Intentional forgetting: Note-taking as a naturalistic example

In the present study, we examined whether note-taking as a memory aid may provide a naturalistic example of intentional forgetting. In the first experiment, participants played Concentration, a memory card game in which the identity and location of pairs of cards need to be remembered. Before the game started, half of the participants were allowed to study the cards, and the other half made notes that were then unexpectedly taken away. No significant differences emerged between the two groups for remembering identity information, but the study group remembered significantly more location information than did the note-taking group. In a second experiment, we examined whether note-takers would show signs of proactive interference while playing Concentration repeatedly. The results indicated that they did not. The findings suggest that participants adopted an intentional-forgetting strategy when using notes to store certain types of information.     

Intentional control of visual processing benefits from referential objects

Arguments have been made that enhanced visual processing occurs in the area of the palms of the hands due to greater density of bimodal neurons. An alternative is that the hands serve as reference objects relative to which attentional resources are allocated. Two experiments were conducted to determine whether the palms are unique in speeding responses in an Eriksen flanker-type task compared with other parts of the hands and objects used as barriers. In Experiment 1, the hands were crossed and positioned so that the palms faced outward toward letters located in the outer positions. Trial blocks differed in whether the centrally located letter or outer letters were designated as the target for responding. Results yielded reductions in flanker interference much as obtained when the palms face inward. This reduction occurred regardless of whether the center or outer positions of the letters were designated as the target. Experiment 2 replicated these results using as reference objects wooden blocks that mimicked the hands' physical contours, positioned with a curve-edge facing outwards. The results lend support to the referential coding account of the reduction of flanker interference.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting and unwanted thought intrusions

The act of retrieving an existing memory has been found to inhibit the recall of related memories, a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF). The purpose of the present study was to investigate the hypothesis that individuals with a strong RIF effect might be better at suppressing unwanted intrusive thoughts. In Experiment 1 the relationship between RIF and the prevalence of intrusive thoughts was investigated using a sample of 58 normal British participants, who completed three different questionnaires to measure their susceptibility to intrusive thoughts, obsessional thoughts, and impulsive thoughts. Their susceptibility to RIF was also measured, using the standard procedure introduced by Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork (1994). The results showed a significant RIF effect, and, although no significant correlations were found between RIF strength and any of the three measures of intrusive thoughts, there was some evidence to suggest a possible relationship between RIF and intrusive thoughts. In an effort to clarify these inconclusive findings, Experiment 2 investigated the relationship between RIF and intrusive thoughts in a different and more varied population sample, consisting of 90 normal members of the Greek population. Experiment 2 confirmed the RIF effect, but no significant association was found between RIF and intrusive thoughts. These findings therefore offer no support for the hypothesis that RIF assists the suppression of intrusive thoughts in normal individuals.     

Intentional forgetting as a facilitator for recalling new product attributes

When market changes alter what product attributes are deemed important, consumers may intentionally try to forget old product information in an attempt to remember new product information. In Experiment 1, the authors demonstrated that intentional forgetting of this nature temporarily inhibits retrieval of old product information and leads to a benefit to memory for new product information. The results show that, after a short delay, benefits continue in the absence of costs, which is supportive of a multiple-process account of intentional forgetting. Experiment 2 extends these effects using an advertising message to stimulate forgetting. Across both experiments, results also show that brand preference is based on learning of new attribute information.     

Intentional forgetting is easier after two "shots" than one

Three experiments evaluated whether the magnitude of the list-method directed forgetting effect is strength dependent. Throughout these studies, items were strengthened via operations thought to increase context strength (spaced presentations) or manipulations thought to increment the item strength without affecting the context strength (processing time and processing depth). The assumptions regarding which operations enhance item and context strength were based on the "one-shot" hypothesis of context storage (K. J. Malmberg & R. M. Shiffrin, 2005). The results revealed greater directed forgetting of strong items compared with weak items, but only when strength was varied via spaced presentations (Experiment 3). Equivalent directed forgetting was observed for strong and weak items when strengthening operations increased item strength without affecting the context strength (Experiments 1 and 2). These results supported the context hypothesis of directed forgetting (L. Sahakyan & C. M. Kelley, 2002).     

