Whose ideology? A rejoinder to M. Plon

M. Plon commits the same offense that he finds so odious in American social psychology: A confounding of political axioms and scientific reasoning. His desire to demonstrate ideological blindness in Americans leads him to misinterpret some published works on the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm in bargaining research and to ignore the issue of the most useful balance in emphasis between conflict maintenance and conflict resolution when these topics are studied experimentally. Thus, M. Plon's angry attack is not a clarification of the deep issues that he essays but, rather, another data point that will itself need to be understood.     

How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?

Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (or at least more often used than the former tactic), but it is not a fallacy.     

The conjunction fallacy? A reply to Bar-Hillel

In her commentary on our article, Bar-Hillel (1991) argues that our normative interpretation of the Lindaproblem is inaccurate and that the representativeness heuristic can account for all of the relevant data. I argue that the normative interpretation of the Linda problem remains slippery and that representativeness fails to account for much of the data. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports our suggestion that subjects use different underlying models in estimating likelihoods in different con problems.     

Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?

Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr(h ₁ & h ₂|e) > Pr(h ₁|e). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h ₁ & h ₂ is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h ₁ alone. Consequently, they suggest that people are tracking this confirmation relation when they commit conjunction fallacies. I offer three experiments testing the merits of Crupi et al.’s account specifically and confirmation-theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy more generally. The results of Experiment 1 show that, although Crupi et al.’s conditions do seem to be causally linked to the conjunction fallacy, they are not necessary for it; there exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 show that Crupi et al.’s conditions, and those offered by other confirmation-theoretic accounts of the fallacy, are not sufficient for the fallacy either; there exist cases that meet all three of CFT’s conditions in which subjects do not tend to commit the fallacy. Additionally, these latter experiments show that such confirmation-theoretic conditions are at best only weakly causally relevant to the presence of the conjunction fallacy. Given these findings, CFT’s account specifically, and any general confirmation-theoretic account more broadly, falls short of offering a satisfying explanation of the presence of the conjunction fallacy.     

Is psychoanalysis alive and well at 85? A rejoinder

Psychoanalysis has declined in public interest and scientific validity. It has become a “dead science” and an anachronistic system of beliefs. Its goal of total personality reconstruction is frustrating and futile. Psychoanalytic practice became a form of “exclusive salvationism,” and unconscionable, when it excluded the spouse from participation in the total treatment plan. More frequent interviews over a longer period of time do not produce a therapeutic effect that is “deeper,” and there is no reason to believe that fewer interviews are superficial, or temporary, and that prolongation of an analysis is more likely to produce better therapeutic results. Research studies do not produce any clear-cut winners when psychotherapies are compared. Psychoanalytic theories rest more on argument than on scientific evidence. The patient’s needs seldom, if ever, correspond to the therapist’s theoretical preoccupations, system of beliefs, and indoctrination. Research psychologists, philosophers of science, and eclectic psychiatrists have expressed their dissatisfaction with unproven psychoanalytic doctrines and the concept of “mental energy.” Psychoanalysis is not a pseudoscience, but a “half-science,” whose poetic mythology requires translation into the prose of science.     

How serious a fallacy is inconsistency?

Consistency is often pictured as an indispensable requisite for rationality. The paper argues that this is overly rigoristic. Inconsistency can be treated as a matter of isolable singularities rather than an all-destructive disaster. The paper, supports and illustrates a perspective on which consistency can be seen as a desideratum rather than a totaly non-negotiable demand. The argumentation of the paper casts consistency in the role of a cognitive ideal rather than a sine qua non condition of rational process.     

Whose forest? Whose land? Whose Ruins? Ethics and conservation

The stakes are very high in many struggles over cultural property, not only because the property is itself valuable, but also because property rights of many kinds hinge on cultural identity. However, the language of property rights and possession, and the standards for establishing cultural rights, is founded in antiquated and essentialized concepts of cultural continuity and cultural purity. As cultural property and culturally-defined rights become increasingly valuable in the global marketplace, disputes over ownership and management are becoming more and more intense. Using the example of a recent lawsuit over logging on Mayan Indian reservations in the Central American country of Belize, this paper argues that cultural essentialist positions are no longer tenable. Assigning exclusive ownership of globally important resources to any group or entity on purely cultural grounds is likely to prolong conflict instead of creating workable management structures. The author instead advocates a concept of “stakeholding” which acknowledges the legitimate interests of diverse individuals and groups. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium entitled “Ethics in Science: Special Problems in Anthropology and Archaeology” held at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Philadelphia, PA, 15 February, 1998.     

