What will Phil do next? : Spontaneously inferred traits influence predictions of behavior

Past research has shown that perceivers intentionally may make trait inferences about others and use this information to make predictions about these others' future behaviors. Other research has also shown that people can make trait inferences without intent—that is, spontaneously. However, one unexplored avenue is whether spontaneous trait inferences (STI), affect how perceivers predict others' will behavior. Three studies explored this issue. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that: (1) exposure to trait-implicative behaviors describing an actor influences subsequent behavior predictions made about the actor in a trait-consistent manner, and (2) predictions occurred regardless of behavior recall, implying that the behavior predictions were derived from prior trait inferences and not from behavior recall. Results from Study 3 bolstered this conclusion by showing that behavior predictions were similar regardless of whether subjects were explicitly instructed to make inferences or not, but that a manipulation known to interfere with inference generation (lie detection instructions) muted behavior predictions. Results from Study 3 also suggested that the prediction effects had both automatic and controlled components, and that reductions observed in the lie detection condition of Study 3 were caused by alterations in the automatic influence of trait knowledge to the behavior predictions. These results suggest that STI may be causal inferences about the actors' dispositions.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

When stereotypes get in the way: stereotypes obstruct stereotype-inconsistent trait inferences

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that people spontaneously make trait inferences while observing the behavior of others. The present article reports a series of 5 experiments that examined the influence of stereotypes on the spontaneous inference of traits. Results consistently showed weaker spontaneous trait inferences for stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information than for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-neutral information. Taken together, the current results suggest that specific spontaneous trait inferences become obstructed by inhibitory processes when behavior is inconsistent with an already activated stereotype. These findings are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance processes and recent models of attribution in social judgment.     

Spontaneous Goal Inference (SGI)

When people learn about or observe the behaviors of others, they tend to make implicit inferences from these behaviors (e.g., Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Such inferences are an essential part of a person's ability to understand his/her environment and to prepare appropriate behavior within that environment. In the present paper, we review the conditions under which people are more likely to make implicit goal inferences versus implicit trait inferences. The distinction between these two ways of understanding the behavior we observe has important consequences for how we make predictions about future behavior, set expectations for our interaction partners, and how we choose to behave. It can determine when we stereotype. However, until now, the literature has focused on trait inference as the dominant way perceivers make sense of their environment, with little discussion of inferences concerning a person's goals.     

When memory fails, intuition reigns: midazolam enhances implicit inference in humans

People often make logically sound decisions using explicit reasoning strategies, but sometimes it pays to rely on more implicit "gut-level" intuition. The transitive inference paradigm has been widely used as a test of explicit logical reasoning in animals and humans, but it can also be solved in a more implicit manner. Some researchers have argued that the hippocampus supports relational memories required for making logical inferences. Here we show that the benzodiazepene midazolam, which inactivates the hippocampus, causes profound explicit memory deficits in healthy participants, but enhances their ability in making implicit transitive inferences. These results are consistent with neurocomputational models of the basal ganglia-dopamine system that learn to make decisions through positive and negative reinforcement. We suggest that disengaging the hippocampal explicit memory system can be advantageous for this more implicit form of learning.     

儿童行为与心理水平的特质推理的发展

选取4岁组、5岁组、7岁组、10岁组、12岁组儿童和成人共192名(各年龄组32名, 男女各半)为被试, 采用个别测查法考察学前和小学儿童行为与心理水平的特质推理发展。结果表明: (1)4岁时儿童已能进行行为水平的特质推理, 5岁时才能进行心理水平的特质推理, 即使用特质引发规则进行特质推理, 10岁时两者均达到成人水平。(2)4岁、5岁时儿童心理水平的特质推理显著落后于行为水平的特质推理, 至少7岁时两者处于同一水平上。(3)儿童使用概念相似规则而不是情境匹配规则进行行为预测。(4)4岁儿童不使用简单效价规则进行行为预测, 5岁及以上儿童使用简单效价规则, 但他们是在区分同一特质范畴和不同特质范畴的基础上、在较低的确定程度上使用该规则。     

品牌态度强度与品牌态度可达性的关系性质

运用态度量表和反应时实验比较了品牌态度强度与品牌态度可达性的关系性质。研究发现,女性被试对保健品品牌要素的态度评价越肯定,态度通达和提取的时间就越快,两者之间形成有规律的函数关系;但在否定性态度条件下,没有出现类似的规律性;当要求被试把模糊性态度明确为肯定或否定态度时,67％的被试明确为否定态度,但所用时间显著慢于明确为肯定态度所用的时间     

基于候选人面孔的特质推理与投票决策

在竞选情境中, 基于政治候选人面孔的能力或热情特质推理可以预测选举结果。面孔吸引力、面孔成熟度、面部表情和面孔熟悉度等因素对基于面孔的特质推理预测竞选结果起着重要作用。近年来, 研究者已经由基于面孔预测结果的行为研究逐步扩展到神经机制的研究上, 采用fMRI技术发现当被试对候选人面孔做负性特质判断和投票时, 杏仁核、岛叶、腹前侧扣带回等脑区会被激活, 而获胜候选人的照片并不会引起脑区的激活。研究者从认知取向和进化适应角度解释了人们为什么会根据面孔中的特质推理进行预测。以往研究在实验材料、研究内容等方面仍有不足, 这也指明了未来的研究方向。     

