Is there still a “Jerusalem School?” Reflections on the state of Jewish historical scholarship in Israel

This essay examines the study of Jewish history in Israel at the juncture of two currents: the ongoing expansion of an international community of Jewish studies scholars and the waning interest in the field in Israel itself. Mindful of the latter trend, it is easy to adopt a declensionist narrative, according to which the “Jerusalem School,” with its monolithic and Palestinocentric view of the past, has run its course. And yet, that framing occludes a number of novel tendencies in Israel, arising in the present “post-post-Zionist” moment, that expand the contours of Jewish historical scholarship in productive ways. They include: the well-known and controversial work of the “New Historians;” the work of a succeeding generation of scholars who have brought new intellectual and methodological openness to the study of Zionism; the work of Israeli scholars who have introduced a new measure of reflexivity through careful examination of the history of Jewish historiography; and the work of Israeli scholars who have eschewed the once-regnant view of an “immanent causality” in Jewish history. In conclusion, the article suggests that kernels of these trends were present in the founding generation of scholars at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, though the current generation of scholars is both more critical toward the Zionist nationalist narrative and more global in its orientation.     

Superaddressee or Who Will Succeed a Mentor?

This philosophical essay is inspired by a four-year pedagogical relationship that continues in its altered form today. The main focus of this piece is the transformation of a mentor as an immediate addressee into mentor as a superaddressee, an influential third listener who oversees observable dialogues. I explore the mutual responsibilities of a student and a mentor in order to uncover the elements in the pedagogical chemistry responsible for the transformation of an addressee into a superaddressee. Confirmation (a perfect form of understanding) of a student’s intellectual and moral uniqueness, incarnation of a particular value deemed desirable by a student, and education of a student into the dialogic ways of being on his or her own are the necessary ingredients of the process of becoming a superaddressee. Initially a mentor engages in the pedagogy of understanding whose ideal outcome is confirmation of a student’s intellectual and moral makeup. After the dialogue is over, a mentor often moves into the domain of inner speech from where he or she continues to offer perfect understanding, especially in the absence of such understanding from an immediate addressee. Two types of superaddressees are identified and their relationship with the invoking consciousness is explored. I conclude that becoming a superaddressee is the most generous pedagogical contribution to a student’s future: a mentor thus makes his or her voice available to a student’s inner dialogue, often without receiving anything in return. Mikhail Bakhtin is highly influential in my writing. “Superaddressee” or “a third listener” is one of his coinages. The term is treated in “The Problem of the Text” as part of the collection “Speech genres and other late essays” (1986), alluded to in Voloshinov’s (1976) “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art” and expanded upon in Frank Farmer’s (2001) “Saying and Silence.”     

The Memory Evolutive Systems as a Model of Rosen’s Organisms – (Metabolic,Replication) Systems

Robert Rosen has proposed several characteristics to distinguish “simple” physical systems (or “mechanisms”) from “complex” systems, such as living systems, which he calls “organisms”. The Memory Evolutive Systems (MES) introduced by the authors in preceding papers are shown to provide a mathematical model, based on category theory, which satisfies his characteristics of organisms, in particular the merger of the Aristotelian causes. Moreover they identify the condition for the emergence of objects and systems of increasing complexity. As an application, the cognitive system of an animal is modeled by the “MES of cat-neurons” obtained by successive complexifications of his neural system, in which the emergence of higher order cognitive processes gives support to Mario Bunge’s “emergentist monism.” Dedicated to the memory of Robert Rosen who kindly accepted to come to Amiens while he was very ill.     

Executive Function and the Frontal Lobes: A Meta-Analytic Review

Currently, there is debate among scholars regarding how to operationalize and measure executive functions. These functions generally are referred to as “supervisory” cognitive processes because they involve higher level organization and execution of complex thoughts and behavior. Although conceptualizations vary regarding what mental processes actually constitute the “executive function” construct, there has been a historical linkage of these “higher-level” processes with the frontal lobes. In fact, many investigators have used the term “frontal functions” synonymously with “executive functions” despite evidence that contradicts this synonymous usage. The current review provides a critical analysis of lesion and neuroimaging studies using three popular executive function measures (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Phonemic Verbal Fluency, and Stroop Color Word Interference Test) in order to examine the validity of the executive function construct in terms of its relation to activation and damage to the frontal lobes. Empirical lesion data are examined via meta-analysis procedures along with formula derivatives. Results reveal mixed evidence that does not support a one-to-one relationship between executive functions and frontal lobe activity. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of construing the validity of these neuropsychological tests in anatomical, rather than cognitive and behavioral, terms.     

