ASSESSING CHOICE MAKING AMONG CHILDREN WITH MULTIPLE DISABILITIES

Some learners with multiple disabilities display idiosyncratic gestures that are interpreted as a means of making choices. In the present study, we assessed the validity of idiosyncratic choice-making behaviors of 3 children with multiple disabilities. Opportunities for each child to choose between food and drink were provided under two conditions. In one condition, the children were given the food or drink item corresponding to their prior choice. In the other condition, the teacher delivered the item opposite to that chosen. It was reasoned that valid choice-making behaviors would be reflected in a greater tendency to accept the chosen item and refuse the unchosen item. Direct observations revealed all children consistently indicated choices during both conditions. Choices of both the food and drink items were made by all 3 children. A reversal design demonstrated that acts of refusal were more frequent when choices were followed by delivery of the item opposite to that chosen. Similar assessment procedures may be effective in determining the function of idiosyncratic gestures exhibited by persons with multiple disabilities. For children lacking such skills, intervention to teach valid choice-making behaviors may be needed to complement assessment procedures.     

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can wait,when they choose to: a study with the hybrid delay task

Self-control has been studied in nonhuman animals using a variety of tasks. The inter-temporal choice (ITC) task presents choices between smaller–sooner (SS) and larger–later (LL) options. Using food amounts as rewards, this presents two problems: (a) choices of the LL option could either reflect self-control or instead result from animals’ difficulty with pointing to smaller amounts of food; (b) there is no way to verify whether the subjects would not revert their choice for the LL option, if given the opportunity to do so during the ensuing delay. To address these problems, we have recently introduced a new protocol, the hybrid delay task, which combines an initial ITC with a subsequent accumulation phase in which selection of the SS option leads to its immediate delivery, but choice of the LL option then leads to one-by-one presentation of those items that continues only as long as the subject does not eat any of the accumulated items. The choice of the LL option therefore only reflects self-control when the number of items obtained from LL choices during the accumulation phase is higher than what could be received in the SS option. Previous research with capuchin monkeys demonstrated that their apparent self-control responses in the ITC task may have overestimated their general self-control abilities, given their poor performance in the hybrid delay task. Here, chimpanzees instead demonstrated that their choices for the LL option in the ITC phase of the hybrid delay task were confirmed by their ability to sustain long delays during accumulation of LL rewards.     

Effects of time between trials on rats' and pigeons' choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers

Parallel experiments with rats and pigeons examined reasons for previous findings that in choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers, rats' choices were affected by the time between trials whereas pigeons' choices were not. In both experiments, the animals chose between a standard alternative and an adjusting alternative. A choice of the standard alternative led to a short delay (1 s or 3 s), and then food might or might not be delivered. If food was not delivered, there was an "interlink interval," and then the animal was forced to continue to select the standard alternative until food was delivered. A choice of the adjusting alternative always led to food after a delay that was systematically increased and decreased over trials to estimate an indifference point--a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Under these conditions, the indifference points for both rats and pigeons increased as the interlink interval increased from 0 s to 20 s, indicating decreased preference for the probabilistic reinforcer with longer time between trials. The indifference points from both rats and pigeons were well described by the hyperbolic-decay model. In the last phase of each experiment, the animals were not forced to continue selecting the standard alternative if food was not delivered. Under these conditions, rats' choices were affected by the time between trials whereas pigeons' choices were not, replicating results of previous studies. The differences between the behavior of rats and pigeons appears to be the result of procedural details, not a fundamental difference in how these two species make choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers.     

