Transfer of calibration in dynamic touch: What do perceivers learn when they learn about length of a wielded object?

Successfully performing everyday behaviours requires that perceptions and actions are properly calibrated to environmental properties. In three experiments, the authors tested whether calibration was specific to perception of a particular property of a wielded object from a particular grasp position on that object. The experiments investigate whether transfer of recalibration occurs across changes in grasp position (Experiment 1), object property (Experiment 2), and grasp position and object property (Experiment 3). The results suggest that a complete transfer of recalibration occurred in each case. Such results are consistent with recent research on dynamic touch and suggest that rather than recalibrating participants to one particular property of the wielded objects, feedback about a particular property served to recalibrate participants to the properties of the rod set as a whole.     

Transfer of calibration in dynamic touch: what do perceivers learn when they learn about length of a wielded object?

Successfully performing everyday behaviours requires that perceptions and actions are properly calibrated to environmental properties. In three experiments, the authors tested whether calibration was specific to perception of a particular property of a wielded object from a particular grasp position on that object. The experiments investigate whether transfer of recalibration occurs across changes in grasp position (Experiment 1), object property (Experiment 2), and grasp position and object property (Experiment 3). The results suggest that a complete transfer of recalibration occurred in each case. Such results are consistent with recent research on dynamic touch and suggest that rather than recalibrating participants to one particular property of the wielded objects, feedback about a particular property served to recalibrate participants to the properties of the rod set as a whole.     

What can behavior analysis learn from the aversives controversy?

The paper argues that behavior analysis may have contributed to the aversives controversy in a number of ways. The role that the field has played and the lessons that may be learned are discussed in the areas of research, training, and politics.     

What do our critical practices say about the nature of morality?

A prominent argument for moral realism notes that we are inclined to accept realism in science because scientific inquiry supports a robust set of critical practices—error, improvement, explanation, and the like. It then argues that because morality displays a comparable set of critical practices, a claim to moral realism is just as warranted as a claim to scientific realism. But the argument is only as strong as its central analogy—and here there is trouble. If the analogy between the critical practices of science and morality is loosely interpreted, the argument does not support moral realism—for paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion display the relevant critical practices just as well. So if the argument is to have force, the realist must say more about why the critical practices of morality are sufficiently like those of science to warrant realism. But this cannot be done—moral inquiry differs from scientific inquiry in too many important ways. So the analogy with the critical practices of science fails to vindicate moral realism. But there are further lessons: in looking closely at the critical practices of our moral discourse—and in comparing them to the critical practices of science and fashion—we gain insight into what is distinctive about morality objectivity and moral metaphysics.     

Categorization and action: What about object consistence?

Categorization studies have focused on the importance of a variety of perceptual properties (shape, size, weight). The present study explored whether the softness or hardness of an object might influence the way we categorize and consider category members. Of additional interest was whether information on consistence is automatically activated and whether it is modulated by the kind of task and of response modality. Three experiments demonstrated that information on consistence is automatically activated, and it helps us to distinguish between artefacts and natural objects. Interestingly, the results are in agreement with the simulation hypothesis; namely, when we consider artefacts, we simulate using them and information on their consistence is activated; this simulation is modulated by the task. The way we differently process artefacts and natural objects across the experiments confirms the simulation hypothesis and our sensitivity to the response modality.     

What drives the organization of object knowledge in the brain?

Various forms of category-specificity have been described at both the cognitive and neural levels, inviting the inference that different semantic domains are processed by distinct, dedicated mechanisms. In this paper, we argue for an extension of a domain-specific interpretation to these phenomena that is based on network-level analyses of functional coupling among brain regions. On this view, domain-specificity in one region of the brain emerges because of innate connectivity with a network of regions that also process information about that domain. Recent findings are reviewed that converge with this framework, and a new direction is outlined for understanding the neural principles that shape the organization of conceptual knowledge.     

What do we learn in psychoanalytic training?

Can one define the aims of psychoanalytic training that most analysts would agree upon? For more than a decade the EPF Working Party ‘End of Training Evaluation Project (ETEP)’ has worked on this issue. Summarizing results of this work the author describes a set of basic elements every developing analyst should have learned or internalized during his training. His assertion is that most analysts notwithstanding their theoretical orientation could agree upon these necessary requirements for a successful ending of psychoanalytic training. These elements are demonstrated in the ability to understand the emotional demand of a patient in every session and the often ensuing emotional storm, to appreciate and deeply understand the value of free association, to preserve a neutral stance, to think in terms of transference and countertransference, and to think conceptually about what is happening and what one is doing in the session.     

What can we learn about immediate memory from the development of children's free recall?

We ask the question: Which aspects of immediate memory performance improve with age? In two studies, we reexamine the widely held view that primary memory capacity estimates derived from children's immediate free recall are age invariant. This was done by assessing children's immediate free-recall accuracy while also measuring the order in which they elected to recall items (Experiment 1) and by encouraging children to begin free recall with items from towards the end of the presented list (Experiment 2). Across samples aged between 5 and 8 years we replicated the previously reported age-related changes in free-recall serial position functions when aggregated across all trials of the standard task, including an absence of age differences in the recency portion of this curve. However, we also show that this does not reflect the fact that primary memory capacity is constant across age. Instead, when we incorporate order of report information, clear age differences are evident in the recall of list-final items that are output at the start of a participant's response. In addition, the total amount that individuals recalled varied little across different types of free-recall tasks. These findings have clear implications for the use of immediate free recall as a means of providing potential indices of primary memory capacity and in the study of the development of immediate memory.     

