论环境伦理学的两种探究模式

环境伦理学既是一种道德哲学,也是一种应用伦理学,由此致使一些人对环境伦理学的身份感到困惑,并对环境伦理学的合法性提出了质疑.通过区分并说明环境伦理学的两种探究模式(即道德哲学模式与应用伦理学模式),试图解答人们关于环境伦理学之身份的困惑,并对环境伦理学的合法性进行辩护.     

什么是应用伦理学?

应用伦理学已成为与理论伦理学在旨趣上相异的研究 ,并形成了一些研究领域。以这一事实为出发点 ,本文力图通过提出并回答 (1)应用伦理学的概念意义是什么 ,(2 )应用伦理学应用什么 ,(3)应用伦理学应用于什么 ,(4 )应用伦理学为了什么而应用 ,(5)应用伦理学怎样应用 ,这五个紧密联系的问题 ,确立一种原则应用模式的应用伦理学的行动性的定义 ,并辩护这种伦理学。     

论元伦理学中的康德式建构主义

康德主义伦理学被怀疑论者看作一种心灵-独立的实在论,并因此遭到它的批评。实在论者则把康德主义伦理学作为一种心灵-独立的实在论加以辩护。科斯嘉承继并推进了罗尔斯所实现的康德主义的元伦理学转向,在回应对康德主义外在实在论批评和辩护的同时,提出了一种建构主义的程序实在论,并把它作为一种内在的实在论加以辩护,完成了道德实在论的内在转变。但是这种康德式建构主义却面临着这样一个困难,即它作为一种内在的实在论同时是一种非认知主义。从理论的融贯性来看,与这种康德式内在实在论相适合的应是一种康德式内在认知主义。     

上帝之手——高道德风险的生命技术何以从伦理学与神学获得辩护

克隆人的出现是后生命科学时代开始的标志;原有的高新生命科学技术发展时期是科学过渡带;人类基因组计划、克隆人与胚胎干细胞研究是后生命科学事件。传统伦理学和神学伦理学在后生命科学时代理论资源桔竭,已达边界;我们“只有同意识形态断裂,彻底改变其结构,才能有真正的科学”;我们必须一边从传统中寻求辩护、一边解放伦理学和神学（经典理论后现代化）。清除障碍,获得解放。     

为伦理学客观性辩护的三条可能进路

怀疑乃至否定客观性一直是伦理学研究中的一种倾向。伦理学虽然含有不可还原的主观成分,但它并不是纯然主观的,同样也具有客观性。其客观性辩护有三条路径:整体主义的策略、认知主义路线和一种非形而上学的维度。     

脑死亡立法的伦理辩护

"脑死亡"立法是必要的并可以得到充分的伦理辩护:尊重人,特别是尊重人的自主性是"脑死亡"立法的伦理基础."脑死亡"立法符合有利和公平的伦理原则,符合功利主义伦理学追求社会利益最大化的目的.但我们在立法时,应尽量贯彻不伤害原则,注意保护患者及其亲属的利益.     

论生态伦理学的利益基础

从人与自然的相关性和整体性以及人类掌握世界的特殊方式的视角来看 ,生态伦理学的利益基础应当确立在人类的整体利益上。因而生存伦理学就应该为人类的整体利益做出理论上的合法性的辩护 ,并且在现实中为维护人类的整体利益做出明确的价值规约     

评阿多诺否定性的道德哲学

受尼采的影响,阿多诺认为,不存在道德的可靠性。不能简单地认为,被所有人一致接受的规范就是道德的,在矛盾着的社会中,任何一种道德规范的实施都可能走向自己的反面。因此,我们要赎罪。这也是与人自身的矛盾联系在一起的。在阿多诺看来,人是理性的存在物,但是这个理性是自我矛盾的。人既是他自己又不是他自己。人的这种矛盾实际上是人自身和社会矛盾的缩影。由于这种矛盾,人总是在矛盾状态中生活,他要做好人就必须做坏人。由此,阿多诺指出,在错误的生活之中不存在正确的生活。由于人和社会的这种矛盾,人们无法为牺牲自我以维系社会的伦理行为提供合理性的辩护。由于不存在可靠的道德,在社会和个人的矛盾中,个人只能用责任来为自己的道德行为辩护。这也表明,在当代社会,我们必须从规范伦理学走向责任伦理学。     

