DO THE BSRI AND PAQ MEASURE THE SAME OR DIFFERENT CONCEPTS?

The present article assesses Frable's (1989) contention that the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) measures only desirable instrumental and expressive characteristics, whereas the Bem Sex Role inventory (BSRI) measures gender schema and related gender concepts. Comparison of the two instruments indicates, first, that they are similar in content and that the parallel M and F scales are substantially correlated. Further, the results obtained with the two instruments in three areas (self-esteem, sex-role attitudes, and gender-schematic processing) suggest that both are valid measures of desirable instrumental and expressive traits. Sexrole attitudes, however, tend to have small and typically nonsignificant relationships with both sets of scales, whereas few studies of gender schematic processing have produced replicable results even with the BSRI. However, Bem and her associates have reported positive results using other designs that have yet to be replicated using either the BSRI or the PAQ. Thus, in response to Frable's (1989) assertion, it seems at best premature to come to any conclusion about whether one, both, or neither of the questionnaires measure broad gender constructs.     

KANT ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE: INDEPENDENCE OR INTEGRATION?

Abstract. Immanuel Kant's theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge tempt conclusion that natural science and religion are two independent discourses of a dualistic system. To be sure, knowledge is anchored in two kinds of causality. Theoretical knowledge is governed by physical causality. Practical knowledge is concerned with the human capacity to initiate a sequence of events that nature could not accomplish on its own—although in conformity with, not independent of, natural causality. Furthermore, the two realms presuppose a common totality of order not of humanity's creation. Without these presuppositions, we could not experience the world as we do, and it would never occur to us to engage in a scientific investigation of the natural world. Hence, we should first exhaust our attempts at explanation on the basis of physical causality before turning to the aid of teleology. The anomalous becomes an occasion to seek a physical law not yet known whereas the miraculous hinders search for a natural law. However, higher than knowledge of “what is” is our capacity to discern “what should be.” This is an inclusive moral capacity that establishes what it means to be human and unites all moral agents in an invisible kingdom of ends that constitutes a moral culture in the physical world uniting religion and science.     

WHO CARES? THE EFFECT OF GENDER AND CONTEXT ON THE SELF AND MORAL REASONING

Theorists suggest that gender differences in moral reasoning are due to differences in the self-concept, with women feeling connected to others and using a care approach, whereas men feel separate from others and adopt a justice approach. Using a self-categorization analysis, the current research suggests that the nature of the self–other relationship, rather than gender, predicts moral reasoning. Study 1 found moral reasoning to be dependent upon the social distance between the self and others, with a care-based approach more likely when interacting with a friend than a stranger. Study 2 suggests that when individuals see others as ingroup members they are more likely to utilize care-based moral reasoning than when others are seen as outgroup members. Further, traditional gender differences in moral reasoning were found only when gender was made salient. These studies suggest that both the self and moral reasoning are better conceptualized as fluid and context dependent.     

ATTACKS ON LINKING OR A DRIVE TO COMMUNICATE? TOLERATING THE PARADOX

The notion of attacks on linking, as described by Bion, may depict a patient's drive to communicate the internalization of a destructive relationship between a primary object and an infant. This may be enacted between patient and analyst in the here and now of the analysis, whereby fragmentation and numbing of thinking may point to a primitive catastrophe relived in the psychoanalytic setting. The patient's material may seem incoherent, but incoherence might be the communication the patient is unconsciously trying to convey. Thus, the notion of attacks on linking depicts a paradoxical, caesural experience in which the attack on linking is itself a link.     

ON EVOLUTION AND CREATION: PROBLEM SOLVED? THE POLISH EXAMPLE

We present the results of research carried out as a part of the project Current Controversies about Human Origins: Between Anthropology and the Bible, which focused on the supposed conflict between natural sciences and some branches of the humanities, notably philosophy and theology, with regard to human origins. One way to tackle the issue was to distribute a questionnaire among students and teachers of the relevant disciplines. Teachers of religion and the natural sciences (biology, chemistry, and physics) and students of theology, philosophy, and the natural sciences (specializing in biology and/or anthropology) were asked to answer eleven questions concerning the perception of the conflict between evolutionism and creationism, the definitions of creation and evolution, the existence of a human spiritual element, and the ways of interpreting the Bible, especially the first chapters of the book of Genesis. We present selected results of this questionnaire.     

