Introversion-extraversion,tempo, and guided imagery

This research tested the hypotheses that (a) introverts would produce more vivid imagery than would extraverts, and (b) introverts would produce better mental imagery if the background auditory tempo was slow, and extraverts would produce better mental imagery of the background auditory tempo was fast. Participants (N=240) were classified as introverts or extraverts and were randomly assigned one of three tempo conditions: slow, fast, or none. They were instructed to form mental images while listening individually to one of two stories. Clicks (slow or fast) sounded in the background during the stories. All participants then completed detailed questionnaires about the vividness of their mental imagery. Analysis showed that introverts reported significantly more vividness in their imagery than did extraverts. The hypothesized interaction between personality and tempo was not found. Implications were drawn for therapeutic applications of mental imagery.     

Mental image generation and the contrast sensitivity function

In one experiment, observers were instructed to generate small and large visual mental images in a light-adapted or a dark-adapted viewing condition, and to rate the vividness of each image. In light-adapted viewing, small images were generated faster than large images. However, the pattern of results was reversed in dark-adapted viewing. Furthermore, the dark-adapted images were more vivid than the light-adapted images. The results show that mental images can be mapped onto some regions of the contrast sensitivity function (CSF), so that the latency (and vividness) of a particular image can be predicted. Since the CSF reflects visual processes occurring mainly in V1, the results agree with functional magnetic resonance imaging data in indicating that early visual pathways participate in imagery. Nonetheless, imagery and perception may involve different processes hosted by the same neural structures as indicated by the direct relationship between image latency and contrast sensitivity.     

Image control from childhood to adolescence

Despite the recognized importance of imagery use by children as well as the developmental relevance for maturity and health of imagery properties such as vividness and control, only a few studies have investigated imagery of children. The aim of the present study was to examine the development of control of mental images in a sample of boys and girls aged 7 to 17 years. Children were assessed on two aspects of mental imagery, vividness and control, and teachers were asked to rate the children's intellectual and socioemotional performance. Analysis showed that the capacity for image control increased in adolescence and that children characterized by vivid and uncontrolled imagery received the lowest ratings from teachers, whereas those with nonvivid and controlled imagery received the highest ratings. The implications of these results were discussed in relation to normal and abnormal development as well as suggestions for research.     

Evaluating the mind's eye: the metacognition of visual imagery

Can people evaluate phenomenal qualities of internally generated experiences, such as whether a mental image is vivid or detailed? This question exemplifies a problem of metacognition: How well do people know their own thoughts? In the study reported here, participants were instructed to imagine a specific visual pattern and rate its vividness, after which they were presented with an ambiguous rivalry display that consisted of the previously imagined pattern plus an orthogonal pattern. On individual trials, higher ratings of vividness predicted a greater likelihood that the imagined pattern would appear dominant when the participant was subsequently presented with the binocular rivalry display. Off-line self-report questionnaires measuring imagery vividness also predicted individual differences in the strength of imagery bias over the entire study. Perceptual bias due to mental imagery could not be attributed to demand characteristics, as no bias was observed on catch-trial presentations of mock rivalry displays. Our findings provide novel evidence that people have a good metacognitive understanding of their own mental imagery and can reliably evaluate the vividness of single episodes of imagination.     

Fantasy proneness, mental imagery and reality monitoring

Individual differences in fantasy proneness and vividness of mental imagery have been suggested to be related to source memory confusions. To test this hypothesis, two groups scoring either high or low on a measure of fantasy proneness (selected from a group of 231 subjects) were compared on measures of self report vividness of mental imagery, objective imagery ability and reality monitoring performance. The two groups differed significantly on ratings of imagery vividness (p<0.01), but not on the imagery performance tasks, nor on reality monitoring performance. Our results indicate that, although fantasy proneness is associated with experiences of vivid mental imagery, it does not necessarily lead to reality monitoring errors.     

Expertise Shapes Multimodal Imagery for Wine

Although taste and smell seem hard to imagine, some people nevertheless report vivid imagery in these sensory modalities. We investigate whether experts are better able to imagine smells and tastes because they have learned the ability, or whether they are better imaginers in the first place, and so become experts. To test this, we first compared a group of wine experts to yoked novices using a battery of questionnaires. We show for the first time that experts report greater vividness of wine imagery, with no difference in vividness across sensory modalities. In contrast, novices had more vivid color imagery than taste or odor imagery for wines. Experts and novices did not differ on other vividness of imagery measures, suggesting a domain-specific effect of expertise. Critically, in a second study, we followed a group of students commencing a wine course and a group of matched control participants. Students and controls did not differ before the course, but after the wine course students reported more vivid wine imagery. We provide evidence that expertise improves imagery, exemplifying the extent of plasticity of cognition underlying the chemical senses.     

The role of vividness of imagery in metaphor generation

Pointing to novel links between mental representation and social communication, we examine the association between vividness of imagery and use of metaphors. In a study on individual differences and three experiments, we demonstrate that vivid imagery is linked to greater use of metaphors and that this relationship is bi-directional. We also show that this relationship is stronger in the context of negative valence. We demonstrate that vivid imagery results in greater generation of metaphors (in particular, for negative concepts). In examining the reverse direction of influence, we show that in the negative (rather than positive) context, use of metaphors results in greater perceptions of vividness. We suggest that vividness can be signified and produced by using metaphors that play an important role in meaning making and communication.     

Beyond the Obvious: Chronic Vividness of Imagery and the Use of Information in Decision Making

The authors investigate two competing hypotheses about how chronic vividness of imagery interacts with the vividness and salience of information in decision making. Results from four studies, covering a variety of decision domains, indicate that chronic imagery vividness rarely amplifies the effects of vivid and salient information. Imagery vividness may, in fact, attenuate the effects of vivid and salient information. This is because, relative to nonvivid imagers, vivid imagers rely less on information that appears obvious and rely more on information that seems less obvious. This tendency is so robust that vividness of imagery may amplify the effects of vivid information only when this information is the only information available in the decision field. The findings seem to reflect vivid imagers' tendency to totally immerse themselves in a decision problem and scrutinize the available information creatively.     

Intuitions and introspections about imagery: the role of imagery experience in shaping an investigator's theoretical views

Early in a scientific debate, before much evidence has accumulated, why are some scientists inclined toward one position and other scientists toward the opposite position? We explore this issue with a focus on scientists' views of the ‘imagery debate’ that unfolded in Cognitive Science during the late 1970s and early 1980s. We examine the possibility that, during the early years of this debate, researchers' views were shaped by their own conscious experiences with imagery. Consistent with this suggestion, a survey of 150 psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists showed that those who experienced their own visual imagery as vivid and picture‐like recall being more sympathetic in 1980 to the view that, in general, images are picture‐like. Similarly, those who have vivid images and who regularly use their images in cognition were more inclined to believe that issues of image vividness deserve more research. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motor imagery vividness and symptom severity in Parkinson's disease

Motor imagery (MI), the mental simulation of movement in the absence of overt motor output, has demonstrated potential as a technique to support rehabilitation of movement in neurological conditions such as Parkinson's disease (PD). Existing evidence suggests that MI is largely preserved in PD, but previous studies have typically examined global measures of MI and have not considered the potential impact of individual differences in symptom presentation on MI. The present study investigated the influence of severity of overall motor symptoms, bradykinesia and tremor on MI vividness scores in 44 individuals with mild to moderate idiopathic PD. Linear mixed effects modelling revealed that imagery modality and the severity of left side bradykinesia significantly influenced MI vividness ratings. Consistent with previous findings, participants rated visual motor imagery (VMI) to be more vivid than kinesthetic motor imagery (KMI). Greater severity of left side bradykinesia (but not right side bradykinesia) predicted increased vividness of KMI, while tremor severity and overall motor symptom severity did not predict vividness of MI. The specificity of the effect of bradykinesia to the left side may reflect greater premorbid vividness for the dominant (right) side or increased attention to more effortful movements on the left side of the body resulting in more vivid motor imagery.     