奥古斯丁的基督教幸福观辨正

“德性论”与“幸福论”构成了西方伦理学中的一个争论焦点。“幸福论”认为,德性取决于幸福,幸福即德性。“德性论”则认为“幸福取决于德性”。苏格拉底、斯宾诺莎和康德都对“德性即幸福”这一原则进行了理智主义的辩护和论证。中世纪伦理学(或基督教伦理学)作为西方伦理学史上一个重要阶段,幸福问题无疑也是其核心问题。那么,基     

什么是应用伦理学?——评曹刚教授新著《道德难题与程序正义》

伦理学是一种实践哲学,它必须面对活生生的现实生活,告诉人们应如何去行动.就此而言,真正的伦理学研究必然是"应用的",不会是纯粹知性的探究,否则就会丧失其实践哲学的品格.故而,可以说,伦理学必然是应用伦理学.既然如此,那为什么还要专门提出"应用伦理学"这一概念呢?这是否是个多余的概念呢?要回答这些问题,就必须澄清究竟什么是应用伦理学?一般而言,伦理学被区分为三个不同的分支,即规范伦理学、元伦理学以及应用伦理学.简单说来,规范伦理学被看作是旨在提出一些理论以解答什么是正当的行动这一问题,并为该理论提供有说服力的辩护.     

Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to “exceptionists” about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first‐person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first‐person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.     

Persons as goods: response to Patrick Lee.

Developing a British perspective on the abortion debate, I take up some ideas from Patrick Lee's fine paper, and pursue, in particular, the idea of individual humans as goods in themselves. I argue that this notion helps us to avoid the familiar mistake of making moral value impersonal. It also shows us the way out of consequentalism. Since the most philosophically viable notion of the person, the individual human, is (as Lee argues) a notion of individual substance that is there from conception, the move has a third effect, which is to rule out abortion.     

Abortion and the human animal.

I discuss three topics. First, there is a philosophical connecting thread between several recent trends in the abortion discussion, namely, the issue of our animal nature, and physical embodiment. The philosophical name given to the position that you and I are essentially human animals is "animalism." In Section II of this paper, I argue that animalism provides a unifying theme to recent discussions of abortion. In Section III, I discuss what we do not find among recent trends in the abortion discussion, namely "the right to privacy." I suggest some reasons why the right to privacy is conspicuous by its absence. Finally, I address Patrick Lee's claim that the evil of abortion involves "the moral deterioration that the act brings to those who are complicit in it, and to the culture that fosters it."     

The moral significance of the genetic relation

Our ordinary moral attitudes give a prominent place to the principle that each person ought specially to care for any child who is his or her genetic offspring. From this principle of genetic-parental responsibility and other plausible premises, we can derive the principle that each person has the right to control the genetic use of his or her own genes. But there are competing principles of parental responsibility that require consideration. Principles of nurture are among the important competitors. Also, the view that a woman has the right to control her own body for reproductive purposes may be based on a principle that denies the genetic-parental principle. An analysis is developed of the relations that constitute the criteria for the various possible principles of parental responsibility. Causality, temporality, spatiality, and resemblance are considered. The genetic relation is not any one of these relations, but it includes some of them. The justification of any principle of parental responsibility requires a detailed consideration of the principle from the viewpoint of a deontological or consequentialist moral theory. This examination is beyond the scope of this paper, but consideration is given to some issues and problems of justification, and difficult or unusual cases are discussed. There remain, then, complexities that require further study.     

论生命健康权在医疗活动中的支配转移

现有法学理论认为,生命健康权是一种具有绝对性和支配性的民事权利,通常不得以任何形式让与他人,即不得买卖、转移、赠与或继承。自然人只能对自己的生命健康权实现有限制的支配。医疗实践证明,生命健康权存在支配转移的实际情况,生命健康权的支配转移是对现有法学理论的补充和完善。     

The role of philosophy in the contemporary abortion debate.

