Neurobiological and memory models of risky decision making in adolescents versus young adults

Predictions of fuzzy-trace theory and neurobiological approaches are examined regarding risk taking in a classic decision-making task--the framing task--as well as in the context of real-life risk taking. We report the 1st study of framing effects in adolescents versus adults, varying risk and reward, and relate choices to individual differences, sexual behavior, and behavioral intentions. As predicted by fuzzy-trace theory, adolescents modulated risk taking according to risk and reward. Adults showed standard framing, reflecting greater emphasis on gist-based (qualitative) reasoning, but adolescents displayed reverse framing when potential gains for risk taking were high, reflecting greater emphasis on verbatim-based (quantitative) reasoning. Reverse framing signals a different way of thinking compared with standard framing (reverse framing also differs from simply choosing the risky option). Measures of verbatim- and gist-based reasoning about risk, sensation seeking, behavioral activation, and inhibition were used to extract dimensions of risk proneness: Sensation seeking increased and then decreased, whereas inhibition increased from early adolescence to young adulthood, predicted by neurobiological theories. Two additional dimensions, verbatim- and gist-based reasoning about risk, loaded separately and predicted unique variance in risk taking. Importantly, framing responses predicted real-life risk taking. Reasoning was the most consistent predictor of real-life risk taking: (a) Intentions to have sex, sexual behavior, and number of partners decreased when gist-based reasoning was triggered by retrieval cues in questions about perceived risk, whereas (b) intentions to have sex and number of partners increased when verbatim-based reasoning was triggered by different retrieval cues in questions about perceived risk.     

A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality

Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.     

Understanding developmental reversals in false memory: Reply to Ghetti (2008) and Howe (2008)

Replies to comments on the current authors' original article. S. Ghetti (2008) and M. L. Howe (2008) presented probative ideas for future research that will deepen scientific understanding of developmental reversals on false memory and establish boundary conditions for these counterintuitive patterns. Ghetti extended the purview of current theoretical principles by formulating hypotheses about how developmental reversals are controlled by the growth of phantom recollection and by the growth of false-memory editing. Some data are available on her hypotheses about phantom recollection, which distinguish phenomenology (vague or vivid) from memory representation (verbatim or gist). Howe introduced alternative theoretical principles that can be traced to the early work of Deese and Underwood. He argued that fuzzy-trace theory is subject to 3 limitations and that his alternative conception makes 3 predictions that contrast with fuzzy-trace theory's predictions. In the current reply, it is shown that the stated limitations do not apply to fuzzy-trace theory, that previously published research runs counter to the 3 predictions, and that the core difference between the 2 approaches is that fuzzy-trace theory is an opponent-processes model whereas the alternative conception is a 1-process model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective

A lay definition of intuition holds that it involves immediate apprehension in the absence of reasoning. From a more technical point of view, I argue also that intuition should be seen as the contrastive of reasoning, corresponding roughly to the distinction between Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (reflective) processes in contemporary dual process theories of thinking. From this perspective, we already know a great deal about intuition: It is quick, provides feelings of confidence, can reflect large amounts of information processing, and is most likely to provide accurate judgments when based on relevant experiential learning. Unlike reasoning, intuition is low effort and does not compete for central working memory resources. It provides default responses which may—or often may not—be intervened upon with high effort, reflective reasoning. Intuition has, however, been blamed for a range of cognitive biases in the psychological literatures on reasoning and decision making. The evidence indicates that with novel and abstract problems, not easily linked to previous experience, intervention with effortful reasoning is often required to avoid such biases. Hence, although it seems that intuition dominates reasoning most of the time—both in the laboratory and the real world—it can indeed be a false friend.     

