共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Greg Restall 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1993,22(5):481-511
This paper continues the work of Priest and Sylvan inSimplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logics, a paper on the simplified semantics of relevant logics, such asB
+ andB. We show that the simplified semantics can also be used for a large number of extensions of the positive base logicB
+, and then add the dualising* operator to model negation. This semantics is then used to give conservative extension results for Boolean negation. 相似文献
2.
Adrian Furnham 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》2009,28(4):225-239
In all, 187 participants completed a new, self-report measure of eight multiple intelligences (Haselbauer 2005), a General Knowledge test (Irwing et al. Personality and Individual Differences 30:857–871, 2001), a measure of Approaches to Learning Styles (Biggs 1987), a measure of the Big Five personality traits (Costa and McCrae 1992), as well as gave their own estimated scores on the Gardner (1999) multiple intelligences. Alpha co-efficients were modest with only three of the eight test-derived, multiple intelligence
scores being over .70. ‘Linguistic’ and Mathematical intelligence alone were correlated with General Knowledge. Five of the
eight ‘intelligences’ were correlated both with Extraversion and Openness. Regressions indicated that ‘Intrapersonal intelligence’
was closely linked with Stability and Conscientiousness; ‘Interpersonal intelligence’ with Extraversion; ‘Linguistic intelligence’
with Openness; ‘Mathematical intelligence’ with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Correlations between self-estimated and
test-derived emotional intelligence showed correlations ranging from r = .18 to r = .56 for similar type ‘intelligences’. This study provides modest evidence for the concurrent and construct validity of
this measure. It requires more psychometric evidence of validity before it is used. 相似文献
3.
Greg Novack 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(6):655-678
The principle of indifference (hereafter ‘Poi’) says that if one has no more reason to believe A than B (and vice versa), then one ought not to believe A more than B (nor vice versa). Many think it’s demonstrably false despite its intuitive plausibility, because of a particular style of thought experiment
that generates counterexamples. Roger White (2008) defends Poi by arguing that its antecedent is false in these thought experiments. Like White I believe Poi, but I find his
defense unsatisfactory for two reasons: it appeals to false premises, and it saves Poi only at the expense of something that
Poi’s believers likely find just as important. So in this essay I defend Poi by arguing that its antecedent does hold in the
relevant thought experiments, and that the further propositions needed to reject Poi are false. I play only defense in this
essay; I don’t argue that Poi is true (even though I think it is), but rather that one popular refutation is faulty. In showing
this, I also note something that has to my knowledge gone unnoticed: given some innocuous-looking assumptions the denial of
Poi is equivalent to a version of epistemic permissivism, and Poi itself is equivalent to a version of epistemic uniqueness. 相似文献
4.
Ross T. Brady 《Studia Logica》1989,48(2):235-241
We provide a semantics for relevant logics with addition of Aristotle's Thesis, ∼(A→∼A) and also Boethius,(A→B)→∼(A→∼B). We adopt the Routley-Meyer affixing style of semantics but include in the model structures a regulatory structure for all
interpretations of formulae, with a view to obtaining a lessad hoc semantics than those previously given for such logics. Soundness and completeness are proved, and in the completeness proof,
a new corollary to the Priming Lemma is introduced (c.f.Relevant Logics and their Rivals I, Ridgeview, 1982). 相似文献
5.
Philippe Schlenker 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):115-142
Stalnaker (1978) made two seminal claims about presuppositions. The most influential one was that presupposition projection is computed by a pragmatic mechanism based on a notion of ‘local context’. Due to conceptual and technical difficulties, however, the latter notion was reinterpreted in purely semantic terms within
‘dynamic semantics’ (Heim 1983). The second claim was that some instances of presupposition generation should also be explained in pragmatic terms. But despite various attempts, the definition of a precise ‘triggering algorithm’ has remained somewhat elusive. We discuss
possible extensions of both claims. First, we offer a reconstruction of ‘local contexts’ which circumvents some of the difficulties
faced by Stalnaker’s original analysis. We preserve the idea that local contexts are computed by a pragmatic mechanism that
aggregates the information that follows from an incomplete sentence given the global context; but we crucially rely on a modified
notion of entailment (‘R-entailment’), whose plausibility should be assessed on independent grounds. Second, we speculate
that local contexts might prove necessary (though by no means sufficient) to understand how some presuppositions are triggered.