When Intertemporal Rewards Are Hedonic,Larger Units of Wait Time Boost Patience

In intertemporal choices between smaller‐sooner (SS) and larger‐later (LL) rewards, five studies reveal that patience for the LL option is influenced by an interactive effect of the measurement units used to express wait time (large vs. small) and the type of the reward (hedonic vs. utilitarian). Specifically, larger time units boost patience, but more so when rewards are hedonic rather than utilitarian. In line with the numerosity heuristic, the effect of time units on patience is mediated by larger time units shrinking wait time perception. This effect arises because hedonic (vs. utilitarian) rewards promote a reliance on heuristics rather than systematic calculations. Therefore, a more calculative mindset diminishes the effect of units even for hedonic rewards and eliminates the hedonic‐utilitarian asymmetry. These results contribute to research on numerosity, intertemporal choice, and hedonic‐utilitarian differences, and offer a simple tool for practitioners to influence patience.     

Effects of pre-trial response requirements on self-control choices by rats and pigeons

Parallel experiments with rats and pigeons examined whether the size of a pre-trial ratio requirement would affect choices in a self-control situation. In different conditions, either 1 response or 40 responses were required before each trial. In the first half of each experiment, an adjusting-ratio schedule was used, in which subjects could choose a fixed-ratio schedule leading to a small reinforcer, or an adjusting-ratio schedule leading to a larger reinforcer. The size of the adjusting ratio requirement was increased and decreased over trials based on the subject's responses, in order to estimate an indifference point-a ratio at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. The second half of each experiment used an adjusting-delay procedure-fixed and adjusting delays to the small and large reinforcers were used instead of ratio requirements. In some conditions, particularly with the reinforcer delays, the rats had consistently longer adjusting delays with the larger pre-trial ratios, reflecting a greater tendency to choose the larger, delayed reinforcer when more responding was required to reach the choice point. No consistent effects of the pre-trial ratio were found for the pigeons in any of the conditions. These results may indicate that rats are more sensitive to the long-term reinforcement rates of the two alternatives, or they may result from a shallower temporal discounting rate for rats than for pigeons, a difference that has been observed in previous studies.     

风险对两类跨期选择的影响：一项ERP研究

该研究利用ERP技术,采用伴随风险的跨期选择任务比较了两类跨期选择（立即vs.延迟、延迟vs.延迟）,并探究了风险（零风险、低风险、高风险）对两者跨期选择影响的神经动力学机制。ERP结果显示,对于立即vs.延迟和延迟vs.延迟,在N2和N400上前者大于后者,在LPC上后者大于前者;风险对两者在时程上的影响趋于一致。因此,其加工可能是先对奖赏在风险维度上进行折扣,再与延迟时间进行整合形成奖赏预期,而后做出选择。     

Choosing schedules of signaled appetitive events over schedules of unsignaled ones

Two experiments were completed allowing albino rats to choose between signaled and unsignaled reward conditions. These experiments examined the effects on preference of (1) response dependent versus response-independent reward and, (2) food pellets versus chocolate milk as the reward. All subjects preferred the signaled condition over the unsignaled condition, whether exposed to response-dependent, or to response-independent delivery of rewards. Preference was controlled most effectively by presenting both the signal itself and the correlated stimulus identifying the signaled condition. The signal presented alone (Extinction 3) controlled preference more effectively than did the stimulus correlated with the signaled condition (Extinction 2). The second experiment showed that the quality of the reinforcer (pellets and chocolate milk) did not affect preference for signaled reward since all subjects preferred the signaled condition at levels comparable to those observed in Experiment 1, with food pellets. These results, along with others, argue against species differences, response-dependency, and reinforcer quality as variables affecting the direction of preference.     

Effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice

The effects of self–other decision-making on intertemporal choice have been revealed in many studies using a monetary outcome. However, the outcome of intertemporal choice is not restricted to money; time is also a scarce and nonrenewable resource outcome. Thus, we conducted a series of experiments to address the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, a type of intertemporal choice that uses time as an outcome. Over the course of three experiments, differences in self–other decision-making were evidenced. Participants who made decisions for others were more likely to prefer the smaller but sooner (SS) option over the larger but later (LL) option and considered the gain of the SS option to be significantly greater than that of the LL option. Participants who made decisions for themselves were likely to prefer the LL option over the SS option. However, they considered the gains of the LL and the SS option to be indifferent. Changing the role of decision-making could affect the ability of individuals to consider the future consequences of their decisions. The effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice could be explained by the accounts of economic reasoning and construal level theory. The findings indicated that the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, which could be generated simply by rewording questions, can help individuals make optimal long-term choices without the need for increased control.     

