Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions

Concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are knowledge attributions of the form ‘S knows p, but it’s possible that q’, where q obviously entails not-p (Rysiew, Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 35:477–514, 2001). The significance of CKAs has been widely discussed recently. It’s agreed by all that CKAs are infelicitous, at least typically. But the agreement ends there. Different writers have invoked them in their defenses of all sorts of philosophical theses; to name just a few: contextualism, invariantism, fallibilism, infallibilism, and that the knowledge rules for assertion and practical reasoning are false. In fact, there is a lot of confusion about CKAs and their significance. I try to clear some of this confusion up, as well as show what their significance is with respect to the debate between fallibilists and infallibilists about knowledge in particular.     

Piaget's logical formalism for formal operations: An interpretation in context

Two interpretations of the equations used by B. Inhelder and J. Piaget in The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958) are discussed, with implication as the central example. The expression (p ? q) (p implies q) is said to be equal to $\text{(p · q)}\text{V}\text{(}\text{p}\text{· q)}\text{V}\text{(}\text{p}\text{·}\text{q}\text{)}$ (i.e.,p and q, or not p and q, or neither p nor q). According to one, (p ? q) asserts the existence of each case mentioned. According to the other, (p ? q) only asserts that current knowledge allows the possibility of each of the cases. Neither interpretation makes sense of all the relevant passages. Both can be combined in a consistent interpretation when attention is paid to the functional context of the subject's use of logical operations in this book: the “operations” describe the knowledge states which the subject can differentiate and relate, on his way to solving Inhelder's tasks. The logical notation used to represent these states is not a representational format attributed to the subject and manipulated by his cognitive processes, but part of a structuralist account of the subject's reasoning capacities.     

Knowledge and epistemic necessity

Claims of the form ??I know P and it might be that not-P?? tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, ??Might P?? is true in a speaker??s mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath??s recent Knowledge in an Uncertain World.     

Confucian Ritual as Body Language of Self, Society, and Spirit

This article explains how li ?Y or ??ritual propriety?? is the ??body language?? of ren ?? or the authentic expression of our humanity. Li and ren are interdependent aspects of a larger creative human way (rendao ???) that can be conceptually distinguished as follows: li refers to the ritualized social form of appropriate conduct and ren to the more general, authentically human spirit this expresses. Li is the social instrument for self-cultivation and the vehicle of harmonious human interaction. More, li must mean something that is effectively communicated to others for an authentic, human (ren) interaction to occur. Li is the body language of ren in being the ritual vehicle for its?? expression; however, li is underdetermined by ren and so must be distinguished from it in on further grounds: authentic human activity must not just be equivocated with social convention because conclusively establishing whether a particular action is li (or is a truly ren action) is impossible. As a result, li is often confused with social power and privilege that is easier to empirically identify than ren conduct is, but this is a mistake since li has to express ren or it is not li at all. The inescapable ambiguity of li ?C an ambiguity that attaches to any language ?C can be critiqued by the Western view that sees something ??essential?? to the ??self,?? and that makes one a ??self?? in and of oneself and not in a way that depends on others. I show that such Western individualism ?C while resting on a fundamentally different way of thinking of being a person and living a good life ?C does not reduce Confucian ritual to being an instrument for social discrimination and subordination. My argument is indebted to twentieth-century philosophy of language in the West that offered the idea that some words are actions.     

Exemplarization and self-presentation: Lehrer and Meinong on consciousness

Alexius Meinong??s specific use of the term ??self-presentation?? had a significant influence on modern epistemology and philosophical psychology. To show that there are remarkable parallels between Meinong??s account of the self-presentation of experiences and Lehrer??s account of the exemplarization of experiences is one of this paper??s main objectives. Another objective is to put forward some comments and critical remarks to Lehrer??s approach. One of the main problems can be expressed by the following: The process of using a particular experience as a sample, that is, an exemplar that we use to stand for and refer to a plurality of experiences, Lehrer calls ??exemplarization??. As concrete experiences are multifarious (red and round, for example), how can we single out a specific sort of experiences (the red ones) by the process of exemplarization when we use such a multifarious experience as a sample?     

Keith Lehrer on the basing relation

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer??s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311?C313, 1971). We show that Lehrer??s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer??s account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer??s own account is more plausible.     

