The Irrationality of Physicalism

This paper argues, not that physicalism is wrong, but that it is irrational. The paper defines standards of rationality, both metaphysical and epistemological, that physicalism necessarily inherits from science. Then it assesses physicalist efforts to naturalize consciousness in light of these. It concludes that physicalism allows its metaphysics to outrun its epistemology, in defiance of applicable standards, revealing a fundamental incoherence in the doctrine. The paper also briefly reviews other naturalization programs, to claim that physicalism, unlike the sciences, hasn’t proved fruitful.     

Irrationality profiles for anger and anxiety

A fundamental position in Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) is that irrational belief systems cause emotional disturbance. This study adds to the body of recent research substantiating this position by showing significantly different profiles on the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) (1968/1969) for a nonclinical population (N=446) differentiated according to low, medium, and high anxiety and low, medium, and high anger. The profile differences not only support the above fundamental position, but also offer some further evidence for the validity of the IBT.Paul J. Woods, Ph.D., co-editor of this journal, is an associate fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, a professor of psychology at Hollins College, and is engaged in private practice in Roanoke, Virginia.Samuel K. Coggin is completing his Master's work at Hollins College and is employed as a psychologist at the Central Virginia Training Center, Lynchburg, Virginia.     

Practical Reason,Instrumental Irrationality,and Time

Standard models of practical rationality face a puzzle that has gone unnoticed: given a modest assumption about the nature of deliberation, we are apparently frequently briefly irrational. I explain the problem, consider what is wrong with several possible solutions, and propose an account that does not generate the objectionable result.     

从繁殖力制约法则看现有肿瘤生长理论的不合理性

繁殖力受三个方面的因素制约,即寿命、形体和食物链的位置.寿命越长,繁殖力越弱；形体越大,繁殖力越弱；在食物链的位置越高,繁殖力越弱.繁殖力制约法则是维持生物界物种平衡和多样性的基本法则.现在的肿瘤生长理论中,肿瘤细胞一方面“抗凋亡”,另一方面却不断增殖,显然与这一法则相矛盾.     

Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality

This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it contends that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. It is also true, however, that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs.     

Tonkens on the Irrationality of the Suicidally Mentally Ill

abstract   Ryan Tonkens proposes that my Kantian approach to suicide intervention with respect to the mentally ill (2002) wrongly assumes that the suicidally mentally ill are rational and are therefore rational agents to whom Kantian moral constraints ought to apply. Here I indicate how the empirical evidence concerning the suicidally mentally ill does not support Tonkens' criticism that the suicidally mentally ill are irrational. In particular, that evidence does not support the conclusion that such individuals are systemically practically irrational so as to undermine the attribution of at least minimal rational autonomy to them. A Kantian moral framework, albeit one developed in a non-ideal direction, remains applicable to such individuals.     

Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Irrationality,Self-Acceptance,and Dispositional Forgiveness

Milburn (J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Ther 33:325–340, 2015) recently suggested a theoretical link between REBT and forgiving, proposing that irrational beliefs, particularly demandingness and global evaluations of human worth, play a role in lack of forgiveness. The present study investigated a quantitative link between the concepts of irrationality, self-acceptance, and dispositional forgiveness. Four-hundred and thirty-three participants (70% female) participated in a 69-item online survey combining four previously validated scales: Shortened General Attitude and Belief Scale; Heartland Forgiveness Scale; Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire; and the Transgression Narrative Test of Forgivingness—(with revised response-options). Results indicated moderate and strong negative correlations between irrationality and dispositional forgiveness. Conversely, unconditional self-acceptance was significantly positively correlated with dispositional forgiveness. Regression analyses indicated that subtypes of irrationality and self-acceptance could predict dispositional forgiveness of self, other, and situation. No significant differences were found between sexes. These findings add empirical support to the hypotheses made by Milburn, suggesting that holding irrational beliefs impedes the process of forgiving, and one’s level of self-acceptance predicts one’s disposition to forgive.     

Confusion,Irrationality and the Ends of Philosophy: Horwich's Wittgenstein Inspired Metaphilosophy

This paper focuses on Horwich's metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, it focuses on Horwich's charge that all philosophy is irrational. First, I coordinate the various aspects of Horwich's metaphilosophical program to make sense of his charge of irrationality against philosophy. Second, I argue that this metaphilosophical program misfires in two distinct ways. However, third, I close by calling attention to what I posit to be a critical insight of Horwich's account.     

Evaluation of the Psychometric Properties of a Measure of Child Irrationality

The article describes results from two studies that examined the psychometric properties of a measure of irrational thinking, the Child and Adolescent Scale of Irrationality (CASI), based on the model of REBT. Participants were 1034 children and parents recruited through schools and clinical settings. While the internal consistency of the total scale was quite high, the reliability of the proposed irrational subscales were considerably lower and an exploratory factor analysis failed to yield interpretable factors. Discriminative validity was demonstrated between subjects in clinical settings and school-based subjects on the total scale score and two of the irrational subscales. The total scale score and irrational subscales were correlated with ratings of behavior and emotion, with higher irrationality being correlated with higher levels of emotional and behavioral disturbance. Overall, while problems exist with the factor structure and reliability of the irrational subscales, the CASI appears to adequately measure irrational beliefs. Therefore, it may be clinically useful as a screener when working with children and adolescents.     

Irrationality as a Selfdefeating Calue-Orientation: A further study of the SVO-12 scale

The SVO-12 is based on an emotive approach to the assessment of irrationality. In order to test its reliability and validity the scale was administered to a group of students and a group of psychiatric patients. The statistical analyses gave acceptable reliability coefficients in both groups. Furthermore the scale differentiated significantly between patients and students, both totally and for men and women separately, thus supporting its validity according to RET-theory.and maintains a small private practice in Laksevåg, Bergen, Norway.     

Simulation and counselling

Simulations are basically models of social and physical situations. Their educational value and the problems involved in using simulation techniques are analysed, and some possible applications of these techniques in counselling are outlined: these include applications in counsellor training, in one-to-one and three-person counselling situations, and in preparing pupils for such experiences as job interviews. But dangers of “faddishness” have to be avoided, and more rigorous research into the effectiveness of simulation techniques is still needed.     

Simulation and the first-person

This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman’s view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.