Hallucinatory predisposition and vividness of auditory imagery: self-report and behavioral indices.

This study examined the relation between a subjective and a behavioral measure of the vividness of auditory imagery as well as the disposition towards hallucination in normal subjects. In addition to the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale, subjects (57 university students) completed the Betts questionnaire in which they rated the vividness of their experienced mental images and performed a behavioral task aimed at measuring auditory imagery. The task consisted of a perception and an imagery condition in which subjects had to indicate the odd one of three everyday sounds. Performance on the behavioral task did not correlate with the auditory or scores on the Visual subscale of the Betts. In addition, neither scores on the behavioral measure nor the Auditory subscale of the Betts correlated significantly with hallucinatory predisposition as rated on the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale. In contrast, the Visual subscale of the Betts did correlate with scores on the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale, consistent with previous research. We conclude that there is no straightforward relationship between imagery vividness and hallucinatory experiences and that subjective and objective indices of imagery vividness measure different aspects of mental function.     

A Mental Imagery Intervention to Increase Future Self‐Continuity and Reduce Procrastination

This research examined how mental imagery practice can increase future self‐continuity to reduce procrastination. A total of 193 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to a present‐focused meditation or to a future self‐focused mental imagery condition. Participants in both conditions were asked to listen to their respective audio recording twice per week for four consecutive weeks and to complete a pre‐intervention, half‐point, and post‐intervention questionnaire. At the four‐week mark, hierarchical regression analyses revealed that both future self‐continuity and empathic perspective taking were significantly higher for the mental imagery condition than the meditation condition. While vividness of future self moderated change in future self‐continuity, affective empathy for future self mediated the relation between vividness of future self and future self‐continuity. Lastly, only empathic perspective taking was a significant moderator of change in procrastination across time. The influence of empathy and future self‐continuity on procrastination is discussed.     

Measuring optimism bias among military personnel

High numbers of young military personnel die due to road traffic collisions (RTCs). Yet, there is a paucity of research related to the contributing factors (i.e., optimism bias and willingness to take risks) associated with RTCs and the examination of road safety education program tailored at reducing young military fatalities. In order to address this gap in the literature, we examined one specific road safety educational intervention tailored for the UK military personnel and investigated their attitudes towards the program, optimism bias and willingness to take risks. Measures evaluating their optimism bias, willingness to take risks and attitudes towards the program were asked after the participants attended the road safety interventions. The results revealed that young military personnel, aged 18–25, had higher optimism bias and willingness to take risks compared to older military personnel, and that this effect diminishes with age. The results provide importance evidence related to military personnel’s attitudes to risk-taking.     

Dying for romance: risk taking as purposive behavior

Many approaches have been utilized to understand adolescent risk taking. The current research frames risk taking as a purposive behavior enacted with a specific goal in mind. Rather than assuming adolescent risk taking to be the result of arrogance or perceived invulnerability, adolescent risk taking is interpreted as a means to an end. Stemming from a Tolmanian framework, an alternative explanation for adolescent risk taking is tested: adolescents are willing to take risks to the extent that the risk is associated with a needed outcome - the greater the need for the outcome, the greater the willingness to take risks. To test the proposed hypothesis, 192 participants completed a survey about their need for a romantic relationship and their willingness to endure harm to obtain a romantic relationship. Data were collected at two time points. A hierarchical regression revealed that need for romance is a significant predictor of willingness to endure harm for romance, even after gender and sensation seeking are statistically controlled. Moreover, need for romance at T1 was shown to be predictive of harm for romance at T2. Results are supportive of taking a purposive - that is, Tolmanian - approach, as a means for interpreting adolescent behavior.     

