Individual differences in the regulation of intergroup bias: the role of conflict monitoring and neural signals for control

Low-prejudice people vary considerably in their ability to regulate intergroup responses. The authors hypothesized that this variability arises from a neural mechanism for monitoring conflict between automatic race-biased tendencies and egalitarian intentions. In Study 1, they found that low-prejudice participants whose nonprejudiced responses are motivated by internal (but not external) factors exhibited better control on a stereotype-inhibition task than did participants motivated by a combination of internal and external factors. This difference was associated with greater conflict-monitoring activity, measured by event-related potentials, when responses required stereotype inhibition. Study 2 demonstrated that group differences were specific to response control in the domain of prejudice. Results indicate that conflict monitoring, a preconscious component of response control, accounts for variability in intergroup bias among low-prejudice participants.     

Stereotype activation and control of race bias: cognitive control of inhibition and its impairment by alcohol

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that alcohol increases race-biased responding via impairment of self-regulatory cognitive control. Participants consumed either a placebo or alcohol and then made speeded responses to stereotypic trait words presented after White and Black face primes while behavioral and event-related brain potential (ERP) data were recorded. Alcohol did not affect stereotype activation in either experiment. Experiment 2 showed that alcohol significantly impaired the ability to inhibit race-biased responses but did not reliably influence control of counterstereotypic responses. This disinhibition appears driven by impairment of regulative cognitive control, as indexed by amplitude of the negative slow wave ERP component. These findings suggest that controlling racial bias can be a function of effective implementation of basic self-regulatory processes in addition to the motivational processes identified in other research.     

Neural and behavioral effects of regulating emotional responses to errors during an implicit racial bias task

Affect regulation plays a key role in several theories of racial bias reduction. Here, we tested whether engaging in emotion regulation strategies while performing an implicit racial bias task (Weapons Identification Task; WIT) would alter neural and behavioral manifestations of bias. Participants either suppressed or reappraised in a positive light the distress associated with making errors during the WIT, while an electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. We hypothesized that engaging in emotion regulation strategies would reduce the distress associated with making errors indicative of bias, resulting in smaller error-related negativity (ERN) amplitude during errors and increased expression of racial bias. Results of within-subjects comparisons (Experiment 1) generally supported these predictions. However, when emotion regulation strategies were manipulated between subjects (Experiment 2) there was no effect of suppression or reappraisal on bias expression. Across both experiments, engaging in emotion regulation led to larger ERNs for errors occurring on Black- relative to White-primed trials. In addition, a number of significant order effects were observed, indicating important differences in the effects of engaging in emotion regulation strategies when those strategies are attempted in participants’ first versus second block of trials. No such order effects were evident when a second trial block was completed with no emotion regulation instructions. Findings are discussed in terms of the need for greater specificity in experimental tests of emotion regulation on error processing and cognitive performance.     

Individual differences in the activation and control of affective race bias as assessed by startle eyeblink response and self-report

The activation and control of affective race bias were measured using startle eyeblink responses (Study 1) and self-reports (Study 2) as White American participants viewed White and Black faces. Individual differences in levels of bias were predicted using E. A. Plant and P. G. Devine's (1998) Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice scales (IMS/EMS). Among high-IMS participants, those low in EMS exhibited less affective race bias in their blink responses than other participants. In contrast, both groups of high-IMS participants exhibited less affective race bias in self-reported responses compared with low-IMS participants. Results demonstrate individual differences in implicit affective race bias and suggest that controlled, belief-based processes are more effectively implemented in deliberative responses (e.g., self-reports).     

Information processing and aspects of visual attention in children with the DSM-III-R diagnosis “pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified” (PDDNOS): II. sustained attention

A group of 15 nonhyperactive children of normal intelligence with the DSM-III-R diagnosis “pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified” (PDDNOS) performed a sustained attention task. Adopting a cognitive-energetical linear stage model of human information processing, we investigated whether task performances deteriorated due to a diminishing level of arousal, activation, or by the active ‘effortful’ mode of information processing. In comparison to an age-matched group of normal children, the patients showed no sharper decrease in perceptual sensitivity (d'). D' is assumed to be a measure of arousal. However, the children with PDDNOS exhibited large fluctuations in their response bias beta (β), which is assumed to be a measure of activation. During the first part of the task, they shifted between under- and overestimating negative responses. In the latter part of the task this pattern altered to significantly overestimating the number of negative responses. This indicates that the patients were not able to appropriately tune to the task-inherent response probability. Moreover, as compared to the control children, the patients showed a significantly sharper decrease in hit rate with time on task, despite the fact that feedback was given on the errors. The findings are interpreted as an increasing loss of the ability to control the response bias due to difficulties in maintaining the voluntary effortful mode of processing information with prolonged time on task.     

