SUPERVENIENCE AND MORAL REALISM

Simon Blackburn has developed an interesting challenge to moral realism based on its alleged inability to account for supervenience relations between the moral and nonmoral. If supervenience holds, then any base property once giving rise to a supervening one must always do so. The realist accepts supervenience, but also (according to Blackburn) accepts the claim that nonmoral base properties do not necessitate the moral ones that supervene on them. This combination is thought deadly, because it leaves the realist without an explanation of why ethical supervenience should be true. I offer three responses on behalf of the moral realist. The first rejects the need for explanation, arguing that supervenience should be understood as closely analogous to Leibniz's law, which, I argue, needs no defense. I next argue that ethical naturalism may be right, and if so, would provide an adequate response to Blackburn. Lastly, I show that the success of Blackburn's arguments implies a global antirealism, and so does not, as he claims, amount to a special problem for realism in ethics.     

SUPERVENIENCE, DETERMINATION, AND DEPENDENCE

Abstract:   I show how existing concepts of supervenience relate to two more fundamental ontological relations: determination and dependence. Determination says that the supervenient properties of a thing are a function of its base properties, while dependence says that having a supervenient property implies having a base property. I show that most varieties of supervenience are either determination relations or determination relations conjoined with dependence relations. In the process of unpacking these connections I identify limitations of existing concepts of supervenience and provide ways of overcoming them. What results is a more precise, flexible, and powerful set of tools for relating sets of properties than current concepts of supervenience provide. I apply these tools to a recalcitrant problem in the physicalism literature – the problem of extras.     

PHYSICALISM, SUPERVENIENCE AND THE FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL

We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its key elements are, first, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not posit new entities solely for the purpose of accounting for mental phenomena, nor new entities with essentially mental characteristics such as propositional attitudes or intentions; secondly, that physicalism can safely make do with no more than a weak global formulation of supervenience.     

SEX-ROLE IDENTITY, GENDER IDENTITY, AND SELF-SCHEMATA

Forty females and 40 males were shown slides of masculine and feminine phrases controlled for social desirability, sex-linked content, syllable length, and negative semantic construction to evaluate schematic processing on the dimensions of masculinity and femininity. Their responses to the phrases were timed. The BSRI, PAQ, and SSR1Q administered subsequent to the slide presentation were used to categorize subjects into groups of masculine, feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated. Comparisons between the groups evaluated by the different scales indicated that the PAQ was the best predictor of schematic processing and that the SSRIQ and gender were not predictors of schematic processing. Correlations between the SSRIQ and the masculine and feminine scales of the BSRI and PAQ provided evidence partially supportive of Storms's (1979) theory that sex-role identity influences the development of same-sex-typed attributes but does not influence opposite-sex-typed attributes.     

IDENTITY SUPPORT, IDENTITY DEVALUATION, AND WELL-BEING AMONG LESBIANS

This research tested predictions about the association of identity support and identity devaluation with psychological well-being (self-esteem, life satisfaction, and depression). Lesbian women completed baseline surveys ( N = 42), then provided daily experience reports during a 2-week period ( n = 38), and completed a 2-month follow-up survey ( n = 34). Several types of evidence consistently demonstrated the importance of identity support for well-being. Lesbians who reported more identity support scored higher on measures of well-being at initial assessment, during the daily phase of the study, and at the follow-up. Comparable results were found for the negative association between identity devaluation and well-being. Identity measures proved to be significant predictors of lesbians' well-being even after controlling for other types of support and social stress. Both identity support and identity devaluation contributed independently to the prediction of daily self-esteem and life satisfaction. Strengths and limitations of this study are discussed.