Cocchiarella’s Formal Ontology and the Paradoxes of Hyperintensionality

This is a critical discussion of Nino B. Cocchiarella’s book “Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism.” It focuses on paradoxes of hyperintensionality that may arise in formal systems of intensional logic.

V.A. Smirnov’s Results in the Field of Modern Formal Logic

This paper is a survey of V.A. Smirnovs main results in modern logic.     

Logic, Formal Methodology and Semantics in Works of Ryszard W��jcicki

For decades Ryszard Wójcicki has been a highly influential scholar in the community of logicians and philosophers. Our aim is to outline and comment on some essential issues on logic, methodology of science and semantics as seen from the perspective of distinguished contributions of Wójcicki to these areas of philosophical investigations.     

Denotational Semantics for Languages of Epistemic Grounding Based on Prawitz’s Theory of Grounds

Studia Logica - We outline a class of term-languages for epistemic grounding inspired by Prawitz’s theory of grounds. We show how denotation functions can be defined over these languages,...     

A Reappraisal of Children’s ‘Potential’

What does it mean for a child to fulfil his or her potential? This article explores the contexts and implications of the much-used concept of potential in educational discourses. We claim that many of the popular, political and educational uses of the term in relation to childhood have a problematic blind spot: interpersonality, and the necessary coexistence for the concept to be receivable of all children’s ‘potentials’. Rather than advocating abandoning the term—a futile gesture given its emotive force—we argue that the concept of children’s potential must be profoundly rethought to be workable as a philosophical notion in education. In an era marked by the unspoken assumption that ‘unlimited potential’ is always a good thing, we argue that it might be necessary to think about the limitations of the notion of individual potential; namely, the moment when it comes into contact with other people’s projects. We propose a conceptualisation of potential as the negotiated, situated, ever-changing creation of a group of individuals, in a process marked by conflict, and which remains essentially difficult.     

A repair of Frege’s theory of thoughts

Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. Thoughts are supposed to do work that requires that they be structured and work that requires that they be unstructured. But this cannot be! While the standard response to this problem is to reject either (i) or (ii), I propose a charitable repair in the spirit of Frege’s theory that accepts both. The key idea can be found in Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic(BL, GGA). Frege argues that the thought expressed by a sentence is determined by the truth-conditions that can be derived from the semantic axioms for the sentence constituents. The fact that the same axiomatic truth-condition can be derived in different ways from different semantic axioms suggests a Fregean solution of the dilemma: A thought is a type that is instantiated by all sequences of senses (decomposed thoughts) that have the same axiomatic truth-conditions. This allows for multiple decomposability of the same thought (for different decomposed thoughts can have the same axiomatic truth-conditions) and for a notion of containment (the decomposed thought contains those senses whose semantic axioms are needed in the derivation of the truth-conditions). My proposal combines the virtues of (i) and (ii) without inheriting their vices.     

A discussion of Kretchmar’s elements of competition

Recently Kretchmar attempted to apply and to explore Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological method in relation to clarifying, in the context of sport particularly, the main features of competition. He concludes with the strong claim that competition is unintelligible unless understood in relation to the four elements of plurality, comparison, normativity, and disputation. Roughly, the idea is that competition needs to be understood as a context in which more than one competitor is involved; where competitors are compared; that comparisons are evaluations of their performance/entry in the competition; and that the expected result of the latter is a matter of dispute between or among contestants. In investigating these points some refinement of this basic outline is attempted against occasional reference to others who in the past made similar claims about the conditions of competition. I conclude that Kretchmar’s claims are mistaken.     

Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”

This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts are given to us in a categorical abstraction.     

Linking Formal Child Care Characteristics to Children’s Socioemotional Well-Being: A Comparative Perspective

Most research on formal child care and children’s outcomes has focused on single countries. We, however, contend that policy context may moderate the association between formal child care characteristics and children’s socioemotional well-being. We examined this by comparing the Netherlands, Finland and the UK; three countries that differ regarding family policies. Of these three countries, Finland was recently ranked highest (ranked 1st) with regards to quality of child care in a recent analysis by the Economist, followed by the UK (ranked 3rd) and then the Netherlands (ranked 7th). We hypothesized that children who attend child-care settings in countries with higher-quality formal child-care provision would generally show better socioemotional outcomes. Data from the comparative ‘Families 24/7’ survey were used, including 990 parents with children aged 0–12. We distinguished between two age groups in our analysis. Results indicated that, compared to the UK, longer hours in formal care were less beneficial in the Netherlands. Furthermore, spending time in formal care during nonstandard hours was more harmful for children in Finland compared to the UK. Lastly, receiving care from multiple caregivers was more disruptive for British children than for Dutch children. No differences were found between Finland and the Netherlands.     

A Critical Analysis of Blaustein’s Polemic Against Husserl’s Method

Husserl Studies - The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów (Lvov, Lviv) and...     

