The Properties of Mental Causation

Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different senses in the principles. In (1) and (3), 'properties' should be read as 'tropes' (properties here are particulars), while in (2) 'properties' should read as 'types' (properties here are universals or classes). Although mental types are distinct from physical types, every mental trope is a physical trope. This allows mental properties to be causally relevant to physical effects without violating the closed character of the physical world.     

No logic of cogency: Reply to Oakley

Despite the fact that the nature of the properties of causation is rarely discussed within the mental causation debate, the implicit assumption is that they are universals as opposed to tropes. However, in recent literature on the problem of mental causation, a new solution has emerged which aims to address the problem by appealing to tropes. It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption that one can combine a trope monism with a type dualism. I argue that such a combination cannot be allowed. Given a plausible interpretation of types within a trope ontology, trope monism in fact entails type monism. Consequently, if one identifies mental tropes with physical tropes, one must also identify mental and physical types and in doing so face a modified version of the multiple realizability argument.     

Trying in some way

Most discussions about trying assume that the expression ‘person P's trying to ?’ refers to a particular of some sort. These discussions then differ amongst themselves about to which metaphysical type these particulars belong: mental particulars, brain states, or physical actions are three of the most obvious candidates. This paper examines that assumption and in particular considers an argument of Davidsonian inspiration that might be used in its favour, which is based on the fact that the verb ‘try’ appears to take adverbial modification. Reasons are offered for rejecting this Davidsonian line of argument. A further argument for rejecting the assumption that ‘P's trying to ?’ is a genuinely referring expression is modelled on Jonathan Bennett's discussion of event names.     

Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism.

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Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How <Emphasis Type="Italic">Not</Emphasis> to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument

In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to save.

Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem

The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event is overdetermined by its mental and physical causes, or they can accept that the physical effect is overdetermined but claim that this is unproblematic because the case is sufficiently dissimilar to prototypical cases of overdetermination.     

Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation

Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level.     

Curse of the qualia

In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist₁ holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist₂ holds (1) and (3) but denies (2). The transcendentalist holds (1) and (2) and denies (3). I argue that both versions of physicalist-functionalism inherit the problem of property dualism which originally helped to motivate functionalist theories of mind. I also argue that neither version of physicalist-functionalism can distinguish in a principled way between those neurophysiological properties of a subject which are relevant to the qualitative character of that subject's mental states and those which are not. I conclude that the only alternative to a functionalist account of qualitative states is a transcendentalist account and that this alternative is not likely to appeal to the critics of functionalism.     

Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization

Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including analytical filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental properties.

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Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism

Abstract: I argue that, on plausible assumptions, anomalous entails monism epiphenomenalism of the mental. The plausible assumptions are (1) events are particulars; (2) causal relations are extensional; (3) mental properties are epiphrastic. A principle defender of anomalous monism, Donald Davidson, acknowledges that anomalous monism is committed to (1) and (2). I argue that it is committed to (3) as well. Given (1), (2), and (3), epiphenomenalism of the mental falls out immediately. Three attempts to salvage anomalous monism from epiphenomenalism of the mental are examined and rejected. I conclude with reflections on the status of non-reductive physicalism.     

The modal status of materialism

Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible.

Causal Exclusion and Causal Autonomism

The causal exclusion problem is often considered as one of the major difficulties for which non-reductive physicalists have no easy solution to offer. Some non-reductive physicalists address this problem by arguing that mental properties are to some extent causally autonomous. If this is the case, then mental properties will not be causally excluded by their physical realizers because causation, in general, is a relation between properties of the same level. In this paper, I argue that the response from causal autonomy cannot be successful for two reasons. First, it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for how mental particulars can have causal efficacy in a non-reductive physicalist framework. Second, the causal considerations underpinning this response do not really support the conclusion that mental properties are causally autonomous.     

A Puzzle for Particulars?

In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red₁—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red₁ is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren’t genuinely related. We argue that Preston’s proffered solution here—to treat property instances as “mental constructs”—is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to show how, by fine-tuning the nature of bare particulars, treating them as abstract modes of things rather than concrete particulars, the traditional realist can neatly evade Preston’s puzzle.