Predictions from a model of global psychophysics about differences between perceptual and physical matches

A well-known phenomenon is that ??matched?? successive signals do not result in physical identity. This phenomenon has mostly been studied in terms of how much the second of two signals varies from the first, which is called the time-order error (TOE). Here, theoretical predictions led us to study the more general question of how much the matching signal differs from the standard signal, independent of the position of the matching signal as the first or second in a presentation. This we call non-equal matches (NEM). Using Luce??s (Psychological Review, 109, 520?C532, 2002, Psychological Review, 111, 446?C454, 2004, Psychological Review, 115, 601, 2008, Psychological Review, 119, 373?C387, 2012) global psychophysical theory, we predicted NEM when an intensity z is perceived to be ??1 times a standard signal x.?? The theory predicts two different types of individual behaviors for the NEM, and these predictions were evaluated and confirmed in an experiment. We showed that the traditional definition of TOE precludes the observation, and thus the study, of the NEM phenomenon, and that the NEM effect is substantial enough to alter conclusions based on data that it affects. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the custom of averaging data over individuals clearly leads to quite misleading results. An important parameter in this modeling is a reference point that plays a central role in creating variability in the data, so that the key to obtaining regular data from respondents is to stabilize the reference point.     

Comparing the meanings of “if” and “all”

In this study, we compared the everyday meanings of conditionals (“if p then q”) and universally quantified statements (“all p are q”) when applied to sets of elements. The interpretation of conditionals was predicted to be directly related to the conditional probability, such that P(“if p then q”) = P(q|p). Quantified statements were assumed to have two interpretations. According to an instance-focused interpretation, quantified statements are equivalent to conditionals, such that P(“all p are q”) = P(q|p). According to a set-focused interpretation, “all p are q” is true if and only if every instance in set p is an instance of q, so that the statement would be accepted when P(q|p) = 1 and rejected when this probability was below 1. We predicted an instance-focused interpretation of “all” when the relation between p and q expressed a general law for an infinite set of elements. A set-focused interpretation of “all” was predicted when the relation between p and q expressed a coincidence among the elements of a finite set. Participants were given short context stories providing information about the frequency of co-occurrence of cases of p, q, not-p, and not-q in a population. They were then asked to estimate the probability that a statement (conditional or quantified) would be true for a random sample taken from that population. The probability estimates for conditionals were in accordance with an instance-focused interpretation, whereas the estimates for quantified statements showed features of a set-focused interpretation. The type of the relation between p and q had no effect on this outcome.     

Base on balls for the Chapman strategy: Reassessing Brouwer, Brenner, and Smeets (2002)

A true understanding of skilled behavior includes the identification of the information that underlies the perception?Caction cycle at work. Often, observers?? sensitivity to perceptual variables is established in laboratory-situated simulation-based psychophysical experiments. The observers?? sensitivity thus determined is then used to draw conclusions that will generalize the findings to natural behavior. Focusing on the example of running to catch fly balls, the present contribution takes the study of Brouwer, Brenner, and Smeets (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) to illustrate how common assumptions in the steps from psychophysical experiments to natural behavior can result in ungrounded conclusions. These authors built an argument to reject the use of the Chapman strategy of zeroing out optical acceleration. For this argument, they determined the sensitivity of the visual system to acceleration, assuming that acceleration is detected as a velocity ratio. Next, they showed that catchers started running earlier than could be expected on the basis of sensitivity thresholds for this velocity ratio, concluding that running initiation could not have been based on optical acceleration. In the present study, we argue that important assumptions in the Brouwer et al. (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) line of argument are incorrect. First, we show how the assumption of parabolic ball flight trajectories, although convenient, biased Brouwer et al.??s (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) conclusion. Next, we present an experiment revealing that observers do not base their judgments of acceleration on the velocity ratio. Thus, we demonstrate that Brouwer et al.??s (Perception & Psychophysics 64:1160?C1168, 2002) argument that optical acceleration cannot serve as the information for running to catch fly balls does not hold.     

Interventionist counterfactuals

A number of recent authors (Galles and Pearl, Found Sci 3 (1):151?C182, 1998; Hiddleston, No?s 39 (4):232?C257, 2005; Halpern, J Artif Intell Res 12:317?C337, 2000) advocate a causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals. But the precise logical significance of the causal modeling semantics remains murky. Particularly important, yet particularly under-explored, is its relationship to the similarity-based semantics for counterfactuals developed by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, 1973b). The causal modeling semantics is both an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals, and an account of which inferences involving counterfactuals are valid. As an account of truth conditions, it is incomplete. While Lewis??s similarity semantics lets us evaluate counterfactuals with arbitrarily complex antecedents and consequents, the causal modeling semantics makes it hard to ascertain the truth conditions of all but a highly restricted class of counterfactuals. I explain how to extend the causal modeling language to encompass a wider range of sentences, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the extended language. Extending the truth conditions for counterfactuals has serious consequences concerning valid inference. The extended language is unlike any logic of Lewis??s: modus ponens is invalid, and classical logical equivalents cannot be freely substituted in the antecedents of conditionals.     

