A bibliometric analysis of the recovered memory controversy in the 21st century

In the 1990s, repressed and recovered memories were at the heart of intense debates within the clinical field as well as in academia. Recent data suggest that this controversy has not yet been resolved in the clinical field. However, it is unclear to what extent repressed and recovered memories are studied in peer‐reviewed outcomes in the 21st century. The current article examined the volume of publications and citations regarding repressed and/or recovered memories during the years 2001–2018. Analysis of the 145 articles retrieved shows that these issues are still being investigated within the academic sphere. Proponents and opponents of repressed memories regularly published articles, and these were cited as often as articles published during the 1990s. These issues were also multidisciplinary (i.e., social/clinical/experimental psychology, psychiatry, and law) and often dealt with dissociation, child abuse, and/or false memory. The results are encouraging for furthering the research field and for the understanding of traumatic memory mechanisms.     

The impact of depression and PTSD symptom severity on trauma memory

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression frequently co-occur following a traumatic event. Differences in the processing of autobiographical memory have been observed in both disorders in the form of overgeneralised memories and negative intrusive memories. The current study examined how symptoms of PTSD and depression influence the phenomenological characteristics of trauma memories. Undergraduate students who had experienced a traumatic event (n?=?696) completed questionnaires online including measures of PTSD and depressive symptom severity. They rated their trauma memory on several phenomenological characteristics using the Memory Experiences Questionnaire [Sutin, A. R., &; Robins, R. W. (2007). Phenomenology of autobiographical memories: The memory experiences questionnaire. Memory.]. Moderated multiple regression was used to examine how PTSD and depressive symptom severity related to each phenomenological characteristic. Symptoms of PTSD and depression were related separately and uniquely to the phenomenological characteristics of the trauma memory. PTSD severity predicted trauma memories that were more negative, contained higher sensory detail, and were more vivid. In contrast, depressive symptom severity predicted trauma memories that were less accessible and less coherent. These findings suggest that depressive and PTSD symptomatology affect traumatic memory differently and support a distinction between these two disorders.     

Recovering memories of trauma: A view from the laboratory

The controversy over the validity of repressed and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been extraordinarily bitter. Yet data on cognitive functioning in people reporting repressed and recovered memories of trauma have been strikingly scarce. Recent laboratory studies have been designed to test hypotheses about cognitive mechanisms that ought to be operative if people can repress and recover memories of trauma or if they can form false memories of trauma. Contrary to clinical lore, these studies have shown that people reporting CSA histories are not characterized by a superior ability to forget trauma-related material. Other studies have shown that individuals reporting recovered memories of either CSA or abduction by space aliens are characterized by heightened proneness to form false memories in certain laboratory tasks. Although cognitive psychology methods cannot distinguish true memories from false ones, these methods can illuminate mechanisms for remembering and forgetting among people reporting histories of trauma.     

SCREEN MEMORIES: A NEGLECTED FREUDIAN DISCOVERY?

In 1899, Freud introduced the concept of screen memories. His insights were revolutionary: screen memories do not emerge into consciousness at the time of recall, he argued; they are formed at that time and, moreover, historical accuracy is not their prime concern. In this article, the author reviews two of Freud's screen memories, as well as two screen memories from a completed analysis of one of his own patients. He argues that, if screen memories are formed, a concept such as screen work must be invoked as the agent of their formation. While screen memories may theoretically be formed at any stage of life, adolescence may be a prime time for their formation.     

When Photographs Create False Memories

ABSTRACT— Photographs help people illustrate the stories of their lives and the significant stories of their society. However, photographs can do more than illustrate events; in this article, we show that photographs can distort memory for them. We describe the course of our "false-memory implantation" research, and review recent work showing that photographs can sometimes increase—while other times decrease—false memories. First, we discuss research showing that a doctored photo, showing subjects taking a completely fictitious hot-air-balloon ride, can cultivate false memories for that experience. We hypothesize that the photograph helps subjects to imagine details about the event that they later confuse with reality. Second, we show that although photographs are indeed powerful sources of influence on memory, they are not necessarily as powerful as narrative. In fact, in certain circumstances, photographs might constrain imagination. Third, we discuss research showing that true photographs can also cultivate false memories. Finally, we present recent work showing that photographs can create false memories for current events.     

