An Infinitary Extension of Jankov’s Theorem

It is known that for any subdirectly irreducible finite Heyting algebra A and any Heyting algebra B, A is embeddable into a quotient algebra of B, if and only if Jankov’s formula χ _A for A is refuted in B. In this paper, we present an infinitary extension of the above theorem given by Jankov. More precisely, for any cardinal number κ, we present Jankov’s theorem for homomorphisms preserving infinite meets and joins, a class of subdirectly irreducible complete κ-Heyting algebras and κ-infinitary logic, where a κ-Heyting algebra is a Heyting algebra A with # ≥  κ and κ-infinitary logic is the infinitary logic such that for any set Θ of formulas with # Θ ≥  κ, ∨Θ and ∧Θ are well defined formulas.     

‘Minimal Religion’ and Mikhail Epstein’s Interpretation of Religion in Late-Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia

This is an examination of two essays on minimal religion by Mikhail Epstein (1982 and 1999), assessing the usefulness of the term ‘minimal religion’ for the analysis of religion in contemporary Russia. An adapted version of a paper delivered at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University of London, on 8 December, 2003. Note regarding Mikhail Epstein’s use of the words ‘religion’, ‘religiosity’ and ‘spirituality’: Epstein uses the word ‘religion’ to signify ‘mainstream’, church-based manifestations of religion and also the institutional, hierarchical structures related to those. Although in English usage the word ‘religiosity’ has negative connotations – signifying either a superficially felt religious sentiment or a somehow false and insincere expression of religious feeling, intended for outward show – Epstein appears to use the term entirely neutrally. For him it simply serves as a synonym for the word ‘spirituality’. In the two essays examined in the present article the word ‘spirituality’ signifies the whole inner spiritual life and aspirations of the individual and her/his reflection on an ethical way of living, whether the person concerned is a committed, church-going believer, or someone engaged in a personal spiritual or philosophical quest for meaning, or else someone who has experienced what Epstein refers to as ‘the wilderness’ of the Soviet years and has learnt of a spiritual dimension to life through that formative experience.     

Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance

This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). It also takes issue with Pritchard’s “merely safety-based” alternative. Ultimately, however, the criticisms made here of Pritchard’s dilemma and its underlying contrast of “anti-luck” and “virtue” epistemologies are intended to help realize his own aspirations for a better diagnosis of radical scepticism to inform a still better neo-Moorean response.     

Talking About a Universalist World

The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows us to make sense of the many different readings of sentences of the same grammatical form.     

On the Meaning of the Constant “c” in Modern Physics

In modern physics, the constant “c” plays a twofold role. On the one hand, “c” is the well known velocity of light in an empty Minkowskian space–time, on the other hand “c” is a characteristic number of Special Relativity that governs the Lorentz transformation and its consequences for the measurements of space–time intervals. We ask for the interrelations between these two, at first sight different meanings of “c”. The conjecture that the value of “c” has any influence on the structure of space–time is based on the operational interpretation of Special Relativity, which uses light rays for measurements of space–time intervals. We do not follow this way of reasoning but replace it by a more realistic approach that allows to show that the structure of the Minkowskian space–time can be reconstructed already on the basis of a restricted classical ontology (Mittelstaedt, Philosophie der Physik und der Raum-Zeit, Mannheim: BI-Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988 and Mittelstaedt, Kaltblütig: Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, pp. 221–240, 2003), and that without any reference to the propagation of light. However, the space–time obtained in this way contains still an unknown constant. We show that this constant agrees numerically with “c” but that it must conceptually clearly be distinguished from the velocity of light. Hence, we argue for a clear distinction between the two faces of “c” and for a dualism of space–time and matter.     

An empirical test of five prominent explanations for the black–white academic performance gap

The viability of five prominent explanations for the black–white performance gap (“academic engagement,” “cultural capital,” “social capital,” “school quality” and “biased treatment”) is examined using NELS data and a LISREL model that adjusts for clustering of students within schools. Empirical models have typically assessed these factors individually—a practice that probably fosters overestimation of their explanatory power. School quality and biased treatment emerge as the primary explanations for black–white high school test performance differentials. Access to better-quality schools and receipt of more stimulating interpersonal “signals” from gatekeepers ensue from racial (and socioeconomic) privilege. Enhanced test performance in turn ensues from these resources. In essence, the explanations for the racial gap that place more emphasis on what black and white students “bring to” high school (i.e., specific levels of engagement, cultural and social capital), seem less consequential to performance differentials than “what happens to” them when they get there (i.e., quality of education provided, and race-contingent treatment received).     

Coreference and meaning

Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants. Consider, for example, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in ‘John went to the store and he bought some milk’. Let us call this ‘de jure’ coreference. Other times, coreference is ‘de facto’ as with ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ in a sincere use of ‘Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens’. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that the names refer to the same person. After surveying many available linguistic and pragmatic tools (intentions to corefer, presuppositions, meanings, indexing, discourse referents, binding etc.) I conclude that we must posit a new semantic primitive to account for de jure coreference.     

A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”. In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view. This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible.     