The growing complexity of international policy in intellectual property

Intellectual property has historically been a self-contained policy at the international level. With the introduction of the TRIPs Agreement in 1994 and developments since the conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement, the relationship between intellectual property policy and other areas of public policy has become much more complex and interactive. This shift reflects the centrality of intellectual property in the knowledge economy, the rapid development of enabling technologies, notably the Internet and biotechnology, and the advent of the networked society. The consequences of this shift are manifold and herald the increased sophistication and complexity that may be expected of intellectual property regimes in the knowledge economy. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Indigenous knowledge,emancipation and Alienation

Recently indigenous knowledge has received increasing academic (see, e.g., Warren et al., 1993; Brokensha et al., 1980; Gómez-Pompa and Kaus, 1992) and institutional (see World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987;Agenda 21, 1992) attention. The study, application, and recording of indigenous knowledge, viewed as indigenous technologies for living with natural environments, has become a field of great interest and promise to nonindigenous and indigenous people; the ways in which the present interest is expressed, however, could also become a source of disappointment for the latter. I begin by considering the meaning of the expression “indigenous knowledge.” Next, I examine whether indigenous knowledge is fundamentally different from scientific knowledge. Finally I discuss the potential for emancipation, but also for alienation, resulting from the current ways of focussing on indigenous knowledge. He has published on the conception “sustainable development,” on technological rationality andAgenda 21, and on the significance of aboriginal boulder structures, as well as on issues in the history of modern philosophy and philosophy of art. He is the Chair of the Canadian Society for the Study of European Ideas for which he is coordinating workshops on “Ideas of Nature and Land” and “Constructed Space” at its June 1995 Conference in Montreal.     

A Minor Philosophy

This article surveys the output of contemporary Italian philosophers and distinguishes three principal ways of approaching their intellectual endeavor: denial, the “evil-queen syndrome,” and compliance. Philosophers in a state of denial seem unaware of the loss in status that Italian philosophy as an academic discipline suffers in international forums. The evil-queen syndrome concerns the habit of compiling surveys of past philosophies, focusing on traditions of which one considers oneself the privileged inheritor. Compliance—in its commendable aspect—refers to the growing number of philosophers who participate in international debates, whose forums are for the most part Anglo-American peer-refereed journals. This article urges a less subservient intellectual attitude, capable of contributing new ideas and arguments to the international philosophical forum.     

Specifying the Neuropsychology of Affective Disorders: Clinical,Demographic and Neurobiological Factors

Neuropsychological research in patients with affective disorders shows heterogeneous results with regard to the severity and profile of cognitive impairments. In this paper we hypothesize that the investigation of clinical (subtypes, comorbidity, traumatization, personality, severity, diurnal swings, course, duration, age of onset, biased processing, rumination, motivation, experience of failure, sleep, suicidal tendencies, computer attitudes), demographic (age, education, gender) and neurobiological factors (structural and functional brain changes, glucocorticoids, medication, ECT) that are related to cognitive performance has specified the understanding of severity and profile of neuropsychological impairments. We reviewed the literature pertaining to clinical, demographic and neurobiological factors following Pubmed and PsychInfo databases using different combinations of general key-terms including “Affective Disorder,” “Depression,” “Mania,” “Neuropsychological,” “Neurobiological,” “Moderator,” and “Review” as well as more specific demographic, clinical and neurobiological search terms. Findings from the literature show that the consideration of these factors has improved knowledge about the severity of neuropsychological impairments in patients with affective disorders whereas the neuropsychological profile is still poorly understood. Despite limited understanding, however, the existent results provide promising suggestions for the development of treatment programs.     

Animal Minds,Cognitive Ethology,and Ethics

Our goal in this paper is to provide enough of an account of the origins of cognitive ethology and the controversy surrounding it to help ethicists to gauge for themselves how to balance skepticism and credulity about animal minds when communicating with scientists. We believe that ethicists’ arguments would benefit from better understanding of the historical roots of ongoing controversies. It is not appropriate to treat some widely reported results in animal cognition as if their interpretations are a matter of scientific consensus. It is especially important to understand why loose references to “cognitive ethology” by philosophers can signal ignorance of the field to scientists who are more deeply immersed in the relevant literature. Understanding the variety of approaches to cognitive phenomena in animals is essential if such capacities are to form the foundation of scientifically-informed ethical reasoning about animals.     

Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument from Direction of Fit

An important argument for the belief-desire thesis is based on the idea that an agent can be motivated to act only if her mental states include one which aims at changing the world, that is, one with a “world-to-mind”, or “telic”, direction of fit. Some cognitivists accept this claim, but argue that some beliefs, notably moral ones, have not only a “mind-to-world”, or “thetic”, direction of fit, but also a telic one. The paper first argues that this cognitivist reply is deficient, for only the “dominant” direction of fit of an attitude is responsible for its character and function. Further, it seems that the dominant direction of fit of an attitude is determined by its psychological mode, and so all beliefs seem to have a dominant thetic direction of fit, and to be motivationally inert. The main part of this paper, however, is devoted to explaining how it is that attitudes, like moral attitudes, can truly have two directions of fit in a way which enables them to be both cognitive and motivational. Reflection on the nature of beliefs suggests that the claim that the dominant direction of fit of an attitude is determined by its psychological mode should be qualified. The reasons beliefs provide draw their authority for the agent – their demanding nature – from the objects represented by these beliefs, and so, it is the beliefs’ content which determine their dominant direction of fit, as far as their role in practical reasoning is concerned. Thus, in the sense relevant to practical reasoning a belief with a normative content does have a dominant telic direction of fit. At the same time, in the sense relevant to its satisfaction conditions a moral belief has a dominant thetic direction of fit, which underlies its classification as a cognitive attitude. Cognitivists, then, can have it both ways.     

Knowledge claims and context: loose use

There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable strictness. “S knows p” is commonly used loosely to implicate “S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes.” A pragmatic account may use a range of semantics, even contextualist. I use an invariant semantics on which knowledge requires complete justification. This combination meets the Moorean constraint as well as any linguistic theory should, and meets the intuition constraint much better than contextualism. There is no need for ad hoc error theories. The variation in conditions of assertability and practical rationality is better explained by variably strict constraints. It will follow that “S knows p” is used loosely to implicate that the condition for asserting “p” and using it in practical reasoning are satisfied.     

Forethoughts from the editor

Conclusion  Perhaps the fundamental question involved in assessing research can best be summarized as follows: On the basis of what criteria must the long-term accountability of public funds allocated for research be measured, and who should determine these criteria? Should these criteria be based on the quality or the quantity of research produced; on the actual utilization of the research results; on the relevance of research to one or more aspects of “development”; or on the medium- or long-range “potential” impact of research results? Should these criteria be in accordance with “international” standards or reflect primarily national goals and objectives? In addition, there is the complex issue of knowledge integration, an understanding of which is a prerequisite for the generation of a “generic frame-work” designed to focus on the organization of communication between science and the social environment. Given that research and knowledge generation are becoming increasingly international in scope and impact, it is insufficient to merely contend that knowledge integration must occur through various forms of collaboration involving cross fertilization and interdisciplinary perspectives. This is already complicated at the national—let alone the international—level. Unfortunately, none of these issues have thus far been solved by the ever-expanding range of tools available for assessing research.     

Alexithymia,verbal intellectual deficit,and neurological dysfunction in relation to risk-taking behavior

This study explored relationships between alexithymia (measured through the Toronto Alexithymia Scale), probable neurological dysfunction (Stroop Color Word Test), and “Verbal” and “Abstraction” IQ scores (Hartford-Shipley Institute for Living Scale) in relation to risk-taking behavior. Subjects were “anti-social” risk-takers (criminal offenders undergoing court-related residential drug treatment), “adventurous” risktakers (college students who regularly engage in such sports as rock-climbing and spelunking), or “normals” (college students who were neither adventurous risk-takers nor criminal offenders). Principal findings reveal that clinically relevant alexithymia is observed among risk-takers of either anti-social or adventurous variety less frequently, but among “normals” more frequently, than chance would predict; that the “verbal deficit pattern” in intellectual functioning is observed more frequently among adventurous risk-takers, less frequently among “normals,” and no more frequently among anti-social risk-takers than chance would predict; and that probable neurological dysfunction is observed more frequently among anti-social risk-takers but less frequently among adventurous risk-takers or “normals” than chance would predict. Results support only in part the Pallone-Hennessy (1999) conceptual model of the genesis and correlates of risk-taking in respect of anti-social, but not in respect of adventurous risk-takers. This study was supported by grants from the Henry Rutgers Scholars Program, Rutgers College, and the Fund for Correctional Psychology, Center of Alcohol Studies. Deep gratitude is expressed to Eric Workowski, Charles Rouse, and Joni Lepore for their invaluable assistance.     

Scientific and lay communities: earning epistemic trust through knowledge sharing

Feminist philosophers of science have been prominent amongst social epistemologists who draw attention to communal aspects of knowing. As part of this work, I focus on the need to examine the relations between scientific communities and lay communities, particularly marginalized communities, for understanding the epistemic merit of scientific practices. I draw on Naomi Scheman’s argument (2001) that science earns epistemic merit by rationally grounding trust across social locations. Following this view, more turns out to be relevant to epistemic assessment than simply following the standards of “normal science”. On such an account, philosophers of science need to attend to the relations between scientific communities and various lay communities, especially marginalized communities, to understand how scientific practices can rationally ground trust and thus earn their status as “good ways of knowing”. Trust turns out to involve a wide set of expectations on behalf of lay communities. In this paper I focus on expectations of knowledge sharing, using examples of “knowledge-sharing whistleblowers” to illustrate how failures in knowledge sharing with lay communities can erode epistemic trust in scientific communities, particularly in the case of marginalized communities.     

A new discourse on Xunzi��s philosophy of language

Xunzi’s philosophy of language was mainly unfolded through the “discrimination of ming 名 (names) and shi 实 (realities)” and the “discrimination of yan 言 (words) and yi 意 (meanings).” Particularly, the “discrimination of names and realities” was centered on the propositions that “realities are realized when their names are heard” and that “names are given to point up realities,” including the view on the essence of language such as “names expect to indicate realities” and “conventions established by usage,” the view of development of language such as “coming form the former usage and being newly established,” and the view of functions of language such as “discriminating superiority and inferiority and differentiating identities and differences”; while the “discrimination of words and meanings” mainly contained two aspects: One was that words could completely represent meanings while it could not do so on the other hand, and the other was that the Dao should be grasped through “an unoccupied, concentrated and quiet mind.” Xunzi’s philosophy of language stressed both language’s value attribute and its cognitive attribute, and it is the greatest achievement of pre-Qin dynasty’s philosophy of language.     

Alexithymia, verbal intellectual deficit, and neurological dysfunction in relation to risk-taking behavior

This study explored relationships between alexithymia (measured through the Toronto Alexithymia Scale), probable neurological dysfunction (Stroop Color Word Test), and “Verbal” and “Abstraction” IQ scores (Hartford-Shipley Institute for Living Scale) in relation to risk-taking behavior. Subjects were “anti-social” risk-takers (criminal offenders undergoing court-related residential drug treatment), “adventurous” risktakers (college students who regularly engage in such sports as rock-climbing and spelunking), or “normals” (college students who were neither adventurous risk-takers nor criminal offenders). Principal findings reveal that clinically relevant alexithymia is observed among risk-takers of either anti-social or adventurous variety less frequently, but among “normals” more frequently, than chance would predict; that the “verbal deficit pattern” in intellectual functioning is observed more frequently among adventurous risk-takers, less frequently among “normals,” and no more frequently among anti-social risk-takers than chance would predict; and that probable neurological dysfunction is observed more frequently among anti-social risk-takers but less frequently among adventurous risk-takers or “normals” than chance would predict. Results support only in part the Pallone-Hennessy (1999) conceptual model of the genesis and correlates of risk-taking in respect of anti-social, but not in respect of adventurous risk-takers. This study was supported by grants from the Henry Rutgers Scholars Program, Rutgers College, and the Fund for Correctional Psychology, Center of Alcohol Studies. Deep gratitude is expressed to Eric Workowski, Charles Rouse, and Joni Lepore for their invaluable assistance.     

The Purpose and Neurobiology of Theory of Mind Functions

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to a cognitive process which allows an individual to “place him/herself” in the other person’s “mind,” so as to comprehend the latter’s cognitive and emotional status, so as to predict his/her behavior and emotional response to a particular situation. ToM is necessary for everyday interaction among individuals and accounts for such human traits as empathy, compassion, and deceit. It is also particularly important in the relationship between a healer and his or her client, as well as in the God–human relationship. Recent research in the area of neurosciences has identified a specific brain “system” responsible for ToM, as well as described how these functions may be affected in certain neuropsychiatric conditions. In this article, we discuss the definition and neurobiological substrate of ToM. In addition, we discuss the cognitive steps important to achieve an “accurate” theory of mind, its relevance to “self-knowledge,” and its limitations. We also review some of the data concerning abnormalities and “distortion” of ToM in neuropsychiatric disorders and aberrant human behavior.     

Fixing broken masculinity: Viagra asa technology for the production of gender and sexuality

In the twenty-first century, technology is not so easily divorced from the human body. Viagra, the blockbuster drug hailed as the “magic erection pill,” exemplifies the increasingly accepted technologically-enhanced body. After a history of medical experts applying technology to women’s bodies in times of weakness, male bodies are now deemed in need of treatment. As male bodies digress from “normal” (erect and penetrating) sexuality, techno-scientific advances promise to “fix” the problem, and thus the patriarchal “machine.” Thus, Viagra is both a material and cultural technology producing and reshaping gender and sexuality under the guise of techno-scientific progress. Drawing on my own ethnographic data, I explore the use and circulation of techno-scientific advancement and inevitability discourses and the ways in which masculinity and heterosexuality are reproduced, as well as contested, critiqued, and reshaped by those who prescribe, dispense, market, and/or use Viagra. Finally, I argue that Viagra is currently being understood and employed as a “tool” to avert or treat masculinity “in crisis” in the contemporary America. This research would not be possible without help from kind medical practitioners, consumers, and participants in the feminist writing group at UCSB.