Task switching: The effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.     

Task switching: the effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.     

Smarter than we think: when our brains detect that we are biased

Human reasoning is often biased by stereotypical intuitions. The nature of such bias is not clear. Some authors claim that people are mere heuristic thinkers and are not aware that cued stereotypes might be inappropriate. Other authors claim that people always detect the conflict between their stereotypical thinking and normative reasoning, but simply fail to inhibit stereotypical thinking. Hence, it is unclear whether heuristic bias should be attributed to a lack of conflict detection or a failure of inhibition. We introduce a neuroscientific approach that bears on this issue. Participants answered a classic decision-making problem (the "lawyer-engineer" problem) while the activation of brain regions believed to be involved in conflict detection (anterior cingulate) and response inhibition (lateral prefrontal cortex) was monitored. Results showed that although the inhibition area was specifically activated when stereotypical responses were avoided, the conflict-detection area was activated even when people reasoned stereotypically. The findings suggest that people detect their bias when they give intuitive responses.     

The regulation of explicit and implicit race bias: the role of motivations to respond without prejudice

Three studies examined the moderating role of motivations to respond without prejudice (e.g., internal and external) in expressions of explicit and implicit race bias. In all studies, participants reported their explicit attitudes toward Blacks. Implicit measures consisted of a sequential priming task (Study 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Studies 2 and 3). Study 3 used a cognitive busyness manipulation to preclude effects of controlled processing on implicit responses. In each study, explicit race bias was moderated by internal motivation to respond without prejudice, whereas implicit race bias was moderated by the interaction of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. Specifically, high internal, low external participants exhibited lower levels of implicit race bias than did all other participants. Implications for the development of effective self-regulation of race bias are discussed.     

Separable neural components in the processing of black and white faces

In a study of the neural components of automatic and controlled social evaluation, White participants viewed Black and White faces during event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging. When the faces were presented for 30 ms, activation in the amygdala-a brain region associated with emotion-was greater for Black than for White faces. When the faces were presented for 525 ms, this difference was significantly reduced, and regions of frontal cortex associated with control and regulation showed greater activation for Black than White faces. Furthermore, greater race bias on an indirect behavioral measure was correlated with greater difference in amygdala activation between Black and White faces, and frontal activity predicted a reduction in Black-White differences in amygdala activity from the 30-ms to the 525-ms condition. These results provide evidence for neural distinctions between automatic and more controlled processing of social groups, and suggest that controlled processes may modulate automatic evaluation.     

Monitoring and Control of Learning Own‐Race and Other‐Race Faces

The own‐race bias refers to the finding that individuals are better able to recognize faces of the same race or ethnicity compared with faces of another race or ethnicity. The current study examined whether the own‐race bias was also evident in participants' predictions of memory performance and their self‐regulation of learning. In three experiments, participants studied own‐race and other‐race faces and predicted the likelihood of recognizing each face on a future test. Experiment 1 showed that participants provided similar predictions for own‐race and other‐race faces, despite superior recognition of own‐race faces. Experiments 2 and 3 permitted participants to control their study of faces and revealed better self‐regulation of learning for own‐race relative to other‐race faces. Collectively, these experiments suggest that the own‐race bias may partially reflect a metacognitive deficiency, as participants are less able to effectively self‐regulate learning for other‐race faces. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross-task individual differences in error processing: Neural,electrophysiological, and genetic components