A Comparison of Dewey’s and Russell’s Influences on China

John Dewey and Bertrand Russell visited China at around the same time in 1920. Both profoundly influenced China during the great transition period of this country. This article will focus on the differences between the two great figures that influenced China in the 1920s. This comparison will examine the following five aspects: 1. Deweyanization vs. Russellization; 2. Dewey’s “Populism” vs. Russell’s “Aristocraticism”; 3. Dewey’s “Syntheticalism” vs. Russell’s “Analyticalism”; 4. Dewey’s “Realism” vs. Russell’s “Romanticism”; 5. Dewey’s “Conservatism” vs. Russell’s “Radicalism”. This examination will highlight that, although their visit left indelible impressions among Chinese intellecturals, for the radical Marx–Leninists, any Western philosophy and socio-political theories, including Dewey’s and Russell’s, were prejudicial, outworn, and even counterrevolutionary. Soon “Marxi–Leninization” was gradually substituted for “Deweyanization” and “Russellization.”     

A resolute reading of Cassirer’s anthropology

In the paper I try, resolutely, to associate the open ended encyclopedic character of Cassirer’s philosophy with the core part of this philosophy concerning symbolic formation. In this way I try to supplement and strengthen the anthropology that Cassirer formulated in AN ESSAY ON MAN. Finally I discuss the historical character and value of this anthropology.     

A consequentialist account of Narveson’s dictum

Philosophical Studies - In population ethics, Narveson’s dictum states: morality favours making people happy, but is neutral about making happy people. The thought is intuitively appealing;...     

A Critique of Resnik’s Mathematical Realism

This paper attempts to motivate skepticism about the reality of mathematical objects. The aim of the paper is not to provide a general critique of mathematical realism, but to demonstrate the insufficiency of the arguments advanced by Michael Resnik. I argue that Resnik’s use of the concept of immanent truth is inconsistent with the treatment of mathematical objects as ontologically and epistemically continuous with the objects posited by the natural sciences. In addition, Resnik’s structuralist program, and his denial of relational properties, is incompatible with a realist metaphysics about mathematical objects.     

A Ludic Appreciation of Mechner’s Aesthetics

The Psychological Record - We can imagine many of our emotions in our family pet: hunger, fear, anger, lust, and even the bonding that we call love. But not the appreciation of a sunset, sonnet,...     

A New–old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge

We seek means of distinguishing logical knowledge from other kinds of knowledge, especially mathematics. The attempt is restricted to classical two-valued logic and assumes that the basic notion in logic is the proposition. First, we explain the distinction between the parts and the moments of a whole, and theories of ‘sortal terms’, two theories that will feature prominently. Second, we propose that logic comprises four ‘momental sectors’: the propositional and the functional calculi, the calculus of asserted propositions, and rules for (in)valid deduction, inference or substitution. Third, we elaborate on two neglected features of logic: the various modes of negating some part(s) of a proposition R, not only its ‘external’ negation not-R; and the assertion of R in the pair of propositions ‘it is (un)true that R’ belonging to the neglected logic of asserted propositions, which is usually left unstated. We also address the overlooked task of testing the asserted truth-value of R. Fourth, we locate logic among other foundational studies: set theory and other theories of collections, metamathematics, axiomatisation, definitions, model theory, and abstract and operator algebras. Fifth, we test this characterisation in two important contexts: the formulation of some logical paradoxes, especially the propositional ones; and indirect proof-methods, especially that by contradiction. The outcomes differ for asserted propositions from those for unasserted ones. Finally, we reflect upon self-referring self-reference, and on the relationships between logical and mathematical knowledge. A subject index is appended.     

A meta-analysis of children’s self-reports of dietary intake

Objective: Although research studies increasingly use children as primary reporters in dietary assessments, it is unclear how well children’s self-reported intake correlates with independently validated reports of their intake; this meta-analysis assesses that correlation.

Design: Moderators of the correlation between self-reported and independently validated intake were predicted a priori: type of dietary intake assessment (24 h recall, food diary and food frequency questionnaires), validation measures, parental assistance and age. Online databases were searched for articles published from 1990 to 2014 that compared children’s self-reports of dietary intake to validated observations of food intake in children age 4–16.

Main outcome measures: Summary effect size Pearson r between children’s self-reported dietary intake and independently validated dietary intake were calculated.

Results: In k = 32 samples from 23 studies, a statistically significant correlation (r = .48, Z = 7.26, p < .001) was found between children’s self-reported dietary intake and independently validated reports of dietary intake. Validation method (Q = 17.49, df = 2, p < .001) and parental assistance (Z = 2.03, p = .042) were significant moderators of this correlation. Self-report methodology (Q = 3.95, df = 2, p = .139) and age (Q = .02, p = .879) were not significant moderators of the distribution of effect sizes.

Conclusion: Together, these results provide baseline information about children’s recall in dietary intake assessments conducted with children as primary reporters.