A GOD THAT COULD BE REAL IN THE NEW SCIENTIFIC UNIVERSE

We are living at the dawn of the first truly scientific picture of the universe‐as‐a‐whole, yet people are still dragging along prescientific ideas about God that cannot be true and are even meaningless (e.g., omniscience) in the universe we now know we live in. This makes it impossible to have a coherent big picture of the modern world that includes God. But we don't have to accept an impossible God or else no God. We can have a real God if we redefine God in light of knowledge no one ever had before. The key question is, “Could anything actually exist in the scientific universe that is worthy of the name, God?” My answer is yes: God is an “emergent phenomenon,” as real as the global economy or the government or the worldwide web, which are all emergent phenomena. But God arose from something deeper: the complex interactions of all humanity's aspirations. An emerging God has enormous implications.     

Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds

A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value‐bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value‐bearers he has already created. Given this, if God exists, our world—considered on the whole—is infinitely valuable. I further contend that this theistic picture makes our world's value unsurpassable. In support of this contention, I consider proposals for how infinitely valuable worlds might be improved upon, focusing on two main ways—adding value‐bearers and increasing the value in present value‐bearers. I argue that neither of these can improve our world. Depending on how each method is understood, either it would not improve our world, or our world is unsurpassable with respect to it. I conclude by considering the implications of my argument for the problem of evil more generally conceived.     

Brightness differences influence the evaluation of affective pictures

We explored the possibility of a general brightness bias: brighter pictures are evaluated more positively, while darker pictures are evaluated more negatively. In Study 1 we found that positive pictures are brighter than negative pictures in two affective picture databases (the IAPS and the GAPED). Study 2 revealed that because researchers select affective pictures on the extremity of their affective rating without controlling for brightness differences, pictures used in positive conditions of experiments were on average brighter than those used in negative conditions. Going beyond correlational support for our hypothesis, Studies 3 and 4 showed that brighter versions of neutral pictures were evaluated more positively than darker versions of the same picture. Study 5 revealed that people categorised positive words more quickly than negative words after a bright picture prime, and vice versa for negative pictures. Together, these studies provide strong support for the hypotheses that picture brightness influences evaluations.     

Enhanced recognition of memorable pictures in ultra-fast RSVP

Long-term recognition memory for some pictures is consistently better than for others (Isola, Xiao, Parikh, Torralba, & Oliva, IEEE Transaction on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence (PAMI), 36(7), 1469–1482, 2014). Here, we investigated whether pictures found to be memorable in a long-term memory test are also perceived more easily when presented in ultra-rapid RSVP. Participants viewed 6 pictures they had never seen before that were presented for 13 to 360 ms per picture in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) sequence. In half the trials, one of the pictures was a memorable or a nonmemorable picture and perception of this picture was probed by a visual recognition test at the end of the sequence. Recognition for pictures from the memorable set was higher than for those from the nonmemorable set, and this difference increased with increasing duration. Nonmemorable picture recognition was low initially, did not increase until 120 ms, and never caught up with memorable picture recognition performance. Thus, the long-term memorability of an image is associated with initial perceptibility: A picture that is hard to grasp quickly is hard to remember later.     

The fate of originally presented surface information following recall errors in sentence memory tasks

Pictures are remembered better than their names. This picture superiority effect in episodic memory has been attributed either to the greater sensory distinctiveness of pictures or to their greater conceptual distinctiveness. Weldon and Coyote (1996) tested the conceptual distinctiveness hypothesis by comparing how well pictures as opposed to words primed in two conceptual implicit memory tasks (category production and word association). They found no picture superiority in priming and concluded that the basis of the picture superiority effect must then be pictures' greater sensory distinctiveness. Using the same logic, we compared how well pictures as opposed to words primed in a perceptual implicit memory task (picture and word fragment identification). The sensory distinctiveness theory would predict that pictures should prime picture fragment identification better than words prime word fragment identification, a result we call the picture superiority in within-form priming. Across three experiments which manipulated the encoding task at study, only one showed picture superiority in within-form priming. In contrast, in all three experiments there was robust picture superiority in recall, and exposure to pictures and words at study and test produced independent effects in which both study and test exposure to pictures was more effective for recall than exposure to words. We consider how these results might be reconciled by differences in retrieval demands between recall and fragment identification.     

Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover from Kant?

Kant marks a watershed in the history of theology, after which the anxious questions, “Can we speak of God? How can we?” have continually haunted modern theologians, insisting on being addressed before any others. Feeling compelled not to say about God what they want to say without first establishing that they are justified or entitled in saying those things, theologians have experienced both frustration and anxiety. However, the widespread assumption that one must experience the Kantian agony in order to be a modern theologian is challenged. Wolterstorff contends that one can move beyond Kant by rejecting the mental representationalist picture required by the latter’s account of intuitions and concepts. Conceiving of our intuitions as ’inputs’ which are then mentally represented according to concepts, is not only unnecessary but misleading. Theologians are better off rejecting the assumption that awareness always represents input and adopting instead the view that perceptual awareness, for example, is not so much an input but an action – the actualization of one of our human powers. Such an alternate pathway (opened up by Thomas Reid) would allow modern theologians to appropriate Kant without being appropriated by Kant.     

The Power of God

Much contemporary analytic philosophy understands the power of God as belonging to the same logical space as the power of human beings: a power of efficient causation taken to the maximum limit. This anthropomorphic picture is often explicated in terms of God’s capacity to bring about any logically possible state of affairs, so-called omnipotence. D.Z. Phillips criticized this position in his last book, The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God. I defend Phillips’s argument against recent criticism by William Hasker, contending that the omnipotence thesis is either false or trivial. I trace the superficial plausibility of the thesis to a Cartesian understanding of personal agency, in the light of which God’s power over the whole material world is an inflated version of our more modest power over our own bodies: it is the power of immaterial souls to control material phenomena. This comparison is expressed to perfection in the work of Richard Swinburne, my main target. I argue that by making God a force among other possible forces, in-principle able to be resisted, however feebly, by contrary forces, this picture reduces the Creator to a creature.     

Episodic encoding and recognition of pictures and words: role of the human medial temporal lobes

In the present PET study, we examined brain activity related to processing of pictures and printed words in episodic memory. Our goal was to determine how the perceptual format of objects (verbal versus pictorial) is reflected in the neural organization of episodic memory for common objects. We investigated this issue in relation to encoding and recognition with a particular focus on medial temporal-lobe (MTL) structures. At encoding, participants saw pictures of objects or their written names and were asked to make semantic judgments. At recognition, participants made yes-no recognition judgments in four different conditions. In two conditions, target items were pictures of objects; these objects had originally been encoded either in picture or in word format. In two other conditions, target items were words; they also denoted objects originally encoded either as pictures or as words. Our data show that right MTL structures are differentially involved in picture processing during encoding and recognition. A posterior MTL region showed higher activation in response to the presentation of pictures than of words across all conditions. During encoding, this region may be involved in setting up a representation of the perceptual information that comprises the picture. At recognition, it may play a role in guiding retrieval processes based on the perceptual input, i.e. the retrieval cue. Another more anterior right MTL region was found to be differentially involved in recognition of objects that had been encoded as pictures, irrespective of whether the retrieval cue provided was pictorial or verbal in nature; this region may be involved in accessing stored pictorial representations. Our results suggest that left MTL structures contribute to picture processing only during encoding. Some regions in the left MTL showed an involvement in semantic encoding that was picture specific; others showed a task-specific involvement across pictures and words. Together, our results provide evidence that the involvement of some but not all MTL regions in episodic encoding and recognition is format specific.     

Frank Ebersole on Wittgenstein and Pictures in Philosophy

How do we get into trouble in philosophy, and what do pictures have to do with it? This article addresses Frank Ebersole's thoughts on (Wittgenstein's remarks on) pictures in philosophy. It identifies the puzzlement generated for Ebersole by what Wittgenstein says and also considers some puzzling aspects of Ebersole's own renderings of pictures. It distinguishes between the philosophical picture and the pictorial form in which it may be crystalized and shows how philosophy's reliance on situationally disembedded grammatical stories (pictorial or not) leads us into trouble. Accordingly, responding to such trouble consists not in recovering the picture, in the sense of a single “object” or image we had before our mind's eye, but in—what is better described as Ebersole's strategy of—supplying a grammatical example (pictorial or otherwise) to go with our thinking, an example that makes what we think and say clear to ourselves.     

