The influence of linguistic and cognitive factors on the time course of verb-based implicit causality

In three eye-tracking experiments the influence of the Dutch causal connective “want” (because) and the working memory capacity of readers on the usage of verb-based implicit causality was examined. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that although a causal connective is not required to activate implicit causality information during reading, effects of implicit causality surfaced more rapidly and were more pronounced when a connective was present in the discourse than when it was absent. In addition, Experiment 3 revealed that—in contrast to previous claims—the activation of implicit causality is not a resource-consuming mental operation. Moreover, readers with higher and lower working memory capacities behaved differently in a dual-task situation. Higher span readers were more likely to use implicit causality when they had all their working memory resources at their disposal. Lower span readers showed the opposite pattern as they were more likely to use the implicit causality cue in the case of an additional working memory load. The results emphasize that both linguistic and cognitive factors mediate the impact of implicit causality on text comprehension. The implications of these results are discussed in terms of the ongoing controversies in the literature—that is, the focusing-integration debate and the debates on the source of implicit causality.     

汉语动词的隐含因果性对代词加工的影响

本文用四个实验探讨了汉语句子理解中动词的隐含因果性特征对代词加工的影响。实验采用2×2被试内设计,方法为探测词法。结果表明,有些汉语动词的语义中存在着隐含因果性特征,它影响了主语和宾语的相对通达性。同时发现,汉语中的宾语引发动词的隐含因果性倾向比主语引发动词中更为明显。     

Temporal Binding,Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective “sense of agency.” However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause–effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.     

Multiple moral foundations predict responses to sacrificial dilemmas

Moral dilemmas, by definition, demand trade-offs between competing moral goods (e.g., causing one harm to prevent another). Although moral dilemmas have served as a methodological pillar for moral psychology, surprisingly little research has explored how individual differences in moral values influence responses to dilemmatic trade-offs. In a cross-sectional study (N = 307), we tested competing claims regarding the relationship between the endorsement of foundational moral values and responses to sacrificial dilemmas, in which one judges the moral acceptability of causing fatal harm to one person to save multiple others. Inconsistent with Moral Dyad Theory, our results did not support the prediction that Harm concerns would be the unequivocally most important predictor of sacrifice endorsement. Consistent with Moral Foundations Theory, however, multiple moral values are predictive of sacrifice judgments: Harm and Purity negatively predict, and Ingroup positively predicts, endorsement of harmful action in service of saving lives, with Harm and Purity explaining similar amounts of unique variance. The present study demonstrates the utility of pluralistic accounts of morality, even in moral situations in which harm is central.     

When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time—the so‐called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non‐causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQC_MqjxZQQ     

Mechanisms of moral disengagement and their differential use by right‐wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in support of war

Right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are associated with the approval of war as a political intervention [McFarland, 2005]. We examined whether the effects of RWA and SDO on war support are mediated by moral‐disengagement mechanisms [i.e., responsibility reduction, moral justification, minimizing consequences, and dehumanizing–blaming victims; Bandura, 1999] and whether the ideologies use the mechanisms differently. Our data were consistent with the possibility that minimizing consequences (Study 1) and moral justification (Study 2) mediate the effects of RWA and SDO on approval of war. Both ideologies were positively associated with all moral‐disengagement mechanism though more strongly so for RWA. Comparisons within ideologies suggest that RWA was most strongly associated with moral justification and SDO was most strongly associated with dehumanizing–blaming victims. We discuss implications and limitations. Aggr. Behav. 36:238–250, 2010. © 2010 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Moral kinematics: The role of physical factors in moral judgments

Harmful events often have a strong physical component??for instance, car accidents, plane crashes, fist fights, and military interventions. Yet there has been very little systematic work on the degree to which physical factors influence our moral judgments about harm. Since physical factors are related to our perception of causality, they should also influence our subsequent moral judgments. In three experiments, we tested this prediction, focusing in particular on the roles of motion and contact. In Experiment 1, we used abstract video stimuli and found that intervening on a harmful object was judged as being less bad than intervening directly on the victim, and that setting an object in motion was judged as being worse than redirecting an already moving object. Experiment 2 showed that participants were sensitive not only to the presence or absence of motion and contact, but also to the magnitudes and frequencies associated with these dimensions. Experiment 3 extended the findings from Experiment 1 to verbally presented moral dilemmas. These results suggest that domain-general processes play a larger role in moral cognition than is currently assumed.     