Information seeking on Bayesian conditional probability problems: A fuzzy-trace theory account

Recently, the ‘heuristics and biases’ approach to the study of decision making has been criticized, with a call for better integrated theory. Three experiments stemming from fuzzy-trace theory addressed information seeking on probability problems, and the cognitive representation of hit-rates, base-rates, and the contrapositive. As predicted by the fuzzy-trace principle of ‘denominator neglect’, many subjects exhibited ‘conversion errors’, confusing the hit-rate, P(A|B), with the answer, P(B|A). These subjects sought base-rates less often than other subjects. On causal problems, more subjects correctly represented base-rates, sought base-rates more often, and produced more accurate estimates than on non-causal problems. Subjects tutored on the meaning of the hit-rate sought the base-rate more often, and were more accurate than control subjects. Results are explained by fuzzy-trace theory principles of gist extraction, fuzzy processing preference, denominator neglect, and output interference.     

Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist extraction,truncation, and conversion

In the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy-trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test this fuzzy-processing assumption. In the first experiment, framing effects were conserved when numerical information was omitted from standard problems, arguing against a critical role for numerical processing. In the second experiment, evidence is presented that some subjects simplified framing problems by mentally truncating linguistically redundant complements in gambles. Experimentally deleting parts of gambles mimiced such effects, and choices varied depending on the information that remained explicit. In the third experiment, truncation effects were also demonstrated for mixed-frame problems, in which one option is positive and the other is negative. The data disconfirmed a ‘halo’ hypothesis that subjects merely selected the positive option over the negative one. Instead, choices were accounted for by conversion, that is, transforming problems into uniformly positive representations to avoid the complexity of negation. In all three experiments, choices could be explained as a consequence of radically simplifying decision information.     

框架效应及其认知机制的研究进展

框架效应违背了不变性原则,是描述性决策理论违背规范性理论的经典异像。以亚洲疾病问题为代表的经典框架效应又称作风险选择框架效应,此外还包括特征框架效应等不同类别。框架效应受损益值类型和大小等社会线索影响。除展望理论可以解释其认知机制外,模糊痕迹理论和概率心理模型等也对此加以解释。框架效应的脑机制在大脑右半球和杏仁核等区域。文章最后对全文做了总结及展望。     

Dopaminergic modulation of incentive motivation in adolescence: age-related changes in signaling, individual differences, and implications for the development of self-regulation

Behavioral activation that is associated with incentive-reward motivation increases in adolescence relative to childhood and adulthood. This quadratic developmental pattern is generally supported by behavioral and experimental neuroscience findings. It is suggested that a focus on changes in dopamine neurotransmission is informative in understanding the mechanism for this adolescent increase in reward-related behavioral activation and subsequent decline into adulthood. Evidence is presented to indicate that incentive-reward motivation is modulated by mesoaccumbens dopamine, and that it increases in adolescence before declining into adulthood because of normative developmental changes at the molecular level. Potential mechanisms of variation in functional mesoaccumbens dopamine transmission are discussed with a focus on the interplay between tonic and phasic modes of dopamine transmission in modulating both general incentive-motivational biases and the efficacy of reward learning during exposure to novel reward experiences. Interactions between individual difference factors and these age-related trends are discussed.     

Perceived social context and risk preference: A re-examination of framing effects in a life-death decision problem

This study examines the effects of perceived group context on subjects risk attitudes and their sensitivity to the framing of choice outcomes in a ‘life-death’ decision problem. It seeks to uncover the psychological mechanisms underlying decision-making biases by systematically manipulating the decision context in which the ‘life-death’ problem was described. The study revealed that subjects risk preferences varied as a function of the experimental manipulations. Previously observed reversals in preferences (framing effects) appeared in large-group contexts and disappeared in small-group and family contexts. When considering the fate of small groups, subjects unambiguously favored the probabilistic outcome, no matter how the ‘life-death’ decision problem was framed. The empirical data obtained from the present study suggest that human choice patterns are behaviorally distinguishable across large-group, small-group, and family social contexts.     