DELAY‐AMOUNT TRADEOFFS IN CHOICES BY PIGEONS AND RATS: HYPERBOLIC VERSUS EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING

An adjusting‐delay procedure was used to study the choices of pigeons and rats when both delay and amount of reinforcement were varied. In different conditions, the choice alternatives included one versus two reinforcers, one versus three reinforcers, and three versus two reinforcers. The delay to one alternative (the standard alternative) was kept constant in a condition, and the delay to the other (the adjusting alternative) was increased or decreased many times a session so as to estimate an indifference point—a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Indifference functions were constructed by plotting the adjusting delay as a function of the standard delay for each pair of reinforcer amounts. The experiments were designed to test the prediction of a hyperbolic decay equation that the slopes of the indifference functions should increase as the ratio of the two reinforcer amounts increased. Consistent with the hyperbolic equation, the slopes of the indifference functions depended on the ratios of the two reinforcer amounts for both pigeons and rats. These results were not compatible with an exponential decay equation, which predicts slopes of 1 regardless of the reinforcer amounts. Combined with other data, these findings provide further evidence that delay discounting is well described by a hyperbolic equation for both species, but not by an exponential equation. Quantitative differences in the y‐intercepts of the indifference functions from the two species suggested that the rate at which reinforcer strength decreases with increasing delay may be four or five times slower for rats than for pigeons.     

What a person thinks upon learning he has chosen differently from others: Nice evidence for the persuasive-arguments explanation of choice shifts

Small shifts in choice occur even without discussion, when individuals merely know each other's preference. This appears to support an interpersonal comparison explanation of group induced shifts in choice and to refute explanations based on persuasive argumentation. The present study demonstrates the contrary, that such effects are consistent with the persuasive-arguments formulation and are obtained under particular conditions specified only by the latter theory, to wit: Knowledge of other's choices is assumed to lead a person to think of reasons (arguments) others might have had for their choices-reasons which ordinarily would not come to mind without this knowledge. Such reasoning functions in the same way as persuasive argumentation during group discussion; it causes the person to persuade himself that an alternative course of action now has greater merit than the one he initially preferred. To test this analysis, an experiment was performed in which subjects responded to choice-dilemma items under three different conditions: Following their own choice (I) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in that same item; (II) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in a different item; and (III) they received no information about others' choices but merely wrote arguments on that item. As predicted, shifts in choice occurred only if the person knew what others chose and had an opportunity to think about the latter (condition I); they did not occur if an opportunity to think of others' choices was denied (condition II), nor if knowledge of others' choices was withheld (condition III). Content analysis of the arguments subjects produced in conditions I and II completely supported the hypothesis, as did analyses of responses to postexperimental questionnaire which directly asked the subjects about their feelings and thoughts upon learning what others had chosen.     

Remembrance of places you passed: social spatial working memory in rats

Pairs of rats were tested in a radial-arm maze to determine whether the spatial choices made by one rat affect the subsequent spatial choices of the other rat. In a free-choice procedure, rats showed an increased tendency to choose the location that had most recently been chosen by a foraging partner but a decreased tendency to visit locations that the foraging partner had visited earlier. Forced-choice procedures were used to better control the social stimulus and the interactions between the rats. Under some conditions, locations were chosen later in the choice sequence of a subject rat if another rat had been observed choosing that location. Odor and other physical traces of the other rat's visits were ruled out as explanations for this effect. The results demonstrate the existence of working memory for locations visited by a familiar conspecific.     

Quinine pellets as an inferior good and a Giffen good in rats.