How context-independent is the outgroup homogeneity effect? A response to Bartsch and Judd

Bartsch and Judd (1993) argue that outgroup homogeneity effects occur independently of any tendency for members of minority groups to see their ingroup as more homogeneous than the majority outgroup. This argument is based on evidence of an underlying outgroup homogeneity effect in a study which purports to unconfound the roles of judged group size and ingroup–outgroup judgement by presenting subjects first with a small or large ingroup (or outgroup) and then a small comparison outgroup (or ingroup). However, from the perspective of self-categorization theory (SCT), such a procedure actually introduces a confound as SCT predicts that when an ingroup is judged first it should be perceived as relatively heterogeneous due to the intragroup nature of this judgemental context. Close examination of Bartsch and Judd's data bears this point out: the tendency to see the ingroup as less homogeneous than the outgroup when the ingroup was judged first was extinguished when the ingroup was judged second even when the judged groups were of equal size. Consistent with SCT, this re-analysis suggests that manifestations of outgroup homogeneity are not independent of contextual factors which determine the relative appropriateness of category-based perception of ingroup and outgroup.     

What is the best way to promote cycling? A systematic review and meta-analysis

Cycling has the potential to address a number of personal and societal challenges, not least with respect to health and the need for more sustainable modes of transport. However, the best way(s) to promote cycling is still unclear. In an effort to answer this question, we identified 39 interventions designed to promote cycling, with a total sample of 46,102 participants. Random effects meta-analysis estimated a small but statistically significant effect of interventions on cycling behaviour (g₊ = 0.14, 95% CI [0.05, 0.23]). To identify the most effective intervention strategies, we coded the behaviour change techniques used within each of the interventions. Interventions that prompted people to self-monitor their behaviour or added objects to the environment (e.g., provided shared bikes) were more effective than those that did not use these strategies. Interventions that restructured the physical environment (e.g., built new cycle paths) were less effective than the studies that did not do this. We also identified a number of factors that moderated the effect of the interventions on outcomes; specifically, interventions that targeted a specific group, used objective measures of cycling such as accelerometers, and that were tested using independent groups designs typically yielded stronger effects. The findings should help to guide interventions to promote cycling in the future.     

Whose Life is it Anyway?

ABSTRACT This paper addresses a current confusion in debates on the morality of experimentation on human pre-embryos: the confusion that arises from ambiguity in the sense of 'human being'. We may quite legitimately decide to apply the term 'human being'to all entities with human DNA but in that case we should not then imply that all human beings are as much objects of moral concern as the fetus or a post-parturate human being. It is argued that whatever classifying terms we use, potential entities need to be distinguished from actual entities and that the very notion of potentiality rests on this distinction. The paper does not offer an argument in favour of experimentation, rather it appeals for clear thought. Moral attitudes to experimentation on pre-embryos are varied and attempts to analyse issues through implicit appeal to emotionally ambiguous terms do not help the moral debate.     

Whose Consent is it Anyway? A Poststructuralist framing of the Person in Medical Decision-Making

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - This paper explores the value of a Poststructuralist psychoanalytic model of persons, or “Subjects,” as an expanded frame for the question...     

What is the speed to transparent and kinetic-boundary displays?

To compare transparent motion and kinetic boundaries with unidirectional motion, in many studies the relative motion is generated by superimposing or adjoining unidirectional motions oriented in opposite directions. The presumption, tacitly underlying this comparison, is that the two oppositely directed velocities are independent of one another as far as their speed is concerned, i.e. the speed of the relative motion is presumed to be equivalent to the speed of the unidirectional components. Here we report that the relative motion between dots moving in opposite directions augments perceived speed. A constant-stimuli procedure was used to pair transparent-motion or kinetic-boundary displays with unidirectional motion, and human observers were asked to match the speed of the relative and unidirectional motions. The results show that transparency and kinetic boundaries increase the perceived visual speed by about 50%, compared with the speed of the individual components.     

Whose self is it anyway? Self-aspect control moderates the relation between self-complexity and well-being

Greater self-complexity refers to the extent that one’s self-concept is comprised of many and relatively differentiated self-aspects. Although some research has found that those greater in self-complexity fare better physically (e.g., fewer illnesses) and psychologically (e.g., less depression) when experiencing stress, other studies have reported another pattern of data (e.g., greater self-complexity predicts greater depression). In the current work, two studies found support for a moderating variable in this latter pattern, self-aspect control. Specifically, for those who perceived relatively little control over their self-aspects, being greater in self-complexity predicted worse physical and psychological outcomes. Study 2 tested alternative explanations and supported an interpretation that perceptions of control over one’s multiple selves, in particular, moderated the relation between self-complexity and well-being.     

The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness?

The representativeness heuristic has been invoked to explain two opposing expectations--that random sequences will exhibit positive recency (the hot hand fallacy) and that they will exhibit negative recency (the gambler's fallacy). We propose alternative accounts for these two expectations: (1) The hot hand fallacy arises from the experience of characteristic positive recency in serial fluctuations in human performance. (2) The gambler's fallacy results from the experience of characteristic negative recency in sequences of natural events, akin to sampling without replacement. Experiment 1 demonstrates negative recency in subjects' expectations for random binary outcomes from a roulette game, simultaneously with positive recency in expectations for another statistically identical sequence-the successes and failures of their predictions for the random outcomes. These findings fit our proposal but are problematic for the representativeness account. Experiment 2 demonstrates that sequence recency influences attributions that human performance or chance generated the sequence.