely a product of children's increasing appreciation for the knowledge held by trusted adults and children's desire to behave in accordance with social expectations.     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

The relationship between Turkish children's perceptions of marital conflict and their internalizing and externalizing problems

The present study investigated the relationship between children's perceptions of marital conflict and children's internalizing and externalizing problems. Additionally, investigating gender and age differences in children's perceptions and the type of problems they exhibited were the other purposes of the study. The sample consisted of 9‐ to 12‐year‐old, nonclinical children from intact families (N = 232), one of their parents, and teachers. The data were gathered by administering the Child Behavior Checklist for Ages 4–18 and the Teacher's Report Form to adult participants and the Children's Perception of Interparental Conflict Scale and the Children's Depression Inventory to the child participants. Findings indicated that there was a significant relationship between children's perceptions of marital conflict and their internalizing and externalizing problems. More specifically, children's perceptions of conflict properties were associated with their internalizing problems in parents', teachers', and children's reports. Children's perceptions of threat were associated with child‐reported depression. Children's perceptions of self‐blame were associated with child‐reported depression, parent‐reported internalizing and externalizing problems, and teacher‐reported externalizing problems. Furthermore, it was found that there were gender and age differences in children's perceptions of marital conflict and their internalizing and externalizing problems. Findings indicated that boys have higher self‐blame scores and teacher‐reported externalizing problems than girls and that girls have more parent‐ and teacher‐reported internalizing problems than boys. Additionally, it was found that 9‐year‐old children have more teacher‐reported internalizing and externalizing problems than 12‐year‐old children. Also, 9‐year‐old boys have higher parent‐reported externalizing problems than 9‐year‐old girls and 9‐year‐old boys have higher parent‐reported externalizing problems than 12‐year‐old boys.     

Preschool children and marital conflict: A constructive view

Effects of marital conflict on children are well documented, but few studies have examined the impact of constructive conflict. This paper examines scenarios of largely constructive marital conflict, and their relations with their preschool children behaviours, in naturalistic situations in the home. Participants were married couples and their preschool child, studied over three years (n = 33 at T1), with children aged about 2 years at the outset. Microanalytic observational coding of marital interactions and children's responses were conducted and contingency analyses were performed. Links were found between parents' relational control strategies and non-verbal affect and children's responses to parents' constructive conflicts. For example, parents' positive affect and children's interfering in conflict scenarios were associated. Children's interference in conflicts was associated with triadic relational sequences, regardless of parents' particular relational control strategies. Findings are discussed in terms of perspectives on understanding children's reactions to constructive conflicts in terms of broader marital and child systems.     

Longitudinal associations between children's understanding of emotions and theory of mind

Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs children's understanding of others’ thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may help children learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-of-mind performance, and not the reverse.     

5～8岁儿童对模糊信息具有多重解释的理解

参照Carpendale和Chandler的实验范式,研究儿童对于“人们可能对同样信息给出不同解释”这一现象的理解,考察5~8岁儿童的解释性心理理论的发展。结果表明,5岁儿童不能理解心理过程的解释性,认为同样的信息只有一种合理的解释。从6岁开始,儿童才认识到,模糊信息可以有多种解释,但6、7岁时的这种理解并不完善,成绩随着任务要求而变化。8岁儿童才有比较稳定的解释性心理理论。     

Effect of lie labelling on children's evaluation of selfish,polite, and altruistic lies

This study investigates how 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds' evaluations of selfish, polite, and altruistic lies change as a result of whether these false statements are explicitly labelled as lies. We are also interested in how interpretive theory of mind may correlate with such evaluations with and without a lie label. Our results showed that labelling lowered children's evaluations for the polite and altruistic lies, but not for the selfish lies. Interpretive theory of mind correlated positively with the evaluation difference between the polite and altruistic lies and that between the selfish and altruistic lies in the label, but not in the non‐label condition. Correlation between the selfish and altruistic lies and that between the polite and altruistic lies were stronger with than without labelling, after controlling for age, and verbal and non‐verbal intelligence. We conclude that lie labelling biases children towards more negative evaluations for non‐selfish lies and makes them see lies of different motives as more similar. If a lie label is applied, whether lies of different motives are still evaluated differently depends on interpretive theory of mind, which reflects the child's ability to represent and allow different interpretations of an ambiguous reality.     

