The Risk-Based View of Trust: A Conceptual Framework

Trust and risk have often been linked in the literature, but their relationship is far from clear. Trust has been used in three different ways — namely, as a perception (subjective trust), as various personal and situational factors that lead to subjective trust (trust antecedents), and as the actions resulting from subjective trust (behavioral trust). We explain how risk is related to these three conceptions of trust. First, we argue that subjective trust and perceived risk are in fact mirror images of each other. Second, we show how behavioral trust can be viewed as risk taking, so that the causal relationship between subjective trust and behavioral trust is similar to that of perceived risk and risk taking. And third, we discuss the role of personal characteristics (such as risk propensity and trust propensity) in the risk–trust relationship. We also develop a number of propositions based on our risk-based view of trust.     

Three theories of nominalized predicates

By the term nominalization I mean any process which transforms a predicate or predicate phrase into a noun or noun phrase, e.g. feminine is transformed into feminity. I call these derivative nouns abstract singular terms. Our aim is to provide a model-theoretic interpretation for a formal language which admits the occurrence of such abstract singular terms.     

A reduction rule for Peirce formula

A reduction rule is introduced as a transformation of proof figures in implicational classical logic. Proof figures are represented as typed terms in a -calculus with a new constant P ⁽⁽⁾⁾. It is shown that all terms with the same type are equivalent with respect to -reduction augmented by this P-reduction rule. Hence all the proofs of the same implicational formula are equivalent. It is also shown that strong normalization fails for P-reduction. Weak normalization is shown for P-reduction with another reduction rule which simplifies of (( ) ) into an atomic type.This work was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research No. 05680276 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Japan and by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Hiroakira Ono     

Supererogation in Deontic Logic: Metatheory for DWE and Some Close Neighbours

In "Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common Sense Morality", Paul McNamara sets out a semantics for a deontic logic which contains the operator It is supererogatory that. As well as having a binary accessibility relation on worlds, that semantics contains a relative ordering relation, . For worlds u, v and w, we say that u w v when v is at least as good as u according to the standards of w. In this paper we axiomatize logics complete over three versions of the semantics. We call the strongest of these logics DWE for Doing Well Enough.     

On a problem of P(α, δ, π) concerning generalized Alexandroff s cube

Universality of generalized Alexandroff's cube plays essential role in theory of absolute retracts for the category of , -closure spaces. Alexandroff's cube. is an , -closure space generated by the family of all complete filters. in a lattice of all subsets of a set of power .Condition P(, , ) says that is a closure space of all , -filters in the lattice ( ), .Assuming that P (, , ) holds, in the paper [2], there are given sufficient conditions saying when an , -closure space is an absolute retract for the category of , -closure spaces (see Theorems 2.1 and 3.4 in [2]).It seems that, under assumption that P (, , ) holds, it will be possible to givean uniform characterization of absolute retracts for the category of , -closure-spaces.Except Lemma 3.1 from [1], there is no information when the condition P (, , ) holds or when it does not hold.The main result of this paper says, that there are examples of cardinal numbers, , , such that P (, , ) is not satisfied.Namely it is proved, using elementary properties of Lebesgue measure on the real line, that the condition P (, ₁, 2 ) is not satisfied.Moreover it is shown that fulfillment of the condition is essential assumption in, Theorems 2.1 and 3.4 from [1] i.e. it cannot be eliminated.     

Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition

Following Henkins discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or cardinality quantifiers, e.g., most, few, finitely many, exactly , where is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, Henkin definition first to a general definition of monotone-increasing (M) POQ and then to a general definition of generalized POQ, regardless of monotonicity. The extension is based on (i) Barwises 1979 analysis of the basic case of M POQ and (ii) my 1990 analysis of the basic case of generalized POQ. POQ is a non-compositional 1st-order structure, hence the problem of extending the definition of the basic case to a general definition is not trivial. The paper concludes with a sample of applications to natural and mathematical languages.     

Dowód aksjomatyzowalności pewnychn-wartościowych rachunków zdań

Praca ta zostaa wykonana pod kierunkiem prof. drJerzego Supeckiego. Jej szczególny przypadek dotyczcyn-wartociowego rachunku zda o jednej wartoci wyrónionej by referowany w Warszawie na zjedzie Grupy Logiki Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN. Streszczenie tego referatu [5] zostao wydrukowane w Sprawozdaniach Wydziau Nauk Spoecznych PAN.Allatum est die 19 Aprilis 1963     

Barker and Achinstein on Goodman

Barker and Achinstein think that it is not possible for a predicate like grue to serve as well as a predicate like green in the role of a qualitative or non-positional predicate. Their arguments consist in a number of attempts to show that one who possesses green in his language can do things with that predicate which one who must work with grue instead cannot do. However, they succeed in showing only that a qualitative predicate is better adapted to our needs than its positional counterpart, rather than that grue is not capable of being a qualitative predicate.     

