Standard delay eyeblink classical conditioning is independent of awareness

P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks (2002) suggested that all forms of classical conditioning depend on awareness of the stimulus contingencies. This article considers the available data for eyeblink classical conditioning, including data from 2 studies (R. E. Clark, J. R. Manns, & L. R. Squire, 2001; J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, & L. R. Squire, 2001) that were completed too recently to have been considered in their review. In addition, in response to questions raised by P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks, 2 new analyses of data are presented from studies published previously. The available data from humans and experimental animals provide strong evidence that delay eyeblink classical conditioning (but not trace eyeblink classical conditioning) can be acquired and retained independently of the forebrain and independently of awareness. This conclusion applies to standard conditioning paradigms; for example, to single-cue delay conditioning when a tone is used as the conditioned stimulus (CS) and to differential delay conditioning when the positive and negative conditioned stimuli (CS+ and CS-) are a tone and white noise.     

Single-cue delay eyeblink conditioning is unrelated to awareness

We examined the importance of awareness for eyeblink conditioning by directly comparing singlecue delay eyeblink conditioning and single-cue trace eyeblink conditioning. During single-cue delay conditioning, participants who became aware of the stimulus contingencies early in the conditioning session conditioned no better than those who became aware later in the session or did not become aware. Thus, the level of awareness was unrelated to the overall level of conditioning across the session. In contrast, awareness of the stimulus contingencies early in the session predicted the success of single-cue trace conditioning. These data, together with earlier findings, show that awareness is irrelevant to single-cue delay eyeblink conditioning but is critical for single-cue trace eyeblink conditioning. The findings from the present study are related to previous findings for differential (CS⁺ and CS⁻) eyeblink conditioning and awareness.     

Parallel acquisition of awareness and differential delay eyeblink conditioning

There is considerable debate about whether differential delay eyeblink conditioning can be acquired without awareness of the stimulus contingencies. Previous investigations of the relationship between differential-delay eyeblink conditioning and awareness of the stimulus contingencies have assessed awareness after the conditioning session was finished using a post-experimental questionnaire. In two experiments, the point at which contingency awareness developed during the conditioning session was estimated from a button-press measure of expectancy of the unconditioned stimulus (US). In both experiments, knowledge of the stimulus contingencies and acquisition of differential delay eyeblink conditioning developed approximately in parallel. In Experiment 1 it was shown that predicting the US facilitated eyeblink conditioning compared with predicting the eyeblink response. In Experiment 2, a masking task was used that slowed down the emergence of awareness, and it was shown that differential conditioning only occurred in participants who were able to predict the US. The current findings challenge the hypothesis that differential delay eyeblink conditioning is entirely mediated by a functionally and neurally distinct nondeclarative learning system.     

Unawareness is more than a chance event: comment on Lovibond and Shanks (2002)

P. F. Lovibond and D. R. Shanks (2002) suggested that expectancy of the unconditional stimulus and emotional ratings are valid indexes of awareness in Pavlovian conditioning and that participants are aware if they can discriminate the conditional stimuli. However, research suggests that processes that are irrelevant to awareness affect these measures. Further, as awareness refers to conscious experience, a valid measures needs to index subjective state rather than discrimination ability. In support, research using subjective measures has demonstrated qualitatively different effects depending on whether participants reported being aware or unaware of the stimuli. In this research, participants reported being unaware of the stimuli even though they were clearly able to discriminate the stimuli. These findings question the validity of Lovibond and Shanks' concept of awareness and their suggestion of a close association between conditioning and awareness.     

Parallel acquisition of awareness and trace eyeblink classical conditioning

Trace eyeblink conditioning (with a trace interval ≥500 msec) depends on the integrity of the hippocampus and requires that participants develop awareness of the stimulus contingencies (i.e., awareness that the conditioned stimulus [CS] predicts the unconditioned stimulus [US]). Previous investigations of the relationship between trace eyeblink conditioning and awareness of the stimulus contingencies have manipulated awareness or have assessed awareness at fixed intervals during and after the conditioning session. In this study, we tracked the development of knowledge about the stimulus contingencies trial by trial by asking participants to try to predict either the onset of the US or the onset of their eyeblinks during differential trace eyeblink conditioning. Asking participants to predict their eyeblinks inhibited both the acquisition of awareness and eyeblink conditioning. In contrast, asking participants to predict the onset of the US promoted awareness and facilitated conditioning. Acquisition of knowledge about the stimulus contingencies and acquisition of differential trace eyeblink conditioning developed approximately in parallel (i.e., concurrently).     

