Getting lost

This paper seeks to explore the process, challenges and journey of setting up counselling within a boys’ public school setting, as an independent practitioner. It looks at the structure and way in which the service was set up and what had to be changed and adapted as time went on. The school had a strong reputation for pastoral care but had come to recognise that there were some issues that it was neither possible nor appropriate for school staff to deal with. So, whilst the school could and did provide containment for many of its pupils, there were those who got lost or were outside of the culture. This seemed to get reflected in my own experience. Setting up counselling in a school is not straightforward, and like the process of therapy itself, it takes time and is not a linear process. Although the service grew steadily, there were factors that led to my finally resigning from the post – I also got lost in the system. There is also a comparison with setting up a service under the auspices of an organisation at the same time.     

Getting it Right

In addition to noting significant differences of interpretation between me and Kristopher Norris on understanding classic just war thought and judging its importance, this Comment flags errors of fact and faulty logic in the Norris essay.     

Getting ontologically natural

It is argued that Arthur Fine's “natural ontological attitude” (NOA), i.e., the view that science should not be philosophically (either realistically or anti‐realistically) interpreted at all but should rather be allowed to “speak for itself”, is seriously problematic, even though it contains deep insights which philosophers of science should take into account. In particular, Fine succeeds in showing that no non‐question‐begging, conclusive demonstration of scientific realism (e.g., on “explanationist” grounds) is possible. But this is not a threat to scientific realism, if realism is subordinated to pragmatism. From the pragmatic point of view, the demand for a non‐circular proof of scientific realism is mistaken. Rather, realism can be seen as our natural attitude, based on our practices, scientific and otherwise. Fine's NOA turns out to be, on a charitable reading, quite close to a version of pragmatic realism. The paper concludes by briefly examining the idea of regarding realism as a “narrative explanation” of science.     

Getting it right

Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata.     

Getting Everybody Involved

Abstract

This paper describes a creative approach for training counselor and counselor educators that provides collaborative interactions among students and faculty in several university training programs. Structured around a problem-solving activity and self-reflection questionnaires, undergraduate teachers-in-training were given an opportunity to receive one-to-one consultative counseling from the master's level counselors-in-training, who in turn received structured problem-solving supervision from the doctoral level students. Finally, the doctoral level students received faculty support to facilitate the development of their supervisory skills. The goal of this training approach is to provide students at all three levels with experiences similar to those they will encounter as professionals following graduation from the university, but within the context of scaffolding from faculty and more advanced students.     

Getting tense about relativity

Special relativity has been understood by many as vindicating a tenseless conception of time, denying the existence of tensed facts and a fortiori objective temporal passage. The reason for this is straightforward: both passage and the obtaining of tensed facts require a universal knife-edge present moment—yet this structure is not easily reconcilable with the relativity of simultaneity. The above being said, the prospects for tense and passage are sometimes claimed to be improved on moving to cosmological solutions of general relativity. In this paper, we evaluate in detail these arguments, finding that there remain several open questions to be addressed if the introduction of tensed facts into the relativistic context is to be compelling. Moreover, we argue that, even setting aside these issues, objective tense stands and falls in relativity for exactly the same reasons that it does in classical philosophical discussions on the matter.

     

Getting what you want

Philosophical Studies - It is commonly accepted that if an agent wants p, then she has a desire that is satisfied in exactly the worlds where p is true. Call this the ‘Satisfaction-is-Truth...     

Getting started with multimedia

This paper provides an overview of the symposium “Multimedia in Instruction” by addressing four basic issues: What does multimedia mean? Does it have advantages beyond traditional means of presentations in a classroom? What equipment does one need? What software are available for psychology instruction? Although multimedia represents a revolutionary technology, its application to instruction is an extension of computer-assisted instruction.     

Getting real in analysis

The author uses a detailed clinical example to illustrate how reality testing can create rather than foreclose opportunities for analytic investigation. He proposes that authentic analysis of transference within the treatment relationship requires close and explicit attention to be paid to considerations of reality, but in a way that does not require the patient to defer to the analyst's view. The author reconsiders certain conceptions of a special psychoanalytic reality, of regression in clinical analysis, and of the nature of free association, suggesting that they tend to discourage the realism necessary to effective psychoanalytic work. In this context, he underlines the importance of ongoing reference to therapeutic outcome as an aspect of reality, and reflects upon the impact of the reality of the analytic treatment setting and the question of termination.     

Getting technical about awareness

It has recently been argued that post-decision wagering provides an objective measure of awareness. We critically evaluate this claim, emphasizing the distinction between performance without awareness and a reluctance to gamble in full awareness of weak sensory evidence. We address two key methodological issues. The first is the design of the pay-off matrix to reward a strategy of wagering that reflects the strength of sensory evidence. The second is the use of signal detection theory to analyze the resulting data. We argue that proper treatment of these issues is essential if post-decision wagering is to prove valuable in validating claims of perception without awareness in normal subjects and neuropsychological patients.     

Getting off the Wheel

Roderick Chisholm argues that in giving an account of knowledge, we must either begin with an account of what knowledge is, and proceed on that basis to identify the particular things that we know, or else start with instances of knowledge, and proceed on that basis to formulate a definition of knowledge. Either approach begs the question against the other. This is the epistemic wheel. This article responds to Chisholm's challenge. It begins with cases of knowledge attribution and builds its account from there, identifying those features that we take to be present in the cases where we have attributed knowledge and those features that seem important when we want to withhold an attribution of knowledge. The proposal does not beg the question against either particularists or methodists; it takes the best features of each view, without beginning with either, and thereby removes us from the wheel.     

Getting Moral Luck Right

Moral luck, until recently, has been understood either explicitly or implicitly through using a lack of control account of luck. For example, a case of resultant moral luck is a case where an agent is morally blameworthy or more morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for an outcome despite that outcome being significantly beyond that agent's control (Nagel 1993). Due to a shift in understanding the concept of luck itself in terms of modal robustness, however, other accounts of moral luck have surfaced. Both Duncan Pritchard (2006) and Julia Driver (2013) have offered an alternative way of understanding moral luck by employing versions of a modal account of luck. This essay considers some problems with these accounts and attempts to resolve them.