THE RETURN OF THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY: A DIALOGUE ON HUMAN FLOURISHING

In response to the proposal justifying the morality of homosexual acts offered by Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, this paper seeks to make intelligible the reasoning used by the New Natural Law Theory and others that arrives at the opposite conclusion. This article proposes to explore the weaknesses in the arguments offered in justification. By proposing an expanded notion of human nature so as to include sexual orientation as one of the factors from which to draw moral norms, the authors have adopted the central proposition of the Old Natural Law Theory defended by Francisco Suarez and others, viz., that human nature as such was a fit source from which to draw moral norms. Thus the New Natural Law Theory, formulated by Germain Grisez to answer the charge of the naturalistic fallacy, has curiously found itself being refuted by a reformulation of the Old Natural Law Theory. This article seeks to show how the proportionalistic reasoning used by Salzman and Lawler leads inevitably to a revival of the naturalistic fallacy.     

A DEFENSE OF THE NECESSARY UNITY OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Some argue that split-brain cases undermine the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is necessarily unified. This paper defends the phenomenal unity thesis against Michael Tye's (2003 ) version of that argument. Two problems are identified. First, his argument relies on a questionable analysis of the split-brain data. Second, his analysis leads to the view that in experimental situations split-brain patients are not single subjects – a result that would render the analysis harmless to the phenomenal unity thesis.     

A REPLY TO JASPER HOLLEY'S DEFENSE OF THE G INDEX

Holley argues that the appearance of effects related to person means in the factor analysis of G indices is due to Levy's failure to adopt the procedure of 'double extending' the score matrix in Q analysis. Holley also points out that this same procedure has no effect upon the G indices. Therefore there is no argument and Levy's results and conclusions stand unaltered.     

A REPLY TO PHILIP LEVY-IN DEFENSE OF THE G INDEX

Levy's criticism that the use of the G index does not equate person means and variances in Q analysis is answered by pointing out that the matrices used in the illustrations supporting his argument are not based upon items which have been 'double-scored', a necessary requirement for the correct use of G in Q technique. His comments, therefore, are regarded as irrelevant.     

A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE

The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended‐mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. This type of view was defended, for example, by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. After drawing this distinction and clarifying the notions of causal influence and constitution, I defend the second weaker hypothesis with respect to procedural knowledge and knowledge of action and show why this sort of view supports what we might call a ‘situationist‐friendly virtue epistemology’.     

INTENTIONAL ACTION AND THE UNINTENTIONAL FALLACY

Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention‐based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility.