Training propositional reasoning

Two experiments compared the effects of four training conditions on propositional reasoning. A syntactic training demonstrated formal derivations, in an abstract semantic training the standard truth-table definitions of logical connectives were explained, and a domain-specific semantic training provided thematic contexts for the premises of the reasoning task. In a control training, an inductive reasoning task was practised. In line with the account by mental models, both kinds of semantic training were significantly more effective than the control and the syntactic training, whereas there were no significant differences between the control and the syntactic training, nor between the two kinds of semantic training. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern of effects using a different set of syntactic and domain-specific training conditions.     

Linguistic and psychometric factors in propositional reasoning

An experiment is reported which demonstrates the effects of linguistic and psychometric factors on adults' performance on a propositional reasoning task. The three linguistic factors were the semantic content in which the logical rule was embedded, the linguistic form of the logical rule, and the polarity of the major premise of the logical arguments. The two psychometric factors were the mode of response and the order of presentation of the different types of content. The results showed that the linguistic factors had a pronounced effect on adults' propositional reasoning abilities, whereas the influence of the psychometric factors was negligible. These findings are discussed in relation to operational and interpretational factors in reasoning.     

Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

This article presents a developmental dual-process theory of the understanding of conditionals that integrates Evans’ heuristic–analytic theory within the revised mental model theory of conditional proposed by Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008). According to this theory, the interpretation of a conditional sentence is driven by unconscious and implicit heuristic processes that provide individuals with an initial representation that captures its meaning by representing the cases that make it true. This initial model can be enriched with additional models (a process named fleshing out within the mental model theory) through the intervention of conscious and demanding analytic processes. Being optional, these processes construct representations of cases that are only compatible with the conditional, leaving its truth-value indeterminate when they occur. Because heuristic processes are relatively immune to developmental changes, while analytic processes strongly develop with age, the initial model remains stable through development whereas the number of additional models that can be constructed increases steadily. Thus, the dual-process mental model theory predicts in which cases conditionals will be deemed true, indeterminate, or false and how these cases evolve with age. These predictions were verified in children, adolescents and adults who were asked to evaluate the truth value and the probability of several types of conditionals. The results reveal a variety of developmental trajectories in the way different conditionals are interpreted, which can all be accounted for by our revised mental model theory.     

Formulation and experimental verification of models in propositional reasoning

In Evans (1977) an experiment of Evans and Lynch (1973) based on Wason's selection task is re-analysed. We reformulated the model proposed by Evans as a state model and extended it to a new model by means of which the data of Evans and Lynch (1973), of Manktelow and Evans (1979), and of our own experiments can be explained. The new model is based on a falsification state, a verification state and a matching state.     

Facilitation and inhibition caused by the orienting of attention in propositional reasoning tasks

In an attempt to study the orienting of attention in reasoning, we developed a set of propositional reasoning tasks structurally similar to Posner's (1980) spatial cueing paradigm, widely used to study the orienting of attention in perceptual tasks. We cued the representation in working memory of a reasoning premise, observing whether inferences drawn using that premise or a different, uncued one were facilitated, hindered, or unaffected. The results of Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d, using semantically (1a–1c) or statistically (1d) informative cues, showed a robust, long-lasting facilitation for drawing inferences from the cued rule. In Experiment 2, using uninformative cues, inferences from the cued rule were facilitated with a short stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), whereas they were delayed when the SOA was longer, an effect that is similar to the “inhibition of return” (IOR) in perceptual tasks. Experiment 3 used uninformative cues, three different SOAs, and inferential rules with disjunctive antecedents, replicating the IOR-like effect with the long SOAs and, at the short SOA, finding evidence of a gradient-like behaviour of the facilitation effect. Our findings show qualitative similarities to some effects typically observed in the orienting of visual attention, although the tasks did not involve spatial orienting.     

Error processes in syllogistic reasoning

In recent years, a number of proposals have been advanced to account for the errors that subjects make in deductive inferences from invalid syllogisms. Principles such as erroneous conversion of premises, probabilistic inference, feature selection, and various other interpretation and combination processes have been suggested. The present paper focuses on the 32 invalid categorical syllogisms for which conversion of premises does not provide an explanation of subject error. An explanation is presented in terms of three error processes: the erroneous conversion of conclusions resulting from backward processing, the erroneous integration of information from the two premises, and the failure to consider hypothetical possibilities. Empirical predictions regarding the differential difficulty of the various premise combinations as well as the pattern of correlations between premise combinations are derived from this formulation, and data are presented that support these predictions.     