In a nutshell, we suggest that a presupposition is triggered when the semantic contribution of an expression to its local
context is in some sense ‘heterogeneous’. Without giving an analysis of the latter notion, we note that this architecture
implies that presuppositions should be triggered on the basis of the meaning that an expression has relative to its local context (what we call its ‘local meaning’); we sketch some possible consequences of this analysis. 相似文献
6.
J. Ritola 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):237-244
In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation
18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis
31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis
56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis
57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. 相似文献
7.
Michael J. Raven 《Philosophia》2011,39(4):751-757
Aristotelian relativism about the future (as recently defended by MacFarlane (2003)) claims that a prediction made on Monday, such as ‘It will rain’, can be indeterminate on Monday but determinate on Tuesday.
A serious objection to this intuitively appealing view is that it cannot coherently be attested: for if it is attested on
Monday, then our blindness to what the future holds precludes attesting that the prediction is determinate on Tuesday, and
if it is attested on Tuesday (when, suppose, it rains), then the fact that it rains precludes attesting that the prediction
is indeterminate on Monday. In this paper, I focus on Moruzzi and Wright (2009)’s recent development of this objection and argue that it fails. This result removes a major obstacle to defending the Aristotelian
view. 相似文献
8.
In this paper, we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:485–507, 2007) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively
inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective inter-connectedness,
as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself. 相似文献
9.
Cheng-Chih Tsai 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):101-114
A Leibnizian semantics proposed by Becker in 1952 for the modal operators has recently been reviewed in Copeland’s paper The Genesis of Possible World Semantics (Copeland in J Philos Logic 31:99–137, 2002), with a remark that “neither the binary relation nor the idea of proving completeness was present in Becker’s work”. In
light of Frege’s celebrated Sense-Determines-Reference principle, we find, however, that it is Becker’s semantics, rather
than Kripke’s semantics, that has captured the true spirit of Frege’s semantic program. Furthermore, for Kripke’s possible
world semantics to fit in Frege’s framework of senses, worlds and referents, it will have to be thoroughly reformulated. By introducing the notion of a hi-world into the picture, we manage to keep
the key ingredients of Becker’s semantics intact, while at the same time solve a fatal problem that used to shadow Becker’s
original semantics—it had not been able to make sense of inhomogeneous modality. The resulting generalized Beckerian semantics
provides, in effect, a Beckerian analysis of the Kripkean possible worlds. It reveals the subtle hierarchical internal structure
of a Kripkean world that has not been discovered before. 相似文献
10.
11.
Dellantonio S Innamorati M Pastore L 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2012,46(2):172-195
This study examines whether the categories animate/inanimate might be formed on the basis of information available to the cognitive system. We suggest that the discrimination of percepts
according to these categories relies on proprioceptive information, which allows the perceiving subject to know that he is
‘animate’. Since other ‘objects’ in the world exhibit movements, reactions, etc. similar to those that the subject experiences
himself, he can ‘project’ his knowledge onto these objects and recognize them as ‘animate’ like himself. On this basis we try to corroborate the empricist position in the debate concerning the organization of knowledge
as opposed to the nativist view. Furthermore, we argue that the categorical dichotomy animate/inanimate is more basic than other analogous ones such as living/non-living, biological/non-biological and we sketch a ‘categorical stratification’ following the line ‘humans–animals–plants’ based on the hypothesis that humans
detect different degrees of ‘vitality’ according to the degree of similarity they recognise between the considered instance and themselves. 相似文献
12.