Classical conditioning,awareness, and brain systems

Memory is composed of several different abilities that are supported by different brain systems. The distinction between declarative (conscious) and nondeclarative (non-conscious) memory has proved useful in understanding the nature of eyeblink classical conditioning – the best understood example of classical conditioning in vertebrates. In delay conditioning, the standard procedure, conditioning depends on the cerebellum and brainstem and is intact in amnesia. Trace conditioning, a variant of the standard procedure, depends additionally on the hippocampus and neocortex and is impaired in amnesia. Recent studies have sharpened the contrast between delay and trace conditioning by exploring the importance of awareness. We discuss these new findings in relation to the brain systems supporting eyeblink conditioning and suggest why awareness is important for trace conditioning but not for delay conditioning.     

Fear Develops to the Conditioned Stimulus and to the Context during Classical Eyeblink Conditioning in Rats

In classical eyeblink conditioning, non-specific emotional responses to the aversive shock unconditioned stimulus (US), which are presumed to coincide with the development of fear, occur early in conditioning and precede the emergence of eyeblink responses. This two-process learning model was examined by concurrently measuring fear and eyeblink conditioning in the freely moving rat. Freezing served as an index of fear in animals and was measured during the inter-trial intervals in the training context and during a tone conditioned stimulus (CS) presented in a novel context. Animals that received CS-US pairings exhibited elevated levels of fear to the context and CS early in training that decreased over sessions, while eyeblink conditioned responses (CRs) developed gradually during acquisition and decreased during extinction. Random CS-US presentations produced a similar pattern of fear responses to the context and CS as paired presentations despite low eyeblink CR percentages, indicating that fear responding was decreased independent of high levels of learned eyeblink responding. The results of paired training were consistent with two-process models of conditioning that postulate that early emotional responding facilitates subsequent motor learning, but measures from random control animals demonstrate that partial CS-US contingencies produce decrements in fear despite low levels of eyeblink CRs. These findings suggest a relationship between CS-US contingency and fear levels during eyeblink conditioning, and may serve to clarify further the role that fear conditioning plays in this simple paradigm.     

Fear develops to the conditioned stimulus and to the context during classical eyeblink conditioning in rats

In classical eyeblink conditioning, non-specific emotional responses to the aversive shock unconditioned stimulus (US), which are presumed to coincide with the development of fear, occur early in conditioning and precede the emergence of eyeblink responses. This twoprocess learning model was examined by concurrently measuring fear and eyeblink conditioning in the freely moving rat. Freezing served as an index of fear in animals and was measured during the inter-trial intervals in the training context and during a tone conditioned stimulus (CS) presented in a novel context. Animals that received CS-US pairings exhibited elevated levels of fear to the context and CS early in training that decreased over sessions, while eyeblink conditioned responses (CRs) developed gradually during acquisition and decreased during extinction. Random CS-US presentations produced a similar pattern of fear responses to the context and CS as paired presentations despite low eyeblink CR percentages, indicating that fear responding was decreased independent of high levels of learned eyeblink responding The results of paired training were consistent with two-process models of conditioning that postulate that early emotional responding facilitates subsequent motor learning, but measures from random control animals demonstrate that partial CS-US contingencies produce decrements in fear despite low levels of eyeblink CRs. These findings suggest, a relationship between CS-US contingency and fear levels during eyeblink conditioning, and may serve to clarify further the role that fear conditioning plays in this simple paradigm.     

