Is Negligence a First Cousin to Intentionality? Lay Conceptions of Negligence and Its Relationship to Intentionality

In three studies, we examined lay conceptions of negligence and how they are used when making judgments about actors' intentions, negligence, and blame. Study 1 examined the extent to which participants agreed about what constitutes negligence and accidents. After finding a high level of agreement between participants, Study 2 explored the features that defined participants' folk understanding of negligence. Additionally, we examined if definitions of negligence overlapped with key features of definitions of intentionality proposed in the literature. Study 2 suggested there were some key overlapping features and differences between negligence and intentionality. Finally, Study 3 examined how two key features of intentionality and negligence (knowledge and awareness) were related to attributions of negligence, accidental causation, blame, and desire to punish. The findings suggested that knowledge and awareness are positively related to judgments of negligence, blame, and desire to punish. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who Is to Blame? Official Discourse and Ethnic Diversity Attitudes During the 2011 Riots in England

In 2011, the killing of a Black man by a police officer triggered violent riots across England. In a context where ethnic minorities are rarely openly blamed, we examined the lens through which the events were interpreted in the official discourses of the British Prime Minister. A thematic content analysis (Study 1) revealed that, without explicitly blaming ethnic minorities, the discourses built on antagonistic normative references opposing a virtuous majority to threatening minorities. Then, based on online survey data of self‐declared Londoners (N = 223) during the riots, we analyzed (Study 2) how agreement with the discourses related to individuals’ ethnocentrism and their understanding of the causes underlying the events. Results of regression analyses showed how agreement with the discourses related to blaming ethnic diversity for the riots and to higher ethnocentrism, especially among individuals least likely to discriminate against minorities (i.e., low in social dominance orientation). Agreement with the discourses was also linked to reduced blame of authorities. To conclude, we discuss the mobilization potential of political discourses on ingroup virtue and outgroup threat.     

What About the Victim? Neglected Dimensions of the Standing to Blame

The Journal of Ethics - This paper points out neglected considerations about the standing to blame. It starts from the observation that the standing to blame debate largely focusses on factors...     

Is there a Moral Right to Vote?

The question raised in this paper is whether legal rights to vote are also moral rights to vote. The challenge to the justification of a moral right to vote is that it is not clear that the vote is instrumental to the preservation of some critical interest of the voter. Because a single vote has ‘no impact’ on electoral outcomes, the right to vote is unlikely to serve the interests of the individual. The account developed in this paper holds that moral voting rights can be justified once we acknowledge that voting by a sub-set of citizens is among the necessary preconditions for democratic institutions making a significant difference to their collective interests. The justification of a moral right to vote does not, then, apply to each individual citizen but only to a sub-set of them. In order to justify inclusive moral voting rights, the further consideration must be added that individuals have critical interests in public recognition of equal status. An inclusive moral right to vote accordingly depends on both collective interest in the outcomes of democratic institutions and on individual interest in equal recognition.     

Does Repeated Exposure to Popular Media Strengthen Moral Intuitions?: Exploratory Evidence Regarding Consistent and Conflicted Moral Content

Previous studies have indicated that media consumption may influence moral intuition sensitivity. The present exploratory studies sought to expand on these findings by employing a three-phase, longitudinal experiment conducted over nine weeks, where participants were exposed to two genres of films (romance, action) mixed in various ratios (high = 100% romance, medium = 60% romance, low = 20% romance, none = 0% romance). Findings from the initial study indicate that repeated exposure to romantic films led to increases in sensitivity for four of the five moral intuitions (i.e., care, fairness, authority, purity); at the same time, any exposure to action films seemed to erode these changes. A follow-up post-hoc content analysis sought to confirm these findings and test an operationalization of “moral conditioning.” We discuss the results in regards to media entertainment theory and research, and the societal implications of the role of media entertainment to reinforce standards of moral judgment.     

Peer Bystanders to Bullying: Who Wants to Play with the Victim?