The error-related negativity (ERN) and error positivity (Pe) are electrophysiological markers of error processing thought to originate in the medial frontal cortex. Previous studies using probabilistic reinforcement showed that individuals who learn more from negative than from positive feedback (negative learners) had larger ERNs than did positive learners. These findings support the dopamine (DA) reinforcement-learning hypothesis of the ERN and associated computational models. However, it remains unclear (1) to what extent these effects generalize to tasks outside the restricted probabilistic reinforcement-learning domain and (2) whether there is a dopaminergic source of these effects. To address these issues, we tested subjects’ reinforcement-learning biases behaviorally and recorded EEG during an unrelated recognition memory experiment. Initial recognition responses were speeded, but the subjects were subsequently allowed to self-correct their responses. We found that negative learners, as assessed via probabilistic learning, had larger ERNs in the recognition memory task, suggestive of a common underlying enhanced error-processing mechanism. Negative learners also had enhanced Pes when selfcorrecting errors than did positive learners. Moreover, the ERN and Pe components contributed independently to negative learning. We also tested for a dopaminergic genetic basis of these ERP components. We analyzed the COMT val/met polymorphism, which has been linked to frontal DA levels. The COMT genotype affected Pe (but not ERN) magnitude; met/met homozygotes showed enhanced Pes to self-corrected errors, as compared with val carriers. These results are consistent with a role for the Pe and frontal monoamines in error awareness.     

Neurocognitive insights into substance abuse

Cognitive studies are revealing key aspects of how drug abusers monitor and respond to negative feedback differently from non-abusers, and in doing so are adding an important piece to the conceptual puzzle that must be solved to understand, treat, and prevent drug abuse. In this review, we bring together two quite different lines of research, one addressing the selection of gambles in a risky decision task, and the other focused on imaging neural systems related to the detection and processing of errors. We suggest that diminished behavioural control, which is a cardinal feature of drug abuse, may be linked to alterations in the psychological and neural mechanisms that detect error signals and which, in turn, lead to optimization of behavioural responses.     

低自尊个体对拒绝性信息的注意偏向

自尊是个体对自我的情感性评价, 影响着个体对周围环境的应对方式。低自尊个体由于容易知觉到外部的拒绝性信息, 也更倾向于将别人的行为知觉为拒绝, 因而存在对拒绝性信息的注意偏向。本文首先综述了低自尊个体的认知与行为特点, 其次简单介绍了低自尊个体注意偏向的常用研究范式(Stroop范式、点探测任务、空间线索任务、惊吓探测范式、注意监测任务、注意转移任务), 随后列举了解释低自尊个体注意偏向的理论(社会计量理论、关系图式理论、注意成分说、注意控制说), 最后总结了低自尊个体注意偏向的脑机制研究。未来的研究应更多关注自尊结构的复杂性, 注意偏向的信息加工阶段性及其脑机制, 注意训练的作用机制及低自尊个体注意偏向的本土研究等问题。     

Performance monitoring in a confusing world: error-related brain activity, judgments of response accuracy, and types of errors

The error-related negativity (ERN) represents a neural response, recorded from scalp electrodes, that is associated with monitoring activities. It is most likely generated in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Measures of the ERN, and of behavioral and perceived accuracy, were obtained from participants while they performed a visual 2-choice reaction time task under degraded stimulus conditions. Irrespective of behavioral accuracy, the amplitude of the ERN (measured at the time of the response) covaried with the perceived inaccuracy of the behavior (measured at the end of the trial). Errors due to premature responding (errors perceived as errors) were associated with large ERNs. Errors due to data limitations (errors about which there was uncertainty) were associated with smaller ERNs. These and other results are consistent with the proposal that performance monitoring, as manifested by the ERN, involves a comparison between representations of the appropriate response and the response actually made.     

Altering attentional control settings causes persistent biases of visual attention

Attentional control settings have an important role in guiding visual behaviour. Previous work within cognitive psychology has found that the deployment of general attentional control settings can be modulated by training. However, research has not yet established whether long-term modifications of one particular type of attentional control setting can be induced. To address this, we investigated persistent alterations to feature search mode, also known as an attentional bias, towards an arbitrary stimulus in healthy participants. Subjects were biased towards the colour green by an information sheet. Attentional bias was assessed using a change detection task. After an interval of either 1 or 2 weeks, participants were then retested on the same change detection task, tested on a different change detection task where colour was irrelevant, or were biased towards an alternative colour. One experiment included trials in which the distractor stimuli (but never the target stimuli) were green. The key finding was that green stimuli in the second task attracted attention, despite this impairing task performance. Furthermore, inducing a second attentional bias did not override the initial bias toward green objects. The attentional bias also persisted for at least two weeks. It is argued that this persistent attentional bias is mediated by a chronic change to participants’ attentional control settings, which is aided by long-term representations involving contextual cueing. We speculate that similar changes to attentional control settings and continuous cueing may relate to attentional biases observed in psychopathologies. Targeting these biases may be a productive approach to treatment.     