Pigeons were trained on three three-item lists (List 1: A1 → B1 → C1; List 2: A2 → B2 → C2; List 3: A3 → B3 → C3). After sessions in which any one of the three lists could be presented on a trial, derived-maintained list and derived-changed
list probe trials were introduced. The derived list probe trials were composed of three items, one drawn from each of the
training lists. On derived-maintained probe trials, each item was in the same ordinal position it occupied during training
(e.g., A3 → B1 → C2). On derived-changed probe trials, items that occupied the second and third position during training were exchanged (e.g.,
A2 → C3 → B1). The performance of subjects on derived-maintained probe trials was significantly above chance and no different to that
observed on the training lists. In contrast, subjects’ performance on derived-changed probe trials was significantly below
chance. To our knowledge, this is the first study that has demonstrated pigeons are able to learn and retain multiple three-item
lists. In addition, subjects’ performance on the derived-maintained probe trials suggests that they acquire knowledge of each
list item’s ordinal position when learning multiple lists. 相似文献
13.
Jonathan Tallant 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):271-280
It is, I think, possible to generate a variation of McTaggart’s (Mind 17:457–474, 1908) paradox that infects all extant versions of presentism. This is not to say that presentism is doomed to failure. There may
be ways to modify presentism and I can’t anticipate all such modifications, here. For the purposes of the paper I’ll understand
‘presentism’ to be the view that for all x, x is present (cf. Crisp (2004: 18)). It seems only right that, at a conference devoted to McTaggart’s work on time, we continue to pursue new ways in which
his now infamous arguments remain relevant to us today. 相似文献
14.
Zachary Beckstead 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2009,43(3):221-227
Schwarz (IPBS: Integrative Psychology & Behavioral Science 43:3, 2009) cogently demonstrates that in conjunction with scientific conventionalism psychology has developed a rather deficient view
of their subject matter: the human being. Psychology based on an impoverished notion of empirical has rendered subjectivity
or ‘the measuring apparatus man’ invisible. As his story implicitly demonstrates, psychologists supported by a positivistic
view of science (in part to be empirical) and notion of ‘objectivity’ have learned to trust their ‘rigorous’ methods instead
of their participants as capable of revealing important and interesting phenomena. If we are going to take subjectivity and
experience seriously there should be a cultivation of a new attitude or orientation regarding psychology’s subject matter
(i.e., the human being) and science. This commentary discusses Mark Freeman’s (2007) argument that the first requirement of science should be ‘fidelity to the phenomena’ and elaborates on the implications
for psychology grounded in this view of science. 相似文献
15.
Bas C. van Fraassen 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2011,40(1):15-32
Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows:
he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires
that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to
represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory
satisfies certain ‘natural assumptions’, then it implies that the subject is inconsistent if the beliefs include arithmetic.
I challenge the result by insisting that the motivation for Thomason’s principle (ii), via Moore’s Paradox, leads to a more
complex representation, in which stating the facts and expressing one’s beliefs are treated differently. Certain logical connections
among expressions of assent, and between expression and statement, are a matter of consequence on pain of pragmatic incoherence, not consequence on pain of classical logical inconsistency. But while this salvages the possibility that a modification of the above sort of representation could be adequate, Thomason’s
devastating conclusion returns if the scientist identifies himself as the subject of that representation, even when paying
heed to the requirement of pragmatic coherence of the sort highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
16.
Franz Huber 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(5):511-538
This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel,
1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming
at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of
confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have
Hempel’s cake and eat it too — in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the
two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, α is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if α is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability
relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap’s positive relevance account, thereby shedding
new light on Carnap’s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory.
A precursor of this paper has appeared as “The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment” in L. Běhounek & M. Bílková (eds.),
The Logica Yearbook 2004, Prague: Filosofia, 2005, 161–176. 相似文献
17.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
18.
Stephen Finlay 《Synthese》2010,177(1):67-89
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing ‘detaching problems’ by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine
three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed
to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number
of senses for ‘ought’. The semantics for ‘ought’ that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these
problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for ‘ought’ provides a more satisfactory solution. 相似文献
19.
Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112 2) and Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44 4) have each presented increasingly harder versions of ‘the hardest logic puzzle ever’ (Boolos The Harvard Review of Philosophy
6:62–65 1), and each has provided a two-question solution to his predecessor’s puzzle. But Uzquiano’s puzzle is different from the
original and different from Rabern and Rabern’s in at least one important respect: it cannot be solved in less than three
questions. In this paper we solve Uzquiano’s puzzle in three questions and show why there is no solution in two. Finally,
to cement a tradition, we introduce a puzzle of our own. 相似文献