Visual-spatial working memory, attention, and scene representation: A neuro-cognitive theory

This paper addresses the issue of how visual-spatial working memory, attention, and scene representation are related. The first section introduces a modified two-stage conception of visual-spatial processing. “Stage one” refers to low-level visual-spatial processing and computes in parallel for the currently available retinal information “object candidates,” here called “visual-spatial units.” An attentional process called “unit selection” allows access to stage two for one of these units at a time. Stage two contains high-level visual-spatial information that can be used for goal-directions (e.g., verbal report, grasping). It consists of three parallel processing streams. First, the currently selected unit is recognized; second, a spatial-motor program for the selected unit is computed; and third, an “object file” is set up for the selected unit. An object file contains temporary episodic representations of detailed high-level visual-spatial attributes of an “object” plus an “index.” An index acts as a pointer and is bound via temporary connections to the attributes of the file. Section two of this paper specifies one part of stage two in more detail, namely visual-spatial working memory (VSWM). It can contain up to four object files. A first central claim is that during sensory-based processing for working memory (“access”), one object file is always “on-line,” and up to three other object files are “off-line”. A second central claim is that the process of setting up an object file depends on the number and the activation level of already stored files. Based on the concept of activation-based competition between object files, it is postulated that the more files that are stored and the higher their activation is, the longer it takes for a newly set up object file to reach a sufficient level of activation. Activation-based competition is also used to explain “short-term forgetting” by “interference.” A third central claim about VSWM is that a “refreshment' process exists that increases the activation level of an index of an object file in order to prevent forgetting or in order to bring the file back to the state of controlling the current action. Finally, section three gives a selective look at a number of experimental data such as the attentional blink, backward masking, dwell time effects, transsaccadic memory, and change blindness. New explanations are offered and new predictions made. Received: 16 January 1998 / Accepted: 25 July 1998     

Further Evidence of the Reliability and Validity of the Multidimensional Anxiety

The psychometric properties of the Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children (MASC) were examined in adolescent psychiatric inpatient samples. In Study 1 (n = 287), confirmatory factor analyses provided satisfactory fit for the four-factor (comparative fit index; CFI = 0.856) and higher-order (CFI = 0.854) solutions. Using parcels as items, the fit of the four-factor model was improved substantially (CFI = 0.935). Next, in the bifactor analyses, support was attained for a model that included a general factor and four domain specific subfactors. In Study 2 (n = 195 inpatient youths), the MASC showed good scale reliability and concurrent validity. Results of the receiver operating characteristic curve and binary logistic regression analyses provided adequate evidence for discriminative validity. In Study 3 (n = 40), test–retest reliability of scores on the MASC-10 scale over a 3-week period was adequate (r _tt = 0.83, p < 0.001) for children ages 8 to 11 years.     

SAS and SPSS macros to calculate standardized Cronbach’s alpha using the upper bound of the phi coefficient for dichotomous items

Cronbach’s α is widely used in social science research to estimate the internal consistency of reliability of a measurement scale. However, when items are not strictly parallel, the Cronbach’s α coefficient provides a lower-bound estimate of true reliability, and this estimate may be further biased downward when items are dichotomous. The estimation of standardized Cronbach’s α for a scale with dichotomous items can be improved by using the upper bound of coefficient ϕ. SAS and SPSS macros have been developed in this article to obtain standardized Cronbach’s α via this method. The simulation analysis showed that Cronbach’s α from upper-bound ϕ might be appropriate for estimating the real reliability when standardized Cronbach’s α is problematic.     

How is God-talk logically possible? A sketch for an argument on the logic of ‘God’

In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term ‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory. The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes.     

Structural correspondence between theories and convergence to truth

While “scientism” is typically regarded as a position about the exclusive epistemic authority of science held by a certain class of “cultured despisers” of “religion”, we show that only on the assumption of this sort of view do purportedly “scientific” claims made by proponents of “intelligent design” appear to lend epistemic or apologetic support to claims affirmed about God and God’s action in “creation” by Christians in confessing their “faith”. On the other hand, the hermeneutical strategy that better describes the practice and method of Christian theologians, from the inception of theological reflection in the Christian tradition, acknowledges the epistemic authority of the best available tests for truth in areas of human inquiry such as science and history. But this strategy does not assume that such tests, whose authority must be regarded as provisional, provides authority for the warrant of affirming claims constituting the confessed “faith”. By attributing theological import to claims advanced by appeal to the best available tests for truth in the practice of science, supporters of ID not only confuse the epistemic authority of these tests with the normative authority of a faith community’s confessional identity, but impute to scientific tests for truth a sort of authority that even goes beyond the “methodological naturalism” against which they counterpose their claims.     

Hindriks on Rule-Following*

This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks’ paper “A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following”. Hindriks claims to find room for what he calls a modest solution to the Kripkensteinian problem of rule-following, different from both straight and sceptical solutions. Hindriks criticises Philip Pettit’s “ethocentric” solution and goes on to provide his own, “modest” one. My paper is in two parts. In the first part, I argue that there is no room for a “modest” solution to sceptical problems: depending on how one reads Kripke, Hindriks’ “modest” solution is always going to turn out either straight or sceptical. In the second part, I defend the ethocentric solution against Hindriks’ arguments. In particular, I argue that the topic-neutral specifications of favourable conditions which Pettit uses are superior to Hindriks’ topic-specific ones. *I want to thank Frank Hindriks for comments on an earlier version, but I take full responsibility for any remaining errors or misunderstandings. This work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland (project 202513).     