疼痛面孔注意加工中共情的作用——来自眼动的证据

疼痛的威胁警示与趋近救助冲突近来受到研究者的关注。本研究结合点探测范式与眼动技术,以疼痛面孔和中性面孔为实验材料,探讨共情在疼痛功能冲突中所扮演的角色。我们收集了33名被试的有效眼动数据,结果发现,与中性面孔相比,被试对疼痛面孔图片的早期注意定向更快（首次注视到达时间更短）、晚期注意维持更长（注视次数更多、总注视持续时间更长）;与低共情组相比,高共情组被试对面孔的总注视持续时间更长,分组分析显示只有髙共情组对疼痛面孔的总注视持续时间比中性面孔长。结果表明,被试存在疼痛面孔注意偏向,被试的共情水平可能作为一个调节变量影响其在注意维持阶段对疼痛威胁的知觉。     

Perceiving pictures

I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures: the “visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation.” I argue for the following four claims: (a) the depicted scene is represented by ventral perception, (b) the depicted scene is not represented by dorsal perception, (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception, and (d) the picture surface is not necessarily represented by ventral perception.     

How much is an icon worth?

We report a new technique for assessing the amount of information extracted from the icon that follows a briefly presented picture. The problem of how to measure such information was formulated in terms of how much physical exposure of a picture an icon is worth. Consider two types of stimulus presentations, each with a base duration of d ms. The first is a d-ms picture followed by an icon, and the second is a d + a-ms picture not followed by an icon. How large does a have to be so that equivalent amounts of information are extracted in the two cases? To answer this question, we showed people pictures and later tested their memory for the pictures. We found that the physical exposure duration needed to reach a particular level of performance was approximately 100 ms longer when an icon was not permitted versus when the icon was permitted. This value was independent of the base duration and the luminance of the picture. Moreover, the same value was obtained using three different kinds of memory test and four different sets of pictures. We conclude that an icon is worth approximately 100 ms of additional physical exposure duration. A reasonable explanation for this robust equivalence between icon and stimulus is that the same encoding processes are responsible for extracting information from the icon and from the physical stimulus. Therefore, any variable that affects these encoding processes must affect extraction of information from the icon and the physical stimulus in an identical manner. This prediction was confirmed for one such variable, picture luminance.     

Conceptual masking: the effects of subsequent visual events on memory for pictures

Three experiments studied the effects of voluntary and involuntary focus of attention on recognition memory for pictures. Experiments 1 and 3 tested the conceptual-masking hypothesis, which holds that a visual event will automatically disrupt processing of a previously glimpsed picture if that event is new and meaningful. Memory for 112-ms pictures was tested under conditions where the to-be-ignored 1.5-s interstimulus interval contained a blank field; a repeating picture; a new picture; a new, nonsense picture; or a new, inverted picture each time. The blank field, repeating picture, and new, nonsense picture did not disrupt memory as much as a new, meaningful picture, supporting the conceptual-masking hypothesis. Experiment 2 studied voluntary attentional control of encoding by instructing subjects to focus attention on the brief pictures, all pictures, or the long pictures in a sequence. Recognition memory for pictures of both durations showed a striking ability of observers to process pictures selectively. The possible role of these effects in visual scanning are discussed.     

Can Models of God Compete?

Though the very task of modeling God implies that the reality of God is to some degree unknowable, there are a variety of positions one may take concerning the degree to which one has epistemic access to God. If our models of God are too influenced by subjectivity, it makes no sense to test them against each other in rational competition. In this essay, I define four possible positions that may underlie the task of God-modeling: mysteriosophy, theopoetics, critical realism, and fallibilism. Of these four, I propose that fallibilism is the most appropriate method for constructing models of God. Fallibilism simultaneously assumes that our models are able to refer to a divine reality, and yet always with a tentative stance, as absolute confirmation or universal consensus concerning them will almost certainly never be obtained. Models of God can engage in rational competition, but a final decision will probably be delayed indefinitely. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

How Can Pictures be Propositions?

Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of language holds that one fact can represent another, and that propositions are pictures of states of affairs. What makes a fact into a picture of a given s tate of affairs are the correlations between picture elements and objects and the correlations between relations among picture elements and relations among objects. But a problem sometimes raised is that propositions can't be pictures, as pictures—unlike propositions—do not say anything. An interpretation (e.g. Anscombe's) holds that the above-mentioned correlations do make the picture into a proposition. But this neither handles the objection, nor is it Wittgenstein's view. Further, Wittgenstein's own account faces serious difficulties in addressing these issues, and the Anscombe-type interpretation obscures this fact.     

