The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colors

Color experience is structured. Some “unique” colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as “pure,” or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as “binary colors.” According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue that colors are not properties of surfaces and that color experiences are neural processes without environmental counterparts. We reconsider the argument both in terms of its logic and in the light of recent models in vision science which point at environment-involving patterns that may be at the basis of the unique/binary structure of color experience. We conclude that, in the light of internal and external problems which arise for it, the argument from structure fails.     

Illumination, background luminance, and perceptual learning in perception of achromatic colors

Plateau's experiment, in which the bisection method was introduced, is recognized as the first psychophysical experiment ever done. That experiment was replicated and extended using modem imaging devices. First, participants with professional training in visual arts painted grayscales with no control on illumination. Then, the trained participants and the nontrained participants generated grayscales using a personal computer in three different conditions: a white background of a linearized monitor, a black background of that monitor, and a white background but without linearizing the monitor. Analyses showed that with artificial illumination, scales with steps more evenly spread were produced than with natural illumination. Humans do not seem to have a natural ability to use the bisection method properly. Experts seem to be able to judge the reflectance of distal stimuli, and perceptual learning played an important role in the perception of achromatic colors as found in prior literature.     

Effects of contour proximity and lightness on Delboeuf illusions created by circumscribed letters

32 observers judged the size of a letter, either an "A" or an "S," which was surrounded by a circle. Both letters were overestimated, but larger surrounding circles reduced the illusion. Decreasing the lightness contrast of the surrounding circle relative to the central letter diminished the illusion. The results suggest that, like the Delboeuf illusion, these circumscribed letters illusions are produced by interactions among size-coding neurons.     

The effects of global grouping laws on surface lightness perception

Previous studies of lightness perception have shown that local surface grouping laws such as proximity and T junction were powerful determinants of target surface lightness. Recent lightness theories also emphasize the importance of local grouping of surfaces. In this study, we further examined the effects of three global grouping laws--symmetry, repetition, and alternation--on lightness perception. Local surface grouping laws such as proximity and good continuation were controlled across all of our stimulus displays. Participants' lightness perception consistently depended on a given surface's belongingness as determined by these laws--that is, global grouping laws affected a target surface's lightness perception. Our results indicate that global grouping laws determine a target surface's lightness when local surface grouping does not produce any distinct surface belongingness. Implications of our basic results are discussed in terms of a recent lightness theory.     

Perceived lightness, but not brightness, of achromatic surfaces depends on perceived depth information

Three experiments were conducted in an attempt to replicate and clarify Gilchrist's (1977, 1980) experiments on the effects of depth information on judgments of achromatic surface color. Gilchrist found that coplanarity, and not retinal adjacency, was the dominant factor in determining achromatic color matches. Because such matches can be made on the basis of either brightness or lightness, we obtained judgments of both qualities. Stereopsis was added to enhance the perceived depth effect of Gilchrist's display, which was otherwise simulated closely on a high-resolution CRT. The results for lightness followed the same pattern as those of Gilchrist, but were smaller in magnitude. This discrepancy may reflect reduced extraneous lighting effects in our displays. Our results therefore agree with related studies in suggesting that lightness matches are based on relationships among coplanar surfaces. Brightness matches, however, were not influenced by perceived depth.     

Colours in black and white: the depiction of lightness and brightness in achromatic engravings before the invention of photography

What is it like to see the world in black and white? In the pioneer days of cinema, when movies displayed grey worlds, was it true that no 'colours' were actually seen? Did every object seen in those projections appear grey in the same way? The answer is obviously no--people in those glorious days were seeing a world full of light, shadows, and objects in which colours were expressed in terms of lightness. But the marvels of grey worlds have not always been so richly displayed. Before the invention of photography, the depiction of scenes in black-and-white had to face some technical and perceptual challenges. We have studied the technical and perceptual constraints that XV-XVIII century engravers had to face in order to translate actual colours into shades of grey. An indeterminacy principle is considered, according to which artists had to prefer the representation of some object or scene features over others (for example brightness over lightness). The reasons for this lay between the kind of grey scale technically available and the kind of information used in the construction of 3-D scenes. With the invention of photography, photomechanical reproductions, and new printing solutions, artists had at their disposal a continuous grey scale that greatly reduces the constraints of the indeterminacy principle.     

Grouping by achromatic color and surface segregation

The study explored the achromatic-color determinants of grouping of uniform surfaces. The stimuli were a set of separate uniform achromatic disks on either a uniform or a bipartite achromatic background. The participants rated the salience of grouping of these disks for different combinations of stimulus luminances. The results show that achromatic color similarity alone could not sufficiently explain the pattern of obtained factorial curves but this factor coupled with the factor of surface segregation could. Luminance contrast similarity per se was found to be unimportant for grouping.     