Branching space-time

Branching space-time is a simple blend of relativity and indeterminism. Postulates and definitions rigorously describe the causal order relation between possible point events. The key postulate is a version of everything has a causal origin; key defined terms include history and choice point. Some elementary but helpful facts are proved. Application is made to the status of causal contemporaries of indeterministic events, to how splitting of histories happens, to indeterminism without choice, and to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen distant correlations.     

Логистическая система, исходными связками которой являются эквивалентность и дизъюнкция

- Allatum est die 5 Martii 1970     

Trying to Resolve the Two-Envelope Problem

After explaining the well-known two-envelope paradox by indicating the fallacy involved, we consider the two-envelope problem of evaluating the factual information provided to us in the form of the value contained by the envelope chosen first. We try to provide a synthesis of contributions from economy, psychology, logic, probability theory (in the form of Bayesian statistics), mathematical statistics (in the form of a decision-theoretic approach) and game theory. We conclude that the two-envelope problem does not allow a satisfactory solution. An interpretation is made for statistical science at large.     

Intuitionistic uniformity principles for propositions and some applications

This note deals with the prepositional uniformity principlep-UP: p x N A (p, x) x N p A (p, x) ( species of all propositions) in intuitionistic mathematics.p-UP is implied by WC and KS. But there are interestingp-UP-cases which require weak KS resp. WC only. UP for number species follows fromp-UP by extended bar-induction (ranging over propositions) and suitable weak continuity. As corollaries we have the disjunction property and the existential definability w.r.t. concrete objects. Other consequences are: there is no non-trivial countable partition of;id is the only injective function from to; there are no many-place injective prepositional functions; card () is incomparable with the cardinality of all metric spaces containing at least three elements.     

Naturalism, scientism and the independence of epistemology

Naturalists seek continuity between epistemology and science. Critics argue this illegitimately expands science into epistemology and commits the fallacy of scientism. Must naturalists commit this fallacy? I defend a conception of naturalized epistemology which upholds the non-identity of epistemic ends, norms, and concepts with scientific evidential ends, norms, and concepts. I argue it enables naturalists to avoid three leading scientistic fallacies: dogmatism, one dimensionalism, and granting science an epistemic monopoly.     

Was sind “ek-statische Maschinen”? (Gedanken aus und zu: M. K. Mamardašvili,Wissenschaft und Kultur)

Ohne ZusammenfassungM. K. Mamardavili, Nauka i kul'tura, inMetodologieskie problemy istorikonaunych issledovanij, M., Nauka, 1982, str. 38–58. Zitate aus diesem Aufsatz werden im Text mit der in Klammern gesetzten Seitenzahl ausgewiesen.     

Независимость одной системы аксиом и правила вывода пропозиционального исчисления

- Allatum est die 5 Martii 1970     

On Alan Turing's anticipation of connectionism

It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks unorganised machines. By the application of what he described as appropriate interference, mimicking education an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of neurons is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the network and the training process by means of a computer program. We outline Turing's connectionist project of 1948.In Memory of Robin Gandy     

Once More into the Breach of Self-Ownership: Reply to Narveson and Brenkert

In reply to Narveson, I distinguish his no-proviso argument from his liberty argument, and I show that both fail. I also argue that interference lacks the strategic status he assigns to it, because it cannot be appropriately distinguished, conceptually and morally, from prevention; that natural resources do enjoy the importance he denies they have; that laissez-faire economies lack the superiority he attributes to them; that ownership can indeed be a reflexive relation; that anti-paternalism does not entail libertarianism; and that he misrepresents the doctrines of a number of philosophers, including John Locke, Ronald Dworkin, and myself. In reply to Brenkert, I show that he seriously misconstrues my view of the nature of freedom, and of its relationship to self-ownership. I then refute his criticisms of my treatment of the contrasts between self-ownership, on the one hand, and autonomy and non-slavery, on the other. I also show that his attempt to exorcize the demon of self-ownership is multiply flawed.     

“The story says that” operator in story semantics

In [2] a semantics for implication is offered that makes use of stories — sets of sentences assembled under various constraints. Sentences are evaluated at an actual world and in each member of a set of stories. A sentence B is true in a story s just when B s. A implies B iff for all stories and the actual world, whenever A is true, B is true. In this article the first-order language of [2] is extended by the addition of the operator the story ... says that ..., as in The story Flashman among the Redskins says that Flashman met Sitting Bull. The resulting language is shown to be sound and complete.     

Increasing correct identifications by children

Four new lineup procedures were examined with the goal of increasingchildren's identification accuracy. Participants (329 children aged 10 and11 years, 426 children aged 12 to 14 years, and 265 adults) were presentedwith either a target-present or target-absent lineup. Proceduralmodifications included providing a salient "I don't know" response option,extending standard instructions, and modeling correct responses eitherusing an identification demonstration video or a handout. These conditionswere compared to a standard (control) lineup procedure. Extendingstandard instructions increased correct identifications by the youngerchildren. Presenting a salient "I don't know" response increased overallchoosing for both target-present and target-absent lineups. Experimentalprocedures did not influence correct rejection rates. These data demonstratea variety of techniques that may be useful for improving the identificationaccuracy of child witnesses. Future directions are discussed.