Wide Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Model for Responsible Governance

Soft regulatory measures are often promoted as an alternative for existing regulatory regimes for nanotechnologies. The call for new regulatory approaches stems from several challenges that traditional approaches have difficulties dealing with. These challenges relate to general problems of governability, tensions between public interests, but also (and maybe particularly) to almost complete lack of certainty about the implications of nanotechnologies. At the same time, the field of nanotechnology can be characterized by a high level of diversity. In this paper, we discuss and compare two models for framing public policy in relation to technology regulation: the first is a deliberative model based on foresight knowledge and the second the wide reflective equilibrium model, developed by political philosopher John Rawls. In both models, the aim is to find consensus on (a framework for) policy measures and regulation. On the basis of a critical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both models, some tentative conclusions are drawn for effective policy making and implementation based on soft law.     

The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium

The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results for our use of the method of reflective equilibrium and for the best interpretation of the method.     

An Agent-Based Account of the Normativity of Reflective Equilibrium

Philosophia - According to an influential characterisation of reflective equilibrium, it is a kind of algorithm for licensing explicitly normative claims in philosophical inquiries. Call this the...     

The Logic of Plausible Reasoning: A Core Theory

The paper presents a core theory of human plausible reasoning based on analysis of people's answers to everyday questions about the world. The theory consists of three parts:

• 1 a formal representation of plausible inference patterns; such as deductions, inductions, and analogies, that are frequently employed in answering everyday questions;
• 2 a set of parameters, such as conditional likelihood, typicality, and similarity, that affect the certainty of people's answers to such questions; and
• 3 a system relating the different plausible inference patterns and the different certainty parameters.

This is one of the first attempts to construct a formal theory that addresses both the semantic and parametric aspects of the kind of everyday reasoning that pervades. all of human discourse.     

Rejecting Technology: A Normative Defense of Fallible Officiating

There is a growing consensus in both academic and popular reflections on sport that if the accuracy of officiating can be improved by technology, then such assistance ought to be introduced. Indeed, apart from certain practical concerns about technologizing officiating there are few normative objections, and those that are voiced are often poorly articulated and quickly dismissed by critics. In this paper, we take up one of these objections – what is referred to as the loss of the human element in sport – and try to provide a firmer foundation for the disquiet that some feel at the threat of its loss. Briefly, it is argued that the cost of trying to eliminate all error in officiating through technological means is an understanding of sport as a practice through which human beings can reconcile themselves with the fallibilities and contingencies of life, in a forum where such losses can safely be experienced. After considering both practical and normative counter-arguments against the implementation of technology to correct officiating errors, we offer an argument that fallible officiating should be seen as desirable and that an attitude in sport that seeks to eliminate all wrong decision-making in officiating should be discouraged.     

The Impact of Fallible Item Parameter Estimates on Latent Trait Recovery

In this paper we propose an upward correction to the standard error (SE) estimation of [^(q)]_ML\hat{\theta}_{\mathrm{ML}} , the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of the latent trait in item response theory (IRT). More specifically, the upward correction is provided for the SE of [^(q)]_ML\hat{\theta}_{\mathrm{ML}} when item parameter estimates obtained from an independent pretest sample are used in IRT scoring. When item parameter estimates are employed, the resulting latent trait estimate is called pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) estimate. Traditionally, the SE of [^(q)]_ML\hat{\theta}_{\mathrm{ML}} is obtained on the basis of test information only, as if the item parameters are known. The upward correction takes into account the error that is carried over from the estimation of item parameters, in addition to the error in latent trait recovery itself. Our simulation study shows that both types of SE estimates are very good when θ is in the middle range of the latent trait distribution, but the upward-corrected SEs are more accurate than the traditional ones when θ takes more extreme values.     

现代性的运作机制:反思性唯我主义

反思性唯我主义是现代性的运作机制;现代性的一些基本现象,技术主义、资本主义、自由主义和历史主义只有根据反思性唯我主义才能得到恰当的理解;要克服现代性的困境即普遍的异化现象和虚无主义,首先要克服反思性唯我主义。     

The Character of Temptation: Towards a More Plausible Kantian Moral Psychology

Kant maintained that dutiful action can have the fullest measure of moral worth even if chosen in the face of powerful inclinations to act immorally, and indeed that opposing inclinations only highlight the worth of the action. I argue that this conclusion rests on an implausibly mechanistic account of desires, and that many desires are constituted by tendencies to see certain features of one's circumstances as reasons to perform one or another action. I try to show that inclinations to violate moral requirements sometimes manifest a morally objectionable half-heartedness in one's commitment to those very requirements, and - by extension - to the values that undergird these requirements.     

反思的、批判的、重构的当代中国伦理学

当代中国伦理学面临广度拓展和深度发掘两大理论任务,前者属于问题域的开显,后者属于伦理学自身的深化。为摆脱成果多、质量低的窘境,当代中国伦理学必须在“不再是”“正在是”和“尚未是”三个维度上拓展和深化。在“不再是”的框架内,从发生学视角深化道德观念史与道德实践史、文化的伦理性的研究;在“正在是”的视阈中,公共性危机的伦理省思、制度与体制伦理学、德性论困境与规范论难题、不同道德范型之间的冲突与通约,将成为亟待深入分析和论证的问题与难题;朝向“尚未是”的当代中国伦理学,必须关注现代技术的二重性、基于构建人类命运共同体之上的人类伦理学的滥觞和走向心灵深处的道德哲学。而完成以上理论任务的思维能力正是判断力、思索和意愿,而这些能力只有在“实际性”生活的体验和沉思中才能培养起来。     

The Learning Portfolio: Reflective Practice for Improving Student Learning

Books reviewed: Zubizarreta, John, The Learning Portfolio: Reflective Practice for Improving Student Learning
Reviewed by Sandra Lee Dixon
University of Denver     

Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough

Res Publica - What sorts of reasons are i) required and ii) morally acceptable when citizens in a pluralist liberal democracy undertake to resolve pressing political issues? This paper presents and...