Inspired by Patrick Lee's "A Christian Philosopher's View of Recent Directions in the Abortion Debate," this essay raises the question of how effective philosophical arguments can be in determining the moral status of legalized abortion. On one hand, Christian philosophers have been successful in explaining both the humanity and the personhood of the unborn child, as well as exposing the incoherence of those who would deny the unborn child's humanity or personhood. Nevertheless, in order to confront the pro-abortion position in its most radical form, a much more complex philosophical argument must be given. Following thinkers such as Alasdaire MacIntyre, Christian philosophers must articulate and promote a philosophical position according to which morality is conceived in richer terms than the mere respecting of individual rights. The social dimension of human nature must be rediscovered in order that the happiness and welfare of others becomes a desirable goal in and of itself. According to a morality where individual rights is the bottom line (for example, that of Judith Jarvis Thompson), women very well may have the right to "extricate" themselves from their pregnancy even when doing so will result in the death of their child. What must be explained, therefore, is the more profound insight that social morality is equally concerned with obligations to others, including those who are most helpless and unable to speak for themselves.     

Abortion and Health Care Chaplaincy in Australia

This paper summarizes the results gained from quantitative and qualitative research involving 327 Australian health care chaplains with regard to their involvement in abortion issues within the health care context. The findings indicate that approximately 20% of surveyed chaplains had provided some form of pastoral intervention to patients and/or their families dealing with issues of abortion and that approximately 10% of chaplains had assisted clinical staff with issues concerning abortion. There was found to be no-statistically significant difference with regard to the number of catholic chaplains compared with protestant chaplains or staff chaplains compared with volunteer chaplains involved in abortion issues. Analysis using the WHO Pastoral Intervention codings highlighted a variety of issues encountered by chaplains and the non-judgmental pastoral care used by chaplains when assisting those dealing with abortion. Some implications of this study with respect to patient and clinical staff support are suggested. Dr. Lindsay Carey, M.App.Sc., Ph.D.: National Research Fellow, Australian Health & Welfare Chaplains Association & Faculty Associate, Palliative Care, School of Public Health, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. Dr. Christopher Newell, AM, Ph.D.: Associate Professor, School of Medicine, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia.     

Sandra Day O'Connor and the justification of abortion

The recent Supreme Court decision upholding Roe v. Wade and in particular, the dissent by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sheds new light on the issue of abortion. Let us consider any stage of a pregnancy when abortion is medically safe for the mother. If at that stage it is also medically viable to save the fetus, is an abortion performed at that stage of pregnancy morally justifiable? For example, if it is, or becomes, medically safe to perform abortions after first trimester of pregnancy and at the same time saving a fetus is, or becomes, medically viable or not unusual during some stage of the second trimester, can abortions during and after that stage of pregnancy be justified? With a number of qualifications I shall argue the thesis that as a general rule, but not an absolute rule, abortion in these instances is not usually justifiable. For if it is, then one will also have to grant the moral justification for a number of other highly questionable medical practices. This thesis is not to be identified with the stronger claim that abortions of viable fetuses can never be performed. There are surely exceptions such as when the life or health of the mother is in danger. But, I shall argue, the justification for making such exceptions is on different grounds than is sometimes claimed because one must weigh the health of the mother against the life of another human being.     

Dehumanization of women and men in elective abortion: A preregistered replication in China

Although abortion in China has been legalized for several decades, it is still controversial and the woman and man involved are at risk of being stigmatized. The current research replicated two studies conducted in Italy by investigating how the abortion decision of the woman and man influence received moral outrage, dehumanization, and perceptions of female professional competence. Study 1, which only included female participants, found higher moral outrage toward a woman having an abortion when the pregnancy was depicted as referring to a “child” (vs. “foetus”), and higher dehumanization of the woman in terms of human nature. Study 2, which included both male and female participants, and clarified responsibility for the abortion decision with respect to the woman and the man, revealed higher moral outrage and a reduction in the attribution of human uniqueness to the man, and of human nature to both the woman and the man. Moral outrage mediated dehumanization when participants had low positive attitudes toward abortion in Study 1 and high positive attitudes in Study 2. Both studies showed a negative impact of the decision to have an abortion on the woman's perceived traditional professional competence. The results generally align with the findings from Italy and yield some practical implications on reducing abortion stigma. Future abortion stigma research should consider more gender-related factors.     

性别选择与法律之回应——法理视野中的变性手术

变性人的出现对社会秩序及法律制度提出了挑战。自然人生而具有的人作为社会主体定在的自由和健康权利,为变性人享有性别选择的权利提供了法理支撑。在权利确认后,很有必要在变性手术的对象、施行者及程序上作出规范的应对,而变性人术后的社会角色及权利保护也应该得到法律的适时回应,以实现法的秩序、公正等价值。