The dual-process turn: How recent defenses of dual-process theories of reasoning fail

In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 crosscut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses of dual-process theory face two problems. First, as pointed out by Sloman, these new dual-process theories cast the net of “reasoning” too wide. Second, and more importantly, this singular distinction cannot accomplish the explanatory work needed to support dual-process theory. These theorists must fall back on using various properties from the Standard Menu in explanations, thereby committing these accounts to a “Standard View” that they had hoped to avoid. Thus, these theorists face a dilemma: either the distinction between intuitive and reflective (or autonomous and working memory involving) falls back on using the properties of the Standard Menu, or it lacks the explanatory promise that made dual-process theory attractive.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications

In this paper, I discuss the current state of theorising about dual processes in adult performance on reasoning and decision making tasks, in which Type 1 intuitive processing is distinguished from Type 2 reflective thinking. I show that there are many types of theory some of which distinguish modes rather than types of thinking and that assumptions about underlying cognitive architecture vary. I show that some dual-system theories have been replaced recently by the idea that we have two or more distinct ‘minds’ with different evolutionary histories. I also present the most recent formulation of my own account of dual processing within hypothetical thinking theory, at a level more easily applied to performance on specific tasks. I then consider implications for cognitive development, pointing out that while Type 2 thinking is clearly linked to the development of cognitive ability, it combines and competes with multiple Type 1 processing systems which persist in adult cognition, each of which could have their own developmental time course. Hence, while dual-process theories can and should inspire much research and theory in cognitive development, the derivation of predictions for cognitive development is far from straightforward.     

Dual-process theories and cognitive development: Advances and challenges

Dual-process theories have gained increasing importance in psychology. The contrast that they describe between an old intuitive and a new deliberative mind seems to make these theories especially suited to account for development. Accordingly, this special issue aims at presenting the latest applications of dual-process theories to cognitive development. Dual-process theoreticians mainly focused on adult functioning have been invited to elaborate the developmental implications of their theory, while developmental psychologists who have proposed dual-process theories of development in the domain of thinking and reasoning present the most recent formulation of their theory and review supporting empirical evidence.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

The primacy of thinking about possibilities in the development of reasoning

One of the main tenets of the mental model theory is that when individuals reason, they think about possibilities. According to this theory, reasoning on what is possible from the truth of a sentence would be psychologically basic, whereas reasoning the other way round, on the truth or falsity of a sentence from a given state of affairs, would require some meta-ability. The present study tested the developmental corollary of this theory, which is that reasoning about possibilities should develop first, whereas the development of reasoning about truth-value should be delayed. For this purpose, 3rd, 6th, and 9th graders as well as adults were presented with tasks requiring them to evaluate either the possibilities compatible with conditional sentences or the truth-value of these sentences from these same possibilities. The results revealed 2 phenomena. First, the same developmental trend was observed in both tasks with 3 successive interpretational levels: conjunctive, biconditional, and then conditional. Second, there was a developmental lag between the 2 forms of reasoning--with developmental transitions from one level to the next occurring about 3 years later when reasoning about truth-value. The implications of these results for theories of cognitive development and of reasoning are discussed.     

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

In three studies, we examined simple counterexample-based and probabilistic reasoning in children 6, 7, and 9 years of age. In the first study, participants were asked to make conditional (if-then) inferences under both categorical (certain or uncertain) and probabilistic instructions. Results showed that 6-year-olds respond to both forms of inference in similar ways, but whereas probabilistic conditional inferences showed little development over this period, categorical inferences clearly improved between 6 and 7 years of age. An analysis of the children's justifications indicated that performance under categorical instructions was strongly related to counterexample generation at all ages, whereas this was true only for the younger children for inferences under probabilistic instructions. These findings were replicated in a second study, using problems that referred to concrete stimuli with varying probabilities of inference. A third study tested the hypothesis that children confused probability judgments with judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these results show that children are capable of accurate conditional inferences under probabilistic instructions at a very early age and that the differentiation between categorical and probabilistic conditional reasoning is clear by at least 9 years ofage. These results are globally consistent with dual-process theories but suggest some difficulties for the way that the analytic-heuristic distinction underlying these theories has been conceptualized.     

Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings.     

Reasoning with conditionals: a test of formal models of four theories

The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press), a dual-process variant of the model theory (Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., & d'Ydewalle, G. (2005). A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking &Reasoning, 11, 278-293), and the probabilistic theory (Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 883-899). The first three theories are formalized as multinomial models. The models are applied to the frequencies of patterns of acceptance or rejection across the four basic inferences modus ponens, acceptance of the consequent, denial of the antecedent, and modus tollens. Model fits are assessed for two large data sets, one representing reasoning with abstract, basic conditionals, the other reflecting reasoning with pseudo-realistic causal and non-causal conditionals. The best account of the data was provided by a modified version of the mental-model theory, augmented by directionality, and by the dual-process model.     

Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective

A lay definition of intuition holds that it involves immediate apprehension in the absence of reasoning. From a more technical point of view, I argue also that intuition should be seen as the contrastive of reasoning, corresponding roughly to the distinction between Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (reflective) processes in contemporary dual process theories of thinking. From this perspective, we already know a great deal about intuition: It is quick, provides feelings of confidence, can reflect large amounts of information processing, and is most likely to provide accurate judgments when based on relevant experiential learning. Unlike reasoning, intuition is low effort and does not compete for central working memory resources. It provides default responses which may—or often may not—be intervened upon with high effort, reflective reasoning. Intuition has, however, been blamed for a range of cognitive biases in the psychological literatures on reasoning and decision making. The evidence indicates that with novel and abstract problems, not easily linked to previous experience, intervention with effortful reasoning is often required to avoid such biases. Hence, although it seems that intuition dominates reasoning most of the time—both in the laboratory and the real world—it can indeed be a false friend.     

Dual systems Competence ←-→ Procedural processing: A relational developmental systems approach to reasoning

Many current psychological models of reasoning minimize the role of deductive processes in human thought. In the present paper, we argue that deduction is an important part of ordinary cognition and we propose that a dual systems Competence ←-→ Procedural processing model conceptualized within relational developmental systems theory offers the most coherent and productive framework for integrating and explaining the sometimes conflicting findings on the development of deductive reasoning across the lifespan. This model invokes a distinction that is quite similar to, though not identical with, the system 2–system 1 dichotomy employed in other dual systems models. In addition, the Competence ←-→ Procedural processing model maintains the more specific distinction between algorithmic and reflective subsystems of system 2. In this account, the algorithmic system is represented as a kind of mental logic while the reflective system is the seat of practical and epistemic self-regulation, including emergent epistemic and metalogical norms. While the proposed systems of mind often appear as split-off component features in other dual systems models, relational developmental systems theory conceives of them as the highly complex and relationally integrated outcome of a self-organizing and self-regulating adaptive developmental process.     

Dual processes in decision making and developmental neuroscience: A fuzzy-trace model

From Piaget to the present, traditional and dual-process theories have predicted improvement in reasoning from childhood to adulthood, and improvement has been observed. However, developmental reversals—that reasoning biases emerge with development—have also been observed in a growing list of paradigms. We explain how fuzzy-trace theory predicts both improvement and developmental reversals in reasoning and decision making. Drawing on research on logical and quantitative reasoning, as well as on risky decision making in the laboratory and in life, we illustrate how the same small set of theoretical principles apply to typical neurodevelopment, encompassing childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, and to neurological conditions such as autism and Alzheimer’s disease. For example, framing effects—that risk preferences shift when the same decisions are phrased in terms of gains vs. losses—emerge in early adolescence as gist-based intuition develops. In autistic individuals, who rely less on gist-based intuition and more on verbatim-based analysis, framing biases are attenuated (i.e., they outperform typically developing control subjects). In adults, simple manipulations based on fuzzy-trace theory can make framing effects appear and disappear depending on whether gist-based intuition or verbatim-based analysis is induced. These theoretical principles are summarized and integrated in a new mathematical model that specifies how dual modes of reasoning combine to produce predictable variability in performance. In particular, we show how the most popular and extensively studied model of decision making—prospect theory—can be derived from fuzzy-trace theory by combining analytical (verbatim-based) and intuitive (gist-based) processes.     

The grim reasoner: Analytical reasoning under mortality salience

The human species enjoys uniquely developed capacities for analytical reasoning and rational decision making, but these capacities come with a price: They make us aware of our inevitable physical death. Drawing on terror management theory and dual-process theories of cognition, we investigate the impact of mortality awareness on analytical reasoning. Two experiments show that experimentally induced thoughts of death impair analytical reasoning performance, just as cognitive load would. When made aware of their own mortality, reasoners allocate their executive resources to the suppression of this disturbing thought, therefore impairing their performance on syllogisms that require analytic thought. This finding has consequences for all aspects of rational thinking that draw on executive resources, and calls for an integrated approach to existential psychology and the psychology of rational thought.     

Counterfactual reasoning and the problem of selecting antecedent scenarios

A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term “problem of selecting antecedent scenarios,” and show that this is an essential challenge in real-life counterfactual reasoning. Then, I demonstrate that the major extant theories of counterfactuals (especially the Lewis/Stalnaker theory and Igal Kvart’s rival account) are unable to solve this problem. I show that there are instances of real-life counterfactual reasoning in the social sciences that are counterexamples to both of these accounts. And finally, I develop a new theory of how to select antecedent scenarios that overcomes these difficulties, and so would be part of a more adequate theory of counterfactuals (and counterfactual reasoning).     

Conditionals and directionality: On the meaning of if vs. only if

The aim of this study was to test the predictions of the current theories of reasoning about the comprehension of conditional statements. We used two types of conditional statement that are logically equivalent: if p then q and p only if q . The model theory of reasoning considers that these conditional forms differ in their initial meaning, because the negative contingency is considered only in the p only if q form. Mental-rule theories maintain that the interpretation of p only if q depends on a rephrasing of the statement as: if not q then not p . Alternatively, a directional bias may explain the differences between if p then q and p only if q . We report three experiments that demonstrate the existence of a directional bias in the comprehension of the conditionals. The results were not predicted by either the mental-rules theories or the model theory; they could, however, be easily assimilated by the model theory.     

推理与决策的双加工理论研究简评

决策与推理的双加工理论是一个颇有影响力的理论,通过对两个加工系统的基本特点、区别点以及基本关系、推理错误原因等几个方面进行分析阐述,发现目前在该理论的一些基本问题的认识上还存在诸多问题。主要表现在以下几方面：（1）两个加工系统的关键区别点不在于工作记忆有无绝对参与;（2）对于推理和决策错误的原因,不同的双加工理论给出了不一致的解释;（3）今后有待从情绪与推理决策的关系、影响等方面加深对推理与决策错误的理解     

Modelling vagueness: what can we ignore?

A theory of vagueness gives a model of vague language and of reasoning within the language. Among the models that have been offered are Degree Theorists?? numerical models that assign values between 0 and 1 to sentences, rather than simply modelling sentences as true or false. In this paper, I ask whether we can benefit from employing a rich, well-understood numerical framework, while ignoring those aspects of it that impute a level of mathematical precision that is not present in the modelled phenomenon of vagueness. Can we ignore apparent implications for the phenomena by pointing out that it is ??just a model?? and that the unwanted features are mere artefacts? I explore the distinction between representors and artefacts and criticise the strategy of appealing to features as mere artefacts in defence of a theory. I focus largely on theories using numerical resources, but also consider other, related theories and strategies, including theories appealing to non-linear structures.     

The influence of cognitive ability and instructional set on causal conditional inference

We report a large study in which participants are invited to draw inferences from causal conditional sentences with varying degrees of believability. General intelligence was measured, and participants were split into groups of high and low ability. Under strict deductive-reasoning instructions, it was observed that higher ability participants were significantly less influenced by prior belief than were those of lower ability. This effect disappeared, however, when pragmatic reasoning instructions were employed in a separate group. These findings are in accord with dual-process theories of reasoning. We also took detailed measures of beliefs in the conditional sentences used for the reasoning tasks. Statistical modelling showed that it is not belief in the conditional statement per se that is the causal factor, but rather correlates of it. Two different models of belief-based reasoning were found to fit the data according to the kind of instructions and the type of inference under consideration.     

On the nature and development of conditional reasoning in early adolescence

Two studies investigated the conditional reasoning capabilities of eighth grade learners. In Study 1, we analysed conditional reasoning performances for differences in learners' abilities to solve problems correctly and propensities to be tricked into responding to problems in a biconditional manner. There seemed to be a developmental progression in conditional reasoning ability. Most young adolescents reason using memory of domain-specific memories. However, pragmatic inferential rules may serve as an intermediate level of abstration in reasoners as they progress from the ability to reason using only domain-specific experience to the ability to use content-free syntactic rules. In addition, correlation between scores on the Test of Logical Thinking and conditional reasoning performances suggested that ability to reason deductively using inferential rules at progressively higher levels of abstraction is related to cognitive development. In Study 2, we assessed the effectiveness of an instructional application of pragmatic inferential rule theory for development of conditional reasoning abilities. Pragmatic reasoning skill was developed throug engagement in Prolog programming activities involving hierarchical knowledge domains.