Choosing the realist framework

There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a way empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework.     

Choosing Methods

This paper begins by adopting a broad criterion of scientific methods, in which a method is some practice in science designed to achieve the goals of science; this allows us to deal with a wider range of questions than has been common in much past philosophy of science, and to discuss some of the more detailed methodological questions of concern to scientists. On this definition, apriori approaches prove insufficient, since many methodological questions require some empirical input to be decided. Laudan has suggested that many such questions can be decided by testing methods empirically, but this encounters the problem that the empirical evidence is often indecisive. A more productive strategy is to utilise scientific theories: there are a wide range of these that are relevant to methodological questions and they are easier to validate. But this does not mean that empirical testing has no place. Instead, our experience with methods can be used to detect specific problems with the methods and to modify them accordingly.     

Choosing your poison and the time of a killing

The problem of the time of a killing is often cited as providing grounds for rejecting the action identification thesis favoured by Anscombe and Davidson. In this paper I make three claims. First, I claim that this problem is a threat to the action identification thesis because of two assumptions the thesis makes: since the thesis takes actions to be a kind of doings, it has to assume that agents’ doings last as long as their actions and vice versa. Second, I claim that not making both of these assumptions necessarily leads to another problem, the problem of the acting dead. This means that any theory of action has to choose its poison and face either one of these unresolved problems. Third, I claim that the solution to the problem of the time of a killing can be found by heeding linguistic arguments that ‘kill’ cannot mean ‘cause to die,’ as is commonly assumed, but instead has to have a more complex meaning. I discuss an alternative, more complex proposal and show how it allows us to keep the action identification thesis, fits colloquial usage of ‘kill’ and deals with the problem of the time of a killing.     

Choosing to believe

This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg. Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston’s influential objections to doxastic voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief.     

Choosing among Maximals

In a choice situation, it is usually assumed that the agents select the maximal elements. Nevertheless, there are situations in which the number of maximal elements is large, and a selection inside the maximal set is then required. This selection may be done in a random way or, as we propose in this work, by obtaining additional information from the preference relation that may provide a way of discriminating among the maximal elements and selecting the “best” ones.     

Choosing the Appropriate Design and Analysis of a Research Project

It is extremely important that the proper mental planning of a research project is considered before the data collection ever begins. Otherwise, problems may be encountered after the data have been collected and it may then be too late to correct them. This paper will explain some of the important considerations necessary in choosing an adequate design and analysis for a research project.     

Choosing Between Parametric and Nonparametric Tests

A fundamental analysis decision confronting researchers in psychology and education is the choice between parametric and nonparametric tests. Despite the statistical and substantive implications of this important decision, many researchers unerringly employ parametric tests and thus ignore the advantages of their nonparametric counterparts. One justification for this behavior has been the absence of guidelines for choosing between these procedures. A second has been the lack of a comprehensive nonparametric test that is computationally manageable. In this article, the author discusses several statistical and substantive criteria that can be used to choose between parametric and nonparametric tests. A non-parametric test capable of testing a number of statistical hypotheses using existing computer packages is also presented. Recommendations are made encouraging researchers to routinely use nonparametric tests in their data analytic work.     

Choosing among natural stimuli

Pigeons worked on concurrent variable-interval, variable-interval schedules with the alternatives signaled by slides either containing trees or not. The schedules were designed to hold both overall and relative rates of reinforcement within narrowly constrained limits, and slides were quasi-randomly ordered each day. Responding to the two alternatives was well described by the generalized matching equation with substantial undermatching. Using an adaptation of the matching law, we estimated that the subjects were correctly classifying 82% to 95% of exemplars. The matching performance transferred to new exemplars of trees and nontrees with only slight generalization decrement. The pigeons appeared to be discriminating among exemplars even when the alternatives provided equal rates of reinforcement and the average relative performances were close to 50%.     

Choosing an inferior alternative

We show how decision makers can be induced to choose a personally inferior alternative, a strong violation of rational decision making. First, the inferior alternative is installed as the leading option by starting with information that supports this alternative. Then, the decision maker uses the natural process of distorting new information to support whichever alternative is leading. This leader-supporting distortion overcomes the inherent advantages of the superior alternative. The end result is a tendency to choose the self-identified inferior alternative. We trace the choice process to reveal the amount of distortion and its influence on preference. Self-reported awareness of distortion to support the inferior alternative is not related to the amount of distortion. The absence of valid awareness suggests that the manipulation that produces this preference violation is unlikely to be detected and that the distortion is unlikely to be corrected by the decision maker. As expected, given the lack of awareness, final confidence is just as high when the inferior alternative is chosen as when the superior one is. The discussion considers how to prevent an adversary from manipulating one's decisions using this technique.     

Choosing when to Die

What would make it the right time for you to die, or the wrong one? In particular, could it be the right time for you to die even if your loved ones want to make the sacrifices needed to prolong your life, because that would cost them too dearly? The worry is that it would be selfish to permit these sacrifies, and wrong for that reason. I think it matters that the sacrifies would occur within a relationship of mutual devotion, and I try to say how it matters. In particular, I argue against some fairly simple views of what constitutes impermissible selfishness in this context, and in favor of approaching such decisions in a different way.     

脑血管病治疗现状及评析

我国正处于人口老龄化、脑血管病患者迅速增加的时期,针对各地千差万别的医疗水平,系统梳理和总结国内外脑血管病有关指南及规范的基础上,强调了脑血管病的预防的重要性,并提出我国数种常见脑血管病的治疗策略选择的意见及建议.     

脑血管病治疗现状及评析

我国正处于人口老龄化、脑血管病患者迅速增加的时期,针对各地千差万别的医疗水平,系统梳理和总结国内外脑血管病有关指南及规范的基础上,强调了脑血管病的预防的重要性,并提出我国数种常见脑血管病的治疗策略选择的意见及建议。     

Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts

ABSTRACT

The literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund uses a similar scenario to illuminate a novel, distinctly metaphysical problem for normative realists of both naturalist and non-naturalist stripes. The problem is that it is not clear what (if anything) would suffice for the sort of ardent realist view that normative realists have in mind – the view that reality itself favors certain ways of acting and valuing. Eklund then offers a metasemantic view that he thinks can provide the best solution to this problem. In this reply to Eklund, I argue that Eklund’s treatment of the problem and his solution re-entangle metaphysical and metasemantic issues that ought to be kept separate. I also argue that there is a purely metaphysical solution to the problem at hand, which Eklund’s own solution seems to implicitly rely upon. While these criticisms do not suggest that Eklund’s positive view is false, they do undermine some of the broader lessons that Eklund hopes to draw from the view.