Perceived angle of incidence and achromatic surface color

Theory and evidence proposing illumination, and therefore necessarily angle of incidence of light, as a perceptual cue for lightness judgments are described. In two experiments, angle of incidence was varied by having 46 Ss view an upright trapezoid that monocularly appeared flat and binocularly, upright. In the first experiment, numbers of cues to the direction of a fixed source above the trapezoid were varied and combined. In a second experiment, the background for an illumination gradient was varied. Angle of incidence and cues to the location of the source did predict the trends in lightness judgments but not the magnitude of the effects. An alternative explanation to cue theory is proposed.     

Local and global processes in surface lightness perception

Various demonstrations show that a target of constant luminance can be made to appear darker in perceived lightness merely by introducing an adjacent region of higher luminance. This has often been interpreted as a manifestation of contrast effects produced by lateral inhibition, a relatively local process. An alternative interpretation holds that the highest luminance in such a display serves as an anchor that defines the white level. This interpretation is global in the sense that the anchor need not be located near any particular target in order to serve as its standard. Edge integration processes have been postulated that would enable such remote comparisons, but there is controversy about the strength of these processes. We report a series of experiments in which local and global processes were assessed. Specifically, we tested whether the introduction of a higher luminance has a greater darkening effect on an adjacent target than on a remote target. We found no difference, suggesting that the darkening effect is a matter of anchoring, not contrast, and that edge integration processes required by anchoring are relatively strong.     

Precision of synesthetic color matching resembles that for recollected colors rather than physical colors

Grapheme-color synesthesia is an atypical condition in which individuals experience sensations of color when reading printed graphemes such as letters and digits. For some grapheme-color synesthetes, seeing a printed grapheme triggers a sensation of color, but hearing the name of a grapheme does not. This dissociation allowed us to compare the precision with which synesthetes are able to match their color experiences triggered by visible graphemes, with the precision of their matches for recalled colors based on the same graphemes spoken aloud. In six synesthetes, color matching for printed graphemes was equally variable relative to recalled experiences. In a control experiment, synesthetes and age-matched controls either matched the color of a circular patch while it was visible on a screen, or they judged its color from memory after it had disappeared. Both synesthetes and controls were more variable when matching from memory, and the variance of synesthetes' recalled color judgments matched that associated with their synesthetic judgments for visible graphemes in the first experiment. Results suggest that synesthetic experiences of color triggered by achromatic graphemes are analogous to recollections of color. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Symmetric and asymmetric matching of joint presentations

The global psychophysical theory of summation and magnitude production of R. D. Luce (2002) had joint presentations of pairs of intensities (measured above threshold) being matched asymmetrically, with 1 component being 0 intensity and the other the matching intensity. For loudness, an intensity pair to the 2 ears is matched by an intensity in just 1 ear. Realizing this experimentally has been difficult, and so, this article extends the theory to the use of symmetric matches with the same intensity being used in both components. In addition, the representational aspect is much improved; a new formulation of the results of the earlier theory is presented; the theory for symmetric matches is outlined; and it is shown that if 1 form of segregation, right or left, holds for asymmetric matches and 1 for symmetric ones, then all forms of segregation hold.     

The unbearable lightness of priming

Repetition priming from text to isolated words has been difficult to observe. One explanation for this difficulty is that previous attempts to observe this type of priming have utilised conditions that normally reduce priming. Two experiments were conducted to evaluate this hypothesis. Experiment 1 involved participants being presented with words in isolation and in text passages. The words were then presented again in a lexical decision test. Results indicated that priming occurred as a result of exposure to both isolated words and words in text, although priming was greater in the word-word condition. Experiment 2 investigated whether priming occurred in a lexical decision test on words that had been read prior to the test in Milan Kundera's novel "The Unbearable Lightness of Being." There was some evidence that participants who had read the book recently were faster at lexical decision to words from the book than participants who had not read the book. The two experiments therefore indicate that priming can occur from text to isolated words, although it is smaller in magnitude to that observed from word to word. Reasons for this difference, as suggested by Kirsner and Speelman (J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22 (1996) 563) model of repetition priming, are discussed.     

The impossibility of incommensurable values

Many recent attacks on consequentialism and several defenses of pluralism have relied on arguments for the incommensurability of value. Such arguments have, generally, turned on empirical appeals to aspects of our everyday experience of value conflict. My intention, largely, is to bypass these arguments and turn instead to a discussion of the conceptual apparatus needed to make the claim that values are incommensurable. After delineating what it would mean for values to be incommensurable, I give an a priori argument that such is impossible. It is widely accepted that value is conceptually tied to desire. I argue that, more specifically, it is proportional to merited desire strength. This connection gives one a metric of all value if there is any such thing. This metric entails that value is a complete ordering over all states of affairs, or, in other words, that value is commensurable.