What do patterns in empirical data tell us about the structure of the world?

This article discusses the relation between features of empirical data and structures in the world. I defend the following claims. Any empirical data set exhibits all possible patterns, each with a certain noise term. The magnitude and other properties of this noise term are irrelevant to the evidential status of a pattern: all patterns exhibited in empirical data constitute evidence of structures in the world. Furthermore, distinct patterns constitute evidence of distinct structures in the world. It follows that the world must be regarded as containing all possible structures. The remainder of the article is devoted to elucidating the meaning and implications of the latter claim.     

How do the internal details of the object contribute to recognition?

Object recognition becomes difficult when the main axis of the object is foreshortened. It has previously been reported that this so-called foreshortened disadvantage is larger when the silhouette of the object is presented than when the line drawing of the object is presented. The pronounced foreshortened disadvantage in silhouette recognition indicates that the internal details of the object, which are absent in the silhouette, provide useful information, particularly when the main axis is foreshortened. But the role of these internal details remains controversial. One account for the pronounced disadvantage is that the internal details contribute to the derivation of the main axis. The other account is that internal details provide the distinctive features that are directly matched to the object represented in memory. The aim in the present study was to determine which of these two explanations best accounts for the differential foreshortened disadvantage between line drawings and silhouettes. To reduce the uncertainty regarding the axis orientation, a 3-D arrow indicating the orientation of the main axis was presented as a cue before the object itself was presented. As a result, the difference in the foreshortened disadvantage between silhouettes and line drawings disappeared. This indicated that the pronounced foreshortened disadvantage for silhouettes was caused by a lack of axis information. In other words, the internal details provided the information necessary for axis derivation when the axis was foreshortened.     

What do eye movements reveal about the role of memory in visual search?

Horowitz and Wolfe (1998, 2003) have challenged the view that serial visual search involves memory processes that keep track of already inspected locations. The present study used a search paradigm similar to Horowitz and Wolfe's (1998), comparing a standard static search condition with a dynamic condition in which display elements changed locations randomly every 111 ms. In addition to measuring search reaction times, observers' eye movements were recorded. For target-present trials, the search rates were near-identical in the two search conditions, replicating Horowitz and Wolfe's findings. However, the number of fixations and saccade amplitude were larger in the static than in the dynamic condition, whereas fixation duration and the latency of the first saccade were longer in the dynamic condition. These results indicate that an active, memory-guided search strategy was adopted in the static condition, and a passive “sit-and-wait” strategy in the dynamic condition.     

What do category-specific semantic deficits tell us about the representation of lexical concepts?

A reassessment of category-specific semantic deficits in light of their contribution to a theory of the representation of lexical concepts is proposed. Two theories are examined: one, held by the majority of researchers in the field, claims that concepts are represented by sets of features; another, in contrast, claims that concepts are atomic representations. An analysis of category-specific semantic deficits in terms of inferential relations (of the meaning-postulates type) between atomic concepts is elaborated. It is argued that this theory can better account for the pattern of performance exhibited by patients with semantic deficits.     

What do eye movements reveal about the role of memory in visual search?

Horowitz and Wolfe (1998, 2003) have challenged the view that serial visual search involves memory processes that keep track of already inspected locations. The present study used a search paradigm similar to Horowitz and Wolfe's (1998), comparing a standard static search condition with a dynamic condition in which display elements changed locations randomly every 111 ms. In addition to measuring search reaction times, observers' eye movements were recorded. For target-present trials, the search rates were near-identical in the two search conditions, replicating Horowitz and Wolfe's findings. However, the number of fixations and saccade amplitude were larger in the static than in the dynamic condition, whereas fixation duration and the latency of the first saccade were longer in the dynamic condition. These results indicate that an active, memory-guided search strategy was adopted in the static condition, and a passive “sit-and-wait” strategy in the dynamic condition.     

What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?

Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick’s thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) but fill in the concrete details that would make them irrelevant. If we do this, we may see our feelings about the experience machine becoming less negative. Second, I argue that, even if our feelings about the experience machine do not perfectly track hedonistic reasons, there are various reasons to doubt the reliability of our anti-hedonistic intuitions. And finally, I argue that, since in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best serve hedonistic ends, hedonism may justify our taking these other things to be intrinsically valuable, thus again making the existence of our seemingly anti-hedonistic intuitions far from straightforward evidence for the falsity of hedonism.     

What do children learn about biology from factual information? A comparison of interventions to improve understanding of contagious illnesses

Background . Children have been shown to hold misconceptions about illness, and previous work has indicated that their knowledge can be improved through the use of interventions. Aims . This study aims to evaluate interventions based on the provision of factual information for improving understanding of contagious illness. Sample . The participants were 96 children from two age groups: 7 and 11 years. Methods . During the pre‐test, the children were asked about three contagious illnesses and one novel illness. There were three intervention conditions, differing in the level of factual information provided: explanations provided, no explanations provided and scientific factual style. The interventions were focused on contagious illnesses (cold, chickenpox). A post‐test was conducted 6 weeks later. Results . Results from the pre‐test show that the older children have more sophisticated understanding of illness than the younger children. Mean pre‐ to post‐test change was calculated and analyses revealed that there is greater pre‐ to post‐test change in the explanation and scientific fact conditions when compared with that in the no‐explanation condition. The improvements in knowledge generalized to other contagious illnesses, and the older children showed more improvements than the younger children. Conclusions . These findings add to the literature on children's understanding of contagious illnesses and contribute towards discussions on the best approach to health education.