The Causal Efficiency of the Passage of Time

Does mere passage of time have causal powers? Are properties like ??being n days past?? causally efficient? A pervasive intuition among metaphysicians seems to be that they don??t. Events and/or objects change, and they cause or are caused by other events and/or objects; but one does not see how just the mere passage of time could cause any difference in the world. In this paper, I shall discuss a case where it seems that mere passage of time does have causal powers: Sydney Shoemaker??s (1969) possible world where temporal vacua (allegedly) take place. I shall argue that Shoemaker??s thought-experiment doesn??t really aim at teaching us that there can be time without change, but rather that if such a scenario is plausible at all (as I think it is) it provides us with good reasons to think that mere passage of time can be directly causally efficient.     

Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.6–7 from the Perspective of the De Anima

The notion of a capacity (dunamis) in the sense of a power to bring about or undergo change plays a key role in Aristotle??s theories about the natural world. However, in Metaphysics ?? Aristotle also extends ??capacity??, and the corresponding concept of ??activity?? (energeia), to cases where we want to say that something is in capacity, or in activity, such and such but not, or not directly, in virtue of being capable of initiating or undergoing change. This paper seeks to clarify and confirm a certain view of how Aristotle wishes us to see the relationship between the two uses of ??capacity?? and ??activity??. To that end, I consider also Aristotle??s employment of the terms in the De Anima, which sheds light on the key examples which direct the discussion in Metaph. ??.     

Bootstrap Contraction

We can often specify how we would contract by a certain sentence by saying that this contraction would coincide with some other contraction that we know how to perform. We can for instance clarify that our contraction by p&q would coincide with our contraction by p, or by q, or by {p, q}. In a framework where the set of potential outcomes is known, some contractions are “self-evident” in the sense that there is only one serious candidate that can be the outcome of such a contraction. Contraction by a specific contractee (sentence or set of sentences to be contracted) is bootstrapped if it is specified by saying that it coincides with some such self-evident contraction. For a wide range of (multiple) contraction operators, contractions by any contractee can be bootstrapped. This means that the selection mechanism (selection function, incision function, etc.) can be replaced by a function called a bootstrapping selector that assigns to each contractee some “self-evident” contractee that yields the same outcome. With bootstrapping we can eliminate traditional extralogical components in contraction (e.g., selection functions) and replace them by bootstrapping selectors that reflect more closely the ways in which we actually reason and argue about belief contraction.     

Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning

This paper concerns the extent to which uncertain propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, and addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method ${\sf B}_{p}$ , which specifies an initial belief state ${\sf B}_{p}(\top)$ that is revised to the new propositional belief state ${\sf B}(E)$ upon receipt of information E. An acceptance rule tracks Bayesian conditioning when ${\sf B}_{p}(E) = {\sf B}_{p|_{E}}(\top)$ , for every E such that p(E)?>?0; namely, when acceptance by propositional belief revision equals Bayesian conditioning followed by acceptance. Standard proposals for uncertain acceptance and belief revision do not track Bayesian conditioning. The ??Lockean?? rule that accepts propositions above a probability threshold is subject to the familiar lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961), and we show that it is also subject to new and more stubborn paradoxes when the tracking property is taken into account. Moreover, we show that the familiar AGM approach to belief revision (Harper, Synthese 30(1?C2):221?C262, 1975; Alchourrón et al., J Symb Log 50:510?C530, 1985) cannot be realized in a sensible way by any uncertain acceptance rule that tracks Bayesian conditioning. Finally, we present a plausible, alternative approach that tracks Bayesian conditioning and avoids all of the paradoxes. It combines an odds-based acceptance rule proposed originally by Levi (1996) with a non-AGM belief revision method proposed originally by Shoham (1987).     