Unimpaired trace classical eyeblink conditioning in Purkinje cell degeneration (pcd) mutant mice

Young adult Purkinje cell degeneration (pcd) mutant mice, with complete loss of cerebellar cortical Purkinje cells, are impaired in delay eyeblink classical conditioning. In the delay paradigm, the conditioned stimulus (CS) overlaps and coterminates with the unconditioned stimulus (US), and the cerebellar cortex supports normal acquisition. The ability of pcd mutant mice to acquire trace eyeblink conditioning in which the CS and US do not overlap has not been explored. Recent evidence suggests that cerebellar cortex may not be necessary for trace eyeblink classical conditioning. Using a 500 ms trace paradigm for which forebrain structures are essential in mice, we assessed the performance of homozygous male pcd mutant mice and their littermates in acquisition and extinction. In contrast to results with delay conditioning, acquisition of trace conditioning was unimpaired in pcd mutant mice. Extinction to the CS alone did not differ between pcd and littermate control mice, and timing of the conditioned response was not altered by the absence of Purkinje cells during acquisition or extinction. The ability of pcd mutant mice to acquire and extinguish trace eyeblink conditioning at levels comparable to controls suggests that the cerebellar cortex is not a critical component of the neural circuitry underlying trace conditioning. Results indicate that the essential neural circuitry for trace eyeblink conditioning involves connectivity that bypasses cerebellar cortex.     

Under what conditions can human affective conditioning occur without contingency awareness? Test of the evaluative conditioning paradigm

The role of conscious cognitive processes in human affective conditioning remains controversial, with several theories arguing that such conditioning can occur without awareness of the conditioned stimulus (CS)-unconditioned stimulus (UCS) contingency. One specific type of affective conditioning in which unaware conditioning is said to occur is "evaluative conditioning." The present experiment tested the role of contingency awareness by embedding an evaluative conditioning paradigm in a distracting masking task while obtaining, in addition to subjective ratings of affect, both psychophysiological (skin conductance and startle eyeblink) and indirect behavioral (affective priming) measures of conditioning, along with a trial-by-trial measure of awareness from 55 college student participants. Aware participants showed conditioning with all of the measures; unaware participants failed to show conditioning with all measures. The behavioral, neurophysiological, and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.     

The role of awareness in Pavlovian conditioning: empirical evidence and theoretical implications

This article reviews research over the past decade concerning the relationship between Pavlovian conditioning and conscious awareness. The review covers autonomic conditioning, conditioning with subliminal stimuli, eyeblink conditioning, conditioning in amnesia, evaluative conditioning, and conditioning under anesthesia. The bulk of the evidence is consistent with the position that awareness is necessary but not sufficient for conditioned performance, although studies suggestive of conditioning without awareness are identified as worthy of further investigation. Many studies have used inadequate measures of awareness, and strategies for increasing validity and sensitivity are discussed. It is concluded that conditioning may depend on the operation of a propositional system associated with consciousness rather than a separate, lower level system.     

Effects of Early Hippocampal Lesions on Trace, Delay, and Long-Delay Eyeblink Conditioning in Developing Rats

The effects of bilateral hippocampal aspiration lesions on later acquisition of eyeblink conditioning were examined in developing Long-Evans rat pups. Lesions on postnatal day (PND) 10 were followed by evaluation of trace eyeblink conditioning (Experiment 1) and delay eyeblink conditioning (Experiment 2) on PND 25. Pairings of a tone conditioned stimulus (CS) and periocular shock unconditioned stimulus (US, 100 ms) were presented in one of three conditioning paradigms: trace (380 ms CS, 500 ms trace interval, 880 ms interstimulus interval [ISI]), standard delay (380 ms CS, 280 ms ISI), or long delay (980 ms CS, 880 ms ISI). The results of two experiments indicated that hippocampal lesions impaired trace eyeblink conditioning more than either type of delay conditioning. In light of our previous work on the ontogeny of trace, delay, and long-delay eyeblink conditioning (Ivkovich, Paczkowski, & Stanton, 2000) showing that trace and long-delay eyeblink conditioning had similar ontogenetic profiles, the current data suggest that during ontogeny hippocampal maturation may be more important for the short-term memory component than for the long-ISI component of trace eyeblink conditioning. The late development of conditioning over long ISIs may depend on a separate process such as protracted development of cerebellar cortex.     