Given widespread concern associated with school-based bullying, researchers have looked beyond a dyadic perspective (i.e., bullies and victims only), and now consider the broader social ecology of the peer group. In this research, we examined how the behaviors of peer bystanders influence subsequent reactions to bullies and their victims. Two hundred and six 10- to 15-year-old boys (Mage?=?12.46) were invited to play a computer game with three other boys allegedly located at another school. Before the start of the game, participants “met the other players” apparently sitting in a waiting room. These child actors depicted an escalating bullying episode in which the behavior of the bystander was manipulated: aide to the bully, defender of the victim, or passive outsider. Immediately after exposure to the bullying, each participant played a ball toss game (Cyberball) with the three other boys in the video. Individual differences among participants were examined as moderators of the effect of bystander behavior on participants’ willingness to include the “victim” in the game. Results indicated that, when exposed to a passive bystander, boys’ normative beliefs about aggression, as well as their tendency to morally disengage from observed egregious acts, decreased their willingness to include the victim in the game.     

Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?

Many philosophers endorse the idea that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and thus hold that such responsibility is essentially interpersonal. In this paper, various interpretations of this idea are distinguished, and it is argued that no interpretation of it captures a significant truth. The popular view that moral responsibility consists in answerability is discussed and dismissed. The even more popular view that such responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes is also discussed, and it is argued that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal.     

Moral Questions and Amoral Answers: Who Decides?

ABSTRACT Researchers have examined moral thought using selected philosophical standards without showing that such standards represent moral thinking. Recently, we examined the extent to which assumed standards actually organize moral knowledge (Quinn, Houts, & Graesser, this issue). We found dimensions not accounted for by previous theories. In his response (this issue), Shaffer misrepresents the aims of our research, and he overlooks the implications of assessing naturalistic rather than prescribed dimensions of morality.     

Bad Woman, Bad Victim? Disentangling the Effects of Victim Stereotypicality, Gender Stereotypicality and Benevolent Sexism on Acquaintance Rape Victim Blame

Based on the assertion that previous research may have inadvertently confounded two stereotypes, we considered the impact of benevolent sexism on rape victim blame in the context of independent manipulations of gender and the perceived genuineness (victim stereotypicality) of an acquaintance rape victim. We predicted that for blame, benevolent sexism may be independently positively associated with gender and victim counter-stereotypicality. Following pilot work, 120 Australian undergraduates read an acquaintance rape scenario. Results indicated that benevolent sexism was only positively associated with blame of the gender counter-stereotypical victim when that victim was also counter-stereotypical in terms of victim stereotypes. This result indicates a more moderate role than previously indicated for benevolent sexism in accounting for rape victim blame.     

Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children?

ABSTRACT I argue, counter-intuitively, that under certain conditions many people are under some moral requirement to attempt to bring children into being (in order to raise them). There is only rarely a strict obligation to have children, but more moderate, inclining moral considerations in favour of having children, have a place in our moral world. I begin by considering a large number of arguments in favour and against the possibility of an obligation to have children. Then I examine when the weight of one set of arguments is greater. And I conclude by pointing out some general lessons from the discussion.     

Moral Judgment in Extreme Social Contexts: Soldiers Who Refuse to Fight and Physicians Who Strike?1

This paper compares two examples of moral action within extreme social contexts: the refusal of Israeli reserve soldiers to perform their military service during the war in Lebanon (1982–1983), and the refusal of Israeli physicians to provide medical care during a “labor war”, that is a strike. This paper examines the cognitive developmental premise that with an increase in the actors' stage of moral development there will be a greater consistency between hypothetical and actual moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984). Blasi's (1983) concept of personal integrity, that is, the consistency between the actors' judgment concerning the morality of an action and the action that was actually performed, is examined as well. The findings show that the “refusing” soldiers manifested stage consistency in their action, whereas the physicians failed to justify their action in line with their moral competence. Whereas the soldiers viewed their action as highly moral, the physicians viewed their strike action as unfortunate but necessary. The motivation of the two groups of actors to act in line with their behavioral choices is discussed.     

What Is Conventionalism about Moral Rights and Duties?

A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individual rights and duties. The reason why I must not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants in that practice. Common targets of this objection include the theories of Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. I argue that (1) the conventionalism of these theories is superficial; (2) genuinely conventionalist theories are not vulnerable to the objection; and (3) genuine moral conventionalism is independently plausible.     

Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal? A Reply to Zimmerman

According to Michael Zimmerman, no interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal captures a significant truth. He raises several worries about the Strawsonian view that moral responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and claims that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. He outlines three problems. First, the existence of self-reactive attitudes may be incompatible with the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility. Secondly, Zimmerman questions the significance of the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility, according to the Strawsonian view. Thirdly, he argues that that view may be taken to suggest the wrong kind of priority relation between ‘P is morally responsible’ and ‘it is appropriate to adopt some reactive attitude toward P’. I discuss each of these problems in turn and conclude that Strawsonians can respond to all three problems raised by Zimmerman. The Strawsonian view supports a significant interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal.     

When Victimhood Goes to War? Israel and Victim Claims

Prominent sociopsychological approaches interpret collective victimhood as inseparable, central characteristic of societies involved in intractable conflicts. Victimhood is broadly perceived as an essential conflict-supportive belief also in other disciplines. In the context of Israel, there is a cross-disciplinary consensus that collective victimhood is the country's foundational identity. This project argues that states' employment of this theme changes and is context dependent. It discusses under what conditions Israel's political elites incorporate victim narratives towards armed conflicts. It examines public communication during the 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense (OPD) and the Yom Kippur war of 1973 (YKW). Employing a modified method of narrative conceptualization analysis, the research demonstrates that victim narratives were used almost twice as much during OPD than during YKW. The findings suggest that we need to differentiate between the role these narratives play for collectives versus states. For the latter, the presence of victim narratives is highly variable and reflects strategic developments. The project is the first systematic study exposing that victim narratives can be a challenge for governance. By conceptualizing victim narratives as claims, it captures the dynamic, contextual characteristics of collective victimhood in state affairs offering a theoretical tool for understanding the political dimension of this identification.     

Who Is I?

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom I refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of I arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 Demonstratives before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of I breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions.     

Is it okay to tell? Children's judgements about information disclosure

The present research investigates how young children evaluate and reason about the disclosure of private information. Using story vignettes, children aged 4–5 and 7–8 years were asked to evaluate an individual who passed on information from a peer revealing that he or she had broken a rule (e.g., stolen a cookie; rule type) or lacked a skill (e.g., could not ride a bicycle; competence type). These negative valence stories were compared with positive valence stories in which the peer had followed a rule or possessed a skill. Younger children approved the sharing of positive, but not negative, information, irrespective of type (rule vs. competence). Older children disapproved the disclosure of someone's incompetence, whereas they approved the disclosure of a rule violation. Children justified their evaluations by reference to social rules in the rule‐type vignettes and to an individual's feelings in the competence‐type vignettes. The findings suggest that young children are concerned about the disclosure of negative information about other people, but with age they become increasingly concerned about protecting the social order even at the cost of individual privacy.     

Texting and Driving: Is It Just Moral Panic?

Significant public efforts have been mounted to stop the perceived epidemic of texting and driving, especially among younger drivers. However, despite the taken-for-granted nature of these fears, cell phones are reported as a contributing factor in only about 1% of all crashes. This study examines 11 years of crash data from Kentucky to demonstrate that despite the exponential growth of cell phones in American culture, cell phone-related crashes have remained stable over time, and they represent far less of a public health risk than most people are led to believe. The conclusions are presented in the context of moral panic theory.     

Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by “objective”? what is meant by “experience”?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis.     

Who is in Need of Victim Support?: The Issue of Accountable, Empirically Validated Selection and Victim Referral

The tremendous growth in victim-oriented laws granting various rights to crime victims, which emerged worldwide during the last two decades, has initiated a renewed research interest in the varied aspects of the needy victims concept. Highly sophisticated theoretical models, indicating various risk factors (e.g. external control, upward relative risk assessments) and protection factors (hardiness, behaviour attributions), were developed to explain which crime victims are in need of victim support. The practical validity of these models is relatively low: at the police level there are simply no resources to conduct lengthy diagnostic interviews with crime victims. This article aims to bridge the gap between sophistication and mundane selection of needy victims. The focus is on a simple selection instrument, namely the victim's psychological condition prior to the victimization. Analyses suggest that low pre-victimization well-being constitutes a central risk factor, predicting a delayed deterioration in post-victimization well-being, and longer term psychological distress, which is manifest ten months after the victimizing incident. The traffic light model is discussed as a simple selection tool, which might be used during the witness interview. Such a model may also be used by defense attorneys to examine if clients were appropriately assessed as needing support after describing their experiences to the police. For the prosecutor's office the traffic light model offers an instrument to predict which victims might benefit from a personal interview with the prosecutor. Some implications of low well-being for studies on repeat victimizations are discussed, inter alia in terms of a potential mood congruence bias, that might result in inflated estimates of multiple victimizations.