共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Mark Siebel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):417-426
In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and
then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate
of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of
mental events.
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Mark SiebelEmail: |
2.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
3.
Scott Hill 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2009,10(2):215-228
Daniel Haybron has made an original contribution to philosophical discussions of happiness. He has put forward a theory that
identifies happiness with moods and the propensity to experience moods. Haybron’s contribution deserves a critical examination.
The first section of my paper is interpretive. I show how Haybron uses the concepts of ‘central affective states’ and ‘mood
propensity’ to define happiness. The second and third sections of the paper are critical. They focus on the inclusion of mood
propensity in Haybron’s theory. In the second section I argue that his theory fails because there is an example that shows
a subject can be happy even when that subject does not have a positive mood propensity. In the third section of the paper,
I consider Haybron’s objection that the case in question is ‘object-specific’ and that it is not ‘emotionally-based’. I discuss
both of these technical terms in detail. Moreover, I argue that a modified version of the counter example accommodates these
technical terms while retaining the persuasiveness of the original example.
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Scott HillEmail: |
4.
Neal Judisch 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):299-318
Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued
that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have
claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I
argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism
does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task
of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.
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Neal JudischEmail: |
5.
‘Is’–‘Ought’ Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Scott Hill 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):545-566
Hume seems to claim that there does not exist a valid argument that has all non-ethical sentences as premises and an ethical
sentence as its conclusion. Starting with Prior, a number of counterexamples to this claim have been proposed. Unfortunately,
all of these proposals are controversial. Even the most plausible have a premise that seems like it might be an ethical sentence
or a conclusion that seems like it might be non-ethical. Since it is difficult to tell whether any of these counterexamples
are genuine, we need a taxonomy that sorts out ethical sentences from non-ethical ones. We need to know the difference between
an ‘Is’ and an ‘Ought’. In the first part of the paper, I establish the need for a taxonomy. I consider some of the most influential
‘Is’–‘Ought’ derivations. These include proposals by Prior and Searle. I argue that each proposal has a premise whose status
as ethical or non-ethical is difficult to determine. In the second part of the paper, I consider taxonomies proposed by Karmo
and Maitzen. I argue against both taxonomies. I end with the claim that we need a taxonomy of ethical sentences and that none
of the current proposals are adequate.
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Scott HillEmail: |
6.
Mitchell O. Stokes 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):439-453
In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in
a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means
to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability
argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s
conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however,
that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is
a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way
except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s
presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet
this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought
into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His
list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.
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Mitchell O. StokesEmail: |
7.
Dorothée Legrand 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):67-87
The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that
one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other
hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness
of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree,
however about which modes of givenness are involved.
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Dorothée LegrandEmail: URL: http://dorotheelegrand.googlepages.com |
8.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
9.
Mikkel Gerken 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(2):243-259
William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness
sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically
assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since
it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation
(SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed
argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation.
These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since
the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple.
相似文献
Mikkel GerkenEmail: |
10.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
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Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
11.
Charles B. Cross 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):173-188
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
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Charles B. CrossEmail: |
12.
Manuel Pérez Otero 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):357-376
Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion
is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist
reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know
that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the
subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly
accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts:
possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project
them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.
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Manuel Pérez OteroEmail: |
13.
Jens Johansson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):247-256
Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable
in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic
value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to
the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.
相似文献
Jens JohanssonEmail: Email: |
14.
Pascale Hugon 《Argumentation》2008,22(1):93-114
The works of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) make abundant use of a particular type of argument
that I term ‘argument by parallels’. Their main characteristic is that the instigator of the argument, addressing a thesis
in a domain A, introduces a parallel thesis in an unrelated domain B. And in the ensuing dialogue, each of the instigator’s
statements consists in replicating his interlocutor’s previous assertion, mutatis mutandis, in the other domain (A or B). I show that such a dialogue involves two parallel arguments that develop in an intersecting
zigzag pattern, and discuss the principles involved in the establishment of the conclusion from the perspective of parity
of reasoning and analogical argument. I examine the overall rhetorical strategy directing the use of arguments by parallels
and the pedagogical and explanatory functions they can serve. I also evaluate the plausibility of their use in Phya pa Chos
kyi seng ge’s works mirroring a contemporary practice of oral debate, and reflect on the status of such arguments in the framework
of Indo-Tibetan logic.
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Pascale HugonEmail: |
15.
Christopher Cowley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(5):495-504
Richard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I explore how the concept is ascribed and withheld in ordinary situations, and show that it is essentially future-oriented. Since the suicide victim has no future, it makes no sense to call his act rational or irrational. The more appropriate reaction to a declared desire for suicide, or to the news of a successful suicide, is horror and pity, and these are absent from Brandt’s account, as is a humble acknowledgement of the profound mystery at the heart of any suicide.
相似文献
Christopher CowleyEmail: |
16.
Paul Crowther 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):151-170
Heidegger’s paper ‘Art and Space’ (1969, Man and world 6. Bloomington: Indiana university Press) is the place where he gives his fullest discussion of a major art medium which is
somewhat neglected in aesthetics, namely sculpture. The structure of argument in ‘Art and Space’ is cryptic even by Heidegger’s
standards. The small amount of literature tends to focus on the paper’s role within Heidegger’s own oeuvre as an expression of changes in his understanding of space. This is ironic; for Heidegger’s main thematic in the essay is
the way in which space is overcome in the creation of sculpture. Of course, by virtue of its three-dimensional character, sculpture seems to be a spatial medium,
par excellence. The counter-intuitive character of Heidegger’s position requires, accordingly, that his argumentative strategy be scrutinized
very closely. In this paper, therefore, I will examine closely the structure of Heidegger’s argument, with the aim of understanding,
rectifying, and then developing his most important insights. My ultimate aim is to show the subtle, but radical points which
are at issue in Heidegger’s arguments, and to develop them much further in the clarification of sculpture’s key philosophical
significance.
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Paul CrowtherEmail: |
17.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):371-388
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational
motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous
preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest
we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance
both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
相似文献
Rasmus Thybo JensenEmail: |
18.
Bas van der Vossen 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):299-302
In this paper I respond to Bernd Krehoff’s article ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot Be the
Whole Story’. I criticize Krehoff’s use of Raz’s theory of authority to evaluate the legitimacy of our political institutions.
Krehoff argues that states cannot (always) claim exclusive authority and therefore cannot possess exclusive legitimacy. Although
I agree with his conclusion, I argue that the questions of legitimacy and (Razian) authority are distinct and that we need
to focus more on the former in order to really support and defend Krehoff’s conclusions.
相似文献
Bas van der VossenEmail: |
19.
Andrea Viggiano 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):213-224
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
Andrea ViggianoEmail: |
20.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
相似文献
Shannon VallorEmail: |