Facilitation and inhibition caused by the orienting of attention in propositional reasoning tasks

In an attempt to study the orienting of attention in reasoning, we developed a set of propositional reasoning tasks structurally similar to Posner's (1980) spatial cueing paradigm, widely used to study the orienting of attention in perceptual tasks. We cued the representation in working memory of a reasoning premise, observing whether inferences drawn using that premise or a different, uncued one were facilitated, hindered, or unaffected. The results of Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d, using semantically (1a-1c) or statistically (1d) informative cues, showed a robust, long-lasting facilitation for drawing inferences from the cued rule. In Experiment 2, using uninformative cues, inferences from the cued rule were facilitated with a short stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), whereas they were delayed when the SOA was longer, an effect that is similar to the “inhibition of return” (IOR) in perceptual tasks. Experiment 3 used uninformative cues, three different SOAs, and inferential rules with disjunctive antecedents, replicating the IOR-like effect with the long SOAs and, at the short SOA, finding evidence of a gradient-like behaviour of the facilitation effect. Our findings show qualitative similarities to some effects typically observed in the orienting of visual attention, although the tasks did not involve spatial orienting.     

Heuristic and analytic processing: age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles

Developmental and individual differences in the tendency to favor analytic responses over heuristic responses were examined in children of two different ages (10- and 11-year-olds versus 13-year-olds), and of widely varying cognitive ability. Three tasks were examined that all required analytic processing to override heuristic processing: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning under conditions of belief bias, and probabilistic reasoning. Significant increases in analytic responding with development were observed on the first two tasks. Cognitive ability was associated with analytic responding on all three tasks. Cognitive style measures such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition explained variance in analytic responding on the tasks after variance shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. The implications for dual-process theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.     

Overcoming intuition: metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning

Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency--receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments 1 and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing one's brow (Experiment 3)--reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments 1 and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.     

Holistic and analytic processes in the comparison of letters

College students made “same-different” judgments about successively presented pairs of letters whose degree of difference, in terms of the number of line segments out of register, was systematically varied. Reaction time was found to decrease with increases in the degree of difference in “different” responses, as well as to depend on the number of line segments present in the second (probe) letter. “Same” responses were much faster than different responses and were unaffected by the number of segments in the probe letter. This pattern of results suggests analytic (component-by-component) processing of “different” letters and holistic processing of “same” letters. The results have important implications for studies of multi-letter comparisons, in which it is commonly assumed that letter comparisons are holistic in nature.     

Conditional reasoning processes in a logical deduction game

Two experiments examined the role of conditional reasoning in the logical deduction game, Mastermind. An analysis suggested that Modus Tollens (MT) reasoning could be used to determine the code structure, for example, in determining if any of the colours in the code are repeated. Consistent with this analysis, Experiment 1 showed that only MT errors are correlated with the number of hypotheses advanced in Mastermind. A subsequent analysis showed that conditional reasoning such as Affirming the Consequent (AC) and Denying the Antecedent (DA) could lead to particularly damaging inferences only when the code was four different colours. When that was known before play, Experiment 2 showed that AC errors, but not MT errors, were significantly correlated with Mastermind hypotheses advanced. A stepwise multiple regression analysis supported these findings: When the solvers knew they were playing a four-colour code, there was a slight diminution in the variance explained by MT errors, and a significant increase in the variance explained by AC errors. An analysis of the number of different possible codes that could be consistent with hypotheses actually played showed that the number of such codes is far fewer when the code consists of four different colours than when its structure is not known. This analysis suggests that reasoners are therefore unlikely to discover many alternative causes for the feedback given when the code consists of four different colours, and it is under these conditions that humans are most likely to engage in AC reasoning.     

Working memory, text comprehension, and propositional reasoning: a new Semantic Anaphora WM test

The aim of this study was to present a new working memory test following the line of work started by García-Madruga et al. (2007) and to examine its relation to reading comprehension and propositional reasoning measures. In that study we designed a new working memory span test--based on Daneman & Carpenter's (1980) Reading Span Test (RST)--in which the processing task called for an inferential decision--to resolve a pronominal anaphora based on Morpho-Syntactic cues and had people recall the result of this inference. In the current study, besides the RST and the Morpho-Syntactic Anaphora test, we presented a new Semantic Anaphora measure. In order to check the validity of this new Working Memory (WM) task, we used the same reasoning task used in the previous study as well as a new reading comprehension test. The results show the tight relationship amongst working memory, reading comprehension and reasoning, and confirm the validity of the new WM measure.     

The content and processes of autobiographical reasoning in narrative identity

Building on research that focuses on individual differences in the narration of important life events, this study examined the content of self-event connections and thematic coherence in relation to the processes of autobiographical reasoning. Autobiographical reasoning was defined as making connections between the past and the self, the effort reported in making those connections and the emotional evaluation of the connections. Personality differences at the levels of traits and ego development were examined in relation to autobiographical reasoning. One hundred and nineteen younger and older adults completed a self-defining memory interview. Self-event connections reported in the interviews were coded as being about dispositions, values, outlook, and personal growth. Connections were then coded for the degree of cognitive effort required to make the connection and the emotional evaluation of the connection. Finally, the entire interview was coded for the presence or absence of a theme. Results showed that cognitive effort and evaluation differed across type of connection, and ego development and traits moderated some of these results. Further, across connections, there were individual differences in cognitive effort and evaluation, as well as in the reports of a themes across memories. Results are discussed in terms of individual differences in the construction of narrative identity.     