‘The Mind as an Object of God's Knowledge’: Another Cartesian Temptation?

In this paper my aim is to consider the picture of God's immediate knowledge of the mind as this appears in Wittgenstein's work, where its soundness seems to be brought into question. My argument is that the response to this denial should take the form, not of an investigation of a theological position concerning God's knowledge (“can God look into the human mind?”), but of a negotiation of the difficulties affecting our use of this picture. A great part of the latter can be seen as difficulties in mastering the communicative relation between God and man which lies at the heart of the religious form of life, and which arises from the dislocation which familiar language‐games undergo within it.     

Differential outcomes facilitate same/different concept learning

Commonly recognized, the training procedure one employs often affects the results they obtain. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that abstract-concept learning is affected by employing a differential-outcomes procedure. The differential-outcome effect has been shown to occur for item-specific strategies but has not been established for relational strategies. To test whether different-outcome expectancies can facilitate a relational strategy, eight pigeons were trained and tested in a two-item same/different task with pictures. After pecking an upper picture, they pecked a lower picture if the pictures were the same or a white rectangle if the pictures were different. Two groups of pigeons were rewarded with either different outcomes (sounds and food amounts) or same outcomes. Both groups were trained to criterion with successively larger picture sets (8–1,024 items) and were transfer tested with novel pictures following each acquisition. With the smallest training sets, neither group showed any novel-stimulus transfer. But after acquiring the task with 32 pictures, the different-outcomes group responded more accurately to novel pictures than the same-outcome group. As the training set-size increased, both groups’ transfer performance converged and became equivalent to training performance. These results show for the first time that training with different outcomes facilitates abstract-concept learning.     

Reconsidering Concursus

How should we picture the relationship between God and creation? Traditional answers to this question, usually asked by the doctrine of providence (and more specifically the doctrine of concursus), tend to forfeit either God’s freedom or creaturely freedom. Yet this need not be the case, as the incarnation points towards an understanding of concursus that is not based primarily upon issues of freedom.     

Divine freedom and creaturely suffering in process theology: A critical appraisal

The suffering of creatures experienced throughout evolutionary history provides some conceptual difficulties for theists who maintain that God is an all-good loving creator who chose to employ the processes associated with evolution to bring about life on this planet. Some theists vexed by this and other problems posed by the interface between religion and science have turned to process theology which provides a picture of a God who is dependent upon creation and unable to unilaterally intervene in the affairs of the world and avert suffering. In the present paper I seek to critique process theism, focusing on divine action and the aforementioned problem posed by evolutionary suffering. I show that the promise of a more compelling account of a loving God who suffers with creation advanced by the process theist is illusory. Rather, the process God is less dynamic than promised. And on such an account the freedom of both God and the world are significantly more circumscribed than one may find in other forms of theism.     

Anticipating who will say what: The influence of speaker-specific memory associations on reference resolution

Some accounts of common ground assume that successful communication requires detailed consideration of others’ knowledge. In two studies, we provide evidence for an alternative account that views common ground as being mediated in part through domain-general memory mechanisms. On each trial, participants heard prerecorded instructions from one of two speakers indicating which of two displayed pictures to select. During an initial association phase, each speaker repeatedly referred to different sets of pictures. In Experiment 1, we contrasted a “between-speaker mapping” condition, in which each speaker referred to only one picture from critical item pairs (e.g., the cat drinking milk vs. the cat sitting up), and a “within-speaker mapping” condition, in which each speaker referred to both pictures within each pair, although item categories differed across speakers. On subsequent test trials, we recorded participants' eye fixations to critical displays that included both items from a category pair. Prior to the linguistic point of disambiguation, participants in the between-speaker mapping condition were more likely to fixate on the picture previously described by the current speaker, suggesting that knowledge associated with the speaker was prompting expectations for which picture would be the intended target. In Experiment 2, we used two prerecorded speakers of the same gender to strengthen the claim that the relevant implicit memory associations are speaker-specific. These results demonstrate how domain-general memory associations can be an important constraint upon language use.