Irrational action and irrational belief

Many philosophers agree with Socrates that it is not possible to perform an akratic action consciously and freely. They take this view because they assimilate the internal irrationality of such a performance to the internal irrationality of drawing a theoretical conclusion which contadicts one's premisses. This article develops some arguments against that assimilation. The extreme cost of theoretical self-contradiction is forming the belief both that something is so and that it is not so. This is impossible for anyone who understands what he is doing, and the impossibility can be explained: nothing could conceivably make such a conjunction of beliefs true. But the conjunction of a value-judgement judgment and an action that gets against it is different. Although it too is internally irrational, there is no property like truth which the value-judgement and his action ought both to possess, but cannot both possess. This article proposes a different model for akratic action, which might serve as a basis for disagreement with Socrates' view of it.     

Knowledge-how, true indexical belief, and action

Intellectualism is the doctrine that knowing how to do something consists in knowing that something is the case. Drawing on contemporary linguistic theories of indirect interrogatives, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have recently revived intellectualism, proposing to interpret a sentence of the form ‘DP know how to VP’ as ascribing to DP knowledge of a certain way w of VPing that they could VP in w. In order to preserve knowledge-how’s connection to action and thus avoid an overgeneration problem, they add that this knowledge must be had under a “practical” mode of presentation of w. I argue that there can be non-knowledgeable true beliefs under a practical mode of presentation and that some such beliefs would nevertheless be sufficient to establish knowledge-how’s characteristic connection to action, and thus count as knowledge-how. If so, Stanley and Williamson’s account is faced with a serious undergeneration problem. Moreover, the structural features on which the argument relies make it likely to present a quite general challenge for intellectualist strategies.     

Functional belief and judgmental belief

Synthese - A division between functional (animal) belief, on the one hand, and judgmental (reflective) belief, on the other, is central to Sosa’s two-tier virtue epistemology. For Sosa, mere...     

Development of naive beliefs about moving objects: The straight-down belief in action

The naive belief that carried objects fall straight down when released has become known as the straight-down belief in the literature of intuitive physics. The present data show that, without formal instruction, many children revise the straight-down belief between 8 and 12 years of age. In Experiment 1, 6-, 8-, and 12-year-old children repeatedly tried to hit a target on the floor or on a table (without feedback) by dropping a ball while moving and judged the optimal release points. Whereas, in their judgments, the majority of the 6- and 8-year-old children exhibited the erroneous straight-down belief, most 12-year-olds gave correct forward answers. In their actions, children who held the straight-down belief dropped the ball significantly later than children who exhibited correct judgmental knowledge. The results of three additional experiments provide converging evidence for the claim that children use their naive beliefs to plan their actions. The data further suggest that the straight-down belief does not directly stem from a perceptual illusion. Age differences concerning the ability to execute action plans as intended are documented and discussed in relation to conceptual development.     

Cognitive biases explain religious belief,paranormal belief,and belief in life’s purpose

Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropomorphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological thinking. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthropomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs. Alternative theoretical models were tested but did not find empirical support.     

“无神论”与“信仰”

无神论对应的是完全否定任何超自然的存在（包括上帝与灵魂等）的观念体系,作为一种世界观．它的根基是唯物主义。“信仰”属于非理性范畴而与唯物主义风马牛不相及。马克思主义是科学而不是信仰。不幸的是多年来我们有些政治家和理论家把共产主义必然实现的政治信念也表述为‘‘信仰”。以致混淆了科学与宗教的区别。60年的治国经验提供给我们的重要教训之一就是：决不能引导或者放任某种政治信念异化为“信仰”。共产主义者根本不需要诉诸“信仰”来维持对既定目标的遵循。认为无神论者不能离开“信仰”的那些号称共产党员又拒绝承认自己信教．以及一方面追逐着金钱一方面又指责“信钱”就是“没有任何崇高信仰的人”的学者应该重温马克思恩格斯的有关论述。执政党处理与宗教界关系的现行原则是“政治上团结合作,信仰上互相尊重”：信教和不信教以及所信宗教不同的信徒之间在根本利益上是完全一致的：世界观上的差别是“形而上”的问题．将长期存在,应该在民主法制层面保证各自的公民权利,最终由社会文明的发展逐步融解。某些研究宗教问题的专家把“信仰”直接归入“精神价值层面”．必然使一些完全违反道德和法律的“信仰”不能不获得“尊重”．以致“信仰上互相尊重’’这个表述成为鸡肋。建议改用不会产生歧义的说法——“政治上团结合作。世界观上互相尊重”。     

Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test

Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey??s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to think of anyone as infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief. It is important to understand the nature of this supposition.     

Self-enhancement and belief perseverance

Belief perseverance—the tendency to make use of invalidated information—is one of social psychology’s most reliable phenomena. Virtually all of the explanations proffered for the effect, as well as the conditions that delimit it, involve the way people think about or explain the discredited feedback. But it seems reasonable to assume that the importance of the feedback for the actor’s self-image would also influence the tendency to persevere on invalidated feedback. From a self-enhancement perspective, one might ask: Why would people persist in negative self-beliefs, especially when the basis for those beliefs has been discredited? In the present study, actors and observers completed a word-identification task and were given bogus success or failure feedback. After success feedback was discredited, actors and observers persevered equally in beliefs about the actor’s abilities. However, following invalidation of failure feedback, actors provided significantly higher performance evaluations than observers, thus exhibiting less perseverance on the negative feedback. These results suggest that the motivation to maintain a relatively favorable self-image may attenuate perseverance when discredited feedback threatens an important aspect of the self-concept.     

More than belief,but not more than belief and desire

Manuel A. Vásquez’ More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion paints a rich picture of what a ‘non-reductive materialist framework for the study of religion’ would look like. Although it receives strong motivation from the inability of the predominant meta-approaches of theorizing religion to take seriously a range of materially grounded religious phenomena, it suffers somewhat from a lack of independent and autonomous argumentation. This article explores a convergence between Vásquez’ main points and the basic elements of one of the most influential positions within philosophical semantics – namely the semantic holism of Donald Davidson. Because Davidson's holism (assuming its correctness) provides constraints on all forms of theorizing, the fact that Vásquez’ position, unlike the ones he critiques, conforms to those constraints lends it a degree of rational presumption.