Prospective and positive mental imagery deficits in dysphoria

We know less about positive mental imagery than we do about negative mental imagery in depression. This study examined the relationship between depressed mood and the subjective experience of emotion in imagined events; specifically, prospective imagery, and imagery in response to emotionally ambiguous stimuli. One hundred and twenty-six undergraduates completed measures of depression, imagery vividness for future events, and a homograph interpretation task in which they generated images and subsequently rated image pleasantness and vividness. As predicted, compared to low dysphoria, high dysphoria was associated with poorer ability to vividly imagine positive (but not negative) future events. These findings were augmented by the observation that high dysphorics provided lower pleasantness ratings of images generated in response to homographs they interpreted as positive. We suggest that an imbalance in the inability to vividly imagine positive but not negative future events may curtail the ability of high dysphorics to be optimistic. High dysphoric individuals are further disadvantaged: even when they interpret ambiguity positively, the resulting images they generate are associated with less positive affect. Therapeutic strategies that address both such positive-specific imagery biases hold promise for depression treatment innovation.     

The functional equivalence of mental images and errors of movement.

Four experiments are reported demonstrating that mental images are functionally equivalent to physical errors of movement in producing changes in visual-motor coordination, at both central and peripheral levels of the visual-motor system. In the first experiment, subjects in one condition pointed at a target seen through laterally displacing prisms and were instructed to imagine pointing errors identical to those recorded previously for subjects in a separate condition who actually observed their pointing errors. Changes in pointing accuracy during adaptation procedures and visual-motor aftereffects following these procedures for subjects who imagined their errors were proportional to visual-motor shifts and aftereffects for subjects who observed their errors. In the second experiment, these same imagery instructions resulted in identical pointing shifts and aftereffects even in the case where prisms did not displace the target. The third experiment showed that when subjects believe that their mental images of pointing errors do not correspond to their actual pointing errors, pointing aftereffects result that are characteristic of the processing of error information at peripheral, but not central, levels of the visual motor system. The final experiment showed that when subjects do believe that their images of pointing errors correspond to actual pointing errors, but imagine the pointing movement itself in addition to their errors, pointing aftereffects result that are characteristic of the processing of error information at central, but not peripheral, levels of the visual-motor system. Contributions to visual-motor aftereffects from these two levels appear to be additive. Another significant result was that, in the imagery feedback conditions of each experiment, subjects who gave high ratings of vividness to their mental imagery showed the greatest magnitude of pointing aftereffects. These findings establish that mental images for errors of movement can produce stable visual-motor changes that cannot be accounted for simply by subjects' expectations regarding the actual consequences of their actions.     

The Role of Vividness of Visual Mental Imagery on Different Dimensions of Creativity

Although research demonstrated that people can mentally manipulate and synthesize visual elements into a creative object, the role that vividness of visual imagery plays on creative imagery is still unclear. This study explored the relationships between vividness of visual imagery and 3 dimensions of creative imagery: originality, practicality, and mental spatial transformations of visual elements. Fifty-three participants performed the creative mental synthesis task and completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ). Results revealed a positive relationship between vividness and the practicality dimension of objects. No relationship was found either between vividness and originality or between vividness and transformational complexity. The association vividness–practicality seems to reflect the ability to use pictorial information of imagery when people generate functional objects that belong to specific categories. Future research directions are discussed.     

Effects of eye movements on the rate of discovery and the vividness of visual images

Two studies investigated the effects of eye movements on the rate of discovery and the vividness of visual images. Eye movements were manipulated by having three conditions: (1) The Ss were instructed to make eye movements while generating images to noun pairs; (2) the Ss were instructed not to make eye movements, but to think about making eye movements while generating images to noun pairs; (3) the Ss were instructed not to make eye movements and not to think about making eye movements while generating images to noun pairs. In addition, the ease of generating images was manipulated by using noun pairs that differed in their image-evoking capacity; five of the noun pairs consisted of high imagery-evoking nouns and five consisted of low imagery-evoking nouns. The two experiments were similar, with the exception that a between-groups design was used in Experiment 1, whereas Experiment 2 employed a within-Ss design. The results of both experiments showed highly significant effects of noun-pair type on both the rate of discovery and the vividness of images, with the fastest and most vivid images occuring to the high-imagery noun pairs. The effects of the eye-movement conditions on the rate of discovery and the vividness of the images were not significant in either experiment, and these findings are discussed in terms of the relationship of ocular activity to imagery.