Parallelism, Interactionism, and Causation

One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers¹ published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem:

• (1)

  There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.
• (2)

  All bodily movements probably have sufficient causes in physical facts and properties, but mental facts and properties are not causally irrelevant to human action.
• (3)

  At the same time, the view that there are not sufficient causes in the physical realm alone for all bodily movements has no good and adequate empirical or philosophical reasons against it.

In this paper I wish (1) to register my strong agreement with the first thesis by way of simply taking it for granted, (2) to defend the second thesis in greater detail and in a manner somewhat different from Mackie's, and (3) to show the third thesis to be false.     

Cognitive development as an executive process – in part: a homeopathic dose of Piaget

Piaget’s theory of cognitive development retains its importance through showing us how the exercise of agency is necessary to the development of self–world dualism and to the developing ability to frame explicit judgements about the physical and mental world. I begin by describing the Piagetian position in my own terms (Agency: Its role in mental development, 1996, for a fuller account) and then set it in the context of research on the executive functions. I also argue, however, that the theory lacks the resources to explain second-order mental representation. The theory was insufficiently nativist in general and insufficiently nativist about symbolic capacities in particular. But adopting a nativist view does not preclude one from taking a Piagetian line on the essential contribution of the first-person experience of agency to cognitive development.     

Contrastive mental causation

Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s (upward) exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion (if mental properties are causally efficacious, their physical realizers are causally impotent), contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive account of causation with non-exhaustive contrasts. That view has independent justification, because it is also needed to solve other puzzles. On this theory, both a mental property and its physical realizer can cause the same physical effect without lapsing into any problematic overdetermination when they cause that effect in contrast with distinct foils. This contrastive solution has advantages over previous accounts of mental causation and is defended against objections.

     

Dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists (nor should they be)

Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who hold the first view also hold the second. In fact, many philosophers just assume that substance dualists ought to, or perhaps even have to, accept anti-criterialism. But I aim to show that this assumption is baseless. Substance dualism doesn’t entail, suggest, support, or in any way motivate anti-criterialism, and anti-criterialism confers no benefit on dualism. Substance dualists have no special reason—and, indeed, no good reason at all—to accept anti-criterialism. Or so I shall argue. My aim isn’t to defend substance dualism, nor is it to attack anti-criterialism. My aim is to show that, contrary to a long-standing trend, dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists. Nor, as it will turn out, should they be.     

Seeking help when transgender: Exploring the difference in mental and physical health seeking behaviors between transgender and cisgender individuals in Ireland

Abstract

Background: While there is growing awareness of the need to support the physical and mental wellbeing of transgender people, some may be reluctant to seek help from healthcare professionals. Little is understood about the mechanisms that influence help-seeking behavior in this group.

Aims: This study aimed to compare transgender and cisgender participants in their likelihood to seek help for both physical and mental health conditions, and to explore whether this help-seeking behavior is predicted by a range of sociodemographic and psychological variables.

Methods: 123 participants living in Ireland (cisgender= 67; transgender= 56) completed a questionnaire which included demographic questions, as well as measures of optimism (LOT-R), self-esteem (RSES), psychological distress (GHQ-12), attitudes towards seeking psychological help (ATSPPH-SF), and attitudes towards seeking help for a physical health problem (Attitudes Towards Seeking Medical Help Scale- Action/Intervention subscale). Associations between predictor variables and mental and physical health seeking were explored using correlation analysis and stepwise regressions.

Results: Transgender participants were less likely to seek help for a physical health issue than cisgender participants, but did not differ in mental health help-seeking behaviors. Results suggest that this may be due to differences in optimism, self-esteem and psychological distress. Transgender participants had significantly lower optimism and self-esteem, which were two factors linked to poorer physical health seeking behaviors. Optimism also emerged as a significant predictor in mental health seeking behaviors.

Discussion: The lack of a significant difference for mental health help-seeking between the transgender and cisgender participants is encouraging, as it suggests that there is less stigma surrounding mental illness than expected, however findings also contradict previous findings suggesting that physical health is less stigmatized. This could be due to stigma relating to gender-specific healthcare and suggests that healthcare professionals should acknowledge the specific healthcare needs and concerns among transgender individuals.     

I—From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism

Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia ) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists.