中国传统"革命"思想的两个维度及毛泽东的"革命"逻辑

传统中国蕴含着两种“革命”思想的维度:一是圣人救世的“汤武革命”,一是基于压迫而进行反抗的农民起义。这两个维度对于既系统地接受过中国传统的规范性文化教育,同时又深受非规范性文化熏染的毛泽东来说都产生了极大的影响,并形成了他“圣人救世”与“压迫-反抗”的两种“革命”逻辑。这两种具有不同文化气质的“革命”逻辑在毛泽东思想中得以结合的根本基础是他尚变求动的宇宙观和人生观。     

Logic,Logic, and Logic

In his recent paper in History and Philosophy of Logic, John Kearns argues for a solution of the Liar paradox using an illocutionary logic (Kearns 2007 Kearns, J. 2007. ‘An illocutionary logical explanation of the Liar Paradox’. History and Philosophy of Logic, 28: 31–66. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Paraconsistent approaches, especially dialetheism, which accepts the Liar as being both true and false, are rejected by Kearns as making no ‘clear sense’ (p. 51). In this critical note, I want to highlight some shortcomings of Kearns' approach that concern a general difficulty for supposed solutions to (semantic) antinomies like the Liar. It is not controversial that there are languages which avoid the Liar. For example, the language which consists of the single sentence ‘Benedict XVI was born in Germany’ lacks the resources to talk about semantics at all and thus avoids the Liar. Similarly, more interesting languages such as the propositional calculus avoid the Liar by lacking the power to express semantic concepts or to quantify over propositions. Kearns also agrees with the dialetheist claim that natural languages are semantically closed (i.e. are able to talk about their sentences and the semantic concepts and distinctions they employ). Without semantic closure, the Liar would be no real problem for us (speakers of natural languages). But given the claim, the expressive power of natural languages may lead to the semantic antinomies. The dialetheist argues for his position by proposing a general hypothesis (cf. Bremer 2005 Bremer, M. 2005. An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics, Bern: Lang.  [Google Scholar], pp. 27–28): ‘(Dilemma) A linguistic framework that solves some antinomies and is able to express its linguistic resources is confronted with strengthened versions of the antinomies’. Thus, the dialetheist claims that either some semantic concepts used in a supposed solution to a semantic antinomy are inexpressible in the framework used (and so, in view of the claim, violate the aim of being a model of natural language), or else old antinomies are exchanged for new ones. One horn of the dilemma is having inexpressible semantic properties. The other is having strengthened versions of the antinomies, once all semantic properties used are expressible. This dilemma applies, I claim, to Kearns' approach as well.     

On Argumentation Logic and Propositional Logic

This paper studies the relationship between Argumentation Logic (AL), a recently defined logic based on the study of argumentation in AI, and classical Propositional Logic (PL). In particular, it shows that AL and PL are logically equivalent in that they have the same entailment relation from any given classically consistent theory. This equivalence follows from a correspondence between the non-acceptability of (arguments for) sentences in AL and Natural Deduction (ND) proofs of the complement of these sentences. The proof of this equivalence uses a restricted form of ND proofs, where hypotheses in the application of the Reductio of Absurdum inference rule are required to be “relevant” to the absurdity derived in the rule. The paper also discusses how the argumentative re-interpretation of PL could help control the application of ex-falso quodlibet in the presence of inconsistencies.     

Symbols and thought

No one need deny the importance of language to thought and cognition. At the same time, there is a tendency in studies of mind and mental functioning to assume that properties and principles of linguistic, or language-like, forms of representation must hold of forms of thought and representation in general. Consideration of a wider range of symbol systems shows that this is not so. In turn, various claims and arguments in cognitive theory that depend on assumptions applicable only to linguistic systems, do not go through or become difficult to state in a manner that makes them both interesting and plausible.This paper was written for and presented at the Peirce Sesquicentennial Congress held in Cambridge, Mass. in 1989.     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

Toposes in Logic and Logic in Toposes

The purpose of this paper is to justify the claim that Topos theory and Logic (the latter interpreted in a wide enough sense to include Model theory and Set theory) may interact to the advantage of both fields. Once the necessity of utilizing toposes (other than the topos of Sets) becomes apparent, workers in Topos theory try to make this task as easy as possible by employing a variety of methods which, in the last instance, find their justification in metatheorems from Logic. Some concrete instances of this assertion will be given in the form of simple proofs that certain theorems of Algebra hold in any (Grothendieck) topos, in order to illustrate the various techniques that are used. In the other direction, Topos theory can also be a useful tool in Logic. Examples of this are independence proofs in (classical as well as intuitionistic) Set theory, as well as transfer methods in the presence of a sheaf representation theorem, the latter applied, in particular, to model theoretic properties of certain theories.     