Ontogenetic changes in the neural mechanisms of eyeblink conditioning

The rodent eyeblink conditioning paradigm is an ideal model system for examining the relationship between neural maturation and the ontogeny of associative learning. Elucidation of the neural mechanisms underlying the ontogeny of learning is tractable using eyeblink conditioning because the necessary neural circuitry (cerebellum and interconnected brainstem nuclei) underlying the acquisition and retention of the conditioned response (CR) has been identified in adult organisms. Moreover, the cerebellum exhibits substantial postnatal anatomical and physiological maturation in rats. The eyeblink CR emerges developmentally between postnatal day (PND) 17 and 24 in rats. A series of experiments found that the ontogenetic emergence of eyeblink conditioning is related to the development of associative learning and not related to changes in performance. More recent studies have examined the relationship between the development of eyeblink conditioning and the physiological maturation of the cerebellum, a brain structure that is necessary for eyeblink conditioning in adult organisms. Disrupting cerebellar development with lesions or antimitotic treatments impairs the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning. Studies of the development of physiological processes within the cerebellum have revealed striking ontogenetic changes in stimulus-elicited and learning-related neuronal activity. Neurons in the interpositus nucleus and Purkinje cells in the cortex exhibit developmental increases in neuronal discharges following the unconditioned stimulus (US) and in neuronal discharges that model the amplitude and time-course of the eyeblink CR. The developmental changes in CR-related neuronal activity in the cerebellum suggest that the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning depends on the development of mechanisms that estavlish cerebellar plasticity. Learning and the induction of neural plasticity depend on the magnitude of the US input to the cerebellum. The role of developmental changes in the efficacy of the US pathway has been investigated by monitoring neuronal activity in the inferior olive and with stimulation techniques. The results of these experiments indicate that the development of the conditioned eyeblink response may depend on dynamic interactions between multiple developmental processes within the eyeblink neural circuitry.     

When feeling right leads to being right in the reporting of implicitly-formed attitudes,or how I learned to stop worrying and trust my gut

Previous research indicates that attitudes can form via the implicit (unconscious) detection of covariations between attitude objects and other valenced stimuli (Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2002). We posit that due to the lack of awareness of their origins, attitudes resulting from implicit evaluative conditioning are more affective in nature and resemble gut intuitions more than rational beliefs. This suggests that circumstances exist when individuals will be more likely to express implicitly-formed attitudes, and across a correlational study and 2 experiments, the present research demonstrates factors that increase conditioning-consistent decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that feelings of intuitiveness and expertise, both of which can foster a sense that one can “trust one's gut,” lead one to express attitudes recently formed through an implicit evaluative conditioning procedure. We conclude that while implicit attitude formation may be a pervasive phenomenon, implicitly formed attitudes may be expressed only under certain conditions.     

Blocking in Rabbit Eyeblink Conditioning Is Not Due to Learned Inattention: Indirect Support for an Error Correction Mechanism of Blocking

Blocking is a classical conditioning task in which prior training to one cue such as a tone reduces learning about a second cue such as a light, when subsequently trained as a tone-light compound. Blocking has been theorized to come about through a US-modulated error correction mechanism by Rescorla & Wagner (1972) as well as through a mechanism of learned inattention as theorized by Mackintosh (1973). In the case of eyeblink conditioning, an error correction mechanism has been hypothesized to take place in the cerebellum while some form of inattention has been hypothesized to take place in the hippocampal region. The hypothesis we are testing is whether the mechanism of learned inattention is involved in blocking in rabbit eyeblink conditioning. If blocking in eyeblink conditioning is produced by a mechanism of learned inattention, then training to a previously blocked cue should be slower than training to that cue in a na?ve animal. Rabbits that had received tone training followed by tone-light training exhibited blocking. Rabbits that had been previously blocked to the light acquired conditioned responses to the light at the same rate as naive rabbits. This finding failed to support the hypothesis that blocking in rabbit eyeblink conditioning is due to learned inattention, but does support the Rescorla-Wagner mechanism of error correction. The present finding along with previous work on error correction mechanism in the cerebellar-brainstem circuit (Kim et al., 1998) lend support to the theory that blocking, at least in rabbit eyeblink conditioning, seems to be due to an error correction mechanism rather than a learned inattention mechanism.     