Children's category‐based inferences affect classification

Children learn many new categories and make inferences about these categories. Much work has examined how children make inferences on the basis of category knowledge. However, inferences may also affect what is learned about a category. Four experiments examine whether category‐based inferences during category learning influence category knowledge and thereby affect later classifications for 5‐ to 7‐year‐olds. The children learned to classify pictures of new types of creatures on the basis of a salient feature (colour) and then answered a question that required them to make an inference on the basis of other features. At test, children classified pictures that included only some features (without colour). Experiment 1 showed that the features relevant to the inference during learning led to better classification than did features irrelevant to the inference. Experiment 2 replicated this finding even when the relevant features were physically close to the irrelevant features. Experiments 3 and 4 found this effect even when the classification was learned prior to the inference task and even when no mention was made of the categories during inference learning. Taken together, these results show that making inferences during category learning can influence category knowledge and suggest a need to integrate the work on category learning and category‐based inferences.     

Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers

Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector,” a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base rate of certain events occurring. Four-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference.     

The timeline of threat processing in repressors: more evidence for early vigilance and late avoidance

Evidence is mixed concerning whether individuals with a repressive coping style can actually selectively avoid threatening stimuli. Recent research (Calvo & Eysenck, 2000) on repressors’ threat processing suggests that it is necessary to take into account the timeline of this bias. A spontaneous trait inference paradigm was used here to test the hypothesis that repressors would, relative to others, be less likely to infer unfavorable and threatening traits. However, if pressured to make trait inferences quickly, it was predicted that they would be less likely than others to infer favorable and unthreatening traits. Repressors and nonrepressors were presented with passages that could have supported positive or negative trait inferences. In Study 1, they were asked to respond to trait words as quickly as possible but were not held accountable for doing so. In Study 2, time pressure was increased to capture uncorrected trait inferences. Results indicated that repressors were more likely to make positive trait inferences than others when simply asked to respond quickly. Under time pressure, this bias disappeared. Results point to the importance of taking into account an important moderator between coping style and threat, namely, the stage of processing at which differences in threat processing are being assessed.     

Stereotypes and the confirmability of trait concepts

Two studies tested the hypothesis that rules of trait inference may differ depending on trait stereotypicality and the social group membership of the target being judged. Specifically, traits that are stereotypic of a group were expected to instantiate lower evidentiary standards (require fewer behaviors to confirm), but only in members of that group. Study 1 focused on race and found that across 180 traits, trait stereotypicality was associated with fewer behaviors required to confirm and more to disconfirm in outgroup targets (in Black actors for White judges and in White actors for Black judges). Study 2 focused on gender and again found that stereotypic traits were tied to low evidentiary standards only when judging outgroup targets. The findings are discussed with reference to the literatures on trait inference, stereotyping, and shifting judgment standards.     

Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait inferences

We present four experiments in which participants were exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and goals. Results from a false recognition task with varying response deadlines revealed heightened activation of goal inferences already within a 350 ms response deadline. In contrast, trait inferences were made only when there was no response deadline, and when the behavior also implied a goal. These results indicate that spontaneous inferences on goals are often encoded more strongly in memory and are reactivated much more quickly in comparison with spontaneous trait inferences. Moreover, spontaneous trait inferences are often facilitated when an inference is first made on the goal of the behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent developmental and neuroscientific evidence on social inferences, and current theories on impression formation.     

Spontaneous trait inferences as self-generated primes: implications for conscious social judgment.

The priming literature has documented the influence of trait terms held outside of conscious awareness on later judgment relevant to the primed trait dimension. The present research demonstrated that spontaneous trait inferences can serve as self-generated primes. In Experiment 1, Ss instructed to memorize trait-implying sentences (thus spontaneously inferring traits outside of consciousness) showed assimilation effects in judgment. Ss instructed to form inferences from these sentences (thus consciously inferring traits) showed contrast effects. Experiment 2 demonstrated that these findings were due to semantic activation rather than to a general evaluative response. When evaluatively inconsistent trait constructs were primed, similar patterns of assimilation and contrast were found. Implications for the ubiquitous occurrence of priming through the process of social categorization are discussed.     

The effect of foregrounding on readers’ use of predictive inferences

This research extends previous attempts to determine whether subjects make predictive inferences during comprehension. For example, when subjects read a passage about someone falling out of a 14th-story window, do they infer that the person is dead? Previous research in which lexical decision, word naming, and recognition tasks have been used for detecting predictive inferences has had mixed results. In experiment 1, a word-stem completion task was used to test for predictive inferences. The word stems were formed from target inferences that followed either priming or control passages. The data revealed that predictive inferences are generated only about concepts that are foregrounded in the passages. In Experiments 2 and 3, lexical decision and naming were used to test for predictive inferences. The lexical decision data replicated the word-stem completion data. A control experiment ruled out a simple context-checking explanation for the lexical decision results. The naming data indicated that this tasks was not sensitive to elaborative inference generation. Theresults show that readers make predictive inferences, but do so selectively.