The development of analogical reasoning processes.

Two experiments were conducted to test the generalizability to children of a theory of analogical reasoning processes originally proposed for adults (R. J. Sternberg, Psychological Review, 1977a, 84, 353–378; R. J. Sternberg, Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning: The componential analysis of human abilities, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977b) and to examine the development of analogical reasoning processes in terms of five proposed sources of cognitive development: (a) availability of component operations; (b) strategy for combining multiple component operation; (c) strategy for combining multiple executions of the same component operation; (d) consistency in use of strategy; (e) component-operation latency and difficulty. Between 15 and 21 subjects in each of grades 2, 4, 6, and adulthood (ages 8, 10, 12, and 19 years, respectively) were tested in their ability to solve analogies of systematically varied difficulty. Performance was measured in terms of latencies for items solved correctly, latencies for all items solved, and error rates. A slightly modified version of the Stenberg, 1977(a), Stenberg, 1977(b) theory was found to be applicable to the data for each of the age levels tested. In analogies with perceptually separable attributes, change over age was found in sources (d) and (e) noted above. In analogies with perceptually integral attributes, change over age was found in sources (a), (c), (d), and (e). Developmental trends were discussed in terms of past theory and findings, and possible reasons for differences in developmental patterns between the two kinds of analogies were suggested.     

The mental representation and processes of spatial deductive reasoning with diagrams and sentences

This study has two main objectives. The first is to specify the nature of the mental representation and processes underlying spatial reasoning with diagrams and sentences. The second is to investigate whether mental representations reproduce geometrical relations relative to spatial reference frames. Forty participants solved 64 spatial reasoning problems that were displayed using diagrams or sentences. Problems varied with respect to their logical structure and geometrical content. We measured the premise's inspection times, the responses, and the response times. Problems were significantly (p < .01) easier to represent and solve when displayed as diagrams than as sentences, indicating that participants constructed mental models. Mental representations and spatial deductions also varied consistently with the geometrical content, suggesting that mental models reproduced this content relative to a viewer‐centred reference frame.     

A temporal logic for reasoning about processes and plans

Much previous work in artificial intelligence has neglected representing time in all its complexity. In particular, it has neglected continuous change and the indeterminacy of the future. To rectify this, I have developed a first-order temporal logic, in which it is possible to name and prove things about facts, events, plans, and world histories. In particular, the logic provides analyses of causality, continuous change in quantities, the persistence of facts (the frame problem), and the relationship between tasks and actions. It may be possible to implement a temporal-inference machine based on this logic, which keeps track of several “maps” of a time line, one per possible history.     

Dyslexia and reasoning: The importance of visual processes

Recent research has suggested that individuals with dyslexia rely on explicit visuospatial representations for syllogistic reasoning while most non‐dyslexics opt for an abstract verbal strategy. This paper investigates the role of visual processes in relational reasoning amongst dyslexic reasoners. Expt 1 presents written and verbal protocol evidence to suggest that reasoners with dyslexia generate detailed representations of relational properties and use these to make a visual comparison of objects. Non‐dyslexics use a linear array of objects to make a simple transitive inference. Expt 2 examined evidence for the visual‐impedance effect which suggests that visual information detracts from reasoning leading to longer latencies and reduced accuracy. While non‐dyslexics showed the impedance effects predicted, dyslexics showed only reduced accuracy on problems designed specifically to elicit imagery. Expt 3 presented problems with less semantically and visually rich content. The non‐dyslexic group again showed impedance effects, but dyslexics did not. Furthermore, in both studies, visual memory predicted reasoning accuracy for dyslexic participants, but not for non‐dyslexics, particularly on problems with highly visual content. The findings are discussed in terms of the importance of visual and semantic processes in reasoning for individuals with dyslexia, and we argue that these processes play a compensatory role, offsetting phonological and verbal memory deficits.     

Early and late processes in syllogistic reasoning: evidence from eye-movements

An eye-movement monitoring experiment was carried out to examine the effects of the difficulty of the problem (simple versus complex problems) and the type of figure (figure 1 or figure 4) on the time course of processing categorical syllogisms. The results showed that the course of influence for these two factors is different. We found early processing effects for the figure but not for the difficulty of the syllogism and later processing effects for both the figure and the difficulty. These results lend support to the Model Theory (Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale, New Jersey: LEA.) as opposed to other theories of reasoning (Chater, N., Oaksford, M. (1999). The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 191-258; Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).     

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change

A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.