“If it's in your mind,it's in your knowledge”: Children's developing anatomy of identity

Recent work has investigated children's developing understanding of the anatomical locus of identity. In two studies, we extend this work by exploring the role of the mind as opposed to the brain in children's conceptualization of identity. In Experiment 1, an analysis of natural language indicated that adults use the term mind more frequently than the term brain with reference to identity-related mental processes. Children's output displayed a similar bias. In Experiment 2, we compared the judgments of 5- and 7-year-old children to those displayed by adults. Participants heard stories in which a magical transformation resulted in either a creature with a mismatch between brain and body or a creature with a mismatch between mind and body. Children were more accurate in recognizing the enduring identity of this transformed creature when the transformation resulted in a mismatch between mind and body as compared to brain and body.     

The Relation Between Executive Function and Theory of Mind is More Than Skin Deep

A simple “expression” account of the relation between executive function (EF) and children's developing theory of mind (ToM) has difficulty accounting for the generality of the changes occurring in children's mental-state understanding during the preschool years. The current study of preschool children (N = 43) showed that EF—especially conflict EF—related uniformly to ToM measures that imposed either high or low executive demands, independent of verbal ability. These findings can be explained within an emergence account wherein executive skills are implicated in the acquisition of mental-state concepts as opposed to merely the expression of these concepts in task performance.     

Young children's self‐benefiting lies and their relation to executive functioning and theory of mind

It is well established that children lie in different social contexts for various purposes from the age of 2 years. Surprisingly, little is known about whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain, how self‐benefiting lies emerge, and what cognitive factors affect the emergence of self‐benefiting lies. To bridge this gap in the literature, we situated children between 2 and 4 years of age in a zero‐sum game where children must lie to their opponent if they wanted to win a desirable reward. We found that the majority of young children did not lie even when they experienced personal losses repeatedly. However, some children spontaneously lied during the game; as the game progressed, more children lied. Further, we found that children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning in terms of a combination of inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility had significant positive and unique correlations with how frequently children lied for personal gain. The present results taken together with the existing findings regarding children's lies for self‐protection and politeness purposes suggest that the act of lying begins early in life. Further, its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

Highlights

• The study investigated whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain.
• This study used a zero‐sum game to elicit children's self‐benefiting lies. Results showed the majority of young children did not lie, and it is related to children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.
• The act of lying begins early in life, and its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

     

Linguistic Acquisitional Style and Mentalising Development: The Role of Maternal Mind-mindedness

We investigated three main questions: (a) Is there consistency over time in mothers' mind-mindedness (the proclivity to treat one's child as an individual with a mind)? (b) Does mind-mindedness relate to children's subsequent mentalising development? and (c) Is mentalising development related to children's linguistic acquisitional style? Two measures of early vocabulary—proportion of common nouns and proportion of frozen phrases—were obtained at 20 months. Three measures of maternal mind-mindedness were taken: (a) mothers' reports of nonstandard words in their children's vocabularies; (b) mothers' meaningful interpretations of their children's early vocalizations; and (c) mothers' propensity to focus on their children's mental attributes at age 3. Children's mentalising abilities were assessed using the “false belief and emotion” task (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989) at age 5. There was clear evidence for consistency in mind-mindedness between 20 months and 3 years. All three measures of mind-mindedness were positively related to children's performance on the false belief and emotion task, but children's linguistic acquisitional style was not related to subsequent mentalising ability. These findings are interpreted as providing support for the view that caregivers' behavior is critical in helping children acquire a “theory of mind.”     