Why Bayesians Needn’t Be Afraid of Observing Many Non-black Non-ravens

According to Hempel??s raven paradox, the observation of one non-black non-raven confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Bayesians such as Howson and Urbach (Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach, 2nd edn. Open Court, Chicago, 1993) claim that the raven paradox can be solved by spelling out the concept of confirmation in the sense of the relevance criterion. Siebel (J Gen Philos Sci 35:313?C329, 2004) disputes the adequacy of this Bayesian solution. He claims that spelling out the concept of confirmation in the relevance sense lets the raven paradox reappear as soon as numerous non-black non-ravens are observed. It is shown in this paper that Siebel??s objection to the Bayesian solution is flawed. Nevertheless, the objection made by Siebel may give us an idea of how Bayesians can successfully handle situations in which we observe more than one non-black non-raven.     

Relational Buddhism: Wedding K.J. Gergen’s Relational Being and Buddhism to Create Harmony In-Between-Selves

The Psychology of Relational Buddhism is a cutting-edge practical understanding of life rooted in two trailblazing paradigms: (1) mind is not gridlocked in the skull but spaced outside the body in-between people??s interactions and (2) all that is observed in science (and noted in mindfulness) are conceptualizations which boil down to social constructions. In Dependent Origination, through parental lustful intercourse (kamadathu), sensing-emoting/thinking-talking capability is embodied. Speech gets form by the syllable during meaning-making exchange (rupadathu). As ??languaging?? progresses formless thoughts transform into fickle mind (arupadathu) and self-organize illusory ??independent self?? that fails to see inseparable ??selves?? spaced-in-between-people-embedded-in-culture. Thus, at bottom, to act is to inter-act and to be is to inter-be: ??I am linked, therefore I am?? (K.J. Gergen). Usually unbeknownst, intentional or premeditated action (karma) arises non-independently, moves Body/Speech/Mind, and could result in psychological malaise. In search for awakened mind (absolute bodhicitta), we encounter the smallest unit of experience (dharma). Relational Buddhism invites the co-creation of inter-being-in-between-selvesand of a ??non-foundational morality of coordinated action?? to render ??team spirit for humanity?? with congenial bonds as lifeline. Imbibed in-depth, this mentality (in line with the Gandavyuha Sutra) will likely enable us, whenever mind blowing AHA and HAHA transform karma. In synergy with the UN-adage ??think globally, act locally??, we might want we need grass root collaborative practice toward bottom-up societal harmony by realizing awakened mind of loving-kindness (relative bodhicitta) via on-going front-burning mindfulness of speech including self-talk.     

What is a Minor Philosophy? A Conversation on Thinking from the Periphery in a Global World

This is the text of a conversation that follows up on Roberto Farneti??s article ??A Minor Philosophy: The State of the Art of Philosophical Scholarship in Italy?? published in Philosophia 38 (1) 2009: 1?C28. After a brief introductory note that details the reception of the article in Italy, Ferrara and Farneti engage in a conversation on the notion of ??minor philosophy?? and on the meaning and future of philosophizing ??from the periphery?? in a globalized world. The text is followed by a short Appendix, a reply to Annalisa Coliva??s commentary on Farneti??s article.     

Nontransitive measurable utility

A new theory of preferences under risk is presented that does not use the transitivity and independence axioms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern linear utility theory. Utilities in the new theory are unique up to a similarity transformation (ratio scale measurement). They key to this generalization of the traditional linear theory lies in its representation of binary preferences by a bivariate rather than univariate real valued function. Linear theory obtains a linear function u on a set P of probability measures for which u(p) > u(q) if and only if p is preferred to q. The new theory obtains a skew-symmetric bilinear function φ on P × P for which φ(p, q) > 0 if and only if p is preferred to q. Continuity, dominance, and symmetry axioms are shown to be necessary and sufficient for the new representation.     

The ��Problem of Number�� Revisited: The Relative Contributions of Psychosocial, Experiential, and Evolutionary Factors to the Desired Number of Sexual Partners

Three studies (N?=?329) using U.S. community samples examined the relative contributions of self-reported ??sex,?? gender identity, and actual number of sexual partners to the question how many sexual partners individuals desire over the lifetime. In Study 1, the more ??feminine?? a participant identified, not self-reported sex, was significantly related to the desired number of sexual partners. Study 2a showed that a person??s actual number of sexual partners also correlated with the desired number. In Study 3, Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem Psychological Review, 88: 354?C364 1981) femininity scores and actual number of sexual partners significantly predicted desired number of sexual partners separately for men and women. These results suggest that non-evolutionary variables drive the ??problem of number?? in mate preference.