自觉运用辩证唯物主义观点与逻辑学知识--关于临床诊疗思维的若干体会与思考

1　在对疾病的诊疗活动中 ,自觉运用辩证唯物主义观点1 1　从系统论出发 ,强化整体性观点、鉴别诊断意识 ,切实注重医学模式的转变 ,审慎制订治疗方案。系统论认为 ,物质系统是物质基本的存在方式和联系方式。著名学者贝塔朗菲曾为系统下过严格的定义 :“系统是处在一定相互联系中的与环境发生关系的各组成成分的总体。”[1] 物质系统具有整体性、层次性、关联性、开放性等基本特征[2 ] 。在对患者的临床诊疗中 ,我们应自觉运用上述观点与知识 ,将其与自己的医学专业知识有机地结合 ,灵活地运用。如果一个患者首发或典型的症状、体征直接与…     

Traditional Logic,Modern Logic and Natural Language

In a recent paper Johan van Benthem reviews earlier work done by himself and colleagues on ‘natural logic’. His paper makes a number of challenging comments on the relationships between traditional logic, modern logic and natural logic. I respond to his challenge, by drawing what I think are the most significant lines dividing traditional logic from modern. The leading difference is in the way logic is expected to be used for checking arguments. For traditionals the checking is local, i.e. separately for each inference step. Between inference steps, several kinds of paraphrasing are allowed. Today we formalise globally: we choose a symbolisation that works for the entire argument, and thus we eliminate intuitive steps and changes of viewpoint during the argument. Frege and Peano recast the logical rules so as to make this possible. I comment also on the traditional assumption that logical processing takes place at the top syntactic level, and I question Johan’s view that natural logic is ‘natural’.     

Modal Logic As Dialogical Logic

The title reflects my conviction that, viewed semantically,modal logic is fundamentally dialogical; this conviction is based on the key role played by the notion of bisimulation in modal model theory. But this dialogical conception of modal logic does not seem to apply to modal proof theory, which is notoriously messy. Nonetheless, by making use of ideas which trace back to Arthur Prior (notably the use of nominals, special proposition symbols which name worlds) I will show how to lift the dialogical conception to modal proof theory. I argue that this shift to hybrid logic has consequences for both modal and dialogical logic, and I discuss these in detail.     

Logic and Aggregation

Paraconsistent logic is an area of philosophical logic that has yet to find acceptance from a wider audience. The area remains, in a word, disreputable. In this essay, we try to reassure potential consumers that it is not necessary to become a radical in order to use paraconsistent logic. According to the radicals, the problem is the absurd classical account of contradiction: Classically inconsistent sets explode only because bourgeois classical semantics holds, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that both A and A cannot simultaneously be true! We suggest (more modestly) that there is, at least sometimes, something else worth preserving, even in an inconsistent, unsatisfiable premise set. In this paper we present, in a new guise, a very general version of this preservationist approach to paraconsistency.     

Logic and Grammar

Grammar can be formulated as a kind of substructural propositional logic. In support of this claim, we survey bare Gentzen style deductive systems and two kinds of non-commutative linear logic: intuitionistic and compact bilinear logic. We also glance at their categorical refinements.     

祈使句和逻辑(英文)

本文基于更新框架定义了一种动态的祈使句语义,并在此基础之上讨论了关于祈使句的逻辑。这个语义对于祈使句的一致性问题和Ross悖论提供了一种直接的解决方案。我们的工作在祈使句和祈使力结构之间的对应之上展开。首先,根据处理祈使句相容性的不同方式,我们给出了几种不同的祈使句一致性定义。然后,祈使句的意义被处理为祈使力机构上的依赖相容性的更新函项。最后,祈使句之间的蕴涵关系被归约为祈使力结构之间的某种关系。基于不同的相容性定义,我们给出了几种不同的蕴涵关系。