道德判断中心理状态和事件因果关系的作用:兼对道德判断双加工过程理论的检验

考察青少年儿童和成人在道德判断中利用心理状态和事件因果关系信息的差异,并验证道德判断双加工过程理论.以道德判断中“行为坏的”程度和“应担负的道德责任程度”作为判断问题类型,共有10～11岁和13～15岁的青少年儿童及大学生各120名,完成道德判断测试任务.结果表明在不同的道德判断问题类型下,事件中他人愿望和信念、因果关系信息的作用模式是不同的,支持道德判断双加工过程理论.10～11岁儿童和13～15岁青少年在判断行为坏的程度时,利用心理状态信息和因果关系信息与成人类似.在判断应担负的道德责任程度时,10～11岁儿童更注重行为结果,并且不能综合应用心理状态信息和事件的因果关系信息.13～15岁青少年的道德判断中心理状态信息和事件因果关系信息的作用与成人的情况类似,但在进行应担负的道德责任程度判断时,还不能融合信念与因果关系信息进行道德判断.研究结果为道德判断双加工过程理论提供了支持,而且表明从儿童青少年到成人,利用心理状态和因果关系信息进行道德判断存在不断发展和成熟的过程.     

Teleology and the intentions of supernatural agents

Teleological beliefs about the natural world often exist implicitly, and there is a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents. In the current study, participants judged a series of scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations of biological organisms and natural non-living objects, under speeded or un-speeded instructions. After controlling for belief in the existence of supernatural agents, rates of implicit (speeded) and explicit (un-speeded) teleological endorsement were moderated by the belief that supernatural agents intentionally interact with the world. Amongst non-religious individuals, rates of implicit endorsement were significantly higher than explicit endorsement, whereas for highly religious individuals the difference was non-significant. This interaction was driven predominantly by explanations of natural non-living objects. These results are consistent with an intention-based theory of teleology, and help to reconcile the finding of a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents, with the those of an enduring teleological bias.     

内隐和外显道德评价的比较研究——来自眼动的证据

为探索内隐道德直觉和外显道德推理在道德评价中的差异及其内在机制,此研究将道德图片内容限定在伤害/关心维度,同时考虑道德效价以及情绪唤醒度,利用眼动追踪技术,考察内隐和外显道德任务中,道德直觉和道德推理的眼动轨迹及其加工过程差异。眼动结果发现,外显和内隐任务中个体均对低唤醒道德图片的首次注视时间更短,对低唤醒不道德图片总注视时间更长; 内隐任务和外显任务早期自动化加工阶段的平均凝视时间无显著差异; 内隐任务中,对不道德图片比对道德图片晚期平均凝视时间更长,瞳孔直径在中晚期时显著增加。此研究结果提示无论是道德直觉过程还是道德推理过程都是意识和无意识之间的相互作用,但是道德直觉过程的加工可能存在时间上的滞后性。     

The Effect of Connectives on the Selection of Arguments: Implicit Consequentiality Bias for the Connective “but”

Recent studies about the implicit causality of inter-personal verbs showed a symmetric implicit consequentiality bias for psychological verbs. This symmetry is less clear for action verbs because the verbs assigning the implicit cause to the object argument (e.g. “Peter protected John because he was in danger.”) tend to assign the implicit consequence to the same argument (e.g. “Peter protected John so he was not hurt.”). We replicated this result by comparing continuations of inter-personal events followed by a causal connective “because” or a consequence connective “so”. Moreover, we found similar results when the consequence connective was replaced by a contrastive connective “but”. This result was confirmed in a second experiment where we measured the time required to imagine a consistent continuation for a fragment finishing with “but s/he ...”. The results were consistent with a contrastive connective introducing a denial of a consequence of the previous event. The results were consistent with a model suggesting that thematic roles and connectives can predict preferred co-reference relations.     

Index to Volume 119

This longitudinal study focused on the causal relationships between self-concept, locus of causality, and academic achievement. The subjects were 212 male and 213 female students at a prestigious secondary school in the central Philippines. Analysis of the panel data indicated that no single network of causal dominance may exist for males and females but did support Weiner's (1979) causal attribution theory in finding that locus of causality was causally predominant over self-concept.     

动词隐含因果关系在代词解决中的作用及时间进程

以大学生为被试,通过三个实验来探讨动词隐含因果关系在代词解决中的作用及其时间进程。结果表明,动词隐含因果关系在代词解决中具有重要作用,特别是偏向NP2的动词具有强烈的导向作用,这种作用在代词解决的过程中,并不是在遇到代词后立即产生,而是在整合的过程中生效。     

How long does it take to find a cause? An online investigation of implicit causality in sentence production

