The Problem of Many Hands: Climate Change as an Example

In some situations in which undesirable collective effects occur, it is very hard, if not impossible, to hold any individual reasonably responsible. Such a situation may be referred to as the problem of many hands. In this paper we investigate how the problem of many hands can best be understood and why, and when, it exactly constitutes a problem. After analyzing climate change as an example, we propose to define the problem of many hands as the occurrence of a gap in the distribution of responsibility that may be considered morally problematic. Whether a gap is morally problematic, we suggest, depends on the reasons why responsibility is distributed. This, in turn, depends, at least in part, on the sense of responsibility employed, a main distinction being that between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility.     

Towards a Perfectionist Response to Ethical Conflict

This paper argues for a pluralist perfectionist response to ethical conflict. This sets for states and their public schools the task of helping people adjudicate conflicts between ethical orientations and of promoting or discouraging particular conceptions of a good life. The aim of deliberation is mutual ethical recognition and growth, judged against a thick yet universally shared conception of human flourishing. The political justification of perfectionism is that it provides a better defense against repression and discrimination than state neutrality on issues of the good life. The paper addresses liberal concerns and counters claims that adjudication threatens human relationships.     

Animal Disenhancement and the Non-Identity Problem: A Response to Thompson

In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” (Nanoethics 2:305–316, 2008) Paul Thompson argues that the possibility of “disenhancing” animals in order to improve animal welfare poses a philosophical conundrum. Although many people intuitively think such disenhancement would be morally impermissible, it’s difficult to find good arguments to support such intuitions. In this brief response to Thompson, I accept that there’s a conundrum here. But I argue that if we seriously consider whether creating beings can harm or benefit them, and introduce the non-identity problem to discussions of animal disehancement, the conundrum is even deeper than Thompson suggests.     

ASPIRing to Mitigate Climate Change: Superordinate Identity in Global Climate Negotiations

The issues surrounding rising levels of atmospheric CO₂ and climate change have become part of the collective conscious and the vernacular of world leaders, media, and the public alike. Despite the widespread concern and attention, attempts to achieve a global commitment to mitigate climate change are failing. In this article, we suggest that the Actualizing Social and Personal Identity Resources model (ASPIRe; Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003 ), developed to help organizations become more sustainable and productive, can promote more efficient negotiations in matters of global environmental concern. Using this model as a framework, the dynamics of the United Nations (UN) meeting in Copenhagen are scrutinized along with suggestions for how to structure future negotiations. Building on an understanding of existing UN‐type committee structures, it is argued that as the interests of individual nations and those of like‐minded other nations (subgroup interests) become the real basis for decision making on the issue of climate change the more likely it is that a higher‐order superordinate identity will emerge, which promotes aligned action. To date, the psychological aspects of social and behavioral change have been neglected, which could be a factor in explaining the lack of coordinated action on climate change.     

Epistemic and Ethical Constraints in Personal and Social Constructions: A Response to Raskin and Debany

In response to Raskin and Debany's lead article (this issue Raskin, J. D., &; Debany, A. E. (this issue). The inescapability of ethics and the impossibility of “anything goes”: A constructivist model of ethical meaning making. Journal of Constructivist Psychology. (Reprinted from Ethics in action: Dialogue between knowledge and practice, pp. 13–32, by S. Cipolletta &; E. Gius (Eds.), 2012, Milan, Italy: LED) [Google Scholar]), I offer support for their general conclusion that ethical implications are inescapable in relation to any version of constructionism, and concur that the frequent characterization of constructivism as ultimately reducing to a position of “anything goes” is not sustainable. I depart from Raskin and Debany on the question of whether an integrative framework for constructivist positions is possible, especially in relation to questions concerning the ethical dimension. I suggest that the reasons for considering the anything goes charge inappropriate are different for different versions of constructivism, and illustrate with analysis of the ethical dimensions of personal construct theory and social constructionism.     

Exploitation as Domination: A Response to Arneson

In a recent paper in this journal, Richard Arneson criticizes the domination account of exploitation and attributes it to me and Allen Wood. In this paper, I defend the domination account against Arneson's criticisms. I begin by showing that the domination view is distinct from the vulnerability‐based view defended by Wood. I also show that Alan Wertheimer's influential account of exploitation is congenial to the domination view. I then argue that Arneson's own fairness‐based view of exploitation generates false negatives and trivializes the concept of exploitation, rendering it entirely parasitic on the notion of unfairness.     

Answering to Future People: Responsibility for Climate Change in a Breaking World

Our everyday notions of responsibility are often driven by our need to justify ourselves to specific others – especially those we harm, wrong, or otherwise affect. One challenge for contemporary ethics is to extend this interpersonal urgency to our relations with those future people who are harmed or affected by our actions. In this article, I explore our responsibility for climate change by imagining a possible ‘broken future’, damaged by the carbon emissions of previous generations (including ourselves), and then asking what its inhabitants might think of our current behaviour, our moral thinking, and our excuses. In particular, I will focus on a simplified scenario where present people can only avoid a broken future by sacrificing Rawlsian favourable conditions. Suppose we refuse to avoid a broken future, on the grounds that we cannot be expected to make such great sacrifices. If the broken future lacks favourable conditions, will its inhabitants accept our excuses? Will they hold us responsible for things we regard as excusable? If so, should we be guided by their judgements or by our own?     

The Rule of Virtue: A Confucian Response to the Ethical Challenges of Technocracy

Science and Engineering Ethics - A variety of approaches have appeared in academic literature and in design practice representing “ethics-first” methods. These approaches typically...     

元认知视野中的气候变化风险研究

气候变化已经成为全球面临的最紧迫问题之一。近期研究发现,个体对于气候变化风险的元认知和其亲环境行为之间关系密切。对元认知知识、元认知来源、元认知确定性及元认知重要性四个维度相关研究的分析表明,公众元认知知识与实际知识的偏离、以分析系统为主导的风险认知来源、对气候变化后果确定性的低估以及对气候变化重要性的忽视都会抑制环境友好行为的发生,并指出了气候变化风险元认知研究的未来趋势。     

Hasidism and Its Response to Change

The article has two distinct parts. The first reviews the current state of scholarship on Hasidism and its history, especially the changes that have taken place over the course of the past two decades. The second is a discussion of theological reflections on change and creativity found in the early sources of Hasidism. The movement’s creators were willing to make far-reaching assertions about the legitimacy of generational change, even considering it an obligatory undertaking. This call is a familiar part of youth culture in many diverse settings. The author suggests that early Hasidism was indeed largely led by young men shaping a revivalist religious movement that called for throwing off the shackles of mere traditionalist behavior. At the same time, it is notable that this potentially powerful radically revisionist claim was in fact used to make only minor changes in the actual patterns of religious behavior, setting the stage for the ultra-conservative wave that was to overtake Hasidism after 1800 and the beginning of its battle with modernity.