算法的认识论逻辑

作为计算机科学、数据科学和人工智能基本内核的算法显现出独特的内在演进逻辑。对这种逻辑的分析和阐明不仅有助于澄清算法的认识论本质,而且有必要和可能建构某种算法认识论来深入思考它的发展和变革。基于不同理论框架对算法所作的一些定义、解释和反思已经提出了关于算法的三个重要认识论问题。第一,算法无论是作为结构化编程还是一种社会-技术系统,为何都存在着认识不透明性。第二,AlphaFold的出现是否表明算法完全可以成为一种科学发现新逻辑。第三,算法的形式化推理能否超越像常识这样的非形式逻辑而变得更加“智能”。从对这三个问题的分析和论证中可以得出算法认识论的三个基本论题：局部认识透明性、算法发现逻辑和常识融合方法。     

从方法论的角度看动态认知逻辑的研究

本文主要探讨动态认知逻辑技术结果背后的思想,着重强调其在方法论方面的一般想法。文章在公开宣告逻辑的基础上展开讨论,重点考察了归约公理的意义,揭示了其本质是在基本语言中提前解析动态信息对认知产生的影响。文章以公共知识为例,说明了并非所有的逻辑算子都能找到归约公理,有时候我们需要丰富基本语言的表达力。而且,我们从如何给出一个逻辑的角度提出,动态认知逻辑实际上是在“动态化”认知逻辑,这种动态化的方法可以应用在其他静态的逻辑系统中。我们以动态偏好逻辑为例,说明了这一过程是如何实现的。     

没有知识和信念的认识论

本文是欣迪卡生前最后一部论文集《苏格拉底认识论》的第一篇文章。欣迪卡认为,我们不应该孤立地探讨知识和信念这些认知概念,而应该把它们放到人的行动和决策的语境中去探讨。在这种探讨中,至关重要的概念不是知识和信念,而是信息。我们不应该把研究重点放在知识的定义和证成,而应该放到知识的发现和获取,即把知识作为探究过程的结果。由此,他提出了基于问答逻辑的询问探究模型,试图由此去建立认知逻辑和认识论,其中知识和信念都不具有关键地位。     

面向不足与复杂认知的当代归纳逻辑研究

一从定性认知到定量认知:古典归纳逻辑到现代归纳逻辑归纳逻辑是以归纳推理和归纳方法为基本内容的知识体系。归纳推理的前提是一些关于个别事物或现象的判断,而结论是关于该类事物或现象的普遍性的判断。归纳推理的结论超出了前提所断定的范     

在动态认知逻辑中融合观察与内省

一直以来,我们使用逻辑系统来描述数学的证明、结构的计算以及语言的意义。近年来,逻辑系统却越来越多地被用来研究理性行动者的很多方面。例如,如何接受单一的信息,多主体间的交流行为,以及更为一般的受目标驱动的主体间的互动。特别是,对观察和交流中的信息流的研究,大家使用所谓的知识更新、信念修正和偏好改变的动态认知逻辑。当新信息进来时,这些逻辑使用信息的“语义意义”作为被更新状态的选择范围。 然而,同样重要的是,理性主体的行动也会基于其他信息,譬如,由推理和反省得到的信息。对这些问题的研究实际上是对信息在更为语法的意义上进行理解的,即,把信息看作是可以由主体阐明的东西。也许有些奇怪,尽管在这一领域已经存在不少的研究方案,但是大家对什么是信息,信息的关键机制是什么等问题更少有一致的意见。可以看出,对“信息”的意义在逻辑中确实有很多不同的理解。 本文基于可能世界的语义,给出一个一致的信息模型,同时也赋予可能世界语法的“可及通路”。这样,我们就能把外部的“更新信息”和内部的“阐明信息”放在同一个动态逻辑系统中。特别是,我们提出了两个基本的信息行动：纯粹的基于观察的更新（“单纯的看”）和把不明显的知识变为明显知识的“知觉实现”。我们阐明为什么这些行动是自然的,同时我们也提出了一些新的研究问题。其中,很多问题探讨如何使其他的逻辑传统,包括信念修正理论、情景语义学和弗协调逻辑等适用于信息一驱使的理性行动者的图景。     

基于广义框架的概率认知逻辑

概率认知逻辑将认知和概率推理融合到同一个逻辑框架中。本文提出了一个基于广义框架的概率认知模型,并讨论了这一模型与已有两种概率认知模型的关系。基于广义框架的概率认知模型能为任意概率认知逻辑公式指派概率,因而是一种比较理想的概率认知逻辑语义模型。本文给出了一个可靠且完全的概率认知逻辑公理系统,提出并证明了概率函数存在引理,进而给出了这一逻辑的完全性证明。最后,本文运用这一逻辑刻画了混合策略博弈的两种状态,为进一步讨论混合策略博弈奠定了基础。     

直觉主义认知逻辑与不同程度的真

直觉主义认知逻辑IEL不仅为邱奇–费奇悖论提供了解悖思路,还促进了直觉主义认识论的研究。IEL的构建旨在遵循BHK解释,以“直觉主义知识就是证实的结果”作为核心观点,接纳A→KA和KA→??A。IEL的预期解释借助“证实”概念给出了“直觉主义知识KA的证明”的定义,并以此扩展BHK解释。但直觉主义逻辑依赖于直觉主义数学,这使得BHK解释的核心在于对构造性证明的要求,基于此,IEL的预期解释偏离了BHK解释的初衷,进而IEL未能达到预期构建目标。通过对KA作新解读,能引出直觉主义真和经典真之间不同程度的真,IEL系统的一些重要内定理也将获得新理解。此外,关于IEL系统对应问题的一个猜测被提出来。     

中医四诊的认知逻辑

中医四诊的认知逻辑辽宁中医学院（沈阳１１００３２）刘庚祥一、四诊的反映中医四诊是对病人的体症进行观察与询问,一般认为：临证所谓的“舌红苔黄”是病人舌红苔黄的客观体症反映到医者的感官,被医生所认定,所谓“脉弦数”,是客观的弦数之脉反映到医者的手下。然而...     

个体认识论的研究现状与展望

个体认识论是个体对知识性质和认识过程的信念,这些信念深刻地影响知识获得和知识建构过程。学生的认识信念是理解学生学习过程的关键成分之一。关于个体认识论研究有个体认识论的发展研究、个体认识的信念系统研究和个体认识的元认知过程研究等三种主要研究取向,这些研究取向既面临着新的问题又各具挑战性的展望     

发生认识论视域下心理逻辑的先天机能

随着心理学从哲学的剥离,哲学认识论的实证研究任务转到了心理学的层面上来,但是试图割裂人类心理研究的思辨过程方显实证主义者的祛魅。[1]心理学的哲学性使认知理论研究属于一个既现实存     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.     

Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

This paper introduces the articles in this volume, and offers an overview of each piece.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.     

Skepticism and Epistemic Logic

This essay attempts to implement epistemic logic through a non-classical inference relation. Given that relation, an account of '(the individual) a knows that A' is constructed as an unfamiliar non-normal modal logic. One advantage to this approach is a new analysis of the skeptical argument.     

The Neglect of Epistemic Considerations in Logic: The Case of Epistemic Assumptions

The two different layers of logical theory—epistemological and ontological—are considered and explained. Special attention is given to epistemic assumptions of the kind that a judgement is granted as known, and their role in validating rules of inference, namely to aid the inferential preservation of epistemic matters from premise judgements to conclusion judgement, while ordinary Natural Deduction assumptions (that propositions are true) serve to establish the holding of consequence from antecedent propositions to succedent proposition.