Do children have to remember to reason? A fuzzy-trace theory of transitivity development

An idea that has become commonplace in the literature on cognitive development is that the solution of thinking and reasoning problems requires that children retain accurate representations of certain background facts in short-term memory. This reasoning/remembering hypothesis is reexamined with reference to the one childhood cognitive task for which the validity of the hypothesis seems to be firmly established, transitive inference. Although the hypothesis says that children's transitive inferences are critically dependent on memory for the initial premise information, it is shown in six experiments that transitivity and premise memory are independent abilities in children. A fuzzy-trace theory is developed to explain this surprising independence effect. The theory assumes that children retain only degraded, schematic representations (fuzzy traces) of the overall pattern of an ordered series and that performance on subsequent test trials is mediated by processing operations that flesh out vague pattern information. Some further experiments that were designed to test various predictions of the fuzzy-trace theory are reported. Last, it is shown that reasoning and remembering are independent abilities in some other childhood cognitive tasks for which the initial background facts are not logically inescapable components of the eventual solution. These reasoning/remembering independence effects argue for an increased emphasis on encoding selectivity in theories of cognitive development.     

“Piensa” twice: On the foreign language effect in decision making

In this article, we assess to what extent decision making is affected by the language in which a given problem is presented (native vs. foreign). In particular, we aim to ask whether the impact of various heuristic biases in decision making is diminished when the problems are presented in a foreign language. To this end, we report four main studies in which more than 700 participants were tested on different types of individual decision making problems. In the first study, we replicated Keysar et al.’s (2012) recent observation regarding the foreign language effect on framing effects related to loss aversion. In the second section, we assessed whether the foreign language effect is present in other types of framing problems that involve psychological accounting biases rather than gain/loss dichotomies. In the third section, we studied the foreign language effect in several key aspects of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. In the fourth study, we assessed the presence of a foreign language effect in the cognitive reflection test, a test that includes logical problems that do not carry emotional connotations. The absence of such an effect in this test suggests that foreign language leads to a reduction of heuristic biases in decision making across a range of decision making situations and provide also some evidence about the boundaries of the phenomenon. We explore several potential factors that may underlie the foreign language effect in decision making.     

A social neuroscience perspective on adolescent risk-taking

This article proposes a framework for theory and research on risk-taking that is informed by developmental neuroscience. Two fundamental questions motivate this review. First, why does risk-taking increase between childhood and adolescence? Second, why does risk-taking decline between adolescence and adulthood? Risk-taking increases between childhood and adolescence as a result of changes around the time of puberty in the brain’s socio-emotional system leading to increased reward-seeking, especially in the presence of peers, fueled mainly by a dramatic remodeling of the brain’s dopaminergic system. Risk-taking declines between adolescence and adulthood because of changes in the brain’s cognitive control system—changes which improve individuals’ capacity for self-regulation. These changes occur across adolescence and young adulthood and are seen in structural and functional changes within the prefrontal cortex and its connections to other brain regions. The differing timetables of these changes make mid-adolescence a time of heightened vulnerability to risky and reckless behavior.     

What lies beneath: Reframing framing effects

Decision framing concerns how individuals build internal representations of problems and how these determine the choices that they make. Research in this area has been dominated by studies of the framing effect, showing reversals in preference associated with the form in which a decision problem is presented. While there are studies that fail to reveal this effect, there is at present no theory that can explain why and when the effect occurs. The purpose of this article is to present a selective review of research and use this to argue for a new framework for considering decision framing, to interpret past studies, and to set an agenda for future research. A simple information-processing model is developed. The model provides the basis for arguing that previous research has taken too narrow a view of how decision problems are internally represented and how these representations are transformed into choice behaviour. In addition, the model is used to highlight the importance of decision content and context.     

Does bullying others at school lead to adult aggression? The roles of drinking and university participation during the transition to adulthood

This study uses a three‐wave longitudinal study of young Australians to identify developmental processes underlying the relationship between school bullying and physical aggression in early adulthood. The central question is whether and how drinking and participation in work or university study disrupt or entrench aggressive pathways from school bullying to adult aggression. Self‐report data were collected from 88 females and 63 males (N = 151) during childhood (age 10), adolescence (age 14), and early adulthood (age 20). Participants who bullied other students during childhood and adolescence, or during adolescence only, reported more physical aggression during early adulthood than those who never bullied. However, those who had bullied during adolescence only reported significantly higher adult aggression if they were also drinking at above‐average frequencies. Conversely, participation in university, compared to being in the workforce, was associated with significantly less adult aggression among the at‐risk groups. Findings suggest that particular contexts during early adulthood can offer youth on aggressive trajectories (as evidenced by bullying at school) unique opportunities to turn their behaviour around. Other contexts, however, may exacerbate aggressive behaviour patterns.     

心理时间旅行与自我:发展中关系模式的转换

该研究分别考察了儿童中晚期(9~12岁)、少年期(13~15岁)和青年早期(17岁、19岁、21岁)个体心理时间旅行的发展模式,并进一步探讨了不同年龄阶段,情景记忆和自我对情景预见作用模式的转换。研究采用访谈法评估心理时间旅行,以自我描述(儿童期和少年期)或自我连续性(青年早期)作为评估自我的指标。研究发现:(1)儿童中晚期,想象未来情景细节的数量随年龄增长而增加,少年期和青年早期的情景预见能力则趋于平稳,与情景记忆的发展趋势一致;(2)无论在哪个年龄段,情景记忆对情景预见都是有效的预测源;(3)自我描述在少年期才开始对情景预见产生预测作用;(4)青年早期,情景记忆以自我连续性为中介变量作用于情景预见。     

Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

Going beyond a positive–negative dichotomy in judgment and decision‐making research: Insights for framing,counterfactual thinking,and ambivalence

Many areas of judgment and decision‐making research have historically relied on a simple positive–negative dichotomy (e.g., positive vs. negative framing). Although this classic assumption about the conceptual space has contributed to some of the field's more impactful findings (e.g., framing effects), it may also have mistakenly led us to believe that these findings told a complete story about biases in processing positive and negative information. Building on a tradition of theoretical accounts outlining how positive and negative information is more complex, the first part of this paper considers how the following three elements jointly help to tell a more complete story about framing effects: (a) regulatory focus theory's concept of the domain (loss vs. gain) of an outcome, (b) the sequencing of positive and negative frames, and (c) the asymmetric influences of positive and negative evaluative processes. Next, the paper reviews research that has contributed to integrating these elements, highlighting opportunities for further integration to generate new insights for framing effects, risky decision‐making, counterfactual thinking, and ambivalence. The reviewed studies suggest that a more sophisticated conceptualization of positive and negative information contributes to a deeper understanding of the basic processes that govern human judgment and decision‐making.     

Developmental Intergroup Theory: Explaining and Reducing Children's Social Stereotyping and Prejudice

ABSTRACT— Social stereotyping and prejudice are intriguing phenomena from the standpoint of theory and, in addition, constitute pressing societal problems. Because stereotyping and prejudice emerge in early childhood, developmental research on causal mechanisms is critical for understanding and controlling stereotyping and prejudice. Such work forms the basis of a new theoretical model, developmental intergroup theory (DIT), which addresses the causal ingredients of stereotyping and prejudice. The work suggests that biases may be largely under environmental control and thus might be shaped via educational, social, and legal policies.     

‘If something doesn’t look right,go find out why’: how intuitive decision making is accomplished in police first-response

ABSTRACT

Intuition is an important mechanism by which organizational actors make significant decisions; however, precisely how intuitive decisions are taken is not well understood and hence is worthy of closer scrutiny. First-response decisions, because of the conditions under which they are executed, offer researchers an interesting and relevant context for the study of intuitive decision making in organizations. We used qualitative methods to explore how “peak performing” police officers used intuition in first-response decisions. Our findings show that intuition’s role in first-response occurs in two differing but complementary ways: “recognition-based intuition” and “intuition-based inquiry”. This finding builds on previous intuition research and informs current debates in behavioural sciences regarding “default-intervention” versus “parallel-competitive” variants of dual-process theory; it also reveals how a complex and situated mix of intuition and analysis can guide effective decision making and support peak performance in uncertain, dynamic and complex environments that typify many organizational decision processes. Our findings contribute to intuition research by extending the current theory of “intuition-as-expertise” in going beyond a simple “recognize-and-respond” model. We propose a “Perceiving-Knowing-Enacting-Closing” framework which captures the complex role that intuition in combination with analysis plays in police first-response decisions, and discuss implications for decision-making policies and practices in organizations.