Intentional forgetting can increase,not decrease,residual influences of to-be-forgotten information

Intentionally forgotten information remains in memory at essentially full strength, as measured by recognition and priming, but access to that information is impaired, as measured by recall. Given that pattern, it seemed plausible that intentionally forgotten information might have a greater impact on certain subsequent judgments than would intentionally remembered information. In 2 experiments, participants cued to forget nonfamous names were subsequently more likely to make false attributions of fame to those names than were participants instructed to remember them. These findings implicate retrieval inhibition as a potent factor in the interplay of recollection and priming in memory and judgment. They also point to possible unintended consequences of instructions to forget, suppress, or disregard in legal or social settings.     

Forgetting unwanted memories: directed forgetting and thought suppression methods

Experimental psychopathologists have tested hypotheses regarding mechanisms that ought to be operative if victims possess skills for forgetting material related to trauma. In this article, we review research on directed forgetting and thought suppression paradigms, concentrating on laboratory studies involving attempts by individuals reporting trauma histories to forget emotionally negative material. Most studies have shown that trauma survivors, especially those with post-traumatic stress disorder, are characterized by a breakdown in the ability to forget disturbing material. Studies on individuals reporting repressed or recovered memories of trauma have not confirmed predictions regarding heightened forgetting skills for trauma-related words. However, recent research on suppressing disturbing autobiographical memories suggests that people who report spontaneously recalling childhood abuse outside of psychotherapy may, indeed, possess skills for not thinking about disturbing material.     

Self-evaluation as a moderating factor of strategy change in directed forgetting benefits

In list method directed forgetting, instructing people to forget a studied word list usually results in better recall for a newly studied list. Sahakyan and Delaney (2003) have suggested that these benefits are due to a change in encoding strategy that occurs between the study of the first list and the study of the second list. To investigate what might mediate such strategy change decisions, in two experiments we induced bothforget and remember participants to evaluate their memory performance on the two lists. In Experiment 1, they were asked to explicitly recall the items from the first list before studying the second list. In Experiment 2, after the study of the first list, the participants provided a rapid aggregate judgment of learning. Evaluation eliminated the differences between the forget and remember groups for the second list in both experiments, because the remember group achieved recall levels comparable to those for the forget group. The role of performance evaluation in mediating directed forgetting benefits is discussed.     

Divided attention facilitates intentional forgetting: evidence from item-method directed forgetting

This study examined the effects of post-cue interval and cognitive load on item-method directed forgetting. The results of Experiment 1 (free recall test) and Experiment 2 (cued recall test) showed that forget item retention increased as the post-cue interval increased. Moreover, increasing the cognitive load of participants by asking them to perform a secondary counting task did not impair, but rather facilitated, the intentional forgetting of the studied item under long post-cue interval conditions. These results and analyses of recall gains from the additional use of the independent cue suggest that the improved recall of forget items caused by an increase in the post-cue interval came from an automatic process, and that after receiving the forget cue, participants did not engage a suppression operation that was resource-demanded. The current findings suggest that forgetting is more effective when participants perform a secondary task after receiving the forget cue.     

Decomposing item-method directed forgetting of emotional pictures: Equivalent costs and no benefits

Using an item-method directed forgetting task, we presented negative, neutral, and positive photographic pictures, one at a time, each followed by an instruction to remember or forget. We determined that the directed forgetting effect, defined as better subsequent recognition of to-be-remembered (TBR) items than to-be-forgotten (TBF) items, was equivalent across negative, neutral, and positive pictures. To disentangle the underlying costs (i.e., decrease in memory for TBF items) and benefits (i.e., increase in memory for TBR items), we compared recognition memory performance in the directed forgetting task to that of a novel within-subjects remember-all control condition (Experiment 1) and to a between-subjects remember-all control group (Experiment 2). We observed costs without benefits across all three emotions—negative, neutral, and positive—in both experiments. These results demonstrate that equivalent directed forgetting effects for emotional stimuli are not attributable to different underlying component processes. Instead, our results suggest that selection for encoding is accomplished in similar ways, regardless of emotional content.     