AVOIDING OR CHANGING THE PAST?

Some philosophers argue that any attempt to model changing the past will either be contradictory or really model avoiding the past. Using Nicholas Smith's (1997) argument as a basis, I formulate a generic version of this Avoidance Argument. I argue that the Avoidance Argument fails because (i) it involves an equivocation of what is meant by ‘bifurcation of the time of an event’ and (ii) resolving the equivocation results in the falsity of at least one of the premises. Hence, the Avoidance Argument will not support the claim that changing the past is logically impossible.     

A SCIENTIST AND A THEOLOGIAN SEE THE WORLD: COMPROMISE OR SYNTHESIS?

Abstract. A scientist (for whom the world is the universe) and a theologian (for whom the world is planet Earth) engage in dialogue, not contrived Platonic or Galilean dialogue, but true bidisciplinary dialogue that strives for higher viewpoint. S: Is the preservation of the human species a primary human responsibility? T: It may be a responsibility we share with God. S: The human species has a limited future if confined to the planet Earth. We must diversify our habitat by colonizing space. T: We are responsible for other life on the planet as well. The discussants conclude that besides protecting Earth ecologies, we should create new ecologies in space.     

GOD OF THE GAPS OR THE GOD OF “DESIGN AND DOMINION”? RE-VISITING NEWTON'S THEOLOGY

Starting with Gottfried Leibniz, Isaac Newton's theology has often been caricatured as putting forward a “God of the gaps” argument for God's existence and continued involvement in the world. Peter Harrison has pointed out that this characterization of Newton's theology is “not entirely clear.” A closer look at Newton's letters and the drafts to the Opticks reveals that, rather than arguing God's providential ordering and care over the world, he takes these for granted and is reluctant to specify instances of this order and care based on his physical research. He certainly believes in gaps in mechanical causes but is more eager to fill those gaps with nonmechanical natural causes than with God. Further, his system does not exhibit the two most prevalent weaknesses attributed to “God of the gaps” theologies: (1) that by describing God as intervening in natural causes his skill as a designer is maligned and (2) that by describing the physical details of God's involvement in the world one puts too much weight on theories likely to be replaced as science advances. Newton avoids the former weakness because it is only God's masterfulness as designer that he ties in any way to his theories of the physical world. He avoids the latter because he never points to God as the direct cause of any specific physical processes. Newton hoped that his system would cause his readers to marvel not only at God's providence but also at humankind's inability to sufficiently understand it.     

DO DESCARTES AND ST. THOMAS AGREE ON THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF?

Abstract: Contrary to received opinion, Descartes’ view on the merits of the ontological proof may actually agree with that of Thomas Aquinas, whose rejection of the a priori existence proof has stocked the armories of anti‐Anselmians ever since. In a rarely noted passage of the First Replies, Descartes claims not to differ in any respect from Thomas on the proof, a claim that gains sense in light of recent work on the Fifth Meditation. That work in turn reveals a well‐founded, if surprising, understanding of the Cartesian proof and of Cartesianism's true relation to Thomism.     

THE RETURN OF LÉON BAKST: SLAV MAGIC OR ORIENTAL OTHER?

Seeing “The Return of Léon Bakst” in the Berlin-based Russian illustrated review Zhar ptitsa (Firebird) in 1922, what “return” might its readers have assumed to be intended? Was it about a return to Judaism that Bakst had abandoned 20 years earlier? Or perhaps a return to Russia, a dream of so many Russian Berliners in that year? Or knowing that the article's author, André Levinson, was a dance critic, could it be about the artist's return as a stage designer to Diaghilev's famous Ballets Russes? In a figurative sense, all three assumptions were true. However, there lies a good deal more behind the depicted return of Léon Bakst. This article explores those three possibilities within the context of the ambivalence created around the figure of Léon Bakst that swayed between the magic of Slav folklore and Western perceptions of the Oriental Other.