Blocking in rabbit eyeblink conditioning is not due to learned inattention: Indirect support for an error correction mechanism of blocking

Blocking is a classical conditioning task in which prior training to one cue such as a tone reduces learning about a second cue such as a light, when subsequently trained as a tone-light compound. Blocking has been theorized to come about through a US-modulated error correction mechanism, by Rescorla &; Wagner (1972) as well as through a mechanism of learned inattention as theorized by Mackintosh (1973). In the case of eyeblink conditioning, an error correction mechanism has been hypothesized to take place in the cerebellum while some form of inattention has been hypothesized to take place in the hippocampal region. The hypothesis we., are testing is whether the mechanism of learned inattention is involved in blocking in rabbit eyeblink conditioning. If blocking in eyeblink conditioning is produced by a mechanism of learned inattention, then training to a previously blocked cue should be slower than training to that cue in a naïve animal. Rabbits that had received tone training followed by tone-light training exhibited blocking. Rabbits that had been previously blocked to the light acquired conditioned responses to the light at the same rate as naïve rabbits. This finding failed to support the hypothesis that blocking in rabbit eyeblink conditioning is due to learned inattention, but does support the Rescorla-Wagner mechanism of error correction. The present finding along with previous work on error correction mechanism in the cerebellar-brainstem circuit (Kim et al., 1998) lend support to the theory that blocking, at least in rabbit eyeblink conditioning, seems to be due to an error correction mechanism rather than a learned inattention mechanism.     

Ontogenetic Changes in the Neural Mechanisms of Eyeblink Conditioning

The rodent eyeblink conditioning paradigm is an ideal model system for examining the relationship between neural maturation and the ontogeny of associative learning. Elucidation of the neural mechanisms underlying the ontogeny of learning is tractable using eyeblink conditioning because the necessary neural circuitry (cerebellum and interconnected brainstem nuclei) underlying the acquisition and retention of the conditioned response (CR) has been identified in adult organisms. Moreover, the cerebellum exhibits substantial postnatal anatomical and physiological maturation in rats. The eyeblink CR emerges developmentally between postnatal day (PND) 17 and 24 in rats. A series of experiments found that the ontogenetic emergence of eyeblink conditioning is related to the development of associative learning and not related to changes in performance. More recent studies have examined the relationship between the development of eyeblink conditioning and the physiological maturation of the cerebellum, a brain structure that is necessary for eyeblink conditioning in adult organisms. Disrupting cerebellar development with lesions or antimitotic treatments impairs the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning. Studies of the development of physiological processes within the cerebellum have revealed striking ontogenetic changes in stimulus-elicited and learning-related neuronal activity. Neurons in the interpositus nucleus and Purkinje cells in the cortex exhibit developmental increases in neuronal discharges following the unconditioned stimulus (US) and in neuronal discharges that model the amplitude and time-course of the eyeblink CR. The developmental changes in CR-related neuronal activity in the cerebellum suggest that the ontogeny of eyeblink conditioning depends on the development of mechanisms that establish cerebellar plasticity. Learning and the induction of neural plasticity depend on the magnitude of the US input to the cerebellum. The role of developmental changes in the efficacy of the US pathway has been investigated by monitoring neuronal activity in the inferior olive and with stimulation techniques. The results of these experiments indicate that the development of the conditioned eyeblink response may depend on dynamic interactions between multiple developmental processes within the eyeblink neural circuitry.     

Both trace and delay conditioned eyeblink responding can be dissociated from outcome expectancy

Squire and colleagues have proposed that trace and delay eyeblink conditioning are fundamentally different kinds of learning: trace conditioning requires acquisition of a conscious declarative memory for the stimulus contingencies whereas delay conditioning does not. Declarative memory in trace conditioning is thought to generate conditioned responding through the activation of a conscious expectancy for when the unconditioned stimulus (US) is going to occur. Perruchet (1985) has previously shown that in a 50% partial reinforcement design it is possible to dissociate single cue delay eyeblink conditioning from conscious expectancy for the US by examining performance over runs of reinforced and nonreinforced trials. Clark, Manns, and Squire (2001) claim that this dissociation does not occur in trace eyeblink conditioning. In the present experiment we examined the Perruchet effect for short, moderate, and long trace intervals (600, 1000, and 1400 ms) and for the equivalent interstimulus intervals (ISIs) in a delay conditioning procedure. We found evidence for a dissociation of eyeblink CRs and US expectancy over runs regardless of whether there was a delay or a trace arrangement of cues. The reasons for the Perruchet effect are still unclear, but the present data suggest that it does not depend on a separate nondeclarative system of the type proposed by Squire and colleagues.     