Intentionally remembering or forgetting own- and other-race faces: Evidence from directed forgetting

People are better at remembering faces of their own relative to another ethnic group. This so-called own-race bias (ORB) has been explained in terms of differential perceptual expertise for own- and other-race faces or, alternatively, as resulting from socio-cognitive factors. To test predictions derived from the latter account, we examined item-method directed forgetting (DF), a paradigm sensitive to an intentional modulation of memory, for faces belonging to different ethnic and social groups. In a series of five experiments, participants during learning received cues following each face to either remember or forget the item, but at test were required to recognize all items irrespective of instruction. In Experiments 1 and 5, Caucasian participants showed DF for own-race faces only while, in Experiment 2, East Asian participants with considerable expertise for Caucasian faces demonstrated DF for own- and other-race faces. Experiments 3 and 4 found clear DF for social in- and outgroup faces. These results suggest that a modulation of face memory by motivational processes is limited to faces with which we have acquired perceptual expertise. Thus, motivation alone is not sufficient to modulate memory for other-race faces and cannot fully explain the ORB.     

Time causes forgetting from working memory

Although forgetting in the short term is a ubiquitous phenomenon, its exact causes remain undecided. The aim of the present study was to test the temporal decay hypothesis according to which memory traces fade away with time when attention is diverted by concurrent activities. In two experiments involving complex span tasks, adults were asked to remember series of items (either letters or spatial locations) while verifying multiplications. The duration of processing was manipulated by presenting multiplications either in word (three    ×    four    =    twelve) or digit (3    ×    4    =    12) format, the former taking longer to solve, while the time available to restore memory traces after each operation was kept constant across conditions. In line with the temporal decay hypothesis, the longer solution times elicited by solving word multiplications resulted in poorer recall performance. The fact that longer processing times had a comparable effect on both verbal and visuospatial memory and that the difference between conditions remained stable from the first to the last trials makes it difficult to account for these findings by assuming that forgetting is exclusively due to representation-based interference or buildup of proactive interference.     

Feedback increases benefits but not costs of retrieval practice: Retrieval-induced forgetting is strength independent

We examined how the provision of feedback affected two separate effects of retrieval practice: strengthening of practiced information and forgetting of related, unpracticed information. Feedback substantially increased recall of retrieval-practiced items. This unsurprising result shows once again that restudy opportunities boost the benefits of testing. In contrast, retrieval-induced forgetting was unaffected by the manipulation and occurred in equal size with or without feedback. These findings demonstrate strength independence of retrieval-induced forgetting and thus support a theoretical account assuming that an inhibitory mechanism causes retrieval-induced forgetting. According to this theory, inhibition resolves competition that arises during retrieval attempts but is unrelated to the consequences of retrieval practice concerning practiced items. The present results match these assumptions and contradict the theoretical alternative that blocking by strengthened information might explain retrieval-induced forgetting. We discuss our findings against the background of previous studies.     

Intentional action arises from early reciprocal exchanges

Intentionality is defined as the cognitive ability to represent goals beyond the here and now of perception. First signs of intentionality appear by the second month after birth. A major mechanism responsible for such development might be the unique reciprocal and intentional ways humans communicate with each other, particularly their young progenies. I argue that starting in the second month, reciprocal exchanges, affective mirroring, and mutual imitations with others provide infants with the unique opportunity to differentiate as well as to compare and conjugate first (self) and third (others') person perspectives. This ability is a prerequisite not only for referential communication but also of intentionality. It corresponds to the emergence of a new contemplative and "meta" stance toward the world. An argument is made that the developmental origins of this stance are primarily social, not to be found in the individual infant interacting solely with physical objects.     

Intentional Objects

The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object.