Can I Reach That Sticker? Preschoolers' Practical Judgments About Their Own and Others’ Body Size

Research to date has focused mostly on children's representation of their physical self as a prelude to the development of a theory of mind (ToM) and on their understanding of the self as distinct from others over time. Whether children approaching the well-known age of ToM mastery are also accurately appraising their own body's functional relationship to the everyday environment remains largely an unanswered question. Little work has investigated typical preschool-age children's explicit accuracy when making judgments about their own body's proportions. In the current study, 98 preschoolers made 16 practical judgments about whether their own body or an experimenter's body could fit through an apparatus (half of the apparatuses were 30% smaller than the body in question, and half were 30% larger). Overall, accuracy increased with age but was unrelated to body size. Children in all age groups performed above chance, and accuracy did not differ depending on target (e.g., self or other). Children in a comparison condition judging fit of inanimate objects (n = 23) performed similarly, though showed less evidence of “yes” bias, and there were no age-based differences in accuracy. Results are discussed with regard to preschoolers’ developing body awareness, as are implications for research protocols in which children are asked to accurately identify their own body size and shape from an array.     

The Development of Internal State Language during the Third Year of Life: A Longitudinal Parent Report Study

Children's talk about the mind has been scarcely studied in non‐English speakers. For this reason, this longitudinal study documents age‐related changes in German‐speaking children's internal state language. At 24, 30 and 36 months, children were administered general language tests and their internal state vocabulary levels were obtained via parental report. The developmental transition from a vocabulary rich in physiological, perceptual and desire terms to a vocabulary rich in a wider range of mental concepts confirmed previous research with French‐speaking and English‐speaking children and research in children's internal state comprehension. Further, children's category scores proved to be developmentally stable. Finally, with increasing age, children's category scores became more specifically related to each other, independent of general language skills. The results are discussed in regard to the universality of children's talk about the mind. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young Children's Understanding of the Conditions for Knowledge Acquisition

We report 3 studies directed to children's understanding of how evidence leads to knowledge. The studies as a whole span a range of ages (4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds), a variety of sources of information (perception, communication, and inference), and a number of targets or recipients of the information (adult, child, baby, and self). Perception proved to be the easiest source to understand, and inference was the most difficult. There was no difference in the accuracy of judgments for the self and judgments for others. Judgments were least accurate for the baby, primarily because children tended to overestimate babies' ability to acquire knowledge from communication or inference. Although performance in general improved with age, the tendency to overestimate the baby was greatest among the oldest children. The results are discussed in terms of children's understanding of 2 contributors to knowledge formation: situational (the nature and adequacy of the informational source) and individual (the cognitive readiness of the recipient of the information).     

Associations between mothers' sensitivity to their infants' internal states and children's later understanding of mind and emotion

This study investigated associations between mother–infant interactions and children's subsequent understanding of mind and emotion. Mothers' tendency to comment on their infants' internal world and their general sensitivity to their infants' internal states were measured through coded play interactions at 10 months. The latter measurement included ratings on four aspects of maternal behaviour: mindful facilitation, joint attention commenting, pacing, and affect catching. In contrast to mothers' internal state language, these behaviours did not tap mothers' explicit linguistic representation of their infants' mental states. At 54 months, children's understanding of mind and emotion was measured through a range of false‐belief tasks and an emotion‐understanding task. Multivariate analysis revealed direct positive links between mothers' sensitivity to their infants' internal states and children's later understanding of mind. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Television Exposure and Children's Decoding of Nonverbal Behavior1

Two studies considered the way in which the magnitude of exposure to television relates to children's understanding and interpretation of others' nonverbal behavior. In the first study, 6th graders made judgments regarding other children whose nonverbal facial behavior did not match their internal emotional state. Results showed that heavier television viewers held a less differentiated, more simplistic view of the consequences of nonverbal self-presentation strategies. In the second study, children in Grades 2 through 6 made judgments of others' nonverbal expressions of emotion. As predicted, heavier television viewers were better at decoding others' nonverbal expressions than lighter viewers, presumably because of their greater exposure to nonverbal displays of emotion on television. In addition, nonverbal decoding skills improved with age.