Switching memory perspective

The perspective in which memories were spontaneously recalled, field (original perspective) or observer (see oneself in the memory), was examined for both recent and remote memories. Recent memories were dominated by field perspective whilst remote memories were dominated by observer perspective. Further, field memories contained reliably more episodic detail than observer memories. After a 1-week interval, the same memories were recalled again but with a switched memory perspective. Switching from an observer to a field perspective did not reliably increase the amount of episodic details in a memory. Switching from field to observer perspective did, however, reliably reduce the number of episodic details. These findings suggest that memories may be represented in long-term memory with a fixed perspective, either field or observer, which can be temporarily altered sometimes changing the nature of a memory, i.e. how much detail remains accessible.     

Using stressful films to analyze risk factors for PTSD in analogue experimental studies – which film works best?

Abstract

To understand mental disorders, analogue paradigms provide an indispensable contribution. In posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the stressful film paradigm is a frequently used analogue approach: Films depicting traumatic events are shown to non-clinical participants in order to elicit stress responses analogue to responses to traumatic events in real life. Previous studies used a large variety of films, which is problematic with regard to the comparability of results. The main goal of this study was to identify a film clip that (a) consistently provokes stress reactions and (b) provokes reactions that are as similar as possible to traumatic stress.

We randomly exposed 105 male and female participants to one of four stressful films, differing, e.g., in content and origin. Intrusive memories of the film, reported immediately after the film and during a diary phase of three days, as well as distress, heart rate, and several mood states were measured. A film clip depicting rape elicited the most consistent reactions that were characterized by a higher heart rate, more distress and more intrusive memories, compared to the other three clips. Intrusive memories across all films were especially related to an increase in heart rate and disgust in response to the film.     

“That one makes things small”: Experimentally induced spontaneous memories in 3.5-year-olds

We introduce a new method for examining spontaneous (unprompted) autobiographical memories in 3.5-year-old children, by inducing them in a laboratory setting. Thirty-eight 3.5-year-olds, who had previously participated in a study in our lab involving highly unique props, were brought back after a one-month delay to the same lab arranged as in the original study and with the same Experimenter present. While waiting for the Experimenter in front of the props, their spontaneous verbalizations about the previous unique experiment were recorded, scored, and compared to those of 29 naïve Controls of the same age. The children in the experimental group produced significantly more spontaneous verbalizations related to the to-be-remembered event measured on a variety of dimensions. The study introduces a promising new approach to investigating spontaneous memories in young children in a controlled lab setting. The findings are discussed in relation to involuntary autobiographical memories as examined in adults.     

Memory distortions: When suggestions cannot be easily ignored

In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FMs) after social feedback that denies their truth was assessed. Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3), participants were clearly told that some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FMs for actions are rather difficult to discard.     

Gender differences in emotional experiences across childhood,romantic relationship,and self-defining memories

The aim of the present study is to examine the gender differences in emotional experiences across three different types of autobiographical memory. A total of 612 undergraduate students from Izmir, Turkey, were asked to recall a memory either from childhood, from romantic relationships, or from self-defining experiences. A gender difference was found in the intensity of anxiety, sadness, and pride for romantic relationship memories. Men had higher scores on emotional distancing than women in self-defining memories. With regard to emotional valance, women’s feelings were less positive than men’s feelings when remembering childhood and romantic relationship experiences, whereas they were more positive than men’s feelings when remembering self-defining experiences. The findings support the notion that gender differences in emotional experiences during the autobiographical recollection of personal life events vary across different memory types.     

Nonbelieved memories in middle-aged and older people

Previous studies have reported that young participants typically date events that they remember, but no longer believe they experienced, to the period of childhood. The present study investigated whether participants aged between 40 and 79 years dated events related to relinquished memories to the period of childhood, as do younger people, or whether they dated such events to a period later in life. The study also compared believed and nonbelieved memories with respect to memory perspective (1st vs 3rd person perspective). Results indicated that the majority of middle-aged and older people dated nonbelieved memories to the period of childhood (median age = 8 years). No correlation was found between the participants’ current age and their age at the time the nonbelieved event occurred. In addition, results showed that believed memories were more likely to be retrieved from a 1st person perspective than were nonbelieved memories.     

Belief in memories may be relinquished as often for adulthood as for childhood events,but for different reasons

ABSTRACT

The age distribution of nonbelieved memories (NBMs) reported by young and older adults typically reflects a large proportion of events dated to childhood. The present study aimed to further investigate the age of origin of NBMs by using instructions that include an NBM related to adulthood. Participants aged from 40 to 80 years were asked to describe an NBM, to explain why they had stopped believing their memory, and to rate its phenomenal characteristics. Participants also described and rated an age-matched believed memory (BM). The results revealed a similar proportion of nonbelieved events experienced in childhood and adulthood, thus calling into question the hypothesis that NBMs are mainly related to childhood events. We also found that NBMs might emerge for different reasons depending on the time of events. Additional analyses indicated that, overall, the influence of temporal distance on the ratings of phenomenal characteristics was similar for BMs and NBMs.     

Thirty-five-month-old children have spontaneous memories despite change of context for retrieval

ABSTRACT

Many parents have experienced incidents in which their preschool child spontaneously (i.e., without prompting of any kind) recall a previously experienced event. Until recently, such spontaneous memories had only been examined in non-controlled settings (e.g., diary studies). Using a novel experimental paradigm, a previous study has shown that when young children are brought back to a highly distinct setting (same room, same experimenter, same furnishing), in which they previously experienced an interesting event (a Teddy or a Game event), spontaneous memories can be triggered. However, exactly which cues (or combination of cues) are effective for the children’s memory, remains unknown. Here, we used this novel paradigm to examine the possible impact of contextual cues at the time of retrieval. We manipulated whether the 35-month-old children returned to the same room (n?=?40) or to a different, but similarly furnished, room (n?=?40) after one week. The results revealed that although the children returning to a new room produced fewer spontaneous memories than the children returning to the same room, the difference was not significant. Interestingly, despite changing rooms, the children still produced spontaneous memories. Taken together the results may shed new light on the mechanisms underlying childhood amnesia.     

Age,memory type,and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: Findings from an Italian sample

The present research explored differences in phenomenology between two types of memories, a general self-defining memory and an earliest childhood memory. A sample of 76 Italian participants were selected and categorised into two age groups: 20–30 years and 31–40 years. The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) was administered, taking note of latency and duration times of the narratives. Consistent with the literature, the self-defining memory differed significantly from the earliest childhood memory in terms of phenomenology, with the recency of the memory associated with more intense phenomenological experience. The self-defining memory took longer to retrieve and narrate than the earliest childhood memory. Meaningful differences also emerged between the two age groups: Participants in their 30s rated their self-defining memory as more vivid, coherent, and accessible than participants in their 20s. According to latency findings, these differences suggest an expanded period of identity consolidation for younger adults. Further applications of the MEQ should be carried out to replicate these results with other samples of young adults.     

