Selfishness,Altruism, and our Future Selves

In this article, I defend the thesis that selfishness and altruism can be intrapersonal. In doing so, I argue that the notions of intrapersonal altruism and selfishness usefully pick out behavioural patterns and have predictive value. I also argue that my thesis helps enrich our understanding of the prudential, and can subsume some interesting work in economic and psychological theory.     

Different Subjects: Postmodern Selves in Psychology and Religion

This paper explores the postmodern suspicion toward the notion of a unified self in light of the scholarship of Michel Foucault and Michel Certeau. Foucault’s analysis critiques modern subjectivity by highlighting the dangers of the human sciences and the pastoral power of Christianity. His ethical alternative of re-appropriating classical concepts of caring for the self is intriguing but remains unfinished after Foucault’s death. Drawing on Foucault’s ideas, Certeau articulated alternative psychoanalytic and Christian mystical perspectives that describe human subjectivity based not on unity, rationality, and universality but on multiplicity, myth, and possibility.     

Bizarre imagery, interference, and distinctiveness

Previous studies have shown that bizarre and common images produce equivalent levels of recall in unmixed-list designs. Using unmixed lists, we tested the view that bizarre images would be less susceptible than common images to common sources of interference. In all experiments, subjects imaged a list of either bizarre or common sentences and then performed some kind of interfering task before recalling the initial list of sentences. Experiment 1 showed that bizarre images were better accessed than common images after imaging an intervening list of common sentences. Also, components of common images tended to be better recalled than those of bizarre images after imaging an intervening list of bizarre sentences. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that interfering tasks consisting of studying lists of common concrete nouns did not differentially affect memory for bizarre and common images. In Experiment 3, labeling and imaging an interfering list of common pictures produced higher recall of bizarre images. Generally, bizarre images appeared to be less susceptible than common images to interference from certain types of common encodings. Importantly, the superior recall of bizarre images was always due to greater image (sentence) access, whereas higher recall of common images was associated with greater recovery of the image (sentence) constituents. Explanation of the precise pattern of results requires consideration of the distinctive properties of bizarre images.     

Public Bodies, Private Selves

ABSTRACT A patient whose case notes had been used, without her permission, during a disciplinary inquiry on the conduct of Wendy Savage (her obstetrician) complained that this was a breach of confidentiality. Her complaint cannot be understood as based on a concern about the possible adverse consequences of this use of the notes: rather, her concern was just with the fact that medical information about her had been made known to others.
My concern is with the meaning and status of the right to privacy, to which the Savage patient appealed. Such a right cannot be reduced to a property right, since this cannot capture what concerned the Savage patient. A proper understanding of what lies behind her complaint requires us to recognise the way in which facts about oneself—in this case facts about one's body—are intimately bound up with one's self, with one's identity, and thus with one's autonomy. What kinds of fact, and thus what conception of the self, are involved in such a conception of privacy need not everywhere be the same; the crucial point is that privacy and the self are concepts which, whatever their particular content, are internally related [1].     

Fictions,feelings, and emotions

Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.     

One Personality, Multiple Selves: Integrating Personality and Social Roles

ABSTRACT How do people maintain multiple, role-specific self-conceptions as well as a consistent sense of self? In a sample of middle-aged women, we examined three issues: (a) the ways in which people view themselves as both different and similar across social roles (e.g., parent, friend, worker), (b) how role-specific self-conceptions and general self-conceptions are related, and (c) the merits of predicting role-specific criteria from role-specific and general self-conceptions. Results showed that subjects' self-conceptions were specific to role contexts, yet highly correlated across those same role contexts. In addition, role-specific self-conceptions were more similar to the general self-concept for roles with which the individual was more satisfied. Finally, as predicted from the bandwidth-fidelity trade-off, ratings of the general self correlated moderately with outcomes across all role domains, whereas ratings of role-specific self-conceptions correlated strongly with outcomes for the same role, but not in other roles.     

Fictions,Conditionals, and Stellar Astrophysics

This article argues in favour of an inferential role for fictions in scientific modelling. The argument proceeds by means of a detailed case study, namely models of the internal structure of stars in stellar astrophysics. The main assumptions in such models are described, and it is argued that they are best understood as useful fictions. The role that conditionals play in these models is explained, and it is argued that fictional assumptions play an important role as either background or antecedent conditions. I then expand on the argument for the compatibility of fictions and scientific realism. I argue that realism and antirealism plausibly offer correspondingly different accounts of the semantics of these fictional conditionals.     

Selves and Moral Units

Derek Parfit claims that, at certain times and places, the metaphysical units he labels selves may be thought of as the morally significant units (i.e., the objects of moral concern) for such things as resource distribution, moral responsibility, commitments, etc. But his concept of the self is problematic in important respects, and it remains unclear just why and how this entity should count as a moral unit in the first place. In developing a view I call Moderate Reductionism, I attempt to resolve these worries, first by offering a clearer, more consistent account of what the concept of self should involve, and second by arguing for why selves should indeed be viewed as moral (and prudential) units. I then defend this view in detail from both conservative and extreme objections.     

Upward Self-Revision: Constructing Possible Selves

This research examined how and when people engage in upward self-revision to embrace new possible selves in response to social validation. First, the present study (n = 67) predicted and found that upward self-revision was more likely to occur when validations fully specify the meaning of the positive discrepancy between the desired self and the alternative self into the explicit prospect of the desired self as more likely to occur. Second, initial elevations in self-confidence mediated the effect of social validations on possible selves. The discussion focuses on implications and future directions of the present work.     

Self-Portraits: Possible Selves in European-American,Chilean, Japanese and Japanese-American Cultural Contexts

Possible selves of students from European-American (EA), Chilean (CH), Japanese-American (JA), and Japanese (JN) cultural contexts were analyzed, revealing differences in the emphasis given to various content themes. EA possible selves focus on intrapersonal themes (i.e., “fear being dependent”), consistent with cultural emphases on uniqueness and independent development. In JN, JA and CH contexts, career and education themes dominate possible selves, consistent with particularly strong cultural emphasis on professional and academic accomplishments. The cultural contexts also differ in their predominant configurations of possible selves—EA and CH possible selves often show balance (expected and feared selves of similar theme but opposing valence, i.e., “expect to graduate from college” and “fear dropping out of college”) while JN and JA selves more frequently match (expected and feared selves of similar thematic content and valence, i.e., “expect to be idle” and “fear being idle”).     

探寻中国人的多重互依自我：理论、挑战与整合

为了全面理解中国人的互依自我内涵,整理相关文献后,发现主要有华人本土与跨文化两种研究取向及相关的多种典型理论,如差序格局理论、华人四元自我理论、道德自我理论、三重自我理论和文化会聚自我理论。这些理论适合解释不同类型的互依自我,并面临各自的挑战。在意义维持模型下对这些理论及互依自我类型进行了整理,发现中国人的互依自我是多层次的、动态的。