Reproduction,familiarity, love,and humaneness: How did confucius reveal “humaneness”?

This article draws out the subtle connections among the various sorts of categories—“sheng 生 (reproduction),” “qin 亲 (familiarity),” “ai 爱 (love),” and “ren 仁 (humaneness)”—focusing on the following: Confucius found the original significance of “reproduction” to be sympathy between males and females, and upon further study he found it extended to the.affinity of blood relations, namely “familiarity.” From “familiarity” he came to understand “love” that one generates and has for people and things beyond one’s blood relations, in other words, the empathic heart or the feeling of empathy itself. From here he anticipated rende 仁德 (the humane and virtuous) level of “fan’ai zhong 泛爱众 (universal love for all people)” or “fan’ai wanwu 泛爱万物 (universal love for all creatures).” The article further makes the point that in order to meet the conditions for the perfection of “humaneness” which has neither any excesses nor any deficiencies, Confucius ultimately developed a means, that is, “the golden mean,” which indicates that his ancient understanding of life and growth produced in Confucius a profound shift in the focus of human concern from “ming 命 (fate)” to “Dao 道 (the Way).”     

Illness Meanings in the Context of Cancer: An Indian Perspective

Attempts at meaning-making are considered an integral part of the process of psychological adjustment following the diagnosis of a major illness. The present study aimed at examining the applicability of Lipowski’s illness meaning framework and the utility of a card-task and an interview method for the assessment of illness meanings in an Indian sample of cancer patients (n=100). ‘Challenge’, ‘value’, ‘punishment’ , ‘weakness’ and ‘enemy’ were the five categories from the Lipowski’s framework that were found to be applicable in the current study sample whereas ‘strategy’, ‘relief’ and ‘loss’ were not applicable in the sample. Five new categories of illness meanings emerged namely; ‘burden’, ‘part of life’, ‘God’s plan’, ‘fate’ and ‘low threat’. Subgroups of patients formed on the basis of four broad categories of illness meanings (positive, negative, fate and low threat) differed significantly on depression, anxiety and quality of life, supporting the convergent validity of the interview based assessment. The study highlights that the card-task for assessment of meanings has significant limitations and that Lipowski’s illness-meaning framework requires expansion to capture the breadth of illness experiences in Indian patients.     

Colour, world and archimedean metaphysics: stroud and the quest for reality

This paper proposes a fundamentally opposite conception of the possibility of metaphysics to that of Barry Stroud in The Quest for Reality and other writings. I discuss Stroud’s views on everyday ‚truth’ and metaphysics (Section 1), on interpretation (Section 2 – replying with a theory of ‚quasi-understanding’), and his ‚no threat’ claim (Section 3). But the main argument (Section 4) is a response to Stroud’s claim that we have no right either to affirm or to deny the metaphysical reality of colours. Stroud’s view resembles Carnap’s (1950, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4, 20–40), that experience can in some sense never settle the metaphysical issue between e.g. materialism, idealism and phenomenalism; though we can allow everyday ‚knowledge’ e.g. that there is a fallen tree in the garden outside, as something available on all three views. (Carnap takes the undecidability as a sign that the metaphysical issue is a pseudo-question; Stroud insists it is factual, but places it beyond our ken, ‚external’.) I argue, instead, that metaphysical argument is possible from within our conceptual scheme and epistemic situation (as in Gareth Evans’s arguments for realism over phenomenalism); that ‚external’ and ‚internal’ questions cannot be separated as Stroud wishes; and that if we really were denied knowledge on ‚metaphysical’ matters, that would infect our right to claim knowledge of ‚observational’ matters too. And I sketch a theory of colour that would allow us to conclude (at once ‚metaphysically’ and ‚internally’) that things are indeed ‚really’ coloured. For all his expressions of sympathy for Wittgenstein, Stroud’s metaphysics is remarkably Cartesian.     

A New Normalization Strategy for the Implicational Fragment of Classical Propositional Logic

The introduction and elimination rules for material implication in natural deduction are not complete with respect to the implicational fragment of classical logic. A natural way to complete the system is through the addition of a new natural deduction rule corresponding to Peirce’s formula (((A → B) → A) → A). E. Zimmermann [6] has shown how to extend Prawitz’ normalization strategy to Peirce’s rule: applications of Peirce’s rule can be restricted to atomic conclusions. The aim of the present paper is to extend Seldin’s normalization strategy to Peirce’s rule by showing that every derivation Π in the implicational fragment can be transformed into a derivation Π′ such that no application of Peirce’s rule in Π′ occurs above applications of →-introduction and →-elimination. As a corollary of Seldin’s normalization strategy we obtain a form of Glivenko’s theorem for the classical {→}-fragment.