Manipulating the reported age in earliest memories

ABSTRACT

Previous work suggests that the estimated age in adults’ earliest autobiographical memories depends on age information implied by the experimental context [e.g., Kingo, O. S., Bohn, A., & Krøjgaard, P. (2013). Warm-up questions on early childhood memories affect the reported age of earliest memories in late adolescence. Memory, 21(2), 280–284. doi:10.1080/09658211.2012.729598] and that the age in decontextualised snippets of memory is younger than in more complete accounts (i.e., event memories [Bruce, D., Wilcox-O’Hearn, L. A., Robinson, J. A., Phillips-Grant, K., Francis, L., & Smith, M. C. (2005). Fragment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia. Memory & Cognition, 33(4), 567–576. doi:10.3758/BF03195324]). We examined the malleability of the estimated age in undergraduates’ earliest memories and its relation with memory quality. In Study 1 (n?=?141), vignettes referring to events happening at age 2 rendered earlier reported ages than examples referring to age 6. Exploratory analyses suggested that event memories were more sensitive to the age manipulation than memories representing a single, isolated scene (i.e., snapshots). In Study 2 (n?=?162), asking self-relevant and public-event knowledge questions about participants’ preschool years prior to retrieval yielded comparable average estimated ages. Both types of semantic knowledge questions rendered earlier memories than a no-age control task. Overall, the reported age in snapshots was younger than in event memories. However, age-differences between memory types across conditions were not statistically significant. Together, the results add to the growing literature indicating that the average age in earliest memories is not as fixed as previously thought.     

On the advantage of autobiographical memory pliability: implantation of positive self-defining memories reduces trait anxiety

This paper is devoted to the mechanism of the positive construction of autobiographical memory. Positive construction consists of the spontaneous transformation of memories in the direction of the subjective enhancement of self-competence in past activities to anticipate improvement over time. We speculated that trait anxiety may indicate a failure to exhibit this mechanism that results in a deficit of affirmative self-esteem. We hypothesised that the implantation of positive self-defining memories in anxiety-evoking domains would decrease trait anxiety. One hundred twenty adults recollected three negative self-defining memories. Then, half of the participants imagined episodes of desired behaviour that differed from the originally recollected ones either in discussion or in hypnosis. Thirty participants experienced a hypnotic state without any references to memories, and the rest formed the control group. Subjects from the “Memory Implantation in Hypnosis” group became unable to distinguish the originally reported memories from the imagined ones, exhibited decreased trait anxiety scores after a 4-month delay, and reported enhanced self-esteem. In contrast, the participants from the “Hypnosis with no reference to the past” group exhibited decreased scores at a short delay but later returned to their original scores. These findings highlight the power of cured episodic-like autobiographical memory for updating the self.     

Pictorial encoding effects and memory confusions in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm: Evidence for the activation of spontaneous imagery

The purpose of the experiments reported in this paper was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery and list-specific cues on pictorial encoding effects induced by the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task. After viewing pictures and words referring to thematically related materials, by way of a picture/word source-judgement task, participants were asked to remember the way in which these materials were presented. Participants reported “seeing” pictures of items that were presented as words, an effect predicted by the imaginal activation hypothesis in its suggestion that incidental images experienced during encoding will later be mistaken as memories for pictures. Whether participants made the same picture misattributions on related lures (or non-presented related items) depended on the way in which the lures’ respective thematic lists were experienced during encoding (Experiments 1 and 2), pointing to the effects of list-specific cues in picture/word judgements. These findings have intriguing implications for interpretations of picture-encoding effects induced by the DRM task. The findings also speak to the use of DRM false-memory rates when marshalling evidence against the use of imagery in applied settings.     

Michael Jackson,Bin Laden and I: Functions of positive and negative,public and private flashbulb memories

This study examined the perceived psychosocial functions of flashbulb memories: It compared positive and negative public flashbulb memories (positive: Bin Laden's death, negative: Michael Jackson's death) with private ones (positive: pregnancy, negative: death of a loved one). A sample of n = 389 young and n = 176 middle-aged adults answered canonical category questions used to identify flashbulb memories and rated the personal significance, the psychological temporal distance, and the functions of each memory (i.e., self-continuity, social-boding, directive functions). Hierarchical regressions showed that, in general, private memories were rated more functional than public memories. Positive and negative private memories were comparable in self-continuity and directionality, but the positive private memory more strongly served social functions. In line with the positivity bias in autobiographical memory, positive flashbulb memories felt psychologically closer than negative ones. Finally, middle-aged adults rated their memories as less functional regarding self-continuity and social-bonding than young adults. Results are discussed regarding the tripartite model of autobiographical memory functions.