Validation of a novel cognitive bias task based on difference in quantity of reinforcement for assessing environmental enrichment

Cognitive bias tasks purport to assess affective states via responses to ambiguous stimuli. We hypothesized that a novel cognitive bias task based on positive reinforcement using quantity differences would detect changes in affect in captive grizzly bears (Ursus arctos horribilis). We trained bears (n = 8) to respond differently (nose or paw touch) to two stimuli (light or dark gray cue cards), with responses counterbalanced across bears. The two cues signaled a small or large food reward, respectively. Responses to ambiguous probe stimuli (i.e., shades of gray) intermediate to the trained stimuli were classified as either ‘optimistic,’ appropriate for the larger reward, or ‘pessimistic,’ appropriate for the smaller reward. In Experiment 1, we explored the contrast in reward size necessary to detect a change in response across probe stimuli (large reward, 3 or 6 apple slices: small reward, 1 slice). We observed a change in response across probe stimuli, with no difference in response between reward-value groups, indicating that a contrast of 3:1 apple slices was sufficient to affect responses. In Experiment 2, we investigated cognitive bias after 2.1 h of exposure to enrichment items varying in attractiveness. Results were unaffected by enrichment type or time spent interacting with enrichments, indicating that the task failed to demonstrate criterion validity for comparing mood following exposure to different enrichment items. However, greater time spent pacing prior to testing was associated with ‘optimistic’ judgments. The data provide some support for use of cognitive bias tasks based on quantity differences in animal welfare assessments involving captive wildlife.     

A computational model of fractionated conflict-control mechanisms in task-switching

A feature of human cognition is the ability to monitor and adjust one's own behavior under changing circumstances. A dynamic balance between controlled and rapid responding is needed to adapt to a fluctuating environment. We suggest that cognitive control may include, among other things, two distinct processes. Incongruent stimuli may drive top-down facilitation of task-relevant responses to bias performance toward exploitation vs. exploration. Task or response switches may generally slow responses to bias toward accuracy vs. speed and exploration vs. exploitation. Behavioral results from a task switching study demonstrate these two distinct processes as revealed by higher-order sequential effects. A computational model implements the two conflict-control mechanisms, which allow it to capture many complex and novel sequential effects. Lesion studies with the model demonstrate that the model is unable to capture these effects without the conflict-control loops and show how each monitoring component modulates cognitive control. The results suggest numerous testable predictions regarding the neural substrates of cognitive control.     

Effects of race on responses and response latencies in the weapon identification task: a test of six models

The authors consider six models of underlying process in the weapon identification task: The first two are response-time extensions of signal detection models; the last four, of the process dissociation model. Predictions for accuracy data, correct response latencies, and false response latencies are used to discriminate between models. In the present study, racial bias in responses and correct response latency was replicated. New findings were that the direction of bias was reversed in error latency and that errors were faster than correct responses. These findings rule out four models, in particular, the idea that race biases early perception and interpretation of targets. Implications for reducing errors in the weapon identification task and possibilities of discriminating between the remaining two models are discussed.     

Using facial muscular movements to understand young children's emotion regulation and concurrent neural activation

Individual differences in young children's frustration responses set the stage for myriad developmental outcomes and represent an area of intense empirical interest. Emotion regulation is hypothesized to comprise the interplay of complex behaviors, such as facial expressions, and activation of concurrent underlying neural systems. At present, however, the literature has mostly examined children's observed emotion regulation behaviors and assumed underlying brain activation through separate investigations, resulting in theoretical gaps in our understanding of how children regulate emotion in vivo. Our goal was to elucidate links between young children's emotion regulation‐related neural activation, facial muscular movements, and parent‐rated temperamental emotion regulation. Sixty‐five children (age 3–7) completed a frustration‐inducing computer task while lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) activation and concurrent facial expressions were recorded. Negative facial expressions with eye constriction were inversely associated with both parent‐rated temperamental emotion regulation and concurrent LPFC activation. Moreover, we found evidence that positive expressions with eye constriction during frustration may be associated with stronger LPFC activation. Results suggest a correspondence between facial expressions and LPFC activation that may explicate how children regulate emotion in real time.