Some interpersonal verbs show an implicit causality bias in favour of their subject or their object. Such a bias is generally seen in offline continuation tasks where participants are required to finish a fragment containing the verb (e.g., Peter annoyed Jane because …). The implicit causality bias has been ascribed to the subject's focusing on the initiator of the event denoted by the verb. According to this “focusing theory” the implicit cause has a higher level of activation, at least after the connective “because” has been read. Recently, the focusing theory has been criticized by researchers who used a probe recognition or reading-time methodology. However no clear alternative has been proposed to explain the offline continuation data. In this paper, we report three experiments using an online continuation task, which showed that subjects took more time to imagine an ending when the fragment to be completed contained an anaphor that was incongruent with the verbal bias (e.g., Peter annoyed Jane because she …). This result suggests that the offline continuation data could reflect the cognitive effort associated with finding a predicate with an agent incongruent with the implicit causality bias of a verb. In the discussion, we suggest that this effort could be related to the number of constraints that an incongruent clause must satisfy to be consistent with the causal structure of the discourse.     

Emerging perception of causality in action-and-reaction sequences from 4 to 6 months of age: Is it domain-specific?

Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.     

Free to blame? Belief in free will is related to victim blaming

The more people believe in free will, the harsher their punishment of criminal offenders. A reason for this finding is that belief in free will leads individuals to perceive others as responsible for their behavior. While research supporting this notion has mainly focused on criminal offenders, the perspective of the victims has been neglected so far. We filled this gap and hypothesized that individuals’ belief in free will is positively correlated with victim blaming—the tendency to make victims responsible for their bad luck. In three studies, we found that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they blame victims. Study 3 revealed that belief in free will is correlated with victim blaming even when controlling for just world beliefs, religious worldviews, and political ideology. The results contribute to a more differentiated view of the role of free will beliefs and attributed intentions.     

Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality

Two experiments investigated Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects appears to evoke an immediate perception that the first motion caused the second, as in a collision. Launching was embedded in event sequences where a third event (a colour change of the second object) was established as a competing predictor of the second motion, in an attempt to see whether subjects' learning of alternative predictive relationships would influence their causal impressions of launch events. In Experiment 1 subjects saw launch events in which temporal contiguity at the point of impact was varied so that an impact was varied so that an impact itself did not reliably predict when the second object would move. Half of these scenes, however, contained a colour change of the second object which did reliably predict when it would move. In accordance with Michotte's theory, subjects' ratings of the degree of perceived causality were not affected by the colour change. In Experiment 2 subjects saw scenes that contained launch events with or without temporal contiguity and a colour change. These were interspersed with events in which a colour change alone did or did not precede the second motion. Thus, movement of the second object was either contingent on or independent of the impact. Subjects repeatedly (a) rated perceived causality in single launch events and (b) judged the necessity of collisions for movement in the overall set of events. These responses dissociated, in that ratings type (a) showed only a substantial contiguity effect, whereas judgements of type (b) showed both a contingency and a much smaller contiguity effect. These results appear to support a distinction between judged and perceived causality and are discussed with respect to Michotte's theory of direct causal perception.     

Ostracism drives group moralization and extreme group behavior

ABSTRACT

Sharing beliefs, particularly moral beliefs, is a way to establish social connections. We hypothesized that ostracism leads people who are high in the need to belong to adhere to the moral beliefs of an ingroup, and that moralizing the beliefs of one’s group increases the willingness to endorse extreme behavior on behalf of the group. Across two studies, participants were ostracized or included, rated the moral relevance of their group values, and indicated their endorsement of extreme behavior on behalf of the group. Across studies, ostracism increased group moralization in participants high in the need to belong. In Study 2, group moralization translated into endorsement of extreme behavior. Our findings suggest that morality serves a binding function that may be channeled into extreme behaviors. (120 words)     

Bullying and defending behavior: The role of explicit and implicit moral cognition

Research on bullying has highlighted the role of morality in explaining the different behavior of students during bullying episodes. However, the research has been limited to the analysis of explicit measures of moral characteristics and moral reasoning, whereas implicit measures have yet to be fully considered. To overcome this limitation, this study investigated the association between bullying and defending, on one hand, and both explicit (moral disengagement, self-importance of moral values) and implicit (immediate affect toward moral stimuli [IAMS]) moral components, on the other hand. Young adolescents (N = 279, mean age = 11 years, 9 months, 44.4% girls) completed a series of self-report scales and individually performed a computer task investigating the IAMS. Two hierarchical regressions (bootstrapping method) were performed. Results showed that moral disengagement was associated with bullying and defending behavior at high levels of IAMS, however not when IAMS was low. In contrast, self-importance of moral values was not significantly associated to the two behaviors when IAMS was high whereas both associations were significant at low levels of IAMS. These results significantly expand previous knowledge about the role of morality in bullying and defending behavior. In particular, they highlight the role of the interaction between explicit and implicit moral dimensions in predicting bullying and defending behaviors.