In Experiment 1, 4 rats earned their daily food ration by choosing between two levers. One lever delivered two regular and one quinine-adulterated food pellets, and the other delivered two regular and four quinine pellets. A 20-s intertrial interval separated successive choices. Sessions began with 10 forced trials during which only one lever, selected with p = .5 and cued by a light above it, could deliver its reinforcer. Forced trials were followed by 30 or 150 trials, depending on the condition, during which choices to either lever could be reinforced. Over this range, absolute choice of the four-quinine, two-regular-pellet lever was inversely related to the number of free-choice trials, establishing this reinforcer as an inferior good. In Condition 1 of Experiment 2, the prior design was altered in two ways: (a) one lever delivered four quinine pellets, and the other lever delivered one standard pellet; and (b) sessions ended after 140 free-choice trials. When the number of free-choice trials was reduced to 100 (Condition 2), all 3 rats increased their preference for quinine pellets, confirming their status as an inferior good. In the next several conditions, the number of quinine pellets provided for selecting its associated lever was varied between three and four. Preference for the quinine-pellet alternative was inversely related to the number of pellets it provided, a result defining it as a Giffen good. These findings are not accommodated readily by extant choice models and complicate the search for a unitary model of choice.     

Reciprocity: Choice shift in a social trap

In the present study it was investigated if choice behaviour in a social trap situation was affected by feedback about the choice of others. On top of the social trap reward structure investigated by Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan and Schwab (1983) a bonus was added. In the individual bonus condition subjects were promised an unspecified bonus if they would obtain more points than any other group member of one's group. In the group bonus condition subjects would obtain a bonus if the own group acquired more points than the other group. As expected, in the group bonus condition one took fewer points than in the individual bonus condition. As suggested by the reciprocity explanation of choice behaviour (Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel and Wolters 1986; Liebrand, Jansen and Rijken 1986) it appeared that first choice corresponded strongly with one's expectations about the choices of others. Before the second choice and also before the third choice one received purported feedback about the choices of other members of one's group. In the conserving condition one learned that all others made a conserving choice, whereas in the consuming condition one learned that all others made a consuming choice. According to the reciprocity explanation it was found that when choice behaviour was in agreement with own previous expectations and previous choice, no choice change did occur. Shifts took place in conditions in which own previous expectations about the choices of others and own choice were disconfirmed by information about choices of others.     

The role of response and reward in spatial memory

Two experiments were conducted to determine the role of the response and of reward in spatial working memory. Rats were initially trained on a four-arm maze to run to the end of each arm for a single pellet of food. On subsequent tests, rats were first placed at the end of one, two, or three arms. In Experiment 1, the arms on which the rat was placed (“placed arms”) had food which the rat was allowed to eat, whereas in Experiment 2 these placed arms did not have food. Following the placements the rat was allowed to choose among the four arms; only unplaced arms contained food. Two measures indicated that the response made a slight but reliable contribution to spatial memory. (a) When a rewarded arm was still available, choice accuracy after placements was less than choice accuracy on tests in which no placements had occurred; this difference diminished over test days. (b) When all four arms had been chosen once, the rats were more likely to go back to a placed arm rather than an unplaced arm. No influence of the presence or absence of food on the placed arms was found. These data demonstrate that the response of running down an arm, but not the reward outcome at the end, had a small influence on the memorability of a visit. Overall, above chance performance in the spatial working memory task was maintained without either running to the arm or obtaining food on it.     

Making choices in anticipation of similar future choices can increase self-control

Two experiments tested the efficacy of linking a current choice with similar future choices as a means of increasing self-control. Participants were offered choices between smaller and sooner vs. larger and later amounts of money (Experiment 1, n = 60) or food (Experiment 2, n = 34). After a small-large pair for which the participant preferred the smaller reward was found, a choice between the same pair was offered as the 1st of 5 such choices to be offered over a period of weeks. The majority of participants in both experiments who chose between all 5 smaller and all 5 larger rewards chose the larger rewards. One third of participants in Experiment 1 who could choose independently on each pair in the series reversed their previous preference and chose the larger reward in the context of the series. These results suggest that self-control can be enhanced by viewing one's current choice as predictive of future choices.     