Hippocampal and cerebellar single-unit activity during delay and trace eyeblink conditioning in the rat

In delay eyeblink conditioning, the CS overlaps with the US and only a brainstem-cerebellar circuit is necessary for learning. In trace eyeblink conditioning, the CS ends before the US is delivered and several forebrain structures, including the hippocampus, are required for learning, in addition to a brainstem-cerebellar circuit. The interstimulus interval (ISI) between CS onset and US onset is perhaps the most important factor in classical conditioning, but studies comparing delay and trace conditioning have typically not matched these procedures in this crucial factor, so it is often difficult to determine whether results are due to differences between delay and trace or to differences in ISI. In the current study, we employed a 580-ms CS-US interval for both delay and trace conditioning and compared hippocampal CA1 activity and cerebellar interpositus nucleus activity in order to determine whether a unique signature of trace conditioning exists in patterns of single-unit activity in either structure. Long-Evans rats were chronically implanted in either CA1 or interpositus with microwire electrodes and underwent either delay eyeblink conditioning, or trace eyeblink conditioning with a 300-ms trace period between CS offset and US onset. On trials with a CR in delay conditioning, CA1 pyramidal cells showed increases in activation (relative to a pre-CS baseline) during the CS-US period in sessions 1-4 that was attenuated by sessions 5-6. In contrast, on trials with a CR in trace conditioning, CA1 pyramidal cells did not show increases in activation during the CS-US period until sessions 5-6. In sessions 5-6, increases in activation were present only to the CS and not during the trace period. For rats with interpositus electrodes, activation of interpositus neurons on CR trials was present in all sessions in both delay and trace conditioning. However, activation was greater in trace compared to delay conditioning in the first half of the CS-US interval (during the trace CS) during early sessions of conditioning and, in later sessions of conditioning, activation was greater in the second half of the CS-US interval (during the trace interval). These results suggest that the pattern of hippocampal activation that differentiates trace from delay eyeblink conditioning is a slow buildup of activation to the CS, possibly representing encoding of CS duration or discrimination of the CS from the background context. Interpositus nucleus neurons show strong modeling of the eyeblink CR regardless of paradigm but show a changing pattern across conditioning that may be due to the necessary contributions of forebrain processing to trace conditioning.     

Central cannabinoid receptors modulate acquisition of eyeblink conditioning

Delay eyeblink conditioning is established by paired presentations of a conditioned stimulus (CS) such as a tone or light, and an unconditioned stimulus (US) that elicits the blink reflex. Conditioned stimulus information is projected from the basilar pontine nuclei to the cerebellar interpositus nucleus and cortex. The cerebellar cortex, particularly the molecular layer, contains a high density of cannabinoid receptors (CB1R). The CB1Rs are located on the axon terminals of parallel fibers, stellate cells, and basket cells where they inhibit neurotransmitter release. The present study examined the effects of a CB1R agonist WIN55,212-2 and antagonist SR141716A on the acquisition of delay eyeblink conditioning in rats. Rats were given subcutaneous administration of 1, 2, or 3 mg/kg of WIN55,212-2 or 1, 3, or 5 mg/kg of SR141716A before each day of acquisition training (10 sessions). Dose-dependent impairments in acquisition were found for WIN55,212-2 and SR141716A, with no effects on spontaneous or nonassociative blinking. However, the magnitude of impairment was greater for WIN55,212-2 than SR141716A. Dose-dependent impairments in conditioned blink response (CR) amplitude and timing were found with WIN55,212-2 but not with SR141716A. The findings support the hypothesis that CB1Rs in the cerebellar cortex play an important role in plasticity mechanisms underlying eyeblink conditioning.