Quantity-based judgments in the domestic dog (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis lupus familiaris</Emphasis>)

We examined the ability of domestic dogs to choose the larger versus smaller quantity of food in two experiments. In experiment 1, we investigated the ability of 29 dogs (results from 18 dogs were used in the data analysis) to discriminate between two quantities of food presented in eight different combinations. Choices were simultaneously presented and visually available at the time of choice. Overall, subjects chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity, but they found numerically close comparisons more difficult. In experiment 2, we tested two dogs from experiment 1 under three conditions. In condition 1, we used similar methods from experiment 1 and tested the dogs multiple times on the eight combinations from experiment 1 plus one additional combination. In conditions 2 and 3, the food was visually unavailable to the subjects at the time of choice, but in condition 2, food choices were viewed simultaneously before being made visually unavailable, and in condition 3, they were viewed successively. In these last two conditions, and especially in condition 3, the dogs had to keep track of quantities mentally in order to choose optimally. Subjects still chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity when the food was not simultaneously visible at the time of choice. Olfactory cues and inadvertent cuing by the experimenter were excluded as mechanisms for choosing larger quantities. The results suggest that, like apes tested on similar tasks, some dogs can form internal representations and make mental comparisons of quantity.     

Integrated versus segregated accounting and the magnitude effect in temporal discounting

Temporal discounting rates in humans generally decrease as the amount of reward increases, a phenomenon known as themagnitude effect. In the present study, we examined whether temporal discounting and the magnitude effect are related to segregation of choices in terms of gains or losses for waiting for or expediting receipt of a reward. Subjects (N = 24) responded to a series of hypothetical choices about amounts of money available either immediately or after a delay. The immediate and delayed amounts either were presented as integrated amounts in the baseline condition or were segregated as differential gains or losses for choosing delayed or expedited consumption (delay and speedup conditions, respectively). Temporal discounting rates decreased in the segregated conditions, in accord with the standard discounted utility model but contrary to the hypothesis that the subjects were choosing on the basis of reward differentials in the baseline condition. The size of the magnitude effect was comparable in the baseline and the delay conditions but decreased in the speed-up condition. These results challenge explanations of the magnitude effect in terms of an increasing proportional sensitivity property of the utility function (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) and the hypothesis that subjects choose on the basis of differentials even when the rewards are presented as integrated amounts.     

Tests of transitivity in choices between fixed and variable reinforcer delays.

This experiment tested for transitivity in pigeons' choices between variable-time (VT) and fixed-time (FT) schedules. In a discrete-trials procedure, a subject chose between two alternatives by making a single key peck. Each choice was between a "standard alternative," which was the same schedule throughout a condition, and an "adjusting alternative," in which the delay to reinforcement was systematically increased or decreased many times a session. These adjustments enabled an approximate indifference point to be identified--the value of the adjusting delay at which the subject chose each alternative about equally often. Each test of transitivity involved four conditions. In one, the standard alternative was a variable-time schedule with a 2-s reinforcer, and the adjusting alternative also delivered a 2-s reinforcer. A second condition was similar except that the adjusting alternative delivered a 5-s reinforcer. The indifference point from each of these conditions was then converted to a fixed-time schedule for subsequent comparisons in the third and fourth conditions, respectively. Each of these last two conditions compared one of the fixed-time schedules (based upon the previous conditions and including their different reinforcer durations) with an adjusting schedule that delivered the alternative reinforcer duration, to determine whether the obtained indifference points would be those predicted from the prior alternative-duration comparisons with the VT schedule. There was little evidence for intransitivity of choice: Averaged across subjects and replications, the obtained indifference points deviated from perfect transitivity by less than 8%, and these deviations were not statistically significant. These results contrast with those of Navarick and Fantino (1972), who found frequent violations of transitivity between periodic and aperiodic schedules using a concurrent-chains procedure with variable-interval schedules in the initial links.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.     

The role of free choice in memory for past decisions

After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and why the choice was made.